That depends I think. For example accommodating Syrian nationalists would need to happen, to a degree at least at the cost of the Kurds and the Maronites. But these are the very people fighting on the French side at the moment. So would France be willing to sell them off?
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
- Start date
If throwing local allies under the bus had been the only obstacle to decolonisation, I can assure you it wouldn’t have dragged on into the 60s...
More to the point, iirc in Syria french strategies of encouraging « minorities » never gained as much traction as they hoped they would. OTL, the French progressively reconciled themselves with the idea of a united syrian nation, so TTL it’s imho also a question of « when » rather than « if ».
More to the point, iirc in Syria french strategies of encouraging « minorities » never gained as much traction as they hoped they would. OTL, the French progressively reconciled themselves with the idea of a united syrian nation, so TTL it’s imho also a question of « when » rather than « if ».
It depends on how long it drags on. The Cartel of Lefts collapsed in 1926, opening the way for the return of Poincaré, the same man who launched the occupation of the Ruhr: not exactly the man to take the Turks' meddling very calmly, rather someone who could resort to old gunboat diplomacy and blockade Turkey if need be (unlike Germany, there is noone to bother of importance to bother about or be able to do anything to help about the Turks, as the Soviets are still pariahs and the Italians quite alone).
The Great Syrian revolt in OTL dragged all the way into mid 1927. It should last at least as long TTL.
But as you said, Turkey wasn't in it OTL. If the French find out, that changes the situation a lot. That's not anymore a tribal rebellion, that's the attempt of a vanquished Central Power to come back; well, that's one way it could be construed by someone as Poincaré, who with Foch, judged Clemenceau hadn't gone far enough at Versailles.
In two words... "plausible deniability". If a handful of criminals are smuggling weapons in to Syria it is obviously not the fault of the sultan's government. Why if France and Britain were not limiting the size of the Turkish army, Turkey would be able to better control such banditry and fanatics. 😇
That said Poincare does not have any great reason to just sit idle if the Sivas government is playing with fire...
Indeed, that's a strong possibility. I was just pointing out at Poincaré's warhawk habits and his trouble at going along plausible denials, especially Germany's at "not being able to pay reparations" (even if it was true at some level). The Turks will have to tread on a tightrope with him here.
Well, he may also, short of sending warships, flood Kurdish rebels in Turkey with surplus arms from French army stores and let loose 'a few' Kurdish officers in French service north of the border; I can imagine Poincaré saying "we can be two playing at this game you see".
I'm not really convinced by this line of reasoning. For Poincaré, Germany was clearly the main ennemy; it was to curb Germany that he was ready to alienate his anglo-saxon allies and invest in the costly occupation of the Ruhr. That doesn't mean he'll throw men and ressources willy-nilly around the globe, quite the countrary - if he has to choose between continuing the occupation of the Ruhr and throwing some ballast overboard in Syria, he'll definitely opt for the later.
The French notoriously were (and are) prone to frame conflicts stemming from local politics into grand narratives. If A Line in the Sand is to be trusted to any extent, quite a few french players OTL were convinced that rather than the French empire vs Syrian nationalists, the Great revolt somehow was underpinned by a conflict of the french empire vs the british empire. Since they were capable of inventing an imaginary British support for the Druze OTL, I am certain some - at least the colonial officials - will figure out Turkish support for the rebels. I am fairly sure as well they will imagine it to be part of a wider scheme to undermine french presence in the Levant, with either the Brits or the Germans as masterminds (possibly the Soviets) and the Turks being "manipulated" the same way as the nationalists were supposed to be. Of course, reasonning on the basis of cognitive bias has limits, but from what I know of French (post)colonial policy making I am fairly certain of what I am proposing here.
So I believe that TTL colonial officials on the ground will be even more hellbent on crushing the "manipulated" nationalists, since the Turks have encouraged them in conjuring up their usual scarecrows. However, I believe Poincaré & the officials in the métropole will on the countrary see this renewed agitation as a dangerous weakness in the context of confrontation with Germany, even more than OTL. "Plausible deniability" is no match for the paranoïa of french colonial officials, but it might just about work in avoiding the French government itself taking direct countermeasures, if Poincaré decides that the military is taking too long in extinguishing this fire while he's confrounting Germany.
EDIT: writing this I had forgotten about the Rif war being slightly more serious than OTL as well. Poincaré might have prefered boots on the ground when dealing with Germany, but he's not the kind of fool who would escalate a war in Syria while another colonial war is raging and he has decided to confront the Germans. I'm really leaning towards a slightly more generous postwar settlement than OTL in Syria, although I would not be capable of precising its contents.
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At the point Poincaré returned (July 1926), the Ruhr crisis was pretty much a settled matter (August 1925, Dawes plan, then the Locarno treaties), so there was nothing to do there for him, and his most pressing concern on the home front was dealing with the financial crisis that has plagued the Cartel of Lefts (which ended with a massive, 80% devaluation of the franc).
And no Turkish help is going to make much difference in the Rif if the attack against French outposts still occur. French military forces in the region were simply too much powerful, and much better equipped to deal with the Rifian rebels than Spain was.
Overall, despite rivalries in the Middle East (probably more a last bout of the pre war rivalry than a standing policy or a driving state of mind since I can't think or remember of other events of this kind forming a pattern in the interwar period), the standing foreign policy in the interwar period from France (at least after the Ruhr crisis) was aligning with the British, and basically do nothing without their support. The only attempt at diverging from that policy was the attempt by Louis Barthou to resurrect the old Franco Russian alliance, but that ended with his assassination, and the subsequent treaty signed in 1935 by Laval was hollowed to the point of being an empty statement of intent, later convincing Stalin an agreement with Germany was preferable as the French stubbornly remained non committal. The French establishment, both political and military, torn between its anti communist instincts and its preference on the British alliance, didn't want to hear about such an alliance, and Barthou was the major driver behind it. After that, both during the remilitarization of Rhineland in 1936 and the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, the French largely followed the British line, unable or unwilling to go alone (in 1936, that was compounded by the cost of the mobilization announced being too high for the French economy, largely due to French command largely overestimating the German military forces involved, and the perspective oncoming elections, so the government was unwilling to proceed without open British support).
Obviously, that changed after WW2 as with the UK systematically aligning with the United States, and the United States being perceived as seeking to under French colonial power especially after the Suez crisis and during the war in Algeria (Felix Gaillard's government fell in 1958 precisely because he was perceived to have relented from bombing rebel bases in Tunisia under American pressure, opening the way for the return of de Gaulle), French policy returned to one of influence struggle and rivalry.
Back to Turkey, the geopolitical situation is quite different from OTL. Instead of a victorious Nationalist regime the French sought to accomodate, ultimately ceding them Alexandretta sanjak, we get a defeated country that has still the stain of massacres of Armenians (I don't remember reading precisely about, but I guess the massacre at Marash still happened as per OTL). Since Venizelos has stayed in power and that both British and French has proven more willing than they were IOTL to help them against Turkey, and later against Italy, it's logical the different geopolitical environment drives Paris away from appeasement of Turkey and towards a policy of distrust, and one both British and Americans won't bother about like they did with Germany (Turkey here would have had the disadvantage of not being a critical element of European peace and stability as was Germany, and be seen as a troublemaker, especially if its role in the Rif and Syria are uncovered).
Beside the matter of meddling into Syria, there is another side Poincaré might consider, just as Turkey looks to be getting closer to its former German ally and forging ties with Italy, seemingly innocent moves that nonetheless paint a geopolitical picture not encouraging moderation. France wouldn't be able to wage a full blown war at this point due to its financial problems, but it doesn't prevent Poincaré to compound Turkish meddling in Syria, the Rif, and their close ties with Germany and Italy, to decide acting more aggressively.
I can't wait to read how this aggressiveness, possibly retribution, translates into the TL. I don't expect a war, but things might definitely become more interesting than OTL.
And no Turkish help is going to make much difference in the Rif if the attack against French outposts still occur. French military forces in the region were simply too much powerful, and much better equipped to deal with the Rifian rebels than Spain was.
Overall, despite rivalries in the Middle East (probably more a last bout of the pre war rivalry than a standing policy or a driving state of mind since I can't think or remember of other events of this kind forming a pattern in the interwar period), the standing foreign policy in the interwar period from France (at least after the Ruhr crisis) was aligning with the British, and basically do nothing without their support. The only attempt at diverging from that policy was the attempt by Louis Barthou to resurrect the old Franco Russian alliance, but that ended with his assassination, and the subsequent treaty signed in 1935 by Laval was hollowed to the point of being an empty statement of intent, later convincing Stalin an agreement with Germany was preferable as the French stubbornly remained non committal. The French establishment, both political and military, torn between its anti communist instincts and its preference on the British alliance, didn't want to hear about such an alliance, and Barthou was the major driver behind it. After that, both during the remilitarization of Rhineland in 1936 and the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, the French largely followed the British line, unable or unwilling to go alone (in 1936, that was compounded by the cost of the mobilization announced being too high for the French economy, largely due to French command largely overestimating the German military forces involved, and the perspective oncoming elections, so the government was unwilling to proceed without open British support).
Obviously, that changed after WW2 as with the UK systematically aligning with the United States, and the United States being perceived as seeking to under French colonial power especially after the Suez crisis and during the war in Algeria (Felix Gaillard's government fell in 1958 precisely because he was perceived to have relented from bombing rebel bases in Tunisia under American pressure, opening the way for the return of de Gaulle), French policy returned to one of influence struggle and rivalry.
Back to Turkey, the geopolitical situation is quite different from OTL. Instead of a victorious Nationalist regime the French sought to accomodate, ultimately ceding them Alexandretta sanjak, we get a defeated country that has still the stain of massacres of Armenians (I don't remember reading precisely about, but I guess the massacre at Marash still happened as per OTL). Since Venizelos has stayed in power and that both British and French has proven more willing than they were IOTL to help them against Turkey, and later against Italy, it's logical the different geopolitical environment drives Paris away from appeasement of Turkey and towards a policy of distrust, and one both British and Americans won't bother about like they did with Germany (Turkey here would have had the disadvantage of not being a critical element of European peace and stability as was Germany, and be seen as a troublemaker, especially if its role in the Rif and Syria are uncovered).
Beside the matter of meddling into Syria, there is another side Poincaré might consider, just as Turkey looks to be getting closer to its former German ally and forging ties with Italy, seemingly innocent moves that nonetheless paint a geopolitical picture not encouraging moderation. France wouldn't be able to wage a full blown war at this point due to its financial problems, but it doesn't prevent Poincaré to compound Turkish meddling in Syria, the Rif, and their close ties with Germany and Italy, to decide acting more aggressively.
I can't wait to read how this aggressiveness, possibly retribution, translates into the TL. I don't expect a war, but things might definitely become more interesting than OTL.
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Part 31 Of bears and peacocks
Teheran, October 1925
Persia was officially proclaimed a republic and the Qajar monarchy abolished. It was the final act of a political campaign "spontaneously" initiated by supporters of Reza Khan Pahlavi in mid-1924. Reza Khan had not failed to take note of the Greek monarchist uprising and the proclamation of Greece into a republic in 1924. The first event had fuelled his paranoia, what happened in Greece potentially could happen in Persia as well with Qajar loyalists trying to overthrow him, a vote of no confidence initiated by Hasan Modarres in July 1924 helped drive the point in his mind. The second event had fuelled his ambition of becoming sole ruler of Persia. After all if a Cretan lawyer could overthrow kings and help destroy the Ottoman empire, surely Reza Khan, could do better. Opposition led by Modarres had failed to stop the push for a republic after Reza Khan, by now named Pahlavi, had managed to neutralize the opposition of the Shia clergy thanks to Pahlavi, negotiating with the British the return of the Najaf grand ayatollahs, exiled in Qom since 1920, to Iraq and a questionable incident in Teheran that had led to the death of the US acting consul Robert Imbrie but allowed Reja to show himself as a devout Shia. Reza Pahlavi was voted by the majiles the first president of Persia. The new president appointed Abdolhossein Teymurtash as his prime minister. It now remained to be seen whether Reza's ambitions would be satisfied with the presidency or he aimed for even more... [1]
Bursa, May 1926
The death of sultan Mehmed VI early in the month had been the cause of some concern, not only to the Turkish government but also the allied powers as for the first time it brought forth the prospect of handling the coronation of the new sultan. Kemal from Rome had sent "strong" advice that the coronation should not take place in Constantinople with Western troops still occupying the capital. Thus Bursa the first Ottoman capital was chosen instead and the 58 year old Abdulmejid II was proclaimed the 37th Ottoman sultan. As well as caliph, protector of the Islamic holy cities, commander of the faithful, khan and kayser-i-Rum, literally Caesar of the Romans. A cynic might have noted that the last title was worth about as much as Latin emperor of Constantinople in the eyes of the presumed subjects while the Islamic holy sites were under the control of the Saudis, who had completely conquered the Hashemite kingdom of Hejaz. Not taking seriously the hold to the title of the caliphate was of course an entirely different matter. Kemal might had preferred prince Osman Fuad, a personal friend of his with a notable war record as sultan but Abdulmejid even though likely more interested in his paintings than ruling the country still had no interest in leaving the throne. After all by now most power was risiding with the government and the Sivas assembly. Elections in 1924 had just confirmed the arrangements at the time of the armistice with Ahmet Tevfik Pasha by now in his eighties had been replaced as grand vizier by Salih Hulusi pasha, another supporter of the sultanate with strong connections to the Kemalists while the all important war ministries were under the outright control of the Kemalist Rauf Orbay and Kazim Karabekir [2].
Athens, July 1926
The Hellenic Electrical Railroads opened their first underground station, below Omonoia square in Athens. Further tunnelling was taking place to extend the subway from Omonoia square to Attikis square thus uniting the Piraeus-Athens electric railway with the Athens-Kifisia and Athens-Laurion railways, thus forming what was to become the main artery of a new metro system for Athens and Piraeus. [3] Till then commuters would have to walk the distance between Omonoia and Laurion squares, where the Kiffisia railway was ending. Plans called for gradually elecrifying the whole railway up to Kifissia and potentially extending the line from there to Tatoi, should the airport of Athens remain there. The technical chamber of Greece had already proposed the previus year a rather ambitius plan with no less than 5 metro lines covering Attica, but it was understood by everyone that this, if it happened would take several decades at a minimum. [4] In the meantime, the short term plans were much less ambitious, but rather more practical. A new station had been built in the new suburb of Kallithea between Athens and Piraeus. Kallithea had already grown to over 11,000 people but was still anything but contiguous with the two main cities with huge olive groves and vineyards separating it from them. [4]
Washington D.C., September 1926
Thanks to sir Basil Zaharoff's influence, Vickers had taken note of the Pedersen rifle since Pedersen had managed to sell his new cartridge to the Greek army, after all Vickers was building 125,000 Mannlicher-Filippidis rifles for the Greeks in Britain with even more being produced or converted by her Hephaestus subsidiary in Greece. In the meantime the Pedersen rifle had been tested with good results back in February and in May an order for 20 rifles for further testing had been made. Vickers representatives now offered Pedersen a contract for the licence production of his rifle in Britain, which Pedersen accepted.
Moscow, October 1926
The Soviet government increasingly feared invasion by the capitalists was imminent. In May marshal Pilsudski had taken over Poland. In the summer a number of countries, including Britain, had removed their ambassadors from Moscow, while propaganda by the capitalist press was deemed to be increasing, and the British elections in late 1924 had already revolved around fabricated claims of British interface. The last straw had been the visit of the British Mediterranean fleet and a Greek squadron to Constantinople back in August. Defensive measures to fight back against the coming invasion were ordered including reinforcing defences in the Black sea coast against a Little Entente naval attack. But more was needed. Stalin had initially entertained thoughts of a 40% cut in the planned Soviet 5-year naval plan that was to begin in 1928. But with the threat of imminent war and the threat posed from the Black sea now he had second thoughts. The building program should be completed in its entirety including the conversion of the unfinished hull of the battlecruiser Izmail to an aircraft carrier and the complete reconstruction of the battleship Frunze to a fast battleship making 27 knots. Further at least one dreadnought should be moved to the Black sea as soon as it became available, to match the Greek threat. It remained to be seen whether this was affordable and whether the Soviet Union had the technical ability to complete the ships... [6] More immediate steps could also be taken. After the short Kars conflict in 1921 relations with Turkey remained strained but it was recognized that Turkey could still be brought in the anti-imperialist forces if it was not dependent on Britain and France for weapons. Thus the sale of 76 heavy guns to Turkey was approved. The guns were a mix of new construction and existing stocks, 16 were 107mm long guns bought from Japan in 1914-18, as many were British 4.5in howitzers and the rest Russian 6in howitzers, but they were all reasonably modern and at about 5.6 million gold roubles including ammunition were far cheaper than anything Turkey could buy elsewhere. The Turks, already trying to rebuild their army, the treaty of Fontainebleau limited the size and equipment of the army but did not ban conscription after all, were of course all too happy to accept the deal. Along with an order for machine guns from Czechoslovakia the previous year it was the first serious arms purchase Turkey.
Athens, December 1926
The Greek supreme war council decided to choose the Czech ZB-26 light machine gun over the Hotchkiss M-1922 for the army. There had been some arguments that light machine guns were not really needed, as the army had about 4,000 Chauchat LMGs available. But it was recognized that the Chauchat while better than nothing was a highly problematic weapon. As a replacement the Czech weapon had proven relatively superior in trials besides it had also been chosen by the Greeks Romanian and Yugoslav allies while M-1922 had not been adopted by anyone so far.
[1] Not as well versed in modern Persian history as I'd like so most of this is based in "Iran a modern history" by Abbas Amanat. In OTL events in Iran were triggered by the proclamation of Turkey as a republic in October 1923, with Reza launching a campaign to make a country a republic, which failed in early 1924 to a degree again due to events in Turkey were Kemal had also abolished the caliphate in the meantime increasing the already existing fears of secularism. TTL even in Turkey should affect Iran. Post that Reza was ambitious in his own right and already had the example of Italy, so news from Greece merely provide the needed trigger to completely remove the Qajars if delayed. But by then the clergy is at least neutral...
[2] No break of either with Kemal so far...
[3] This is line 1 of the modern Athens metro.
[4] That's the Verdelis plan from OTL. All I can say is my fellow engineer was not thinking small...
[5] No refugees... so the ancient olive grove that covered most of the area between Athens and Piraeus is still around. Parts of it could even survive to the modern day TTL... maybe.
[6] The 1926-27 war scare is entirely historical, much like the early 1980s the Soviets feared they were about to be invaded... at the very time the people supposed to be about to invade them hadn't even noticed. And here it has an additional naval angle with the straits wide open from the Soviet point of view.
Persia was officially proclaimed a republic and the Qajar monarchy abolished. It was the final act of a political campaign "spontaneously" initiated by supporters of Reza Khan Pahlavi in mid-1924. Reza Khan had not failed to take note of the Greek monarchist uprising and the proclamation of Greece into a republic in 1924. The first event had fuelled his paranoia, what happened in Greece potentially could happen in Persia as well with Qajar loyalists trying to overthrow him, a vote of no confidence initiated by Hasan Modarres in July 1924 helped drive the point in his mind. The second event had fuelled his ambition of becoming sole ruler of Persia. After all if a Cretan lawyer could overthrow kings and help destroy the Ottoman empire, surely Reza Khan, could do better. Opposition led by Modarres had failed to stop the push for a republic after Reza Khan, by now named Pahlavi, had managed to neutralize the opposition of the Shia clergy thanks to Pahlavi, negotiating with the British the return of the Najaf grand ayatollahs, exiled in Qom since 1920, to Iraq and a questionable incident in Teheran that had led to the death of the US acting consul Robert Imbrie but allowed Reja to show himself as a devout Shia. Reza Pahlavi was voted by the majiles the first president of Persia. The new president appointed Abdolhossein Teymurtash as his prime minister. It now remained to be seen whether Reza's ambitions would be satisfied with the presidency or he aimed for even more... [1]
Bursa, May 1926
The death of sultan Mehmed VI early in the month had been the cause of some concern, not only to the Turkish government but also the allied powers as for the first time it brought forth the prospect of handling the coronation of the new sultan. Kemal from Rome had sent "strong" advice that the coronation should not take place in Constantinople with Western troops still occupying the capital. Thus Bursa the first Ottoman capital was chosen instead and the 58 year old Abdulmejid II was proclaimed the 37th Ottoman sultan. As well as caliph, protector of the Islamic holy cities, commander of the faithful, khan and kayser-i-Rum, literally Caesar of the Romans. A cynic might have noted that the last title was worth about as much as Latin emperor of Constantinople in the eyes of the presumed subjects while the Islamic holy sites were under the control of the Saudis, who had completely conquered the Hashemite kingdom of Hejaz. Not taking seriously the hold to the title of the caliphate was of course an entirely different matter. Kemal might had preferred prince Osman Fuad, a personal friend of his with a notable war record as sultan but Abdulmejid even though likely more interested in his paintings than ruling the country still had no interest in leaving the throne. After all by now most power was risiding with the government and the Sivas assembly. Elections in 1924 had just confirmed the arrangements at the time of the armistice with Ahmet Tevfik Pasha by now in his eighties had been replaced as grand vizier by Salih Hulusi pasha, another supporter of the sultanate with strong connections to the Kemalists while the all important war ministries were under the outright control of the Kemalist Rauf Orbay and Kazim Karabekir [2].
Athens, July 1926
The Hellenic Electrical Railroads opened their first underground station, below Omonoia square in Athens. Further tunnelling was taking place to extend the subway from Omonoia square to Attikis square thus uniting the Piraeus-Athens electric railway with the Athens-Kifisia and Athens-Laurion railways, thus forming what was to become the main artery of a new metro system for Athens and Piraeus. [3] Till then commuters would have to walk the distance between Omonoia and Laurion squares, where the Kiffisia railway was ending. Plans called for gradually elecrifying the whole railway up to Kifissia and potentially extending the line from there to Tatoi, should the airport of Athens remain there. The technical chamber of Greece had already proposed the previus year a rather ambitius plan with no less than 5 metro lines covering Attica, but it was understood by everyone that this, if it happened would take several decades at a minimum. [4] In the meantime, the short term plans were much less ambitious, but rather more practical. A new station had been built in the new suburb of Kallithea between Athens and Piraeus. Kallithea had already grown to over 11,000 people but was still anything but contiguous with the two main cities with huge olive groves and vineyards separating it from them. [4]
Washington D.C., September 1926
Thanks to sir Basil Zaharoff's influence, Vickers had taken note of the Pedersen rifle since Pedersen had managed to sell his new cartridge to the Greek army, after all Vickers was building 125,000 Mannlicher-Filippidis rifles for the Greeks in Britain with even more being produced or converted by her Hephaestus subsidiary in Greece. In the meantime the Pedersen rifle had been tested with good results back in February and in May an order for 20 rifles for further testing had been made. Vickers representatives now offered Pedersen a contract for the licence production of his rifle in Britain, which Pedersen accepted.
Moscow, October 1926
The Soviet government increasingly feared invasion by the capitalists was imminent. In May marshal Pilsudski had taken over Poland. In the summer a number of countries, including Britain, had removed their ambassadors from Moscow, while propaganda by the capitalist press was deemed to be increasing, and the British elections in late 1924 had already revolved around fabricated claims of British interface. The last straw had been the visit of the British Mediterranean fleet and a Greek squadron to Constantinople back in August. Defensive measures to fight back against the coming invasion were ordered including reinforcing defences in the Black sea coast against a Little Entente naval attack. But more was needed. Stalin had initially entertained thoughts of a 40% cut in the planned Soviet 5-year naval plan that was to begin in 1928. But with the threat of imminent war and the threat posed from the Black sea now he had second thoughts. The building program should be completed in its entirety including the conversion of the unfinished hull of the battlecruiser Izmail to an aircraft carrier and the complete reconstruction of the battleship Frunze to a fast battleship making 27 knots. Further at least one dreadnought should be moved to the Black sea as soon as it became available, to match the Greek threat. It remained to be seen whether this was affordable and whether the Soviet Union had the technical ability to complete the ships... [6] More immediate steps could also be taken. After the short Kars conflict in 1921 relations with Turkey remained strained but it was recognized that Turkey could still be brought in the anti-imperialist forces if it was not dependent on Britain and France for weapons. Thus the sale of 76 heavy guns to Turkey was approved. The guns were a mix of new construction and existing stocks, 16 were 107mm long guns bought from Japan in 1914-18, as many were British 4.5in howitzers and the rest Russian 6in howitzers, but they were all reasonably modern and at about 5.6 million gold roubles including ammunition were far cheaper than anything Turkey could buy elsewhere. The Turks, already trying to rebuild their army, the treaty of Fontainebleau limited the size and equipment of the army but did not ban conscription after all, were of course all too happy to accept the deal. Along with an order for machine guns from Czechoslovakia the previous year it was the first serious arms purchase Turkey.
Athens, December 1926
The Greek supreme war council decided to choose the Czech ZB-26 light machine gun over the Hotchkiss M-1922 for the army. There had been some arguments that light machine guns were not really needed, as the army had about 4,000 Chauchat LMGs available. But it was recognized that the Chauchat while better than nothing was a highly problematic weapon. As a replacement the Czech weapon had proven relatively superior in trials besides it had also been chosen by the Greeks Romanian and Yugoslav allies while M-1922 had not been adopted by anyone so far.
[1] Not as well versed in modern Persian history as I'd like so most of this is based in "Iran a modern history" by Abbas Amanat. In OTL events in Iran were triggered by the proclamation of Turkey as a republic in October 1923, with Reza launching a campaign to make a country a republic, which failed in early 1924 to a degree again due to events in Turkey were Kemal had also abolished the caliphate in the meantime increasing the already existing fears of secularism. TTL even in Turkey should affect Iran. Post that Reza was ambitious in his own right and already had the example of Italy, so news from Greece merely provide the needed trigger to completely remove the Qajars if delayed. But by then the clergy is at least neutral...
[2] No break of either with Kemal so far...
[3] This is line 1 of the modern Athens metro.
[4] That's the Verdelis plan from OTL. All I can say is my fellow engineer was not thinking small...
[5] No refugees... so the ancient olive grove that covered most of the area between Athens and Piraeus is still around. Parts of it could even survive to the modern day TTL... maybe.
[6] The 1926-27 war scare is entirely historical, much like the early 1980s the Soviets feared they were about to be invaded... at the very time the people supposed to be about to invade them hadn't even noticed. And here it has an additional naval angle with the straits wide open from the Soviet point of view.
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Interesting as always. What is the international response to the declaration of republic by Iran?
Not much I'd suspect. For Britain and the Soviet Union, which are the two powers that count I suppose that some in the Soviet Union might get a bit better disposed towards Persia for ideological reasons but that's likely about it...
Reza's carreer happened within the ranks of the Persian Cossack brigade, in proximity with Russian Whites, suppressing separatists and rebels, notably the Soviet republic of Gilan. It's far from inspiring trust from the Soviets or even Stalin, unlike with Kemal, and besides longstanding geopolitical interests by Russia, I don't see what these ideological reasons it might be. In fact, after the Gilan episode, I'd suspect Reza spends his time balancing between the British and the Italians, and on friendly terms with Turkey, but stay away from the Soviets like it's plague.
Actually not quite. The Soviets saw Reza's coup rise to power after 1921 as an improvement and took an active policy of selling arms to Persia at bargain prices in hopes of minimizing Persian dependence on Western powers, this actually continued after Reza became shah. To quote from David Stone's "Soviet Arms exports in the 1920s":
"Through the mid-1920s, if diplomatic reports are accurate, Soviet arms shipments to Iran continued in support of the Iranian government. British officials reported the arrival at Anzali on the Caspian Sea of 800,000 rifle cartridges in December 1924 and another 600,000 cartridges, along with four cartloads of rifles, in September 1925. One million rifle cartridges intended for Reza Khan’s campaign to assert Tehran’s authority over the province of Khuzestan (Arabistan in British sources), arrived in January 1925. Reza Khan’s elevation to shah at the end of 1925 did not affect the Soviet attitude towards Iran; the Politburo determined in the wake of Reza Khan’s deposition of Ahmad Shah Qajar that it would maintain friendly relations with the Iranian government and committed itself to non-interference with the political transition. "
and from the same:
"Though details are sketchy, Soviet arms sales to Iran continued over the ensuing years. In September 1929, for example, the Politburo approved a cash sale by the Soviet Main Military-Industrial Directorate of 4000–5000 bombs, provided that the Iranians agreed as well to purchase Soviet rifles, bullets and artillery. In August 1932, the Politburo also approved the sale to Iran of military aircraft, cavalry saddles and boots."
And from Abbas Amanat's "Iran a modern history":
"Reza Khan’s performance as a military commander and a political operator nevertheless earned grudging praise not only from the new British minister Percy Lorraine but also from the Soviet minister Theodore Rothstein, who after his arrival comfortably slipped into the role of a Russian diplomatic counterweight to the British minister. Both sides were impressed with Reza Khan’s discipline and resolve, as well as his detachment from everyday politics and his display of political astuteness. No longer did his
“peasant” and “humble” origins bother the class-conscious British diplomats who were accustomed to hobnobbing with refined members of Iranian nobility. The Soviet comrades, too, forgot that he had crushed the Jangal movement as soon as they discovered Reza Khan’s proletariat origins and later the redeeming qualities of the national bourgeoisie."
One of course should always keep in mind the limits of this. To quote again from Amanat:
"Even before the fall of the Jangal movement, Reza Khan had managed to establish friendly relations with the Soviet legation. Later, during the campaign for republicanism he even instructed some of his trusted military and civilian supporters to surreptitiously hoist a few red flags in the style of the Bolsheviks. Yet his anticommunist credentials were intact, and that is what mattered most for British interests at a time when there seemed to be no viable Russian party with whom the British could negotiate Iran’s status as a buffer state."
Good to learn, I didn't know of that. But then, that's more geopolitical than ideological, in the line of Russia's history of trying to expand its influence southwards, so that makes sense to me.
I'm curious, how is Dario Moreno in this TL? I just learned he grew up in Smyrna, and from the date of his birth, it looks his birth wouldn't be affected by the late july 1920 pod.
He was born in April 1921. So certainly gets born. Post that he is Jewish and the Jewish community of Smyrna is hardly affected by the war, if anything at large they should be quite a bit better off at the moment since there in great fire of Smyrna. That said he does grow up in a radically different place, he's Greek-Jewish TTL, music wise Smyrna is one of the centres of Greek rembetiko as well as the Smyrniot estudiana. I'm thinking of Rosa Eskenazy actually here...
Part 32 Of past and present rebels
Spanish Morocco, November 26th, 1926
The Rif revolt was in increasingly dire straits for the past several months under the inexorable pressure of French and Spanish troops. The Rif rebels had come close to throwing the Spanish to the sea after their victory in Annual in July 1921 and for a second time in late 1924 when the Rif army, reorganized with the help of Turkish volunteers had turned an attempt of the Spanish army to retreat from its outlying outposts to a near rout. Coupled with an increasingly war weary Spanish population it looked like Rif was close to actually winning its war against the Spanish. But then the Rifian forces had been provoked into attacking French outposts and after initial Rif success the French had reacted by bringing overwhelming force under marshal Petain which combined with renewed Spanish attacks. Abd El Krim on the run himself was now forced to surrender to the French, who arranged his exile to the island of Reunion from where he was not likely to be a threat ever again. With him the last vestiges of organized Rif resistance were gone but it would still take the Spanish till the summer of 1927 to destroy the last die hards that fought on.
Syria, June 1927
The French army had been forced to bring to Syria over 50,000 men to fight the Syrian revolt, besides greatly expanding recruitment within Syria itself. It had not been either cheap or popular at a time that France was also fighting a major war in the Rif and as always feared Germany. But when all was said and done France was a great power that could bring to bear forces far stronger than anything the Syrian rebels could muster, while its colonial empire allowed her to minimize casualties among metropolitan troops, not a small consideration after the bloodbath of the Great War. The rebels had still fought on an increasingly bloody and brutal war for nearly two year, helped to no small degree by the smuggling of arms and volunteers over the Turkish border before the revolt was finally crushed. By the end of it several things were far different than they had been at the start of the war. The French had been forced to increasingly rely upon the Kurds, Alawites, Circassians and Maronites that had remained loyal to them, over 20,000 had been recruited into the "Troupes Speciales du Levant", nearly half of them Alawi, the rest about evenly spread between Kurds and Maronites with a sprinkling of other nationalities. But this in turn had brought much increased tensions between all three groups and the predominantly Sunni population of Syria which in turn had brought increased sectarian violence as the rebel had targeted any and all supporters of France and their families and they in turn had reciprocated. In the Alawite state, where an Alawite majority was before the revolt mostly ruled by a minority of Sunni landlords, who for the most part supported the rebels, most of the Sunni minority being forced to flee while the land of Sunni landlords would had backed the revolt was redistributed among their share-croppers. Lebanon had also seen a notable though far less dramatic outflow of Sunnis. On the reverse in Damascus and Aleppo most of the handful of Alawis and a notable number of Christians had moved the other way round, although it should be noted that many of the most notable Syrian nationalists were Christians themselves. And perhaps most importantly the French High commissioner had committed to the Lebanese, Kurds and Alawis that their states would remain separate from the State of Syria that had been established in 1925. Whether the promise would be actually held remained to be seen...
Bhamdoun, Lebanon, July 1927
Several leading Kurdish nationalists along with members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation gathered in the town, ostensibly by accindent as it was on of Lebanon's main holiday resorts. The real reason was forming Xoybun a nationalist organization with the express aim of launching a Kurdish revolution in Turkey. Hopes were that the new uprising would fare better than the 1921 one, which had proved an abject failure with limited support, or for that matter an abortive attempt at revolt led by Sheikh Said back in 1925. Said still felt loyalty towards to sultan and that had proven the undoing of his movement as his attempts to contact the sultan had brought the attention of the Turkish government that had reacted fast and brutally with mass arrests and over 500 summary executions ordered by the "courts of independence" for people suspect of participating in the conspiracy. Xoybun would soon establish offices in Beirut, with the French government turning a blind eye on its activities and delegations established in several European capitals as well.
Mount Ararat, Turkey, September 10th, 1927
The Kurds rose up in revolt, pushing back elements of the Turkish third army that occupied the area and proclaiming a republic in the liberated area. Soon the rebel forces had reached about 8,000 men led by Ihsan Nuri a former Ottoman army officer. Xoybun was quick to openly support the revolt trying to secure French and British and appeal to the League of nations. The appeals failed but the French government also failed to take any action to suppress Xoybun activity in support of the revolt and arms and fighters crossing the border into Turkey. Claims that French support went beyond that with provision of arms and soldiers of the Troupes Speciales, given leaves with no questions asked to join the rebels remained unsubstantiated.
Constantinople, League of Nations, December 25th, 1927
The night was cold. But the roads leading to Hagia Sophia were full of Christians, mostly Greeks but with a fair number of worshippers from other nations. Today was after all one of the few days every year that Hagia Sophia was a church. Mustafa Kemal and the handful of his bodyguards, well clad in modern European clothes hardly felt the cold as he mixed in the crowd. Perhaps the bottle of raki he had finished earlier helped there. Either way he hardly cared. What he cared about was having a look at the results of his handiwork, or rather his failure first-hand now that he was back in Constantinople, one always should know the enemy. And six years of self-exile in Germany and Italy were enough. His lieutenants had handled things well enough but it was high time he took back the reins directly. The question was how and when...
The Rif revolt was in increasingly dire straits for the past several months under the inexorable pressure of French and Spanish troops. The Rif rebels had come close to throwing the Spanish to the sea after their victory in Annual in July 1921 and for a second time in late 1924 when the Rif army, reorganized with the help of Turkish volunteers had turned an attempt of the Spanish army to retreat from its outlying outposts to a near rout. Coupled with an increasingly war weary Spanish population it looked like Rif was close to actually winning its war against the Spanish. But then the Rifian forces had been provoked into attacking French outposts and after initial Rif success the French had reacted by bringing overwhelming force under marshal Petain which combined with renewed Spanish attacks. Abd El Krim on the run himself was now forced to surrender to the French, who arranged his exile to the island of Reunion from where he was not likely to be a threat ever again. With him the last vestiges of organized Rif resistance were gone but it would still take the Spanish till the summer of 1927 to destroy the last die hards that fought on.
Syria, June 1927
The French army had been forced to bring to Syria over 50,000 men to fight the Syrian revolt, besides greatly expanding recruitment within Syria itself. It had not been either cheap or popular at a time that France was also fighting a major war in the Rif and as always feared Germany. But when all was said and done France was a great power that could bring to bear forces far stronger than anything the Syrian rebels could muster, while its colonial empire allowed her to minimize casualties among metropolitan troops, not a small consideration after the bloodbath of the Great War. The rebels had still fought on an increasingly bloody and brutal war for nearly two year, helped to no small degree by the smuggling of arms and volunteers over the Turkish border before the revolt was finally crushed. By the end of it several things were far different than they had been at the start of the war. The French had been forced to increasingly rely upon the Kurds, Alawites, Circassians and Maronites that had remained loyal to them, over 20,000 had been recruited into the "Troupes Speciales du Levant", nearly half of them Alawi, the rest about evenly spread between Kurds and Maronites with a sprinkling of other nationalities. But this in turn had brought much increased tensions between all three groups and the predominantly Sunni population of Syria which in turn had brought increased sectarian violence as the rebel had targeted any and all supporters of France and their families and they in turn had reciprocated. In the Alawite state, where an Alawite majority was before the revolt mostly ruled by a minority of Sunni landlords, who for the most part supported the rebels, most of the Sunni minority being forced to flee while the land of Sunni landlords would had backed the revolt was redistributed among their share-croppers. Lebanon had also seen a notable though far less dramatic outflow of Sunnis. On the reverse in Damascus and Aleppo most of the handful of Alawis and a notable number of Christians had moved the other way round, although it should be noted that many of the most notable Syrian nationalists were Christians themselves. And perhaps most importantly the French High commissioner had committed to the Lebanese, Kurds and Alawis that their states would remain separate from the State of Syria that had been established in 1925. Whether the promise would be actually held remained to be seen...
Bhamdoun, Lebanon, July 1927
Several leading Kurdish nationalists along with members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation gathered in the town, ostensibly by accindent as it was on of Lebanon's main holiday resorts. The real reason was forming Xoybun a nationalist organization with the express aim of launching a Kurdish revolution in Turkey. Hopes were that the new uprising would fare better than the 1921 one, which had proved an abject failure with limited support, or for that matter an abortive attempt at revolt led by Sheikh Said back in 1925. Said still felt loyalty towards to sultan and that had proven the undoing of his movement as his attempts to contact the sultan had brought the attention of the Turkish government that had reacted fast and brutally with mass arrests and over 500 summary executions ordered by the "courts of independence" for people suspect of participating in the conspiracy. Xoybun would soon establish offices in Beirut, with the French government turning a blind eye on its activities and delegations established in several European capitals as well.
Mount Ararat, Turkey, September 10th, 1927
The Kurds rose up in revolt, pushing back elements of the Turkish third army that occupied the area and proclaiming a republic in the liberated area. Soon the rebel forces had reached about 8,000 men led by Ihsan Nuri a former Ottoman army officer. Xoybun was quick to openly support the revolt trying to secure French and British and appeal to the League of nations. The appeals failed but the French government also failed to take any action to suppress Xoybun activity in support of the revolt and arms and fighters crossing the border into Turkey. Claims that French support went beyond that with provision of arms and soldiers of the Troupes Speciales, given leaves with no questions asked to join the rebels remained unsubstantiated.
Constantinople, League of Nations, December 25th, 1927
The night was cold. But the roads leading to Hagia Sophia were full of Christians, mostly Greeks but with a fair number of worshippers from other nations. Today was after all one of the few days every year that Hagia Sophia was a church. Mustafa Kemal and the handful of his bodyguards, well clad in modern European clothes hardly felt the cold as he mixed in the crowd. Perhaps the bottle of raki he had finished earlier helped there. Either way he hardly cared. What he cared about was having a look at the results of his handiwork, or rather his failure first-hand now that he was back in Constantinople, one always should know the enemy. And six years of self-exile in Germany and Italy were enough. His lieutenants had handled things well enough but it was high time he took back the reins directly. The question was how and when...
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That last bit was a bit of a suspense, I almost expected a terrorist act there and then at the Hagia Sophia... but it didn't come yet.
Well, me too, think that could happen, something there, until once that the narrator tells us, who was there... Now, once he will be some hundred km away from Hagia Sophia...