The Mexican Century: An Alternate Mexican History
- Thread starter AlexGarcia
- Start date
Iturbide huh, as a Mexican I am curious on what your take on him is, always felt bad for the guy, after all he was executed after offering his military service to the country because of the possibility of Spanish invasion, when he arrived in Mexico he was detained and while he was given command of his escort as the local general had been pardon by Iturbide back in the day, he still surrendered peacefully and didn’t offer resistance, always felt that to be a very tragic way for him to go, he offered his country help during a difficult time and was executed for it
Sometimes I wonder what would have happened had he openly pushed for a stronger congress and a prime minister. Some conservatives like Lucas Aleman admired the British system, they would have gone along with it and might have won over some of the more moderate republicans, especially considering that not all "republicans" really even understood what that entailed (like Santa Ana). I feel like he was blinded by the idea of preserving the old colonial system with the only difference being the lack of peninsulares. He did get unfair criticism for how he handled the Congress. Yet other criticisms were valid.
To be fair he is mainly remembered more fondly because of how badly Santa Anna is hated, though yeah I agree that he was a flawed person who made many mistakes during his reign, but I also thing that he was unfairly treated and I see his execution as nothing more than as a purge of possible political opponents (like how other politicians/generals like Vicente Guerrero would be killed for political reasons)
The next chapter is going to be published soon (probably tomorrow if I finish it today), I'm not dead: you see, I was searching about the conditions of 19th Century Mexico, but I got some problems trying to define how capitalist was Mexico. I'm still trying to find a reliable source (Marxist or not) that studies the development of feudalism and capitalism in Colonial Mexico, to give me an idea on how the economy can evolve TTL. This may not be as important by itself, but I believe that since economics and politics are connected in some way, studying the former can help me to offer a more realistic and viable political outcome for the country TTL. Problem is that there's no full consensus over if Mexico was feudal, semifeudal, or if it was not even feudal in the first place.
I'm also studying the social conditions of 1810-1830's Mexico to give me an idea of how the common people lived. Unfortunately, I still don't have enough info. when it comes to army and naval history (military history is not my field, ngl), but I will keep trying to find something useful.
Finally: I think I have defined (at least somewhat, and with the help of a friend -thanks Sume-) the route of the post-War of 1812 US politics. A little spoiler: both parties (D-R's and Federalists) will be nativist.
That's all for now folks, see you later!
I'm also studying the social conditions of 1810-1830's Mexico to give me an idea of how the common people lived. Unfortunately, I still don't have enough info. when it comes to army and naval history (military history is not my field, ngl), but I will keep trying to find something useful.
Finally: I think I have defined (at least somewhat, and with the help of a friend -thanks Sume-) the route of the post-War of 1812 US politics. A little spoiler: both parties (D-R's and Federalists) will be nativist.
That's all for now folks, see you later!
Iturbide was politically an opportunist, but nonetheless he was not all that bad. I'd say he was pretty much f*cked since his government was factionalist, between the Republicans (both conservative and liberals), his supporters (Iturbidistas) and other monarchists who also opposed him (generally aligned to the idea of a Spanish king). The use of military force to repress the parts of Central America that didn't wanted to unite with Mexico (El Salvador especially) was pretty bad and I personally believe it contributed to Central America declaring independence once he was dethroned and exiled. I'm looking on his political proposals (that don't involve a monarchy) to check if he can become a sort of political reference for other people in the future.
Oh yeah he was definetly an opportunist, but let’s be honest most Mexican politicians were (and still are), either opportunist, incredibly corrupt, completely morally bankrupt or a combination of those 3, and honestly looking at how the Centralist proyect screwed everything so badly it is easy to look at him with a more positive tone since the people that established the centralist republic were led by the person who was mainly behind the coup against Iturbide, that being Santa Anna, who I very heavily dislike which probably contributes to my sympathy with Iturbide, the fact that Iturbide was executed after he returned to offer his military service (and refused to fight back with arms) also probably color the glasses a bit. Also yeah his idea for Central America was pretty f&cked.
I'd say the Centralists had some good ideas (especially strengthening the national market to avoid being so dependent on the UK, that's why Banco de Avio was initially successful), but their constant infighting and the lose of both Texas and Yucatán did a good job on damaging the already complicating situation of the country after 1830. Nonetheless, I can agree with you that Santa Anna was pretty much a horrible person, even if I need to clarify that he has been demonized a lot by history in general.
About Central America it's good that we can agree...and that's the reason I'm in a complicated situation to find a way to bring the region to Mexico without a war. I'm still defining a plan.
In general the biggest problem of the centralists was both their timing and their heavy handiness which led to multiple revolts at once, biggest among them being the Texan revolution (which would have happened eventually probably anyway) and while yeah Santa Anna is sometimes overhated, his own attitude and arrogance doesn’t help his case, (This is the guy who wanted to be called ”Su Alteza Serenísima”|”Your Serene Highness”)
Of course. In general, almost every historian I have read distrusts him a lot, even the ones who defend the Conservatives against the Liberals.
Him being gone from Mexican politics is going to help greatly the political stability of the country, but it's just a start. Some other things need to be modified for the country to enforce some sort of civil nationalism or institutionalism. Partisan politics (and in a way, US involvement + masonic logias) eliminated any possibility of a peaceful country.
Veracruz: a redemption?
Excerpts from "Historia General de México, 1800-1900", done in 2019.
"During 1813 to 1815 the nascent Republic had to face several challenges, including rebellions coming from indigenous populations loyal to the Spanish or else, food crises as a consequence of the generalized collapse of the state apparatus, the search for international recognition that simply did not seem to come, the practical non-existence of a stable financial system, or the political discussions around the direction of the newly born country. However, the two most important events were the final capture of Veracruz, and the Central American Crisis. The first event is traditionally considered the de facto end of the War of Independence, while the second forced Mexican political actors to decide on the form of state administration, whether more centralist or more federal.
Of course, it is not possible to begin with the general and/or detailed mention of such events as it is necessary to understand that the events that gave rise to the Crisis occurred before the capture of Veracruz, and, in fact, it is likely that they would have occurred with or without the republican proclamation made by the Junta in Mexico City. You, reader, will not allow me to lie, as I have already mentioned on previous occasions about the relative autonomy possessed by the Captaincy General of Guatemala, which for some years allowed it to remain aloof from events in the rest of New Spain. While conventional historiography tends to link the two events as a line of succession, that is, without X, Y would not have happened, in truth history does not always work that way.
Having said that, we must talk about the Capture of Veracruz: the documents recovered from those dates suggest a strong unanimous disposition on the part of all the Mexican political actors to capture the fortress-city. The so-called First Directory, represented by Rayón, had sought the massive recruitment of tens of thousands of men (official estimates dictate at least 30 to 35 thousand souls, but recent investigations point out that in reality there was no determined number of troops to be recruited as long as they were not less than 20 thousand), who would have to be armed with firearms, bladed weapons and in general, any type of instrument that could serve as a weapon. Likewise, amnesty was sought for certain Creoles and peninsulars captured in previous years, so that they could contribute to the republican cause. One of the best known cases, if not the best known, was that of Lieutenant Agustín de Iturbide y Arámburu, arrested for his opposition to the government of the Supreme Junta led by Hidalgo around 1812.
Of course, it is not possible to begin with the general and/or detailed mention of such events as it is necessary to understand that the events that gave rise to the Crisis occurred before the capture of Veracruz, and, in fact, it is likely that they would have occurred with or without the republican proclamation made by the Junta in Mexico City. You, reader, will not allow me to lie, as I have already mentioned on previous occasions about the relative autonomy possessed by the Captaincy General of Guatemala, which for some years allowed it to remain aloof from events in the rest of New Spain. While conventional historiography tends to link the two events as a line of succession, that is, without X, Y would not have happened, in truth history does not always work that way.
Having said that, we must talk about the Capture of Veracruz: the documents recovered from those dates suggest a strong unanimous disposition on the part of all the Mexican political actors to capture the fortress-city. The so-called First Directory, represented by Rayón, had sought the massive recruitment of tens of thousands of men (official estimates dictate at least 30 to 35 thousand souls, but recent investigations point out that in reality there was no determined number of troops to be recruited as long as they were not less than 20 thousand), who would have to be armed with firearms, bladed weapons and in general, any type of instrument that could serve as a weapon. Likewise, amnesty was sought for certain Creoles and peninsulars captured in previous years, so that they could contribute to the republican cause. One of the best known cases, if not the best known, was that of Lieutenant Agustín de Iturbide y Arámburu, arrested for his opposition to the government of the Supreme Junta led by Hidalgo around 1812.
Portrait of Iturbide
The amnesty offered by the Directory established in the case of civilians the restitution of their homes and the absolution of all criminal charges previously brought against them. In the case of the military, such as Iturbide, it offered the restitution of their posts, which would be paid "as soon as possible", as long as they swore loyalty to the government of the Republic and the Constitution. Such amnesty was even considered for those criollos and peninsulares who were guarding Veracruz, in order to, in the best of cases, surrender the city peacefully, and if that was not possible, at least to have allies within the city. Some individuals, such as Iturbide, accepted the amnesty, not so much out of sympathy with the republican government (it is known beforehand the monarchist sympathies that he had, supporting a constitutional and moderate monarchy), but as a means to gain popularity, or simply to avoid public reprimand as a result of La Venganza. Better to be protected by the state than to be killed by lynching.
However, although the majority accepted the amnesty, there were others who rejected it outright, especially the royalists in Veracruz. The future Spanish Captain General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna (who will be discussed at greater length once we get to the corresponding chapter on Spanish Cuba after the Independence), at that time a First Lieutenant, and who was part of the defending forces of the city, was part of those members who swore their loyalty to the Kingdom. Not being subject to the pressure of all the groups involved in La Venganza, or simply because they saw no hope for the republican project, which certainly was born not exactly in the best possible conditions, these individuals bet on the most stable regime in every possible way. To a certain extent, they cannot be blamed. The actions, although understandable on the part of the Mexican revolutionary government, provoked the fear of many, who saw in the East a new Jacobin France, even if several authors have challenged since the 19th century this comparison for its invalidity.
Daguerreotype of Santa Anna c. 1870
In any case, the objectives of the Directory were, fundamentally, to have suitable people to lead the troops of the nascent Mexican Army: if the disaster of La Tragedia was to be avoided. If the republican government hoped to have effective control of the country and be able to reestablish the economy (especially the mining economy, which was in a deplorable situation, and which until 1814 only served to fulfill Mexican obligations with the United States), it was necessary to eliminate the royalist control over Veracruz, the port city from which the resources coming from Europe originated. In other words, capturing Veracruz would not only eliminate the pressure of another royalist attempt on Mexico City, but would also allow the reopening of trade between Mexico and the European nations, in the absence of more developed ports in the Gulf of Mexico.
Although a general offensive by land was foreseen at the beginning of 1814, the practical inexistence of an effective bureaucratic apparatus in the country complicated the recruitment processes, whether voluntary or by means of levy. Many combatants were by this point tired, discouraged or wounded. While the Republican proclamation and the Miracle in Mexico City exacerbated the fervor of the insurgents, the fact of having to quell royalist revolts in different parts of the country, as well as the effervescence in crimes committed and the diminishing quality of life, quickly provoked a feeling of apathy. Many indigenous groups had joined the insurgents under concrete objectives, which usually included the assassination of gachupines who had harmed their communities (either through physical abuse or abuse of authority), or through promises of protection of their way of life, close to a "commune" [1].
By 1814, the first case had been fulfilled in most cases thanks to the lynchings resulting from La Venganza, and the second case had not developed due to the extraordinary circumstances of the war, which in many cases resulted in the aggravated destruction of the property of these "comunas", native communities. In addition, among the nascent liberal current, there was criticism of the existence of indigenous communal property, as it hindered private industrial and agrarian development. Furthermore, the intellectual consensus considered that the average indigenous person did not care much about what happened in the rest of the country, except for those considered enlightened (educated), since their life and family were located in a single geographic space. The Directory knew this, so the search for republican legitimacy took longer than expected, in the face of native multitudes who knew only that they were officially subjects of the King of Spain. [2] The plans, then, ended up taking until September, once the amnesty was granted and some de facto order was established in most of the country.
Of the 30,000 men expected to be needed to take the city (although the Spanish ability to defend so many men has tended to be exaggerated, while analysts such as José O'Neil* have determined that, realistically, only 15,000 or so well-armed men would be needed), in the absence of maritime support, at least 2/3 were to be armed with some kind of firearm. Each battalion (of 10,000 men) was to be commanded by different military men of various ranks, including lieutenants, captains, generals, etc; without distinction beyond "that of their own merit", that is to say, without discrimination on ethnic grounds. However, the news from Europe, which assured the collapse of the Napoleonic regime and the restitution of the government of Ferdinand VII was only bad news for the Republic, given the possible sending of reinforcements from Spain to make the capture of the city even more difficult. The official data mention, in total, 26,718 men enlisted for the battle, but if the mentions of desertion and/or failed mobilization are true, we would have between 22 to 24 thousand men, with the exact number impossible to determine. Since the required cap was not reached, a reorganization of the battalions was required."
Iturbide had been a de facto prisoner of war for more than a year. When he was offered amnesty in exchange for working on the capture of Veracruz, he gladly accepted according to official records. However, in his mind, he was openly royalist, considering the Republic as a state that would not survive more than a decade, a pseudo-government led by revolutionaries who didn't had experience in dealing with the political affairs of a country. In his consideration, Mexican Independence would have been achieved without the need for bloodshed, and with relations between Mexico and Spain in a situation of cordiality and even royal equality (dual monarchy). In its place was a republican misgovernment that not only failed to pacify the country of peninsulars, but also had no administration to deal with hunger, disease, robberies and murders, which were on the rise due to the war. Furthermore, his position as a wealthy Creole was compromised by the revolutionary ideals initiated by Hidalgo, and now carried out by Morelos. Instead of a Mexico led by criollos, it would be a Mexico dominated by Indians, mestizos and blacks.
However, Iturbide shared a certain resentment towards the peninsulars for the excesses committed in Mexico City, an act he relates in his Memoirs as "an act so atrocious and vile that it made my blood boil". In addition, it is known beforehand the relatively friendly relationship he and Hidalgo had, whom although politically he rejected, on a personal level he considered him a good person. The atrocities committed in Mexico City and the death of Hidalgo left Iturbide with a nationalist sentiment that, although in rejection of the Republic, advocated the separation of the Spanish viceroyalties, so that "we Americans could all choose our own destiny", in his words. Although his acceptance of the amnesty was more of an opportunistic tactic to get rid of death or social rejection from the lower classes, Iturbide had a legitimate pro-independence sentiment at heart.
Iturbide was commissioned as General, which would give him command of a full battalion of soldiers. Although he accepted the offer, he warned that the high number of soldiers in each battalion would only destroy the supply lines, on the one hand, and on the other, it offered the defenders in Veracruz easily shot cannon fodder. His proposal was to reduce the number of men in each battalion to at least 7,000, so that their distribution would be much easier in certain points of the battlefield, and in case of failure, the number of casualties would be lower. To a certain extent, Iturbide argued that he preferred not to see another massacre like the one in Mexico City, so it was imperative to reduce the number of military casualties in general. A well-disciplined, armed, and sufficiently efficient Army, which would effectively contribute to the capture of the city, as well as to convince civilians to join the rebel cause, in the face of the abuses committed by both sides against "all Americans, who are Spaniards as well as Indians, castes and mestizos". It is not surprising then, that Iturbide's personal ideals, ignoring monarchism, would be the basis for the future Moderate Party: Union (among all Mexicans, without distinction of any kind), Independence, Religion and Progress, which would later include proposals for a pluralist (but not secular) State or proposals for the attraction of Chinese migrants in California and Baja California, among other things. [3]
While the insurgent government did not look favorably on the military reorganization proposal, Guerrero himself acted as a diplomat in considering it valid. It was obvious that without some kind of recognition that a military reform had to take place as soon as possible, it would never be possible to end the war. Iturbide and Guerrero quickly colluded as allied strategists, both in the field of traditional warfare and guerrilla warfare, of which Guerrero had some experience. The Mexican Army would theoretically be prepared for the U.S. threat in the future. However, we are getting ahead of ourselves: the Directory approved after a long discussion Iturbide's recommendation, which was viewed favorably by Mariano Matamoros, Morelos' advisor. The military plans involved the necessary capture of the City of Veracruz and its port, and if possible, the capture of the island of San Juan de Ulúa, an island fortress, which commonly served as an outpost against pirates, but at that time acted as a Spanish refuge and rearguard in case the city fell. Iturbide would have his battalion of 7,000 men but was specifically reminded that he would be watched for his actions, as the amnesty did not imply the restoration of trust.
Iturbide and Guerrero
Excerpts from a history book for Mexican elementary school children, 2014, authored by the Ministry of Education.
Upon the defeat of the royalist insurgency in different parts of the country, the rebels fled en masse to the city of Veracruz, until then under Spanish control. In the absence of a naval fleet that could block supplies, the insurgents were forced into a general amassing by land, led by the caudillos Vicente Guerrero, Agustín de Iturbide, Mariano Matamoros, etc. Each would lead a military contingent of a few thousand men more or less armed with rifles and swords. Smaller groups, more specialized in the art of cavalry, would try to break through while the artillery (provided by Haitian aid to the Mexican government, and in some cases stolen and used from captured royalists) was to inflict serious damage to the Spanish defensive infrastructure.
Preparations for the battle were concluded in mid-October. An ultimatum* was offered to avoid further bloodshed, in a humanitarian aspect, and economically speaking, because the country needed to rebuild after years of war. Unfortunately, the royalist forces in the city rejected the ultimatum, demonstrating their loyalty to the Spanish crown, and not to the homeland where they were born.
Preparations for the battle were concluded in mid-October. An ultimatum* was offered to avoid further bloodshed, in a humanitarian aspect, and economically speaking, because the country needed to rebuild after years of war. Unfortunately, the royalist forces in the city rejected the ultimatum, demonstrating their loyalty to the Spanish crown, and not to the homeland where they were born.
Learn new words: Ultimatum is a term used to refer to a demand from one party to another for the fulfillment of an obligation within a specific time frame. In the event that the defendant party does not accede to this demand, the plaintiff party may incur a more severe action, such as a declaration of war when we speak of a diplomatic ultimatum.
The valiant forces composed of Generals Iturbide, Guerrero and Mariano Matamoros quickly positioned themselves under the orders of battle considered days before. Since the entire city was surrounded by walls, there were only two ways to gain access: by destroying the walls, or by crossing the access points established in the walls (specifically three: the gates of Mexico, La Merced and Puerta Nueva). Iturbide's forces, better prepared, would try to break the wall surrounding the New Gate, which was the front access route to the city. The forces of Guerrero and Matamoros, on the contrary, would serve as help and would try to gain access through the two remaining gates.
The valiant forces composed of Generals Iturbide, Guerrero and Mariano Matamoros quickly positioned themselves under the orders of battle considered days before. Since the entire city was surrounded by walls, there were only two ways to gain access: by destroying the walls, or by crossing the access points established in the walls (specifically three: the gates of Mexico, La Merced and Puerta Nueva). Iturbide's forces, better prepared, would try to break the wall surrounding the New Gate, which was the front access route to the city. The forces of Guerrero and Matamoros, on the contrary, would serve as help and would try to gain access through the two remaining gates.
Map of the city of Veracruz in 1797. The island fortress of San Juan de Ulúa appears in the northeastern part of the map.
The battle, begun on October 27, ended in the partial defeat of the Spanish forces, who fled to San Juan de Ulúa, until they were finally expelled in 1819. With the city captured, the Mexican government declared the total victory of the insurgent forces, thus initiating the independent era of our nation.
Despite the strategic importance of the port of Veracruz, the environmental conditions in which it was located meant that the city was not particularly inhabited. In 1790 it was inhabited by at least 16,000 people, who in many cases migrated to cities with better temperatures or less tendency to a yellow fever epidemic. Estimates for 1803 did not give a promising result, since at best the population remained more or less the same. The decline of New Spain and the War of Independence only made this worse, and by the time of the Battle of Veracruz in 1814, there were at least 10,000 people, if one does not count the Royalist soldiers who held the city in check, who numbered another 2,500 temporary inhabitants. To a certain extent, the unhealthy conditions that existed in the city allowed the insurgents to exert some pressure when the battle began, since the city was not prepared, neither in infrastructure nor in health services, to house too many soldiers and civilians practically besieged by land. On the other hand, supplies from Cuba were something that had to be cut off as soon as possible.
However, the insurgents continued to present problems of different kinds: the most obvious was logistics, since the economy was on the verge of collapse as a result of the gradual abandonment of mines (except for those destined to develop salaries for the military, and those used until the beginning of the year for U.S. war maintenance) and the stoppage of trade with other nations. In addition, the climate outside the walls was not necessarily better than in the city itself, and disease and desertions were not an isolated, but more of a common phenomenon. In any case, the creation of minimally functional cannons (plus the shipment of a few others from Haiti), and the rather slow but still nascent specialization of infantry weapons for local production from American models allowed having a minimum material base for the establishment of an Army more or less capable of having the initiative.
Once the battle began, the insurgent forces tried to break through the city wall as possible, without foolishly risking an attempt by sea, since there was no presence that would allow them any kind of complete siege. That same concern led them to seek to enter the city through the gates and encourage the population to rally to their cause. Be that as it may, the priority was to disable the existing defenses on the walls, which although they could not kill the tens of thousands of insurgent soldiers, they could damage the attacking cannons. A frontal attack was made through the Puerta Nueva as well as through La Merced, in order to destroy the defenses that surrounded those entrances and gain access. The situation was complicated by the action of the defensive batteries on the walls, which prevented the destruction of the gates directly, so that the cannons on the ground were forced to shoot from afar, often not hitting anything (the mobile artillery and rear-loading artillery had not yet appeared, so the overall efficiency was much worse.
Therefore, a realistic view of the Battle of Veracruz is that of a series of unsuccessful or moderately successful bombardments of the city's defensive walls for at least two weeks. While an insurgent victory was inevitable, given the superiority on the ground, and the virtual non-existence of a basic supply line to a civilian population that only wanted peace, it goes without saying that the victory was anything but glorious, honorable or chivalrous. On November 9, the Spanish forces, including Santa Anna, surprisingly proceeded to a tactical retreat to San Juan de Ulua first, and then to Cuba. It is believed that, in view of the increasing risk of a civil uprising, the Spanish forces would be trapped, so that the city could no longer be safeguarded. Another possibility, based on medical documents of the time, is the spread of yellow fever among the Spanish troops, although it has not been confirmed that this was the main reason for the retreat. A small regiment kept San Juan de Ulua defended until its expulsion years later, but they had neither the naval and land capacity to represent an invasion squadron, since Spain had better matters to attend to. However, they still had certain batteries, which they used for the bombardment of the city, even after being cornered, which resulted in an even worse decrease of the local population, which by 1820 barely reached 7,000 souls. On November 10, the civilian population opened its doors to the insurgents, who proceeded to confirm the republican control over the port. Hidalgo's headless body was quickly found, buried in an unmarked grave, in an unsuccessful effort so that no tribute or offering could be given to him. Instead, his putrefied head was found in the Cathedral of the Assumption in the center of the city. Both parts were taken to Mexico City to be duly processed in a funeral ceremony, practically a state ceremony.
The Father of Mexico had finally returned home, some said. An eternal rest was what he deserved.
However, the insurgents continued to present problems of different kinds: the most obvious was logistics, since the economy was on the verge of collapse as a result of the gradual abandonment of mines (except for those destined to develop salaries for the military, and those used until the beginning of the year for U.S. war maintenance) and the stoppage of trade with other nations. In addition, the climate outside the walls was not necessarily better than in the city itself, and disease and desertions were not an isolated, but more of a common phenomenon. In any case, the creation of minimally functional cannons (plus the shipment of a few others from Haiti), and the rather slow but still nascent specialization of infantry weapons for local production from American models allowed having a minimum material base for the establishment of an Army more or less capable of having the initiative.
Once the battle began, the insurgent forces tried to break through the city wall as possible, without foolishly risking an attempt by sea, since there was no presence that would allow them any kind of complete siege. That same concern led them to seek to enter the city through the gates and encourage the population to rally to their cause. Be that as it may, the priority was to disable the existing defenses on the walls, which although they could not kill the tens of thousands of insurgent soldiers, they could damage the attacking cannons. A frontal attack was made through the Puerta Nueva as well as through La Merced, in order to destroy the defenses that surrounded those entrances and gain access. The situation was complicated by the action of the defensive batteries on the walls, which prevented the destruction of the gates directly, so that the cannons on the ground were forced to shoot from afar, often not hitting anything (the mobile artillery and rear-loading artillery had not yet appeared, so the overall efficiency was much worse.
Therefore, a realistic view of the Battle of Veracruz is that of a series of unsuccessful or moderately successful bombardments of the city's defensive walls for at least two weeks. While an insurgent victory was inevitable, given the superiority on the ground, and the virtual non-existence of a basic supply line to a civilian population that only wanted peace, it goes without saying that the victory was anything but glorious, honorable or chivalrous. On November 9, the Spanish forces, including Santa Anna, surprisingly proceeded to a tactical retreat to San Juan de Ulua first, and then to Cuba. It is believed that, in view of the increasing risk of a civil uprising, the Spanish forces would be trapped, so that the city could no longer be safeguarded. Another possibility, based on medical documents of the time, is the spread of yellow fever among the Spanish troops, although it has not been confirmed that this was the main reason for the retreat. A small regiment kept San Juan de Ulua defended until its expulsion years later, but they had neither the naval and land capacity to represent an invasion squadron, since Spain had better matters to attend to. However, they still had certain batteries, which they used for the bombardment of the city, even after being cornered, which resulted in an even worse decrease of the local population, which by 1820 barely reached 7,000 souls. On November 10, the civilian population opened its doors to the insurgents, who proceeded to confirm the republican control over the port. Hidalgo's headless body was quickly found, buried in an unmarked grave, in an unsuccessful effort so that no tribute or offering could be given to him. Instead, his putrefied head was found in the Cathedral of the Assumption in the center of the city. Both parts were taken to Mexico City to be duly processed in a funeral ceremony, practically a state ceremony.
The Father of Mexico had finally returned home, some said. An eternal rest was what he deserved.
Santa Anna would remain in Cuba, where he would try to gradually rise in political power. For their part, Iturbide, Guerrero and Matamoros returned as national heroes. Iturbide had redeemed himself in the eyes of the revolutionary government, since he had demonstrated loyalty. In reality, Iturbide was no fool to desert, not under the circumstances; and he did well. The directorial government organized a celebration (modest, but still remembered with some affection) in the still wounded but visibly in better shape Mexico City. Beyond the occasional realist attempting guerrilla actions, the national territory was now effectively under Mexican control. The so-called Victory Day was proclaimed on November 15, marking the end of the War of Independence...or was it? There was still a matter to attend to, and it was of extreme importance for the revolutionary government to settle it as quickly as possible, since the country longed for peace.
The Directory looked towards the Captaincy General of Guatemala and prepared itself.
The Directory looked towards the Captaincy General of Guatemala and prepared itself.
[1] The organization of several native groups during Colonial Mexico and even Independent Mexico IOTL was mostly "communal" in nature: they procured the development and protection of their families and communities above all else; if a government gave them what they wanted, they would be loyal, independently of the ideological position of such government. Interestingly enough, such communes were not as communal as one can expect: being part of such lands was not a guarantee that you would be given part of the land, and there were contradictory interests within such communes (you could say that there was some sort of class struggle within the natives themselves).
[2] A majority of natives during the Independence didn't care that much about what was happening in New Spain, as long as their communities were not affected. They considered themselves as subjects of the King of Spain, although this was pretty much all the knowledge they had about who governed them.
[3] There's a document that specifies some of the plans of the Mexican government when it came to migration and the attraction of migrants, and how this was a contradictory project as a result of Mexico having a state religion (the Catholic Church). Nonetheless, it is mentioned that during the short duration of the First Empire, Iturbide proposed to settle Chinese migrants into the Californias. Since the policy of the government with the Chinese was pretty racist during the 19th Century, this was the first and only proposal for such idea until the Porfiriato (which was the first government to allow Chinese migration, and even then, heavily regulated). Iturbide being alive and not exiled means such migration can occur earlier, if he succeeds on making the government agreeing with the idea.
[2] A majority of natives during the Independence didn't care that much about what was happening in New Spain, as long as their communities were not affected. They considered themselves as subjects of the King of Spain, although this was pretty much all the knowledge they had about who governed them.
[3] There's a document that specifies some of the plans of the Mexican government when it came to migration and the attraction of migrants, and how this was a contradictory project as a result of Mexico having a state religion (the Catholic Church). Nonetheless, it is mentioned that during the short duration of the First Empire, Iturbide proposed to settle Chinese migrants into the Californias. Since the policy of the government with the Chinese was pretty racist during the 19th Century, this was the first and only proposal for such idea until the Porfiriato (which was the first government to allow Chinese migration, and even then, heavily regulated). Iturbide being alive and not exiled means such migration can occur earlier, if he succeeds on making the government agreeing with the idea.
Consider this my Christmas gift for you: Happy Holidays or Merry Christmas, depending on what you celebrate!
You know now that I see it, for all we discuss the politics of Independence era figures, not enough attention is given to their military tactics, like in what type of warfare they excelled at, what was their focus in maters of the army, how did they affect the way the Mexican army developed and other small things.
also Happy Holidays, and Merry Christmas!
also Happy Holidays, and Merry Christmas!
When it comes to military affairs, I'm not an expert and, frankly, I may need help on that. Most I can remember meanwhile researching about the war is that the Viceroyalty government used or tried to use counter-insurgency tactics in an effort to diminish the strength of the insurgents, but this quickly evolved into some sort of "White" terror. For example (I'm going to put both the original and translated quote, former for you because we both know Spanish, and latter for the rest of people haha):
La estrategia realista arremetió contra los pueblos de igual forma que hizo con los cuerpos de los rebeldes: con el propósito de destruir, de arrasar. Y fue el fruto, por lo menos en algunos casos, de una política deliberada. Véase si no un par de proclamas del interesante comandante José de la Cruz: una de diciembre de 1812, en la que se refería a los insurgentes como "unos monstruos producidos por el infierno" a quienes era preciso "matar o perseguir como bestias feroces"; y otra de enero de 1811 en la que amenazaba con incendiar y exterminar aquellos pueblos que, una vez indultados, volviesen a rebelarse.32 Muchos de estos pueblos rebeldes fueron efectivamente arrasados, quemados, borrados del mapa, y algunos con más suerte fueron simplemente atacados y/u ocupados.
El ejército realista atacó, ocupó, incendió o arrasó, entre 1811 y 1813, por lo menos 160 villas, pueblos, ranchos y haciendas de las Intendencias de Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, México, Guadalajara, Zacatecas y Valladolid. En algunas localidades se realizaron ejecuciones selectivas, como en La Barca y Colima, La Piedad, Pénjamo, Acatlán, Atlixco y Sultepec; otras fueron tan sólo ocupadas como Zapotlán, Juchipila, Zamora, Jiquilpan, Salamanca o Ixmilquilpan. Pero en algunos casos se arrasó, como ya señalamos, con la localidad entera, como ocurrió en Zitácuaro, Santa María, San Andrés, San Mateo, San Bernabé, San Francisco, San Juan, Timbineo y San Miguel, en la intendencia de Valladolid; o Tenango, Nopala, Los Remedios y Orizaba en la intendencia de México.
The royalist strategy lashed out against the towns in the same way it did with the bodies of the rebels: with the purpose of destroying, of razing to the ground. And it was the fruit, at least in some cases, of a deliberate policy. See if not a couple of proclamations by the interesting commander José de la Cruz: one of December 1812, in which he referred to the insurgents as "monsters produced by hell" whom it was necessary to "kill or pursue like ferocious beasts"; and another of January 1811 in which he threatened to burn and exterminate those towns that, once pardoned, rebelled again.32 Many of these rebellious towns were effectively razed, burned, wiped off the map, and some with more luck were simply attacked and/or occupied.
The royalist army attacked, occupied, burned or razed, between 1811 and 1813, at least 160 towns, villages, ranches and haciendas in the Intendencias of Guanajuato, San Luis Potosí, Mexico, Guadalajara, Zacatecas and Valladolid. In some towns selective executions were carried out, such as in La Barca and Colima, La Piedad, Pénjamo, Acatlán, Atlixco and Sultepec; others were only occupied, such as Zapotlán, Juchipila, Zamora, Jiquilpan, Salamanca or Ixmilquilpan. But in some cases, as we have already pointed out, the entire town was razed to the ground, as happened in Zitácuaro, Santa María, San Andrés, San Mateo, San Bernabé, San Francisco, San Juan, Timbineo and San Miguel, in the intendancy of Valladolid; or Tenango, Nopala, Los Remedios and Orizaba in the intendancy of Mexico.
Nonetheless, the Insurgents were also brutal in their methods. I have deliberately "diminished" the brutality that both the Realists and the insurgents are doing TTL because explicitly mention them may be too graphic for some people. Understandable considering the circumstance, but still horrible from an ethical and/or moral aspect. The Independence was brutal, and that's something it has been ignored. I remember there was some article that mentioned Iturbide's advancements on military matters (essentially, proposals and actions he did during the war), but I can't find it anymore (I will try to find it, and if not, then search similar docs.). In the case of Guerrero, it's evident that his OTL experience made him a viable asset when it comes to guerrilla war, but since the Independence lasts less time here, such experience will not be as strong, unfortunately.
Great update as always Alex, now that the Republic has achieved independence for the time being, it makes wonder me wonder how would it affect revolutions happening across Latin America from Spain?
Cuba will one day be rightfully Mexican! I remember a while back that there this small organization way back then that advocated for the overthrow of the Spanish overlords and be annexed to Mexico, probably misremembering for sure
Hello everyone, it is I, Alex.
1. First of all, I wish you to enjoy the coming of 2024, Happy New Year everyone, I hope you celebrate well with your family and/or friends.
2. I will try to bring up the Central American update as fast as possible, since I found relevant information that has helped me a lot. I also discovered how much of a sh*tshow the bureaucratic system of the Spanish Viceroyalties was, and it's painful. Imagine my face when I discovered that, nominally, Venezuela was part of New Spain until around 1718-1720, and even then there were problems defining if Venezuela was actually part of Nueva Granada or New Spain.
3. I ask my readers for help: I have tried to found information about Colonial Philippines (the Captaincy General of the Philippines), its political-administrative organization/division during the first years of the 19th Century, and the possibility of autonomist and/or independentist movements during such time era, but I haven't found anything useful. Only info. I got is related to the last years of the Captaincy, before the War of Independence led by the Katipunan started, and that's something I don't require rn. Apparently, most Hispanic sources ignore the Philippines since it was not "part of the Indies", even though I'm pretty sure the "Indies" included them, along with the Americas. So, if you know something about this, or are directly Filipino, please message me, thank you!
I hope you don't mind extensive endnotes (the [X] part at the end of the posts), because I want to offer a good explanation of the background of the Central American situation when I finish the next update, which, as you can imagine, will be related to the final event in the Independence War: The Central American question.
Anyways, see ya! (if you can read in Spanish, spoilers)
Anyways, see ya! (if you can read in Spanish, spoilers)
La Unificación
Excerpts from "Historia General de México, 1800-1900", done in 2019, by Ignacio Bernal.
The Independence of Central America and its subsequent annexation to the Mexican Republic were not necessarily hyper-violent processes like what happened in New Spain itself, but neither were they peaceful and, of course, there were times when everything could have gone to hell, as what happened in the specific case of Costa Rica during the collapse of the royalist order. Official history tends to omit this detail, partly to make the Mexican state look in a good shape, but it is the duty of every historian to present the facts as objectively as possible. In any case, what can be taken for granted, is that the unification went better than expected, partly thanks to the concessions made to reduce the power of Guatemala over the rest of the region, and partly because of the evident supremacy of the Mexican Army over any militia that could raise Central America; which allowed the guarantee of giving loyalty to the Constitution to proceed with the unification, which would lead to the formation of the already known hybrid of central federalism. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
Contrary to what happened in the rest of New Spain, the situation in the Captaincy General of Guatemala (also called the Kingdom of Guatemala) was less dramatic or violent, at least at the beginning. The events of 1808 in Spain and the actions of Hidalgo in 1810 did not have a decisive influence on the daily life of the Central American population initially, thanks in part to the autonomous character of the Captaincy General. The seizure of power by the insurgents in 1811 and the formation of the Supreme Junta were not recognized by Captain General Antonio Gonzalez Mollinedo, who also served as president of the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala. This Audiencia, which had political control over the whole of the Captaincy, exercised power quasi-independently of what the novo-Hispanic Viceroy could or could not do, since the Captain General (and President of the Audiencia) had the powers of viceroy, even if de jure he was not [1]. It is under this argument that the captain decided not to abide by the Supreme Junta, declaring his loyalty to the Spanish Crown, accusing the insurgents of "afrancesados", among other things.
Don Antonio decided to fight with a contingent created under his command against the Supreme Junta, proceeding to an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Oaxaca in mid-1811 thanks to the actions of Morelos, who was campaigning for the capture of Acapulco at the time, after which he was captured, but not before delegating his functions indefinitely to José Bustamante y Guerra, the latter becoming the new Captain General of Guatemala. The Supreme Junta purposely kept Don Antonio alive under a regime of house imprisonment in Oaxaca (despite the objections of Morelos, who demanded his execution) [2], in a gesture of goodwill towards the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala, which was however rejected by Bustamante, who maintained the stance of his predecessor. The only real difference undertaken by Bustamante, a peninsular Spaniard, was to gradually abandon any negotiations with the Creole elites about autonomy which ironically led to their radicalization.
Contrary to what happened in the rest of New Spain, the situation in the Captaincy General of Guatemala (also called the Kingdom of Guatemala) was less dramatic or violent, at least at the beginning. The events of 1808 in Spain and the actions of Hidalgo in 1810 did not have a decisive influence on the daily life of the Central American population initially, thanks in part to the autonomous character of the Captaincy General. The seizure of power by the insurgents in 1811 and the formation of the Supreme Junta were not recognized by Captain General Antonio Gonzalez Mollinedo, who also served as president of the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala. This Audiencia, which had political control over the whole of the Captaincy, exercised power quasi-independently of what the novo-Hispanic Viceroy could or could not do, since the Captain General (and President of the Audiencia) had the powers of viceroy, even if de jure he was not [1]. It is under this argument that the captain decided not to abide by the Supreme Junta, declaring his loyalty to the Spanish Crown, accusing the insurgents of "afrancesados", among other things.
Don Antonio decided to fight with a contingent created under his command against the Supreme Junta, proceeding to an unsuccessful attempt to capture the city of Oaxaca in mid-1811 thanks to the actions of Morelos, who was campaigning for the capture of Acapulco at the time, after which he was captured, but not before delegating his functions indefinitely to José Bustamante y Guerra, the latter becoming the new Captain General of Guatemala. The Supreme Junta purposely kept Don Antonio alive under a regime of house imprisonment in Oaxaca (despite the objections of Morelos, who demanded his execution) [2], in a gesture of goodwill towards the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala, which was however rejected by Bustamante, who maintained the stance of his predecessor. The only real difference undertaken by Bustamante, a peninsular Spaniard, was to gradually abandon any negotiations with the Creole elites about autonomy which ironically led to their radicalization.
Antonio Gonzalez Mollinedo and José Bustamante y Guerra, respectively.
One of the most famous examples is the so-called "Revolt of 1811", which is often considered the first attempt at independence rebellion in Central America. This event occurred in El Salvador in November of that year as a result of a series of internal problems between the capital of the then intendancy, San Salvador (the intendancy was also called San Salvador at that time, but to avoid any confusion, we will use the modern name for the region, and only San Salvador for the city), and the excessive Guatemalan influence and interference in the region. [3] However, emphasis must be placed on the notion of a revolt: although it had a popular character, the events of 1811 in San Salvador did not impact greatly on the rest of the Intendency at least initially, on the one hand, and on the other, they did not seek the independence of the region, but only the conformation of a municipal (not even provincial) junta, which continued to mention its loyalty to King Ferdinand VII. Moreover, it was not a violent event, since the protests were of a peaceful nature. Even so, we could thank the leaders of the Salvadoran junta, because their actions inspired others, whether Creole or not, to seek the formation of their own local juntas throughout El Salvador, varying in radicalism and racial integration, with special mention of the riots in Santa Ana and Metapan, where indigenous and mulatto participation was crucial, these being the protagonists of these riots. [4] A piece of information that the Mexican government used to its advantage to gain political power after the unification of Central America with the rest of the country were the alleged letters sent from El Salvador to the insurgent government around 1813 after the proclamation of the Republic, but it is not known for sure if these letters were real, or if it was an attempt of forgery made by the Captaincy General to delegitimize the Creole aspirations. Even assuming their veracity, it cannot be so stated because the letter did show an independence intention, if not rather it was only interest in the events in Mexico [5].
The Revolt of 1811
Similar events occurred in Nicaragua, between 1811 and 1812. Likewise, it was not an independence insurrection, but rather one that was part of the disputes between peninsulars and Creoles in the region. However, while the events in San Salvador ended under negotiations between the cabildo and the government of the Captaincy General, in the case of Nicaragua (where both the cities of León and Granada were involved) open repression was manifested against the so-called free cabildos resulting from the uprisings, partly due to the radical character of these, while the plebe (Indians and blacks, among others) were co-participants and demanded the end of slavery and, in general, different reforms, which were appropriated by the Creoles to demand autonomy. The response was especially harsh in Granada, justified from the point of view of the government of the Captaincy General given the attempts of the Granadines to forcibly confiscate arms for the arming of the local population [6]. Bustamante y Guerra, who had agreed to negotiate with the rebels in San Salvador, ordered the arrest and imprisonment of those involved in the events in Granada, as well as threatened an intervention in León, as a result of the fact that after the conformation of the cabildos abiertos, no one recognized the new authority from León, causing the Intendency of Nicaragua to be in open rebellion practice. [7]
Here it is necessary to understand a point of view more attached to the modern, scientific consensus: The events in Nicaragua, as well as the continuous demands from Mexico City to recognize the Supreme Junta that were rejected, forced Bustamante to adopt much more aggressive measures against any Creole or caste attempts to demand autonomy or independence [8]. While one could speak of a dictatorship, it must be emphasized that, in the face of the continuing threat of intervention from Mexico City, Bustamante's actions were understandable from the point of view of a realist. Certainly, if any of us, dear readers, were in his shoes, under the same circumstances and political beliefs, we would probably have done the same thing. That does not mean that we personally should agree in a strict sense, although we should thank Mr. Bustamante, since his actions only radicalized ambivalent Creoles, such as what happened in Tegucigalpa in 1812, a sign that liberal ideals were spreading, albeit gradually. [9]. An example of double-edged actions on the part of Bustamante is the positive vote of the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala for the conformation of a superintendence that acted with a police character with emergency powers, or the patriotic donations quasi-mandatory for the maintenance of the loyalist militias. [10] In this sense, the most resounding example for most of us, and main factor for the Mexican intervention, was the Conjuration of Belén, in conjunction with the deliberate rejection of certain precepts of the Constitution of Valencia.
As far as is known, the Constitution of Valencia was only pronounced at the beginning of November 1812 in Guatemala City, due to the difficulties in terms of communication because of the delicate situation in New Spain. Although the Supreme Junta in Mexico City did not reject the Constitution as such, its struggle against the peninsulars and the gradual radicalization of the Junta in favor of Independence meant that its validity was not proclaimed, so only the articles that coincided with the objectives and plans of the Junta were taken into account. Therefore, the Mexican authorities did not give notice of the Constitution to the Captaincy General, being forced to ask for information about it to Cuba, which sent copies of it for its immediate application. Although Bustamante was not against its application in times of peace, the situation in Central America was certainly not peaceful, which alarmed him, since the Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press and gave Creoles the opportunity to gain access to government positions in a much easier way. Bustamante was aware that not implementing the Constitution would provoke them even more, but neither could he allow anti-government or radical expressions, especially when there were confirmed reports at the beginning of April 1813 that the insurgents in Mexico City had proclaimed a Republic, and not only that, but that a good part of the New Spanish Creoles were aligned to this new republican project (it should be emphasized here that in some cases it was real alignment, and in others, opportunism or fear).
This situation meant that, although the Guatemalan government could not (at least not completely) ignore the Constitution of Valencia, it did not allow the full enjoyment of the social rights guaranteed therein. It neither promoted nor rejected it, at least initially. This situation of ambiguity and continuous attempts to prevent the rise of the Creoles in the region only caused some of them to decide to have clandestine contact with the republican government in Mexico. This is where the so-called conspirators in the convent of Belén in Guatemala City came in. The so-called Conjuration of Belén, as it is usually known, was the first serious attempt on the part of the Creole elites to stage a coup against the Guatemalan government and contact the insurgent forces in Mexico City, although the details of whether they were seeking independence or not are not entirely clear [11]. The plan was relatively simple: take advantage of the Christmas festivities to stage a coup against Bustamante with the help of militias favorable to the movement, free any political prisoners that might exist (many of whom were those accused of the events in Nicaragua last year), and promote the formation of a provisional government led by Creoles, inspired in part by the actions and laws of the republican government in Mexico, without explicitly mentioning the formation of another republic, or guaranteeing the social rights stated in the Constitution of 1813.
On December 24, 1813 the attempted coup d'état took place. The conspirators managed to convince certain militias unhappy with the local administration to support the seditious actions, and with the implicit endorsement of the local cabildo, an attempt was made to proceed with the arrest of Bustamante, by force if necessary. However, given the lack of organization of the conjurors, Bustamante managed to escape to Antigua Guatemala, the former capital before 1776 [12], from where he called for a fight against the insurgent elements. The situation was complicated, since, while the fighting to recover the capital was taking place, the Creole elites found themselves divided between supporting the coup plotters or joining Bustamante in exchange for concessions and the correct application of the Spanish Constitution. Finally, by mid-February, the insurrection had been practically defeated. While it is true that they did not have the ability to win, they hoped that other major cities would rise up in arms and give allegiance to their government, but with the exception of a few towns, plus the participation of San Salvador, which rose up again as in 1811, deposing the intendant of the region [13], most criollos preferred caution. The leaders of the Conjura were charged with sedition and, although they were sentenced to death or, at best, an exile in Spain for a process that would normally take months, Bustamante advocated even more extraordinary measures, so most sentences were handed down by June 1814.
The joint actions between what happened in El Salvador and Guatemala ended up destroying any Creole autonomist attempt, since, once the abolition of the Constitution of Valencia was confirmed in August, Bustamante could act practically without legal obstacles to pacify the region. Or so he thought, since while the constitutional guarantees were abolished, the Mexican government was already preparing a contingent of troops to request the annexation of the region.
Here it is necessary to understand a point of view more attached to the modern, scientific consensus: The events in Nicaragua, as well as the continuous demands from Mexico City to recognize the Supreme Junta that were rejected, forced Bustamante to adopt much more aggressive measures against any Creole or caste attempts to demand autonomy or independence [8]. While one could speak of a dictatorship, it must be emphasized that, in the face of the continuing threat of intervention from Mexico City, Bustamante's actions were understandable from the point of view of a realist. Certainly, if any of us, dear readers, were in his shoes, under the same circumstances and political beliefs, we would probably have done the same thing. That does not mean that we personally should agree in a strict sense, although we should thank Mr. Bustamante, since his actions only radicalized ambivalent Creoles, such as what happened in Tegucigalpa in 1812, a sign that liberal ideals were spreading, albeit gradually. [9]. An example of double-edged actions on the part of Bustamante is the positive vote of the Royal Audiencia of Guatemala for the conformation of a superintendence that acted with a police character with emergency powers, or the patriotic donations quasi-mandatory for the maintenance of the loyalist militias. [10] In this sense, the most resounding example for most of us, and main factor for the Mexican intervention, was the Conjuration of Belén, in conjunction with the deliberate rejection of certain precepts of the Constitution of Valencia.
As far as is known, the Constitution of Valencia was only pronounced at the beginning of November 1812 in Guatemala City, due to the difficulties in terms of communication because of the delicate situation in New Spain. Although the Supreme Junta in Mexico City did not reject the Constitution as such, its struggle against the peninsulars and the gradual radicalization of the Junta in favor of Independence meant that its validity was not proclaimed, so only the articles that coincided with the objectives and plans of the Junta were taken into account. Therefore, the Mexican authorities did not give notice of the Constitution to the Captaincy General, being forced to ask for information about it to Cuba, which sent copies of it for its immediate application. Although Bustamante was not against its application in times of peace, the situation in Central America was certainly not peaceful, which alarmed him, since the Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press and gave Creoles the opportunity to gain access to government positions in a much easier way. Bustamante was aware that not implementing the Constitution would provoke them even more, but neither could he allow anti-government or radical expressions, especially when there were confirmed reports at the beginning of April 1813 that the insurgents in Mexico City had proclaimed a Republic, and not only that, but that a good part of the New Spanish Creoles were aligned to this new republican project (it should be emphasized here that in some cases it was real alignment, and in others, opportunism or fear).
This situation meant that, although the Guatemalan government could not (at least not completely) ignore the Constitution of Valencia, it did not allow the full enjoyment of the social rights guaranteed therein. It neither promoted nor rejected it, at least initially. This situation of ambiguity and continuous attempts to prevent the rise of the Creoles in the region only caused some of them to decide to have clandestine contact with the republican government in Mexico. This is where the so-called conspirators in the convent of Belén in Guatemala City came in. The so-called Conjuration of Belén, as it is usually known, was the first serious attempt on the part of the Creole elites to stage a coup against the Guatemalan government and contact the insurgent forces in Mexico City, although the details of whether they were seeking independence or not are not entirely clear [11]. The plan was relatively simple: take advantage of the Christmas festivities to stage a coup against Bustamante with the help of militias favorable to the movement, free any political prisoners that might exist (many of whom were those accused of the events in Nicaragua last year), and promote the formation of a provisional government led by Creoles, inspired in part by the actions and laws of the republican government in Mexico, without explicitly mentioning the formation of another republic, or guaranteeing the social rights stated in the Constitution of 1813.
On December 24, 1813 the attempted coup d'état took place. The conspirators managed to convince certain militias unhappy with the local administration to support the seditious actions, and with the implicit endorsement of the local cabildo, an attempt was made to proceed with the arrest of Bustamante, by force if necessary. However, given the lack of organization of the conjurors, Bustamante managed to escape to Antigua Guatemala, the former capital before 1776 [12], from where he called for a fight against the insurgent elements. The situation was complicated, since, while the fighting to recover the capital was taking place, the Creole elites found themselves divided between supporting the coup plotters or joining Bustamante in exchange for concessions and the correct application of the Spanish Constitution. Finally, by mid-February, the insurrection had been practically defeated. While it is true that they did not have the ability to win, they hoped that other major cities would rise up in arms and give allegiance to their government, but with the exception of a few towns, plus the participation of San Salvador, which rose up again as in 1811, deposing the intendant of the region [13], most criollos preferred caution. The leaders of the Conjura were charged with sedition and, although they were sentenced to death or, at best, an exile in Spain for a process that would normally take months, Bustamante advocated even more extraordinary measures, so most sentences were handed down by June 1814.
The joint actions between what happened in El Salvador and Guatemala ended up destroying any Creole autonomist attempt, since, once the abolition of the Constitution of Valencia was confirmed in August, Bustamante could act practically without legal obstacles to pacify the region. Or so he thought, since while the constitutional guarantees were abolished, the Mexican government was already preparing a contingent of troops to request the annexation of the region.
Areas of unrest in Central America between 1811 and 1814.
[The map comes from José de Bustamante and Central American Independence, T. Hawkins.]
Mexican authorities were informed of the events in Guatemala about a month after the summary trials took place. However, given the priority over operations in Veracruz, Mexican troops could not directly intervene and take control of Central America. However, the information of such trials was dictated to be transmitted, especially directed towards the Creole population in the country, so that they would see beforehand the terror to which their Central American peers were subjected, and more quickly embrace the Republic as an ideal model. Certainly, the relative details as to whether the so-called martyrs of Belén were autonomists or not were ignored, since it was necessary to support the propaganda that would give legitimacy to the independentists. In any case, the clandestine contacts existing between different Creole groups and the directorial government were successful enough to convince the former of the need for a revolution, but it was made clear that any prospect of that nature would be destroyed without Mexican intervention, partly due to the pro-royalist militias known as the Volunteers of Ferdinand VII [14], which had been sufficiently effective in suppressing any Creole or caste attempts since 1812.
When the Constitution of Valencia was abolished and its repeal became effective in Guatemala in August, several criollo groups protested and demanded its restoration, only to be accused of sedition and arrested. Those who did not, were between a rock and a hard place, for although they were aware that autonomy was no longer a viable condition for the defense of their interests against the Peninsulares, neither did they advocate a republic, much less a republic as radical as the one that existed in Mexico. Some sympathetic criollos warned that, unless the castes united on their side, there would be no possibility of removing Bustamante. Thus, they could either accept the facts and be forced to accept the new republican reality, in exchange for radicalizing these groups that were normally content with minimal concessions, or they could ignore them and promote a purely Creole revolt, at the cost of their own annihilation. The Mexican government promoted the first option, encouraging the Central American Creoles to take it, since literally it was forced to do so by being subordinated to the Constitution, so moderate measures such as maintaining the caste system in exchange for a gradual political opening were out of the question once the unification was done which, they warned, was not a negotiable option either.
The news of the fall of Veracruz in November alarmed the Guatemalan authorities. They knew the enemy was approaching, and they were quite right. The Directory, under the auspices of the nascent Supreme Congress, made official a petition (more like an ultimatum) to the local authorities to abolish the Captaincy General, and delegate power to "the children of our Mexican Americas" (Creoles, mestizos, castes and blacks). In exchange, the Peninsulares could return peacefully to Cuba, or even stay in the country in exchange for swearing allegiance to the republic. Should the request be denied, then the Mexican Army would enter and forcibly detain the Bustamante government until the annexation was a fait accompli. At the same time, the Mexican government dictated to its Creole sympathizers to prepare for a conflict that seemed inevitable, and to recruit as many as they could: the Directory saw no hope for a fully peaceful unification.
On the morning of January 14, 1815, a contingent of Mexican troops entered the Intendancy of Chiapas, after the request was rejected. News of the invasion reached Guatemala City on the 16th, which quickly sent communiqués to the local governments of the Captaincy, calling for the recruitment by levy and the total mobilization of the volunteers of Ferdinand VII. On the 20th Juan de Dios Mayorga, a politician of Guatemalan origin living in El Salvador who had recently been released from prison for his pro-autonomist activities in 1811 and 1812 proclaimed the birth of the Republic of Central America in the town of Metapán, which added to the slave uprisings throughout Central America. Mayorga was one of the Creole sectors in Central America that had quickly become disillusioned with autonomism, fully embracing republicanism. Some politicians and religious prisoners quickly tried to promote an insurrection in Guatemala City, which added to the calls of people like José Matías Delgado for a peaceful surrender. Caste and indigenous groups - not necessarily pro-independence - took advantage of the situation to "render personal accounts" against Peninsulares in various towns in Nicaragua and Honduras (which resulted in several assassinations of Peninsulares), which effectively reduced the de facto control of the royalists in various parts of the region. Evidently, some towns positioned themselves in favor of the status quo. In the Province of Costa Rica, Creole groups found themselves in opposing positions, since while some were pro-republican, others preferred either the status quo or the promotion of a monarchy, which quickly devolved into factional struggle.
Bustamante's government initially did not give in, ordering conscript regiments to defend the Captaincy from Mexican invasion. However, by the 31st the fall of Ciudad Real [15], the capital of the Intendencia de Chiapas, was reported. Increasingly confusing reports, and the establishment of a free cabildo in San Salvador that supported Don Mayorga's calls made it clear that, outside Guatemala, Central America was mostly a battleground between royalists and independentists, ignoring the opportunists that used the situation to commit crimes or kill their own enemies. Faced with the critical situation, the cabildo in Guatemala City advocated the release of political prisoners and the arrest of Bustamante, in exchange for the Mexican authorities to stop and allow a negotiated resolution. On February 2, such an event, informally known as the second Conjuration took place, and the released prisoners quickly called for a general insurrection. Manuel José Arce, one of those freed, and a relative of Matías Delgado, advocated the establishment of a federal republic, as a model that ensured the autonomy of the constituent parts of Central America was more acceptable than monarchical or central despotism, which contradicted the centralism stipulated in the Mexican Constitution. Bustamante fled on the 3rd to Antigua Guatemala, while Mexican troops advanced towards Tapachula.
When the Constitution of Valencia was abolished and its repeal became effective in Guatemala in August, several criollo groups protested and demanded its restoration, only to be accused of sedition and arrested. Those who did not, were between a rock and a hard place, for although they were aware that autonomy was no longer a viable condition for the defense of their interests against the Peninsulares, neither did they advocate a republic, much less a republic as radical as the one that existed in Mexico. Some sympathetic criollos warned that, unless the castes united on their side, there would be no possibility of removing Bustamante. Thus, they could either accept the facts and be forced to accept the new republican reality, in exchange for radicalizing these groups that were normally content with minimal concessions, or they could ignore them and promote a purely Creole revolt, at the cost of their own annihilation. The Mexican government promoted the first option, encouraging the Central American Creoles to take it, since literally it was forced to do so by being subordinated to the Constitution, so moderate measures such as maintaining the caste system in exchange for a gradual political opening were out of the question once the unification was done which, they warned, was not a negotiable option either.
The news of the fall of Veracruz in November alarmed the Guatemalan authorities. They knew the enemy was approaching, and they were quite right. The Directory, under the auspices of the nascent Supreme Congress, made official a petition (more like an ultimatum) to the local authorities to abolish the Captaincy General, and delegate power to "the children of our Mexican Americas" (Creoles, mestizos, castes and blacks). In exchange, the Peninsulares could return peacefully to Cuba, or even stay in the country in exchange for swearing allegiance to the republic. Should the request be denied, then the Mexican Army would enter and forcibly detain the Bustamante government until the annexation was a fait accompli. At the same time, the Mexican government dictated to its Creole sympathizers to prepare for a conflict that seemed inevitable, and to recruit as many as they could: the Directory saw no hope for a fully peaceful unification.
On the morning of January 14, 1815, a contingent of Mexican troops entered the Intendancy of Chiapas, after the request was rejected. News of the invasion reached Guatemala City on the 16th, which quickly sent communiqués to the local governments of the Captaincy, calling for the recruitment by levy and the total mobilization of the volunteers of Ferdinand VII. On the 20th Juan de Dios Mayorga, a politician of Guatemalan origin living in El Salvador who had recently been released from prison for his pro-autonomist activities in 1811 and 1812 proclaimed the birth of the Republic of Central America in the town of Metapán, which added to the slave uprisings throughout Central America. Mayorga was one of the Creole sectors in Central America that had quickly become disillusioned with autonomism, fully embracing republicanism. Some politicians and religious prisoners quickly tried to promote an insurrection in Guatemala City, which added to the calls of people like José Matías Delgado for a peaceful surrender. Caste and indigenous groups - not necessarily pro-independence - took advantage of the situation to "render personal accounts" against Peninsulares in various towns in Nicaragua and Honduras (which resulted in several assassinations of Peninsulares), which effectively reduced the de facto control of the royalists in various parts of the region. Evidently, some towns positioned themselves in favor of the status quo. In the Province of Costa Rica, Creole groups found themselves in opposing positions, since while some were pro-republican, others preferred either the status quo or the promotion of a monarchy, which quickly devolved into factional struggle.
Bustamante's government initially did not give in, ordering conscript regiments to defend the Captaincy from Mexican invasion. However, by the 31st the fall of Ciudad Real [15], the capital of the Intendencia de Chiapas, was reported. Increasingly confusing reports, and the establishment of a free cabildo in San Salvador that supported Don Mayorga's calls made it clear that, outside Guatemala, Central America was mostly a battleground between royalists and independentists, ignoring the opportunists that used the situation to commit crimes or kill their own enemies. Faced with the critical situation, the cabildo in Guatemala City advocated the release of political prisoners and the arrest of Bustamante, in exchange for the Mexican authorities to stop and allow a negotiated resolution. On February 2, such an event, informally known as the second Conjuration took place, and the released prisoners quickly called for a general insurrection. Manuel José Arce, one of those freed, and a relative of Matías Delgado, advocated the establishment of a federal republic, as a model that ensured the autonomy of the constituent parts of Central America was more acceptable than monarchical or central despotism, which contradicted the centralism stipulated in the Mexican Constitution. Bustamante fled on the 3rd to Antigua Guatemala, while Mexican troops advanced towards Tapachula.
Manuel José Arce, one of the de facto co-founders of the short-lived Republic of Central America, and apparent creator of the flag of the country, which used the colors of the Mexican flag.
However, unlike what had happened months before, this time there was no possibility of retaking Guatemala City. The royalist militiamen battled as heroically as one could imagine, even earning the respect of some independentists, but with the Guatemalan government apparatus "decapitated", it was only a matter of time before the ambivalent Creoles decided to go for the highest bidder. On February 14, Bustamante called for surrender, once Mexican troops entered Quetzaltenango, Guatemala. However, fighting between royalists and independentistas did not cease until mid-May, when all rebellion was destroyed once and for all. Bustamante agreed to be guaranteed exile, partly to avoid further bloodshed. The Guatemalan Creole authorities, for their part, summoned various representatives from throughout the region to formalize the birth of the Republic of Central America, as well as its status with respect to Mexico.
Excerpts from "The development of Mexican-style federalism in the 19th century" by Alejandro Gonzalez Fuentes*.
When the Mexican authorities arrived in Guatemala City in March, they were surprised to discover what had happened, since the locality now hosted a provisional government that gave allegiance to the so-called Republic of Central America. Apparently, representatives of the various parts of the Republic were divided over whether to join Mexico, as the Mexican government demanded, or to preserve their new independence. It was not that they were against the Mexican government per se, since various parts of the Constitution of 1813 had been used as provisional documents or laws in the nascent Republic, including the total abolition of slavery and the form of indirect elections for the election of deputies; but there was the problem that many Central American Creoles and mestizos advocated a political autonomy that the Mexican Constitution did not strictly guaranteed in strict sense. Therefore, they requested the Mexican Directory the formation of a Committee between the Mexican and Central American representatives that could reach a consensus to achieve unification. For their part, the Mexican authorities reacted contradictorily: members of the Supreme Congress advocated that the requests made by the Central Americans were opposed to the ideal of a stable and strong republic, which could guarantee happiness for all its citizens without distinction. Members of the northern provinces (as well as representatives of the California and New Mexico territories), for their part, called for a model similar to that of the United States, rejecting outright both full centralism and a confederation. The situation worsened since in May, with the gradual pacification of Costa Rica, several free cabildos were invoked to vote, since a referendum was called to decide what would the Central American government do, with the most voted options resulting in either annexation with or without conditions, and with the former option being ultimately victorious against the latter. [16]. The Central American representatives, among whom were Juan de Dios Mayorga, Juan de Dios Campos, Benito Soto [...] among others, representing the constituent governments of the nascent Republic, moved from petitions to demands.
Although the experience of the Constitution of Valencia, of which the Mexican government was already aware, was sufficiently relevant to have sufficient material basis to support some kind of decentralization, it was feared that the excessive delegation of various powers to state governments could undermine both the effective capacity of the national state to maintain its borders and stability, and there were also those who rejected the complicity of the Creole elites in favor of federalism, since it actually benefited them. The Directory was forced to intervene, after which the following arguments were given:
Although the experience of the Constitution of Valencia, of which the Mexican government was already aware, was sufficiently relevant to have sufficient material basis to support some kind of decentralization, it was feared that the excessive delegation of various powers to state governments could undermine both the effective capacity of the national state to maintain its borders and stability, and there were also those who rejected the complicity of the Creole elites in favor of federalism, since it actually benefited them. The Directory was forced to intervene, after which the following arguments were given:
- While the Constitution of 1813 was obliged to be modified to guarantee the population representation in each province once a national census was taken, the Central American provinces would be at a clear disadvantage by having a lower representation of deputies than other Mexican provinces.
- The current system of provincial representation in the Supreme Congress was already de facto a senate, since each province had an equal number of deputies, being two in this case, in reference to the organization of the AmericanSenate.
- The petitions given by some members of the Supreme Congress in favor of a confederal system were completely unfounded, since the situation in the north of the country at the hands of the Indian tribes, the imperative need to rebuild the national economy, and the national defense against the Spanish threat demanded a strong state that would promote nationalism.
- The plainly centralist demands, although not necessarily wrong, were unrealizable in the face of the existence of an efficient bureaucratic apparatus in Mexico. The Spanish experience with a decentralized centralism that granted certain powers to local bodies, such as municipalities and provinces, to make up for this lack of bureaucrats and effectively regulate the quality of life in a given place was better in the short and medium term.
- The Constitution guaranteed the right of all Mexicans to happiness. Given that the votes in Central America advocated annexation with concessions, it was the will of its inhabitants [or at least of those who had voted, given local instability] to be guaranteed some kind of autonomy and national representation that would allow them to have equal conditions before the law, which would help in the realization of the happiness of the inhabitants of Central America.
The Directory asked (it could not demand, given the limitations that the Executive had with respect to the Legislative) to consider the arguments mentioned above and to reach a point of understanding with the Central American authorities. Consequently, the Supreme Congress promoted a series of negotiations based on these points, after which the points of understanding with the Central American representatives were conceived (and which received the endorsement of those of the northern provinces, since they also advocated autonomy):
- The current system of provincial representation in two deputies would be maintained, but the deputies would be renamed senators. Likewise, the Mexican Supreme Congress would become a bicameral chamber, and the powers given to the deputies would be distributed to grant some of these to the new senators.
- In addition, a member of the Mexican Supreme Government (the Directory) would be elected solely by the Central American provinces and would serve as their representative within it. The number of members of the Directory would remain at four. The Central American representative would not have exclusive powers over the rest of the organization, beyond serving as the representative of Central America.
- Each province of the Republic would have its own legislative body (a local Congress), similar to the U.S. model. However, at no time could such congresses contradict the provisions given by the national government and the powers that conformed it, and if such a case were to occur, the Supreme Congress would have the power to annul any vote or validity of what was agreed upon in such congresses. Likewise, each province would have a local Executive and a local Judiciary, and unlike the federal level, the exercise of the Executive power would be allowed in one person, although he would have the help of different secretaries and other assistants.
- The national government, now federal, would delegate specific attributions to the provinces, which were renamed as states. Some attributions already considered were the formation of local militias for the joint defense of each state and the country; the number of deputies and members of the local directories of each state, the formation of laws (assuming they did not contradict the national Constitution), and the formation of local constitutions. Other burdens, such as education, health, and the formation of regiments for the National Army would be left fully to the federal government, which reserved the right to gradually delegate such burdens to the states. Each state could form, modify or eliminate sub-delegations [municipalities], and negotiate the transfer of territories among them, but the federal government had the final say on whether to ratify or annul such negotiations.
- However, in situations of internal or external crisis (i.e. war), such local powers could be removed indefinitely, until the country returned to a state of peace. The Supreme Government was delegated (under authorization of the Congress) the power to impose loyal governments in extraordinary situations, in case a state government decided to defy the federal authority by force of arms, or in case it did not render aid to the federal authorities in case of war.
- The city councils-cabildos in the sub-delegations were to be accountable to the branches of each state for finances, and likewise, each state was to be accountable to the federal government. Each state would have a local section of the Court of Residence, which would be responsible for overseeing the actions of the three local branches. Although some fiscal autonomy was granted to the states, it was foreseen that all expenditures and revenues would be regulated by the federal government, in order to avoid wasteful spending.
- Finally, all Central Americans, without distinction, would enjoy the rights emanating from the Mexican Constitution, and would be considered Mexicans, regardless of ethnicity. Each Central American state would be autonomous with respect to the other (sovereign under certain limitations), so that the power of the Guatemalan Creoles over the rest of the region would be cut off. The borders of each state would remain unchanged, unless an agreement was reached between the states to modify the borders or sub-delegations [as what happened between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over the Nicoya region].
These points were to no one's liking, but they were sufficiently conciliatory to keep both radical federalists and pure centralists at bay. Ultimately, the consensus advocated an intermediate federalism, formally centralist federalism, where the federal state would have greater powers than the state governments, in part because of the rejection of any possible inter-oligarchic pact, even if this was inevitable to some extent [17]. A state decentralized enough to make up for the lack of an effective bureaucratic apparatus, and at the same time strong enough to protect the country from any external or internal threat, along with punish corruption, at least de iure.
The Central American authorities, although not totally convinced by the Mexican offer, agreed with the concessions made, and finally gave their approval to the unification, which was ratified on October 2, 1815, the 5th anniversary of the beginning of the War of Independence, with the Act of Unification between the Mexican Republic and the Republic of Central America. Once the annexation was ratified, the national census was carried out between October and December, and, in turn, the Supreme Congress was convened to modify the Constitution in accordance with the points of agreement with Central America [...].
The Central American authorities, although not totally convinced by the Mexican offer, agreed with the concessions made, and finally gave their approval to the unification, which was ratified on October 2, 1815, the 5th anniversary of the beginning of the War of Independence, with the Act of Unification between the Mexican Republic and the Republic of Central America. Once the annexation was ratified, the national census was carried out between October and December, and, in turn, the Supreme Congress was convened to modify the Constitution in accordance with the points of agreement with Central America [...].
Although there was no official symbolism during the signing of the unification between the Central American and Mexican republics, in recent years there has been attempts to create some unique symbols that represent, in a way, such event. This is one of them, simply being called "La Unificación".
And with the signing of the Act, Mexico was finally free from Spain. But the Mexican Century had only just begun.
Map of the Mexican Republic in 1830.
Map of the Mexican Republic in 1830.
[1] According to the HGIS of the Indies, in the specific case of the Audiencia of Guatemala, it possessed attributions of a much more autonomous/quasi-independent character with respect to the Viceroyalty of New Spain. The "Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de las Indias" in its Book II, Title XV, Law VI confirms this, by mentioning the following: "And we order that the governor and captain general of the said provinces, and president of the royal audience of them, have, use and exercise by himself the governance of that land and all its district, as our viceroy of the New Spain has it, and provide the distribution of Indians and other offices, as it used to do the said royal audience [...]", so the Captain General of Guatemala had the powers of viceroy, and the Audiencia did not report to the New Spain government in practice, but to the Council of the Indies.
[2] Morelos ordered the execution of Gonzalez Mollinedo OTL, after unsuccessfully attempting to repel an insurgent offensive on Oaxaca in 1812. That event occurs here a year earlier, but with Don Antonio acting as the invader, not the defender.
[3] San Salvador had a sophisticated network of Creole families, including politicians and clergymen, who sought to control the city. These families were hurt by the interference of Guatemalan traders, who fixed indigo prices in the region. This, in addition to the events in New Spain and the already known Creole-Peninsular dispute, led to the aforementioned events.
[4] The events in San Salvador inspired other towns to form their own local juntas, which in some cases went beyond the political and demanded the end of tributes and alcabalas, something similar to what happened in New Spain. In some cases, as in San Miguel, the opposite occurred: locals opposing such juntas and calling for the defense of "God, king and country".
[5] According to T. Hawkins in his book "José de Bustamante and Central American Independence[...]", at least one letter was sent to Morelos on May 1, 1813, as well as plans to form a constitution that would result in an elected junta and a three-person Executive. I will assume that in this timeline the letter is real and is sent with tones of sympathy for the republican government, judging from the reference in the supposedly extant OTL content.
[6] Some sources mention that on January 8, 1812, the Grenadians seized Fort San Carlos, located at the exit of the San Juan River, on Lake Cocibolca, captured the Spaniards and took their weapons, which was used as a "casus belli" to intervene in Granada. Since I confirmed the existence of said Fort, I will assume that the information is true.
[7] In the case of León, the Intendant of Nicaragua, José Salvador y Antoli, was removed and replaced by Nicolas García Jerez as interim Intendant. In addition, a Government Junta was formed, which was not recognized by the other town councils in Nicaragua, being forced to be dissolved by García Jerez due to the threat of the Captain General. In the case of Granada, an open cabildo was called, led only by Creoles, which gave fidelity to the Junta of León, and once this disappeared, they rejected the authority of García Jerez, Granada being functionally a self-government, which derived in a military intervention.
[8] In OTL, this is also the case, but the difference is that, in general, Bustamante's actions are not unique, as the Novo-Hispanic government also resorted to increasingly extremist tactics to destroy the insurgents and their sympathizers. Here, Bustamante stands alone. This is, more or less, the POD with respect to Central America: the isolation of the Captaincy makes Bustamante more and more intransigent and refuses all compromise since, to be fair, he is isolated. However, since there is no viceregal government to help (and influence) him, counterinsurgency actions are less effective, beyond the suppression of individual liberties that could legally exist, as well as the generalized increase of repression at the hands of loyalist militias, acting as police bodies with extraordinary powers, which is certainly not to the liking of the majority of Creoles.
[9] In January 1812 Tegucigalpa suffered a rebellion of pardo (descendants of Europeans, indigenous and blacks together) and ladino (mestizos) origin led by the Creoles Julian Romero and José Antonio Rojas. Although the rebellion originally had a moderate objective (the deposition of two ordinary mayors), the two aforementioned individuals attempted to steer it in a more radical direction (schooling for caste children, representation of the "lower classes" (castas) in local government, etc.).
[10] The Royal Audiencia rejected the OTL superintendence for fear that Bustamante's government could be seen as a despotic government. Here, under the situation of total isolation, the Audiencia accepts. The patriotic donations, on the other hand, are unchanged.
[11] As far as is known, the members involved in the so-called "Conjuration" met from October 28 until the end of December 1813 in said Convent, but it is not known what they discussed there, beyond complaints about the situation between Creoles and Peninsulares, and the need for reforms. Once detained, the government of Bustamente accused them of sedition for planning a coup d'état and seeking independence. There are also mentions that they may have recited a proclamation (it is not known which one in particular) by Morelos, but this is nothing more than speculation. The situation in Mexico here allows me to use this information vacuum to give the Conjura a little more radicalism and that the accusations made against them OTL are actually true here (TTL): an armed rebellion.
[12] The present capital is "Nueva Guatemala de la Asunción", or simply Guatemala City. The "Antigua Guatemala" mentioned here still exists, and is officially called "Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala". An earthquake in 1773 left the old capital severely damaged, which was the perfect excuse to build a new capital in a more suitable location, resulting in the founding of Guatemala City.
[13] In January 1814, the city of San Salvador again rebelled to oust the Salvadoran intendant, José María Peinado. Apparently, the local government had held elections, largely won by Creoles, who were in constant friction with the mayor. Here, the rebellion occurs more or less in a similar way, although there is some solidarity between the Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels. In addition, the seizure of control of the city of San Salvador lasts somewhat longer (OTL did not last more than a week).
[14] This corps also existed in New Spain OTL, in this case it was dismantled for the most part after Hidalgo's victory in 1811.
[15] Currently San Cristobal de las Casas. Ciudad Real was its name until 1829 OTL.
[16] The opposite happened OTL when Central America joined the First Mexican Empire. Here, with the Republicans having political supremacy, they are more likely to demand an autonomous situation.
[17] If federalism was able to be implemented in Mexico OTL, it was because the joint effects of the Bourbon reforms, the Cadiz Constitution and the administrative configuration created a series of regional oligarchies, which negotiated among themselves to form the so-called Federal Pact. A more radicalized and independent Mexico ahead of time may limit to some extent (but not eliminate, since this is impossible) the regionalism of such groups of oligarchs, since Creole exclusionism is less prominent.
[2] Morelos ordered the execution of Gonzalez Mollinedo OTL, after unsuccessfully attempting to repel an insurgent offensive on Oaxaca in 1812. That event occurs here a year earlier, but with Don Antonio acting as the invader, not the defender.
[3] San Salvador had a sophisticated network of Creole families, including politicians and clergymen, who sought to control the city. These families were hurt by the interference of Guatemalan traders, who fixed indigo prices in the region. This, in addition to the events in New Spain and the already known Creole-Peninsular dispute, led to the aforementioned events.
[4] The events in San Salvador inspired other towns to form their own local juntas, which in some cases went beyond the political and demanded the end of tributes and alcabalas, something similar to what happened in New Spain. In some cases, as in San Miguel, the opposite occurred: locals opposing such juntas and calling for the defense of "God, king and country".
[5] According to T. Hawkins in his book "José de Bustamante and Central American Independence[...]", at least one letter was sent to Morelos on May 1, 1813, as well as plans to form a constitution that would result in an elected junta and a three-person Executive. I will assume that in this timeline the letter is real and is sent with tones of sympathy for the republican government, judging from the reference in the supposedly extant OTL content.
[6] Some sources mention that on January 8, 1812, the Grenadians seized Fort San Carlos, located at the exit of the San Juan River, on Lake Cocibolca, captured the Spaniards and took their weapons, which was used as a "casus belli" to intervene in Granada. Since I confirmed the existence of said Fort, I will assume that the information is true.
[7] In the case of León, the Intendant of Nicaragua, José Salvador y Antoli, was removed and replaced by Nicolas García Jerez as interim Intendant. In addition, a Government Junta was formed, which was not recognized by the other town councils in Nicaragua, being forced to be dissolved by García Jerez due to the threat of the Captain General. In the case of Granada, an open cabildo was called, led only by Creoles, which gave fidelity to the Junta of León, and once this disappeared, they rejected the authority of García Jerez, Granada being functionally a self-government, which derived in a military intervention.
[8] In OTL, this is also the case, but the difference is that, in general, Bustamante's actions are not unique, as the Novo-Hispanic government also resorted to increasingly extremist tactics to destroy the insurgents and their sympathizers. Here, Bustamante stands alone. This is, more or less, the POD with respect to Central America: the isolation of the Captaincy makes Bustamante more and more intransigent and refuses all compromise since, to be fair, he is isolated. However, since there is no viceregal government to help (and influence) him, counterinsurgency actions are less effective, beyond the suppression of individual liberties that could legally exist, as well as the generalized increase of repression at the hands of loyalist militias, acting as police bodies with extraordinary powers, which is certainly not to the liking of the majority of Creoles.
[9] In January 1812 Tegucigalpa suffered a rebellion of pardo (descendants of Europeans, indigenous and blacks together) and ladino (mestizos) origin led by the Creoles Julian Romero and José Antonio Rojas. Although the rebellion originally had a moderate objective (the deposition of two ordinary mayors), the two aforementioned individuals attempted to steer it in a more radical direction (schooling for caste children, representation of the "lower classes" (castas) in local government, etc.).
[10] The Royal Audiencia rejected the OTL superintendence for fear that Bustamante's government could be seen as a despotic government. Here, under the situation of total isolation, the Audiencia accepts. The patriotic donations, on the other hand, are unchanged.
[11] As far as is known, the members involved in the so-called "Conjuration" met from October 28 until the end of December 1813 in said Convent, but it is not known what they discussed there, beyond complaints about the situation between Creoles and Peninsulares, and the need for reforms. Once detained, the government of Bustamente accused them of sedition for planning a coup d'état and seeking independence. There are also mentions that they may have recited a proclamation (it is not known which one in particular) by Morelos, but this is nothing more than speculation. The situation in Mexico here allows me to use this information vacuum to give the Conjura a little more radicalism and that the accusations made against them OTL are actually true here (TTL): an armed rebellion.
[12] The present capital is "Nueva Guatemala de la Asunción", or simply Guatemala City. The "Antigua Guatemala" mentioned here still exists, and is officially called "Santiago de los Caballeros de Guatemala". An earthquake in 1773 left the old capital severely damaged, which was the perfect excuse to build a new capital in a more suitable location, resulting in the founding of Guatemala City.
[13] In January 1814, the city of San Salvador again rebelled to oust the Salvadoran intendant, José María Peinado. Apparently, the local government had held elections, largely won by Creoles, who were in constant friction with the mayor. Here, the rebellion occurs more or less in a similar way, although there is some solidarity between the Salvadoran and Guatemalan rebels. In addition, the seizure of control of the city of San Salvador lasts somewhat longer (OTL did not last more than a week).
[14] This corps also existed in New Spain OTL, in this case it was dismantled for the most part after Hidalgo's victory in 1811.
[15] Currently San Cristobal de las Casas. Ciudad Real was its name until 1829 OTL.
[16] The opposite happened OTL when Central America joined the First Mexican Empire. Here, with the Republicans having political supremacy, they are more likely to demand an autonomous situation.
[17] If federalism was able to be implemented in Mexico OTL, it was because the joint effects of the Bourbon reforms, the Cadiz Constitution and the administrative configuration created a series of regional oligarchies, which negotiated among themselves to form the so-called Federal Pact. A more radicalized and independent Mexico ahead of time may limit to some extent (but not eliminate, since this is impossible) the regionalism of such groups of oligarchs, since Creole exclusionism is less prominent.
