The Confederacy has a better administrator in charge here, but her resources are fundamentally limited. How long does the war have to go on before the massive material superiority of the Union really becomes prominent?
Until Every Drop of Blood Is Paid: A More Radical American Civil War
- Thread starter Red_Galiray
- Start date
This could be used to make him blunder so badly in demanding retreat that it makes the army vulnerable. All Lee has to do is make him retreat and force open one weakness.
It won't so long as McClellan is in command and since he is set-up to blunder massively probably a few years. If he doesn't outright lose the Union the war, if there is any man who could do so it is McClellan.
Quite. He is blindly arrogant so if Lee overcommits to do that he will assume the Confederate army is even bigger than his absurd estimations and retreat in panic allowing Lee to extract a heavy toll and regain land.
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Happy 155th anniversary of the Appomattox Court House surrender everyone. Also DOWN WITH THE TRAITORS UP WITH THE STARS! THE UNION FOREVER HURRAH BOYS HURRAH!
He ended up dying of his wounds, right? I've always wondered how can you die of a wound several decades later.
We shall see indeed.
I agree that encircling McClellan would be almost impossible, since he's so obsessed with the idea of having a safe retreat line and would probably flee at the first sight of danger.
The piecemeal approach is probably... especially because McClellan has no qualms about abandoning officers he doesn't like.
I wouldn't say direct command, though his orders at the Valley were definitely a blunder, had more capable people been at charge it's likely that Stonewall could at least have received a bloody nose. Instead, Commissary Banks and the Wholly Horse were humiliated.
Wasn't that kind of what happened? I need to brush up on the Peninsula Campaign, but if I remember correctly the Union Army was divided by the Chickahominy (McPherson even names the chapter "Billy Yank's Chickahominy Blues").
Food shortages, the lack of arms, and bad logistics are already acute problems. No matter how good he is, Breckenridge can't summon food or guns out of thin air. Nonetheless, the OTL situation where barns of grain rotted away while soldiers and civilians went hungry will probably be averted - at least until Yankee brigands start to apply some neckties. Problems should increase towards the start of 1863 - Breckinridge just managed to delay the inevitable around 6 months.
If McClellan retreats and that results in Lee achieving a crushing victory, that would be very bad optics for him.
Simple math and logic would be able to disprove that the Confederacy with some 5 million white males would be able to outnumber the 21 million loyal citizens of the North. Yet he clung to that belief...
The Union Forever!
the part in this video abput not having a real break is what got me
for me and i am sure many slavery was a historical issue that exists solely in history class as an historical fact.
yet it hurt people not only in the whippings and family serperation but even with the "kind" slave owners.it is a system that fundamentally is always harmful to the human soil .i can't understood how some slave owners understood that and yet were okay living with it or even fighting for it.
for me and i am sure many slavery was a historical issue that exists solely in history class as an historical fact.
yet it hurt people not only in the whippings and family serperation but even with the "kind" slave owners.it is a system that fundamentally is always harmful to the human soil .i can't understood how some slave owners understood that and yet were okay living with it or even fighting for it.
Kitiem3000
Donor
I never really cared that much about the realities of slavery (not being an American), but sometimes you see or read something that really hammers it home.
Like this article; America’s Breeding Farms: What History Books Never Told You
Like this article; America’s Breeding Farms: What History Books Never Told You
...every time I think that I know the worst thing about slavery, I find out something even worse.
Holy shit.
I just finished reading this wonderful TL after about three days, and I have only one thing to say: Bravo!
Chapter 31: We're Foes unto Wrong and Oppression!
The timing of the Peninsula Campaign was unfortunate. September was the sickest month of the year, and in 1862 it was one of the wettest as well. This would have spelled trouble even for an aggressive and dynamic general, but George McClellan was neither. Fort Monroe was in the peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers. Not far from the fort stood Yorktown, famous as the place where Cornwallis had surrendered to Washington. Confederate commander Magruder, known as the “Master of Ceremonies” due to the theatrical shows he had mounted for McClellan at Annapolis and Anacostia, was guarding the line. McClellan once again fell for this old trick, and in September 23rd, after constating the supposedly endless rebel legions, McClellan laid siege.
The news, naturally, alarmed Lincoln. "It is indispensable to you that you strike a blow.”, the President practically pleaded, “The country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy, is but the story of Annapolis repeated.” This seemed to strike a raw nerve, for Annapolis had been undoubtedly McClellan’s greatest failure. Even at the moment, some newspapers were still all but accusing him of murdering McDowell through his inaction. McClellan, for his part, accused the Republicans of conspiring to make him fail. “The abolitionists are doing their best to displace me”, he told Halleck, “You have no idea of the undying hate with which they pressure me.”
Part of the pressure was, of course, that Lincoln and Stanton had not allowed McClellan to take the entire army with him. A significant fraction of the Confederate Army remained at Manassas, just a few miles outside of the recently liberated Washington. They were a real threat, and though the President and the apparatus of government remained in Philadelphia, the Union could not afford to lose Washington again. Consequently, 50,000 men under Hooker remained in Washington, ready to defend the city from the rebels, and other 20,000 under Frémont were in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan was allowed to take the other half of the army, that is, some 80,000 soldiers. The number was enough by itself to overwhelm Magruder’s 13,000 rebels, and since some Southern units remained at Manassas, Lee had at most 50,000 to face Little Mac.
Nonetheless, McClellan believed himself outnumbered. This could be explained as a way to lay the blame on Lincoln, for McClellan claimed that in retaining troops in Washington Lincoln was setting him up for failure and taking away the soldiers he desperately needed in order to overcome the rebel defenses. In response to Lincoln’s plea to take action, McClellan only stated that he could not attack the rebels with his present numbers. Lincoln then promised to send Hooker’s 50,000 if the enemy retreated from Manassas. Though some members of the government, such as Meigs, recognized that it was unlikely for the rebels to try and take back “the ashes of Washington” when their own capital was threatened, Lincoln’s decision to keep troops around the city was not illogical or mean-spirited as McClellan believed it was.
John B. Magruder
When he left for Fort Monroe, McClellan had vowed that he would no longer fall prey to the “petty intrigues, zealotry, military ignorance, and self-serving partisanship” of his enemies, but now it seemed to him that his campaign was doomed unless it was conducted with the precise, cautious approach to the arts of war that characterized him. Despite warnings from political allies that he needed to cooperate with the government (Francis P. Blair told him that “no general can succeed without proper relations with the Administration.”), McClellan refused to heed Lincoln’s advice or even his orders. Indeed, McClellan bitterly resented Lincoln’s prodding, even telling his wife that if Lincoln wanted the rebel lines taken “he had better come & do it himself." This did not augur well for the military fortunes of the Union.
Even as Lincoln struggled with the ego of his general, despair ruled the day in Richmond. Breckenridge was said to be “greatly depressed in spirits”, and when some Senators visited him and saw his pitiable condition, he could only say “Gentlemen, this is what’s left of me.” Davis’ niece too reported that “Uncle Jeff. is miserable. . . . Our reverses distressed him so much. . . . The cause of the Confederacy looks drooping and sinking . . . I am ready to sink with despair.” The Confederacy needed a victory, or else it would shatter. It was in such a mood that Robert E. Lee arrived at Richmond, summoned as Johnston’s replacement. Lee quickly took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which finally assumed that name officially – it had been called the First Confederate Army until then.
Breckenridge’s initial skepticism was soon overcome, and he was now able “to see true light . . . for the first time in many months” as the military talents of Lee revealed themselves. Serving as the de facto General in-chief of the Confederacy, Lee took several measures in order to strengthen the Confederate forces and enhance the CSA’s chances of survival. Despite waspish criticism within the press and McClellan’s joyful exclamation that Lee was "cautious and weak under grave responsibilty . . . likely to be timid and irresolute in action", the Virginian set to work re-organizing the Army and developing an offensive-defensive master-stroke that, far from the clumsy offensives of Beauregard and A. S. Johnston, would be able to destroy the Union Army in a later-day Waterloo.
For the moment, Lee just ordered Magruder to hold the line, so as to slow down McClellan. The renewed effort at fortification caused taunts of “King of Spades” in the newspapers, but in truth Lee was trying to lure McClellan into a trap. It was, in fact, a rather obvious one: since McClellan was going up the peninsula, he would have to ford the Chickahominy at some point. Lee would then be able to confront each half of the Yankee Army separately, thus nullifying the Union’s superior numbers. Lee also send Stonewall Jackson to the Shenandoah Valley, after hearing from a Maryland Confederate that the 70,000 men not in McClellan’s Army would not be send if Washington was threatened. Jackson, till then wasted on defense, was the man for the job.
Francis Preston Blair
Though disillusioned by defeat, the Army of Northern Virginia had by then developed a strong spirit de corps, and Lee, after careful study of the performance of several commanders under Beauregard and Johnston, was able to reorganize the army into two unified corps, instead of the rather unmanageable 9 divisions of Johnston. Magruder, good for theatrics but not for fighting, was relegated to a secondary role as capable men such as Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart were promoted. In doing this, Lee was seeking to “forge its chain of command into an extension of his will.” The President was awed when he visited the rejuvenated Army of Northern Virginia.
When the decisive time came, Lee was ready to face McClellan, who continued to lose time bringing in heavy siege guns to Yorktown. Whereas Marse Lee’s charm and leadership were injecting morale and discipline into a dispirited command, Little Mac’s charisma and organization were unable to overcome the morale and leadership crisis of the Army of the Susquehanna. Part of the blame laid with McClellan, of course, because he encouraged such demoralization with his unsubtle criticism of the “radical war” and his obvious contempt for the corps commanders not aligned with him. Thus, the Union Army floundered under divided leadership, disease and demoralization while the Southern Army regained strength and spirit under Lee.
This “miraculous transformation” was punctuated by Breckinridge’s visit to the Army camps. A compassionate man, greatly popular with the common folk who made the bulk of the Army, Breckinridge was cheered openly by soldiers who saw him as their defender from corrupt and incompetent officials. He entered an Army hospital to bid farewell to many dying soldiers, and the hardened rebels observed how he took time to console everyone. ''Breck's tones were as tender as if he were talking to his own son," one commented later. "His presence had a magical effect upon the men," wrote another man, “for he shared our hardships and felt our sorrows. With him at the lead, we are sure to defeat the tyrant.”
"Come, my brave boys, and follow General Lee faithfully—he will lead you on to victory!", said the President as he departed. Immediately, loud cheering and rebel yells resonated as the men pledged their loyalty to “Johnny Breck”, who only smiled at the affectionate nickname. Lee, for the moment, received no cheers, though he was quick to earn the men’s respect at least. Nonetheless, his actions over the next few weeks assured that a strong, fierce loyalty to Marse Lee would also grow within the ranks. Despite privations and penuries, the Rebels were motivated to fight against McClellan’s Yankee invaders, who were now coming after taking Yorktown.
General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia
In October 20th, Magruder was instructed to withdraw from Yorktown. Joe Johnston, reduced to an insignificant role as a military inspector, observed that the defenses were so weak that "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack.” As in after Anacostia, Breckenridge had made careful preparations for a masterful retreat, though he was painfully aware that retreats would not win the war. He reflected gloomily on this fact when a subordinate called the retreat “a practical victory”, observing that “another such victory will sink the Confederacy.” Optics were key again, and even though Longstreet successfully slowed down McClellan through a rear-guard action that took 2,200 Yankees for the price of 1,500 rebels, journals in the North celebrated that McClellan had the rebels on the run for Richmond.
Of course, the truth was other, but with the elections of November a couple weeks away, the Lincoln administration’s enemies were “submerged under the most profound despair and consternation.” The National Union had been unable to formulate a unified response to the Emancipation Proclamation and the other radical actions of the government. Certainly, they unanimously disapproved the measure, but how to express this opposition was another matter. Lincoln had expertly framed the Proclamation as purely a military matter, rather than a moral decision. Military victories at Corinth, Kings Creek, and New Orleans had apparently showed the success of the policy, and Chesnut protests that these victories had nothing to do with the Proclamation were feeble and ineffective.
National Unionists hadn’t anticipated the tremendous excitement within the people and eventual acceptance within the Army either. John Hay, for example, noted how a multitude of serenaters came to Chase’s windows, and “gleefully and merrily called each other and themselves abolitionists, and seemed to enjoy the novel sensation of appropriating that horrible name.” Prominent politicians remarked with horror how “the radical and bloody doctrines” of the Republicans were being accepted by the people, who extended their confidence to Lincoln and his prosecution of the war.
In truth, the response to the Proclamation was not as positive as sullen Chesnuts believed. Though there was plenty of praise, which Lincoln considered gratifying, he told Hamlin that “The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath . . . but breath alone kills no rebels.” Similarly, many romantic revolutionaries had endorsed the proclamation. But the far more important opinions of the statesmen and dignitaries of Europe were negative. Lord Russell went as far as predicting “acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge” as a result of the Proclamation, and many Britons, though pleased by the shift from a war to subjugate an independence movement to a war for human freedom, were skecptical of the American’s altruism due to the exceptions the Proclamation contained.
Montgomery Blair
Lincoln’s greatest worry, nonetheless, remained the conservative reaction. Montgomery Blair had warned the President that the Proclamation would give the National Unionists "a club . . . to beat the Administration" in the coming elections, and objected to its immediate implementation. When Lincoln simply answered that the Chesnut’s clubs “would be used against us take what course we might” and pressed ahead, Blair presented his resignation, which Lincoln decided to accept. The Blair Clan’s alienation from the Lincoln administration was complete. This incident, more than anything, represents the desertion of many conservative elements that were willing to fight for Union, but utterly refused to fight for abolition. With this in mind, National Unionists started a political campaign that had opposition to slave emancipation as its cornerstone.
In New York, factions of Democrats and National Unionists bitterly divided by the legacy of the Douglas-Buchanan feud were able to unite once again in order to oppose the Proclamation. Under the banner of the “National Democracy”, they united in a fusion ticket that decried the Proclamation as "a proposal for the butchery of women and children, for scenes of lust and rapine, and of arson and murder." The conservative but colorless Horatio Seymour was nominated as the Party’s nominee, despite speeches that reeked of disloyalty. For instance, he proclaimed that "If it be true that slavery must be abolished to save this Union, then the people of the South should be allowed to withdraw themselves from the government which cannot give them the protection guaranteed by its terms."
Many New York newspapers echoed the opposition of Seymour, though few approached calls for peace like he did. The New York Evening Express called the Proclamation “an act of revolution” that would make “the restoration of the old Constitution and Union impossible.” It was true that this was the aim of the Proclamation, but it’s needless to say that the newspaper considered this a disastrous consequence. The New York Journal of Commerce predicted that due to the Proclamation the war would continue “in a dark future, in which the end is beyond our vision.” An alarmed correspondent wrote Secretary Chase, saying that throughout the North Chesnuts were saying “I told you so, can’t you see this is an Abolition war?” to every disaffected person.
Similar bitter denunciations echoed throughout the rest of the North. One party convention went as far as asserting that “the South cannot be subdued and ought not to be subdued” if abolition was the aim of the war. “In the name of God, no more bloodshed to gratify a religious fanaticism”, they implored. An editor called for “the despot Lincoln” to “meet with the fate he deserves: hung, shot, or burned”; another agreed, saying that "true Americans” saw “no reason why they should be shot for the benefit of niggers." “The measure is wholly unwarrantable and wholly pernicious,” said some more sober Chesnut editorials in Pennsylvania. Giant meetings of National Unionists assembled in response to the parades that had celebrated the Proclamation, accusing the Republicans of being “Nigger Worshippers” and saying that the measure would cause “a swarthy inundation of negro laborers and paupers”
In the Northwest, in Douglas country where there was less need to appeal to the old Buchaneers, the Illinois and Ohio Chesnuts nonetheless followed the lead of their Eastern brethren and denounced the Proclamation as “another advance in the Robespierrian highway of tyranny and anarchy.” A newspaper said it would “render eternal the hatred between the two sections”, and another brandished proof of the Army’s demoralization to claim that “the vulgar usurper we are forced to call Mr. President” would destroy the Army, thus retrospectively making “the sacrifice of thousands of brave white men” a sacrifice for the “sake of niggers and abolitionists.” “Did your son, your brother, your father die for negroes?”, a speaker asked yeomen of Southern Illinois. “No! No! No!”, answered they.
Horatio Seymour
However, under the curtain of unity of purpose, the National Democracy was in fact still very divided. National Unionists usually remained committed to the restoration of the Union, but how to restore it was another matter. Following Douglas’ lead, many remained “War Unionists” who supported the restoration of the Union through arms. Though understandably alienated by what they saw as a change in the purpose of the war, they did not regard peace as an alternative solution either. Reviled as “Copperheads”, after the poisonous snake, many Chesnuts openly called for peace, which, they believed, would allow for peaceful reunion through a convention of states.
This was nothing but a “fond delusion”, for both War Union men and Republicans recognized that the Confederacy had no intention to submit unless it was forced to. Breckenridge, nonetheless, encouraged Copperhead prospects through careful doublespeak that a Northern newspaper called “the most impressive circus trick of North America – watch, as Johnny Breck promises both peaceful reunion and warlike resistance to the last!” For example, he famously declared that he was ready “for peace negotiations, if honorable terms are offered in good faith.” For Southerners, honorable terms meant independence; for Northerners, it may mean reunion. Breckenridge was unable to push this Machiavellian strategy as much as he wanted because he feared that overdoing it would seem “a confession of weakness” at a critical moment. However, he still managed to mislead some Northerners.
Perhaps the Copperheads wanted to be misled. Either way, pro-peace rhetoric rose during the electoral campaign as speakers gloomily painted pictures of endless war and more bloodshed. Calls for “resistance to the last” against “Lincoln’s Dictatorship” abounded. Seymour went as far as calling for men to “resist, at all costs” the “unconstitutional and treasonable” decrees of the government. “Better to lose your life in the struggle for freedom than in the struggle for the negro”, he concluded. When the patriotic song “We Are Coming Father Abraham” gained popularity in the North, Chesnuts created a parody that encapsulated their reasons for opposing the war:
Aside from hostility to Black emancipation, Copperhead sentiments also responded to disillusionment with the war. Even a Republican admitted that “After a year and a half of trial, and a pouring out of blood and treasure, and the maiming and death of thousands, we have made no sensible progress.” The Lincoln Administration, in the view of many, had been a “flat, regrettable failure”, and the Chief Executive of the Nation “would only be remembered by his incompetence, his tyranny, and his idiocy.” Union victories did not matter because “the final blow” had not been given yet despite much fanfare. An Ohio man, for example, bitterly complained that the Peninsula Campaign was the “fourth or fifth” offensive advertised as the final one. Within public opinion, thus, “Union armies seemed on occasion to be successful but never victorious.” The result was that Copperheads increasingly called for peace.
Anti-Copperhead Political Cartoon
This War Unionists could not accept. In a time when the rebels were on the run on all fronts and military victory seemed in sight, many regarded asking for a peace conference to be “a disastrous, dishonorable surrender”. Indeed, “why should we yield to rebel threats”, asked a newspaper, “when General McClellan will soon dine in Richmond?” “Should be surrender the blood of thousands of loyal men and tell them that their sacrifice was for naught?”, asked rhetorically a speaker, “Now, when the culmination of our efforts seem so near?” Others easily saw through Breckenridge’s “circus tricks” and recognized that military victory was the only way to assure the restoration of the Union. “Johnny Breck, Jeff Davis and all the other traitors encourage you to vote for Seymour, the candidate of treason, slavery and cowardice”, said campaign signs in New York. To accusations that Wadsworth would inaugurate "the worst reign of Terror since the French Revolution", Republicans answered that "a vote for Seymour is a vote for treason."
Ironically enough, some National Unionists opposed peace because they could see that “the only way for Lincoln’s black designs” to be completed would be if the war continued. “Speedy victory and fraternal reunion”, they argued, would put an immediate end “to the murderous Proclamation”. It was, then, the duty of every patriot to support the government for the moment. Otherwise, they warned, “the accursed doctrines of the Black Republicans will reach triumphant conclusions.” Simply put, to continue the war longer than necessary would also “prolong the suffering of the White men, women and children of the South at the hands of criminal fanatics and Negro murderers.” If the war ended right there and then, there was still hope of restoring the Union as it was – after all, the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation was doubtful and many areas of the South had been untouched by war.
Of course, they did not want Republicans at the helm when the Restauration of the Union started. They wanted “every Black Republican” to be “shamed, humiliated and defeated” in the elections, but War Unionists, committed to ending the war “on honorable terms” rather than the Copperhead’s “dishonorable surrender” should be the ones elected. Whatever the rhetoric behind the split, the concrete result was that the fusion tickets of the “National Democracy” failed, and in many states both War Unionists and Copperheads ran, splitting the anti-Republican vote, lending strength to the Lincoln Administration, and, most unfortunate of all for the Chesnuts, smoothing over factional differences within the Republicans.
The clearest example is New York, where General John A. Dix was recruited to head a “Constitutional Re-Union” ticket that opposed both Seymour’s “National Democracy” and the Republican candidacy of the “earnest abolitionist” James S. Wadsworth. Beforehand, Seward and his political associate Thurlow Weed had tried to draft Dix for a Union Party ticket that would broaden the basis of the Republicans in New York, but they were opposed by radicals lead by Horace Greeley, who supported Wadsworth. The feud threatened to weaken both radicals and conservatives within the state, but when news came that Dix accepted the “Re-Union” nomination instead, Seward and Weed threw their support to Wadsworth, even if reluctantly.
John A. Dix
The Lincoln Administration also robbed National Unionists of two issues they had been ready to trumpet during the campaign: civil liberties and the economic situation. In the first case, perhaps this was less indicative of a careful scheme by Lincoln than of the new fortune of the Union. With victory in sight and Maryland liberated, Lincoln directed Stanton to free the few political prisoners that remained, ironically earning the Secretary of War some very brief praise as a civil libertarian. Alleging that “every department of the Government was paralyzed by treason, and demoralized due to the capture of the Federal capital” as a justification for the previous measures, Lincoln now proclaimed that "The insurrection is believed to have culminated and to be declining.” “In view of these facts and anxious to favor a return to the normal course of the administration," Lincoln thus released prisoners and ordered the process of recruitment slowed down.
When it comes to the economy, the situation had been perilous indeed for the Union. As McPherson details, “for a time in the winter of 1861-62, fiscal problems threatened to overwhelm the Union cause.” Secession naturally had caused an economic panic as people ran to the banks and withdrew as much specie as they could. Threats of war with Britain and the slow pace of the war eroded confidence on the government, and towards the end of 1861 many banks suspended specie payments. The legacy of hard-money Jacksonian doctrine aggravated the problem because payments to the Treasury were delivered in specie to government vaults, where it “remained idle for weeks . . . while bank reserves dropped toward the danger point.”
Lincoln played almost no part in the efforts to solve the crisis because he was no expert on finance. Secretary Chase was not an expert either, but he was an able man who learned quickly and counted with the support of good advisers, such as the banker Jay Cooke. Through a combination of short-term loans such as “five-twenties” and “seven-thirties”, Chase was able to keep the government’s credit afloat. Cooke, furthermore, pioneered the kind of patriotic advertising that would become common-place in the 20th century, marketing the bonds even to ordinary people. Despite accusations of undue profiteering, Cooke only earned some 700,000 dollars out of 400 million of five-twenties and 800 of seven-thirties. Altogether, Cooke’s advertising “was a cheaper and more efficient means of selling bonds to the masses than the government could have achieved in any other way.”
Increased tariffs and the first ever federal income tax in American history supplemented the Northern economy, and the progressive nature of the tax bill lessened its impact, because the tax was only leveled on annual incomes over $800 – thus excepting most of the working men of the country. Despite these efforts, it was clear that a solution for the specie problem would have to be found soon. Chase finally “proposed the chartering of national banks authorized to issue notes secured by government bonds.” This would eventually result in the National Banking Act of 1863, but in the meantime the solution for the emergency was a bill authorizing the Treasury to print $150 million notes, which would be legal tender “receivable for all debts public or private except interest on government bonds and customs duties.”
Greenback bill engraved with Lincoln's face
National Unionists, heirs of the Jacksonian doctrine, protested this measure. Their arguments ranged from Constitutional ones (saying that under the Constitution Congress could only issue metal coins) to the theological (“gold and silver are the only true measure of value. These metals were prepared by the Almighty for this very purpose.") In any case, the undercurrent of this opposition was the belief that fiat money could not be “kept at par value, except by its speedy, cheap, certain convertibility into gold and silver.” "Prices will be inflated . . . incomes will depreciate; the savings of the poor will vanish; the hoardings of the widow will melt away; bonds, mortgages, and notes—everything of fixed value—will lose their value," they warned, doubtlessly with the disastrous inflation of the American Continental and Confederate “grayback” in mind.
Republicans ignored these arguments, and even some who harbored doubts about whether the bill was wise or not ultimately voted for it due to the pressing necessity of funding the government. Chase drove the point home when he informed the Congress that "Immediate action is of great importance” because “The Treasury is nearly empty." Senator William Pitt Fessenden, despite saying that the bill “shocks all my notions of political, moral, and national honor” voted for it since "to leave the government without resources in such a crisis is not to be thought of." Almost all Republicans voted for the bill; almost all National Unionists voted against it. The Legal Tender Act of 1862 became law when Lincoln signed it on February 25th.
The act was a big success, creating “a national currency” and altering “the monetary structure of the United States”. In the words of James McPherson:
Besides the “underlying strength” of the Northern economy, the act was a success due to being issued during a period of military success. With McClellan pursuing the fleeing rebels to Richmond and Grant about to take Vicksburg, the enthusiasm of the Northern people was high in the sky, and their trust in their commander in-chief was reinforced. The National Unionists were unable to overcome their differences and find a coherent program of opposition besides simple racism. News that the ailing Douglas had finally succumbed to cirrhosis of the liver came at the worst time, and at the end Republican turnout was high while it was depressed in Chesnut areas. The National Union, as a result, was “routed and whipped” by the Republicans in the 1862 mid-terms. Republicans won the governors election in New York, elected several Missouri congressmen, and made a net gain in the Senate.
The Elections of 1862
To be sure, the opposition did manage to win some pivotal battles, including the governorship and legislature of New Jersey, the legislature of Indiana, and several seats in the Lower North. But they failed to take the legislature of Illinois, and only won a miserable 10 congressmen. The Republicans had a 123 majority in the House, that is, only 2 representatives over the 2/3rds required for a supermajority. In the Senate, the picture was grimmer – Republicans held 35 seats, 4 more than the 31 required for a supermajority. Exultant Republicans called the election “a great, sweeping revolution of public sentiment . . . the triumphal victory of freedom and emancipation”, and asserted that the results showed “a severe reproof” to the National Unionists and the acceptance of the Northern people of the Emancipation Proclamation and Union and Liberty as war objectives.
The greatest irony of McClellan’s career as a general is how his cautiousness probably resulted in this Republican victory, thus assuring Republican control and greater radicalization as Party leaders interpreted the election as an endorsement of their measures. McClellan, the War Unionist, also ensured that the National Union would become a completely Copperhead Party after the War wing had failed so miserably. However, while the Republican Party utterly crushed their rivals in the polls, McClellan was marching right into Lee’s trap, and after this spectacular victory, the Lincoln Administration would receive one of its most severe defeats. The fortunate timing of the elections can’t be overstated, because it allowed the Lincoln Administration to govern with wide majorities whereas the Union war machine might have been permanently stopped had the National Unionists won. But the fact that in the coming months the Union would fall from the heights of enthusiasm to which it had climbed to the depths of gloom and consternation cannot be ignored.
The news, naturally, alarmed Lincoln. "It is indispensable to you that you strike a blow.”, the President practically pleaded, “The country will not fail to note—is now noting—that the present hesitation to move upon an entrenched enemy, is but the story of Annapolis repeated.” This seemed to strike a raw nerve, for Annapolis had been undoubtedly McClellan’s greatest failure. Even at the moment, some newspapers were still all but accusing him of murdering McDowell through his inaction. McClellan, for his part, accused the Republicans of conspiring to make him fail. “The abolitionists are doing their best to displace me”, he told Halleck, “You have no idea of the undying hate with which they pressure me.”
Part of the pressure was, of course, that Lincoln and Stanton had not allowed McClellan to take the entire army with him. A significant fraction of the Confederate Army remained at Manassas, just a few miles outside of the recently liberated Washington. They were a real threat, and though the President and the apparatus of government remained in Philadelphia, the Union could not afford to lose Washington again. Consequently, 50,000 men under Hooker remained in Washington, ready to defend the city from the rebels, and other 20,000 under Frémont were in the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan was allowed to take the other half of the army, that is, some 80,000 soldiers. The number was enough by itself to overwhelm Magruder’s 13,000 rebels, and since some Southern units remained at Manassas, Lee had at most 50,000 to face Little Mac.
Nonetheless, McClellan believed himself outnumbered. This could be explained as a way to lay the blame on Lincoln, for McClellan claimed that in retaining troops in Washington Lincoln was setting him up for failure and taking away the soldiers he desperately needed in order to overcome the rebel defenses. In response to Lincoln’s plea to take action, McClellan only stated that he could not attack the rebels with his present numbers. Lincoln then promised to send Hooker’s 50,000 if the enemy retreated from Manassas. Though some members of the government, such as Meigs, recognized that it was unlikely for the rebels to try and take back “the ashes of Washington” when their own capital was threatened, Lincoln’s decision to keep troops around the city was not illogical or mean-spirited as McClellan believed it was.
John B. Magruder
When he left for Fort Monroe, McClellan had vowed that he would no longer fall prey to the “petty intrigues, zealotry, military ignorance, and self-serving partisanship” of his enemies, but now it seemed to him that his campaign was doomed unless it was conducted with the precise, cautious approach to the arts of war that characterized him. Despite warnings from political allies that he needed to cooperate with the government (Francis P. Blair told him that “no general can succeed without proper relations with the Administration.”), McClellan refused to heed Lincoln’s advice or even his orders. Indeed, McClellan bitterly resented Lincoln’s prodding, even telling his wife that if Lincoln wanted the rebel lines taken “he had better come & do it himself." This did not augur well for the military fortunes of the Union.
Even as Lincoln struggled with the ego of his general, despair ruled the day in Richmond. Breckenridge was said to be “greatly depressed in spirits”, and when some Senators visited him and saw his pitiable condition, he could only say “Gentlemen, this is what’s left of me.” Davis’ niece too reported that “Uncle Jeff. is miserable. . . . Our reverses distressed him so much. . . . The cause of the Confederacy looks drooping and sinking . . . I am ready to sink with despair.” The Confederacy needed a victory, or else it would shatter. It was in such a mood that Robert E. Lee arrived at Richmond, summoned as Johnston’s replacement. Lee quickly took command of the Army of Northern Virginia, which finally assumed that name officially – it had been called the First Confederate Army until then.
Breckenridge’s initial skepticism was soon overcome, and he was now able “to see true light . . . for the first time in many months” as the military talents of Lee revealed themselves. Serving as the de facto General in-chief of the Confederacy, Lee took several measures in order to strengthen the Confederate forces and enhance the CSA’s chances of survival. Despite waspish criticism within the press and McClellan’s joyful exclamation that Lee was "cautious and weak under grave responsibilty . . . likely to be timid and irresolute in action", the Virginian set to work re-organizing the Army and developing an offensive-defensive master-stroke that, far from the clumsy offensives of Beauregard and A. S. Johnston, would be able to destroy the Union Army in a later-day Waterloo.
For the moment, Lee just ordered Magruder to hold the line, so as to slow down McClellan. The renewed effort at fortification caused taunts of “King of Spades” in the newspapers, but in truth Lee was trying to lure McClellan into a trap. It was, in fact, a rather obvious one: since McClellan was going up the peninsula, he would have to ford the Chickahominy at some point. Lee would then be able to confront each half of the Yankee Army separately, thus nullifying the Union’s superior numbers. Lee also send Stonewall Jackson to the Shenandoah Valley, after hearing from a Maryland Confederate that the 70,000 men not in McClellan’s Army would not be send if Washington was threatened. Jackson, till then wasted on defense, was the man for the job.
Francis Preston Blair
Though disillusioned by defeat, the Army of Northern Virginia had by then developed a strong spirit de corps, and Lee, after careful study of the performance of several commanders under Beauregard and Johnston, was able to reorganize the army into two unified corps, instead of the rather unmanageable 9 divisions of Johnston. Magruder, good for theatrics but not for fighting, was relegated to a secondary role as capable men such as Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart were promoted. In doing this, Lee was seeking to “forge its chain of command into an extension of his will.” The President was awed when he visited the rejuvenated Army of Northern Virginia.
When the decisive time came, Lee was ready to face McClellan, who continued to lose time bringing in heavy siege guns to Yorktown. Whereas Marse Lee’s charm and leadership were injecting morale and discipline into a dispirited command, Little Mac’s charisma and organization were unable to overcome the morale and leadership crisis of the Army of the Susquehanna. Part of the blame laid with McClellan, of course, because he encouraged such demoralization with his unsubtle criticism of the “radical war” and his obvious contempt for the corps commanders not aligned with him. Thus, the Union Army floundered under divided leadership, disease and demoralization while the Southern Army regained strength and spirit under Lee.
This “miraculous transformation” was punctuated by Breckinridge’s visit to the Army camps. A compassionate man, greatly popular with the common folk who made the bulk of the Army, Breckinridge was cheered openly by soldiers who saw him as their defender from corrupt and incompetent officials. He entered an Army hospital to bid farewell to many dying soldiers, and the hardened rebels observed how he took time to console everyone. ''Breck's tones were as tender as if he were talking to his own son," one commented later. "His presence had a magical effect upon the men," wrote another man, “for he shared our hardships and felt our sorrows. With him at the lead, we are sure to defeat the tyrant.”
"Come, my brave boys, and follow General Lee faithfully—he will lead you on to victory!", said the President as he departed. Immediately, loud cheering and rebel yells resonated as the men pledged their loyalty to “Johnny Breck”, who only smiled at the affectionate nickname. Lee, for the moment, received no cheers, though he was quick to earn the men’s respect at least. Nonetheless, his actions over the next few weeks assured that a strong, fierce loyalty to Marse Lee would also grow within the ranks. Despite privations and penuries, the Rebels were motivated to fight against McClellan’s Yankee invaders, who were now coming after taking Yorktown.
General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia
In October 20th, Magruder was instructed to withdraw from Yorktown. Joe Johnston, reduced to an insignificant role as a military inspector, observed that the defenses were so weak that "No one but McClellan could have hesitated to attack.” As in after Anacostia, Breckenridge had made careful preparations for a masterful retreat, though he was painfully aware that retreats would not win the war. He reflected gloomily on this fact when a subordinate called the retreat “a practical victory”, observing that “another such victory will sink the Confederacy.” Optics were key again, and even though Longstreet successfully slowed down McClellan through a rear-guard action that took 2,200 Yankees for the price of 1,500 rebels, journals in the North celebrated that McClellan had the rebels on the run for Richmond.
Of course, the truth was other, but with the elections of November a couple weeks away, the Lincoln administration’s enemies were “submerged under the most profound despair and consternation.” The National Union had been unable to formulate a unified response to the Emancipation Proclamation and the other radical actions of the government. Certainly, they unanimously disapproved the measure, but how to express this opposition was another matter. Lincoln had expertly framed the Proclamation as purely a military matter, rather than a moral decision. Military victories at Corinth, Kings Creek, and New Orleans had apparently showed the success of the policy, and Chesnut protests that these victories had nothing to do with the Proclamation were feeble and ineffective.
National Unionists hadn’t anticipated the tremendous excitement within the people and eventual acceptance within the Army either. John Hay, for example, noted how a multitude of serenaters came to Chase’s windows, and “gleefully and merrily called each other and themselves abolitionists, and seemed to enjoy the novel sensation of appropriating that horrible name.” Prominent politicians remarked with horror how “the radical and bloody doctrines” of the Republicans were being accepted by the people, who extended their confidence to Lincoln and his prosecution of the war.
In truth, the response to the Proclamation was not as positive as sullen Chesnuts believed. Though there was plenty of praise, which Lincoln considered gratifying, he told Hamlin that “The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath . . . but breath alone kills no rebels.” Similarly, many romantic revolutionaries had endorsed the proclamation. But the far more important opinions of the statesmen and dignitaries of Europe were negative. Lord Russell went as far as predicting “acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge” as a result of the Proclamation, and many Britons, though pleased by the shift from a war to subjugate an independence movement to a war for human freedom, were skecptical of the American’s altruism due to the exceptions the Proclamation contained.
Montgomery Blair
Lincoln’s greatest worry, nonetheless, remained the conservative reaction. Montgomery Blair had warned the President that the Proclamation would give the National Unionists "a club . . . to beat the Administration" in the coming elections, and objected to its immediate implementation. When Lincoln simply answered that the Chesnut’s clubs “would be used against us take what course we might” and pressed ahead, Blair presented his resignation, which Lincoln decided to accept. The Blair Clan’s alienation from the Lincoln administration was complete. This incident, more than anything, represents the desertion of many conservative elements that were willing to fight for Union, but utterly refused to fight for abolition. With this in mind, National Unionists started a political campaign that had opposition to slave emancipation as its cornerstone.
In New York, factions of Democrats and National Unionists bitterly divided by the legacy of the Douglas-Buchanan feud were able to unite once again in order to oppose the Proclamation. Under the banner of the “National Democracy”, they united in a fusion ticket that decried the Proclamation as "a proposal for the butchery of women and children, for scenes of lust and rapine, and of arson and murder." The conservative but colorless Horatio Seymour was nominated as the Party’s nominee, despite speeches that reeked of disloyalty. For instance, he proclaimed that "If it be true that slavery must be abolished to save this Union, then the people of the South should be allowed to withdraw themselves from the government which cannot give them the protection guaranteed by its terms."
Many New York newspapers echoed the opposition of Seymour, though few approached calls for peace like he did. The New York Evening Express called the Proclamation “an act of revolution” that would make “the restoration of the old Constitution and Union impossible.” It was true that this was the aim of the Proclamation, but it’s needless to say that the newspaper considered this a disastrous consequence. The New York Journal of Commerce predicted that due to the Proclamation the war would continue “in a dark future, in which the end is beyond our vision.” An alarmed correspondent wrote Secretary Chase, saying that throughout the North Chesnuts were saying “I told you so, can’t you see this is an Abolition war?” to every disaffected person.
Similar bitter denunciations echoed throughout the rest of the North. One party convention went as far as asserting that “the South cannot be subdued and ought not to be subdued” if abolition was the aim of the war. “In the name of God, no more bloodshed to gratify a religious fanaticism”, they implored. An editor called for “the despot Lincoln” to “meet with the fate he deserves: hung, shot, or burned”; another agreed, saying that "true Americans” saw “no reason why they should be shot for the benefit of niggers." “The measure is wholly unwarrantable and wholly pernicious,” said some more sober Chesnut editorials in Pennsylvania. Giant meetings of National Unionists assembled in response to the parades that had celebrated the Proclamation, accusing the Republicans of being “Nigger Worshippers” and saying that the measure would cause “a swarthy inundation of negro laborers and paupers”
In the Northwest, in Douglas country where there was less need to appeal to the old Buchaneers, the Illinois and Ohio Chesnuts nonetheless followed the lead of their Eastern brethren and denounced the Proclamation as “another advance in the Robespierrian highway of tyranny and anarchy.” A newspaper said it would “render eternal the hatred between the two sections”, and another brandished proof of the Army’s demoralization to claim that “the vulgar usurper we are forced to call Mr. President” would destroy the Army, thus retrospectively making “the sacrifice of thousands of brave white men” a sacrifice for the “sake of niggers and abolitionists.” “Did your son, your brother, your father die for negroes?”, a speaker asked yeomen of Southern Illinois. “No! No! No!”, answered they.
Horatio Seymour
However, under the curtain of unity of purpose, the National Democracy was in fact still very divided. National Unionists usually remained committed to the restoration of the Union, but how to restore it was another matter. Following Douglas’ lead, many remained “War Unionists” who supported the restoration of the Union through arms. Though understandably alienated by what they saw as a change in the purpose of the war, they did not regard peace as an alternative solution either. Reviled as “Copperheads”, after the poisonous snake, many Chesnuts openly called for peace, which, they believed, would allow for peaceful reunion through a convention of states.
This was nothing but a “fond delusion”, for both War Union men and Republicans recognized that the Confederacy had no intention to submit unless it was forced to. Breckenridge, nonetheless, encouraged Copperhead prospects through careful doublespeak that a Northern newspaper called “the most impressive circus trick of North America – watch, as Johnny Breck promises both peaceful reunion and warlike resistance to the last!” For example, he famously declared that he was ready “for peace negotiations, if honorable terms are offered in good faith.” For Southerners, honorable terms meant independence; for Northerners, it may mean reunion. Breckenridge was unable to push this Machiavellian strategy as much as he wanted because he feared that overdoing it would seem “a confession of weakness” at a critical moment. However, he still managed to mislead some Northerners.
Perhaps the Copperheads wanted to be misled. Either way, pro-peace rhetoric rose during the electoral campaign as speakers gloomily painted pictures of endless war and more bloodshed. Calls for “resistance to the last” against “Lincoln’s Dictatorship” abounded. Seymour went as far as calling for men to “resist, at all costs” the “unconstitutional and treasonable” decrees of the government. “Better to lose your life in the struggle for freedom than in the struggle for the negro”, he concluded. When the patriotic song “We Are Coming Father Abraham” gained popularity in the North, Chesnuts created a parody that encapsulated their reasons for opposing the war:
“We’re not coming Tyrant Abra’am, not a single man more
For Southern niggers you will not sacrifice Northern boys
You take our fathers and husbands, our sons and brothers dear
And plow them into bloody graves to satisfy your fanatism
Come here, see the the widows and orphans that you have left
We’re not coming Tyrant Abra’am, not a single man more!”
Aside from hostility to Black emancipation, Copperhead sentiments also responded to disillusionment with the war. Even a Republican admitted that “After a year and a half of trial, and a pouring out of blood and treasure, and the maiming and death of thousands, we have made no sensible progress.” The Lincoln Administration, in the view of many, had been a “flat, regrettable failure”, and the Chief Executive of the Nation “would only be remembered by his incompetence, his tyranny, and his idiocy.” Union victories did not matter because “the final blow” had not been given yet despite much fanfare. An Ohio man, for example, bitterly complained that the Peninsula Campaign was the “fourth or fifth” offensive advertised as the final one. Within public opinion, thus, “Union armies seemed on occasion to be successful but never victorious.” The result was that Copperheads increasingly called for peace.
Anti-Copperhead Political Cartoon
This War Unionists could not accept. In a time when the rebels were on the run on all fronts and military victory seemed in sight, many regarded asking for a peace conference to be “a disastrous, dishonorable surrender”. Indeed, “why should we yield to rebel threats”, asked a newspaper, “when General McClellan will soon dine in Richmond?” “Should be surrender the blood of thousands of loyal men and tell them that their sacrifice was for naught?”, asked rhetorically a speaker, “Now, when the culmination of our efforts seem so near?” Others easily saw through Breckenridge’s “circus tricks” and recognized that military victory was the only way to assure the restoration of the Union. “Johnny Breck, Jeff Davis and all the other traitors encourage you to vote for Seymour, the candidate of treason, slavery and cowardice”, said campaign signs in New York. To accusations that Wadsworth would inaugurate "the worst reign of Terror since the French Revolution", Republicans answered that "a vote for Seymour is a vote for treason."
Ironically enough, some National Unionists opposed peace because they could see that “the only way for Lincoln’s black designs” to be completed would be if the war continued. “Speedy victory and fraternal reunion”, they argued, would put an immediate end “to the murderous Proclamation”. It was, then, the duty of every patriot to support the government for the moment. Otherwise, they warned, “the accursed doctrines of the Black Republicans will reach triumphant conclusions.” Simply put, to continue the war longer than necessary would also “prolong the suffering of the White men, women and children of the South at the hands of criminal fanatics and Negro murderers.” If the war ended right there and then, there was still hope of restoring the Union as it was – after all, the legality of the Emancipation Proclamation was doubtful and many areas of the South had been untouched by war.
Of course, they did not want Republicans at the helm when the Restauration of the Union started. They wanted “every Black Republican” to be “shamed, humiliated and defeated” in the elections, but War Unionists, committed to ending the war “on honorable terms” rather than the Copperhead’s “dishonorable surrender” should be the ones elected. Whatever the rhetoric behind the split, the concrete result was that the fusion tickets of the “National Democracy” failed, and in many states both War Unionists and Copperheads ran, splitting the anti-Republican vote, lending strength to the Lincoln Administration, and, most unfortunate of all for the Chesnuts, smoothing over factional differences within the Republicans.
The clearest example is New York, where General John A. Dix was recruited to head a “Constitutional Re-Union” ticket that opposed both Seymour’s “National Democracy” and the Republican candidacy of the “earnest abolitionist” James S. Wadsworth. Beforehand, Seward and his political associate Thurlow Weed had tried to draft Dix for a Union Party ticket that would broaden the basis of the Republicans in New York, but they were opposed by radicals lead by Horace Greeley, who supported Wadsworth. The feud threatened to weaken both radicals and conservatives within the state, but when news came that Dix accepted the “Re-Union” nomination instead, Seward and Weed threw their support to Wadsworth, even if reluctantly.
John A. Dix
The Lincoln Administration also robbed National Unionists of two issues they had been ready to trumpet during the campaign: civil liberties and the economic situation. In the first case, perhaps this was less indicative of a careful scheme by Lincoln than of the new fortune of the Union. With victory in sight and Maryland liberated, Lincoln directed Stanton to free the few political prisoners that remained, ironically earning the Secretary of War some very brief praise as a civil libertarian. Alleging that “every department of the Government was paralyzed by treason, and demoralized due to the capture of the Federal capital” as a justification for the previous measures, Lincoln now proclaimed that "The insurrection is believed to have culminated and to be declining.” “In view of these facts and anxious to favor a return to the normal course of the administration," Lincoln thus released prisoners and ordered the process of recruitment slowed down.
When it comes to the economy, the situation had been perilous indeed for the Union. As McPherson details, “for a time in the winter of 1861-62, fiscal problems threatened to overwhelm the Union cause.” Secession naturally had caused an economic panic as people ran to the banks and withdrew as much specie as they could. Threats of war with Britain and the slow pace of the war eroded confidence on the government, and towards the end of 1861 many banks suspended specie payments. The legacy of hard-money Jacksonian doctrine aggravated the problem because payments to the Treasury were delivered in specie to government vaults, where it “remained idle for weeks . . . while bank reserves dropped toward the danger point.”
Lincoln played almost no part in the efforts to solve the crisis because he was no expert on finance. Secretary Chase was not an expert either, but he was an able man who learned quickly and counted with the support of good advisers, such as the banker Jay Cooke. Through a combination of short-term loans such as “five-twenties” and “seven-thirties”, Chase was able to keep the government’s credit afloat. Cooke, furthermore, pioneered the kind of patriotic advertising that would become common-place in the 20th century, marketing the bonds even to ordinary people. Despite accusations of undue profiteering, Cooke only earned some 700,000 dollars out of 400 million of five-twenties and 800 of seven-thirties. Altogether, Cooke’s advertising “was a cheaper and more efficient means of selling bonds to the masses than the government could have achieved in any other way.”
Increased tariffs and the first ever federal income tax in American history supplemented the Northern economy, and the progressive nature of the tax bill lessened its impact, because the tax was only leveled on annual incomes over $800 – thus excepting most of the working men of the country. Despite these efforts, it was clear that a solution for the specie problem would have to be found soon. Chase finally “proposed the chartering of national banks authorized to issue notes secured by government bonds.” This would eventually result in the National Banking Act of 1863, but in the meantime the solution for the emergency was a bill authorizing the Treasury to print $150 million notes, which would be legal tender “receivable for all debts public or private except interest on government bonds and customs duties.”
Greenback bill engraved with Lincoln's face
National Unionists, heirs of the Jacksonian doctrine, protested this measure. Their arguments ranged from Constitutional ones (saying that under the Constitution Congress could only issue metal coins) to the theological (“gold and silver are the only true measure of value. These metals were prepared by the Almighty for this very purpose.") In any case, the undercurrent of this opposition was the belief that fiat money could not be “kept at par value, except by its speedy, cheap, certain convertibility into gold and silver.” "Prices will be inflated . . . incomes will depreciate; the savings of the poor will vanish; the hoardings of the widow will melt away; bonds, mortgages, and notes—everything of fixed value—will lose their value," they warned, doubtlessly with the disastrous inflation of the American Continental and Confederate “grayback” in mind.
Republicans ignored these arguments, and even some who harbored doubts about whether the bill was wise or not ultimately voted for it due to the pressing necessity of funding the government. Chase drove the point home when he informed the Congress that "Immediate action is of great importance” because “The Treasury is nearly empty." Senator William Pitt Fessenden, despite saying that the bill “shocks all my notions of political, moral, and national honor” voted for it since "to leave the government without resources in such a crisis is not to be thought of." Almost all Republicans voted for the bill; almost all National Unionists voted against it. The Legal Tender Act of 1862 became law when Lincoln signed it on February 25th.
The act was a big success, creating “a national currency” and altering “the monetary structure of the United States”. In the words of James McPherson:
It asserted national sovereignty to help win a war fought to preserve that sovereignty. It provided the Treasury with resources to pay its bills, it restored investor confidence to make possible the sale at par of the $500 million of new 6 percent bonds authorized at the same time, and unlocked the funds that had gone into hoarding during the financial crisis of December. All these good things came to pass without the ruinous inflation predicted by opponents . . . While the greenbacks' lack of a specie backing created a speculator's market in gold, the "gold premium" did not rise drastically except in periods of Union military reverses. During the four months after passage of the Legal Tender Act, the gold premium rose only to 106 (that is, 100 gold dollars would buy 106 greenback dollars).
Besides the “underlying strength” of the Northern economy, the act was a success due to being issued during a period of military success. With McClellan pursuing the fleeing rebels to Richmond and Grant about to take Vicksburg, the enthusiasm of the Northern people was high in the sky, and their trust in their commander in-chief was reinforced. The National Unionists were unable to overcome their differences and find a coherent program of opposition besides simple racism. News that the ailing Douglas had finally succumbed to cirrhosis of the liver came at the worst time, and at the end Republican turnout was high while it was depressed in Chesnut areas. The National Union, as a result, was “routed and whipped” by the Republicans in the 1862 mid-terms. Republicans won the governors election in New York, elected several Missouri congressmen, and made a net gain in the Senate.
The Elections of 1862
To be sure, the opposition did manage to win some pivotal battles, including the governorship and legislature of New Jersey, the legislature of Indiana, and several seats in the Lower North. But they failed to take the legislature of Illinois, and only won a miserable 10 congressmen. The Republicans had a 123 majority in the House, that is, only 2 representatives over the 2/3rds required for a supermajority. In the Senate, the picture was grimmer – Republicans held 35 seats, 4 more than the 31 required for a supermajority. Exultant Republicans called the election “a great, sweeping revolution of public sentiment . . . the triumphal victory of freedom and emancipation”, and asserted that the results showed “a severe reproof” to the National Unionists and the acceptance of the Northern people of the Emancipation Proclamation and Union and Liberty as war objectives.
The greatest irony of McClellan’s career as a general is how his cautiousness probably resulted in this Republican victory, thus assuring Republican control and greater radicalization as Party leaders interpreted the election as an endorsement of their measures. McClellan, the War Unionist, also ensured that the National Union would become a completely Copperhead Party after the War wing had failed so miserably. However, while the Republican Party utterly crushed their rivals in the polls, McClellan was marching right into Lee’s trap, and after this spectacular victory, the Lincoln Administration would receive one of its most severe defeats. The fortunate timing of the elections can’t be overstated, because it allowed the Lincoln Administration to govern with wide majorities whereas the Union war machine might have been permanently stopped had the National Unionists won. But the fact that in the coming months the Union would fall from the heights of enthusiasm to which it had climbed to the depths of gloom and consternation cannot be ignored.
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McClellan really is to military leadership what Buchanan was to public office.
Another spectacular update! I love the look at how a combination of factors leads to overwhelming pro-Lincoln election results!
Another spectacular update! I love the look at how a combination of factors leads to overwhelming pro-Lincoln election results!
Great job. McClellan perched and staying there while you went through all the election stuff gave me a feel just like the nation would feel. Anxious to get the battle over with, amazed how much goes on in the interim.
Great update. I might have missed it but did you say who was chosen as Speaker of the new House? I assume that Grow didn't loose his seat TTL but was he unseated or is he considered closely-enough aligned with the Radicals?
Also, what’s Frederick Douglass up to at this point TTL?
Also, what’s Frederick Douglass up to at this point TTL?
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Just wanted to say, you're really good at putting a heart into the history.
If anyone's read anything I've written on this thread, they know I have very few soft spots for the Confederacy. But somehow, this scene of the humbled politician tending to wounded men sparked more sympathy than I feel like admitting.
It's a sweet moment, and I like it a lot.
Philosophical question: If a writer creates a coincidence does it still count as serendipity?
Jewels & Prison Cigarettes: Am I a Joke to You?
Also props on the economics section, I'm sure that was a mountain of research and I definitely understood a solid 85% of it.
So it looks like the Peninsula Campaign is going to end a lot worse then OTL with McClellan walking right into a trap. If this does end up being the Cannae Lee always wanted wonder how he'll react when the Union acts like Rome and doesn't give up.
When one plays the game of LARP, one either wins or lives long enough to become the role they play.
Lee seems like the best fit for an American Hannibal as any, it's fitting that he bites off more than he can chew and spends the rest of his life ruminating over an impossible war.
His campaigns into the north do have a hannibal-esque feel to them, don't they?