WI: U.S backs Communists over the Nationalists in China

[BBadolato]

So, considering I've basically written a damn thesis thats close to this topic, I'm wondering if was there any possibility for the U.S to back Mao and the Communists over the GMD. The POD i'm looking at is from 1943-1945 possibly 46 although I don't think the window of oppurtunity was that big. What I can gather is this, people on the ground in China like John Service knew that the GMD were either ineffectual at best or purposefully not fighting against the Japanese at worst. With the GMD being seen as corrupt, lacking in support from the people, and emulating Nazi Germany with the Blue Shirts.

It seems that not also was there resistance from Patrick Hurley who was U.S ambassador to China, but also from Harry Hopkins a close to FDR who was willing to support not just the nationalists, but usually did support some ideas that the departments of state, war, and treasurey where against such as giving the okay to the military actions of the Flying Tigers despite being unfeasible.

Mao largely saw that if they the Communists were going to get aid it would have come from the U.S over the Soviets considering Barbarossa. Hell Mao even tried to butter the U.S up with praising Lincoln and Washington, and some people for their saw Mao as a nationalist not a communist, not unlike what some people think of Ho Chih Minh. My only concern is how would the Civil War play out, Stalin was quite willing and expectant to see the GMD remain in power. I'm not really expecting a U.S alliance, but I am curious to see an early with at least non-hostile Communist China and how it could effect the Cold War.

 

[Napoleon IV]

You would need to overcome several hurdles:

1. Chiang had strong ties to many American politicians and public figures, including Henry R. Luce (owner of Time and Life magazines). Given the power these figures have on public opinion it would be very difficult to convince the American people to think that the KMT was the bad guys, and it would be very difficult to get the pro-Chiang politicians to vote for such a change.

2. Mao was definitely a Communist. He and the CCP had strong ties to the Soviet Union and even a cursory glance at the Party's positions and rhetoric would show plenty of Communist influence. For the American government to decide that these facts didn't matter, and that Mao could be a nationalist rather than a member of a monolithic Communist bloc, would require much more nuance in US foreign policy than was shown during that period.

3. By 1943 the US and the KMT were quite clearly allies, so any KMT emulation of Nazi Germany is going to be ignored. The US has a strong incentive not to change horses until the war is over, and postwar worsening relations with the Soviet Union and a rise in anti-Communist sentiment would make it difficult for the US to embrace Mao.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

No way would it work with Mao.

However, Zhou Enlai impressed some Americans as someone they could work with, and I could theoretically imagine support going initially to both Communists and Nationalists, then funnelled more toward the former as they showed more effective use of the resources against the Japanese.

Of course the BIG stumbling block is getting ANY western resources to the CCP, while the Japanese are still big in China. You´d have to have Szechwan be Communist, or something.

 

[El Speculador]

I could theoretically imagine support going initially to both Communists and Nationalists, then funnelled more toward the former as they showed more effective use of the resources against the Japanese.

I'm no expert on the history of this area but I found this quote and it seems to fly in the face of what you are saying:

"(Japan) doesn't have to say sorry, you had contributed towards China, why? Because had Imperial Japan did not start the war of invasion, how could we communist became mighty powerful? How could we stage the coup d'état? How could we defeat Chiang Kai Shek? How are we going to pay back you guys? No, we do not want your war reparations!"
​

-Mao Zedong greeting Japanese Prime Minister Takuei in Nanjing, 1972

I don't understand. Can someone help me understand?

 

[Shinsu]

I don't understand. Can someone help me understand?

I'm no expert either but what I'm pretty certain he is referring to that during the war with Japan, both sides (Communists and nationalists) agreed to fight Japan together, not only did the war weaken the nationalists much more then the communists, but the way that Chiang acted during the war (leaving a large force to protect against the communists) really turned public opinion against the KMT. By 1946, the communists had a force of 1.2 million with an additional 2 million in militia, they got a large amount of weapons and supplies from the Soviet Union (mainly the weapons from the Kuomintang army).

 

[BBadolato]

I don't understand. Can someone help me understand?

Okay, the problem with the politics of Communist China until the death of Mao is that it essentially changed with Mao's mood. The relationship that Japan and China have now is much different from then.

By 1972, China had seen its relationship with the Soviet degenerate into outright open warfare, but also at the same time China and the U.S were warming up to one another. Japan was the lynchpin to U.S interests in the Cold War, and China had bigger concerns than grievances with Japan, such as the fear of being opposed by both the USSR and U.S.

So Dathi, why would any chance of good relations with the U.S not work out with Mao exactly?

@Napoleon IV 1: I figured that was considered some of the things Nationalists got anyhow, by the China Lobby. 2 Was more an interesting observation on my send. I know Mao was Communist, but seeing the same arguments that would be brought up for negotiating with Ho Chi Minh is interesting. 3 Figured that too, but there did seem to be some kind of disconnect between various people on the ground and in the government when it came to China as a whole.

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

So, considering I've basically written a damn thesis thats close to this topic, I'm wondering if was there any possibility for the U.S to back Mao and the Communists over the GMD. The POD i'm looking at is from 1943-1945 possibly 46 although I don't think the window of oppurtunity was that big. What I can gather is this, people on the ground in China like John Service knew that the GMD were either ineffectual at best or purposefully not fighting against the Japanese at worst. With the GMD being seen as corrupt, lacking in support from the people, and emulating Nazi Germany with the Blue Shirts.

It seems that not also was there resistance from Patrick Hurley who was U.S ambassador to China, but also from Harry Hopkins a close to FDR who was willing to support not just the nationalists, but usually did support some ideas that the departments of state, war, and treasurey where against such as giving the okay to the military actions of the Flying Tigers despite being unfeasible.

There's really zero chance of the U.S. withdrawing recognition from a friendly government and declaring that U.S. now supports the overthrow of that government by violent revolutionaries.

Even less of a chance when that country has been a military ally of the U.S., fighting (inefficiently, but fighting) against a mutual enemy in cooperation with the U.S.

It would be even more absurd for the U.S. to embrace a force of Communists, who by definition were hostile to the U.S. as a country with private property and free enterprise, and whose primary long-term goal was control of China, not the defeat of Japan (the illusions of Service and his ilk notwithstanding).

While Chiang was no George Washington, I think a comparison to the U.S. during the Revolution is useful. Both nation (the RoChina and the U.S.) were fighting a Great Power with extremely limited resources, had weak central authorities, and were politically divided.

Both were defeated again and again and again in the field.

The U.S. survived because it had a cadre of geniuses among its leaders, and because France intervened to help. China survived because it's so huge and because the U.S. intervened.

 

[BBadolato]

There's really zero chance of the U.S. withdrawing recognition from a friendly government and declaring that U.S. now supports the overthrow of that government by violent revolutionaries.

Not gunning for the U.S supporting violent overthrow granted, the KMT and Communists were aligned at first.

I have been tinkering with the ideas of could it possible for some different choices by Roosevelt maybe no Hurley as the Chinese ambassador at the least. Even in the most positive estimations of the Communists, the U.S was gunning for a coalition of them and the Nationalists. Could it be possible for the KMT to somehow really screw up, maybe a worse Ichi-Go offensive against them?