[snipped]
So a lot of that industry won't get in, so very reduced AAA capability, and doing a Khe Sanh style siege around Haiphong with the limited supplies coming across the two Chinese RR lines will be very costly in PAVN lives by an even larger degree.
Doing a stand up fight was not their forte.
OTL 80% of the North's military imports came thru Haiphong, 20% across the border, rates stayed stable over 1965-1968
I was assuming that A & B Corps offensive landings seriously to entirely retards the DRVN's capacity to act as a traditional geographic state and obliterates the PAVN as a force in being, making them take on the political roles that the NFL and PLAF had in the South. Some kind of Rump Flag Show connected by land to the PRC at best, no manoeuvre army existing (or if existing entirely dispersed), an underground state, and years of dead 14-22 year olds in police actions. Because I don't think the PRC are going to be monstrously stupid in the same way twice by picking a land war. And as far as the ARVN patrolled free fire area close to the Chinese border I don't think the US would want the same stupidity again either. If they stop short and agree to only let Vietnamese north of this, we'll only smuggle aid over borders and not counter-invade.
The US would forcing the PAVN into the same supply situation that the PLAF was in during 1961. This is going to give you a force structure similar to the PLAF 1961-1965: local militia, regional political police, few carefully hoarded light infantry units dispersed below concentration. And it is the first two elements that keeps the underground state demanding rice at gun point or collecting the agreed as necessary heroic tax contributions to the people's struggle. Without local catholic elites, and as a result of a foreign invasion, along side the historical evidence from OTL of sustained state legitimacy despite a limited air war and a significant mobilisation in the historical DRVN the state remaining legitimate, after the 4 corps invasion of the North, the DRVN as an underground state will maintain legitimacy. Even more so should the RVN become part of the occupation given the tendency to personal profit in leading RVN figures and the opportunity to reallocate agricultural profits in the newly occupied Northern provinces. So after great sudden military success and the collapse of the apparent enemy, there's an ongoing political problem.
Which leaves the political problem, happening in a higher density environment of rice agriculture, with a US military dabbling in opposed political policing for the first time, while it is either failing to meet its NATO commitments OR under mobilisation. This isn't the post 1990s US military who has sponsored two generations of staff and academic consideration of political warfare. These are the guys who were about to be made obsolete by air bombardment and whose imaginary war is one of organisational diagrams of units meeting in space and expending logistics, not organisational diagrams of committees extracting young men and rice and building legitimacy. And please note I'm making the primary problem for the US the NATO drawdown and/or mobilisation. Should the US choose to do so, its political elites won't face significant opposition from its population over just being in Vietnam and just having kicked the living shit out of a communist government. It will take years for the town's boys not coming home, or coming home different, after patrols to change the minds of the town. Whereas a mobilisation call up is going to piss a lot of people off who wanted to be plumbers or sit on their arse in Germany.
I can't see the US military being willing to engage in an occupation that requires mobilisation or a German draw down lasting long enough until political circumstances in the occupied DRVN change. The VWP is an insanely motivated nationalist organisation: they will quite happily bleed Vietnam to death, and any advantages the US had politically in the RVN have just been massively diluted by occupying the DRVN. I don't see the RVN elite being capable of dealing with the political problem that A-D corps have bought either. I'm casting about for endless low intensity horrors with ineffective central government and the Phillipines comes to mind. Won all the battles but couldn't make a peace.
When do you give up two police actions that are merged that aren't effective but where there's nobody really to surrender to you properly?
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I also think such a scenario would derange the Vietnamese workers party. Historically it was at the low end of bloody, and the high end of rational. I think this would reverse both those whenever the US finds something better to do in 10 years time. And that's going to be even uglier than historically. There'll also be two Vietnams worth of liberation area leaders who heroically withstood for years to … correct to the central line. Two Vietnams worth of orphans and prostitutes to chastise. And far less rationality left in the VWP.
yours,
Sam R.