This Abominable System

[VengefulWaffle]

This Abominable System
Introduction​

I’ve debated doing this for quite some time. As a political science graduate student whose bachelor’s had an emphasis in International Relations, I love wide-spanning alternate histories (shoutout A House Divided by Patrick @prolemasses on Twitter and Jimmy Two by @Vidal on here for inspiring me with their amazing alt-hists), and have had ideas for multiple bouncing around in my head that I just haven’t acted on yet. Well, this is one of those ideas. In my studies of other political systems, my frustration with our two-party system and the electoral system that entrenches it has only grown. As cliche and self-righteous as it sounds, I don’t feel like I really belong to either party, being too liberal for Republicans and too conservative for Democrats. This frustration and lack of belonging has me looking to countries like Germany and Uruguay for their electoral systems, and Switzerland and Colombia for their party systems. While none of those systems have a simple path forward in American politics with how monumental the overhaul would have to be, it got me thinking about how a true multi-party system ever could have come to be, and how This Abominable System could be dismantled.

For a multi-party system to succeed beyond just one or two elections (aka longer than the Reform or Progressive parties), there’d need to be three factors happening within a decade of each other:​

1. A voting public not rabidly partisan.​
2. Parties not super ideologically cohesive or united.​
3. Reform away from FPTP.​

The first two factors are easier to find than create for an alt-hist, while the third factor would necessarily be created, as the American electoral system has been pretty much the same for a long time. So my wondering led me on a search for a time in American history where the first two factors were present, and my research, as well as my schooling, led me to 1976.

1976 was an incredibly interesting time in American politics. Ticket splitting was incredibly common, and there was significant overlap between liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats. [1] [2] The sitting GOP president was primaried from his right, and just four years later the sitting Democrat president was primaried from his left. These facts demonstrate a time ripe for splinter parties, all that’d be needed to create them would be a spark. This is where my POD comes in.

In OTL 1975, shortly before Ford announced his run for president, the hype surrounding Reagan’s potential candidacy reached a fever pitch. In response, Ford’s administration drafted a letter of support that most of the Congressional GOP signed. In TTL, Ford’s administration decides against drafting this letter, not wanting to project weakness, and instead reads the writing on the wall for Ford as a candidate. His decision has ramifications that destroys the two-party system as we know it, and leads to four viable parties by the 1984 election. Now, the third factor listed above, a reform to the electoral system itself, wouldn’t just happen naturally. Previous efforts (Bayh-Celler) failed, so a situation would have to occur that would produce the popular and congressional will to change the system. My solution for that conundrum occurs after the 1984 election. The solution probably took the longest for me to settle on out of any aspect of this alt-hist, and took a lot of compromise (as Congress in TTL 1986 will show you). This is the one part of my scenario I’m most asking for a bit of suspension of disbelief in, as a reform as radical as the one needed to change our draconic electoral system to support multiple parties was never going to be an easy pass.

With the lead-up to this scenario outlined, I’d like to set expectations a bit. This is my first alt-hist, so while I have some great role models in this sphere to emulate (see above authors), I don’t have the most actual experience writing this. I’ll do my best, including extensive research, to try and ensure both accuracy and believability, but there may be times where I fail at one or both of those goals, so my apologies in advance. Additionally, I do my best while writing this to remove my ideologies and biases from the equation, and base my story on real life personalities, motivations, and relationships of the day. Despite these best efforts, my personal experiences and beliefs may leak in at times, but just know that I endeavor to avoid this.

This scenario will focus largely on American happenings, though this will necessarily bleed into international situations as the Cold War draws down, and American supremacy becomes reality. Despite that, my main focus will be on domestic politics and the way this alternate history shapes the national goings-on of my place of birth. In addition to this national focus, I can’t promise a diverse set of perspectives (both inspirations mentioned above do an exceptional job at this), as I’m not the most talented writer, and due to certain aspects of my personality, I struggle to write as if I’m another person. I’ll do my best to spread my focus across parties, individuals, bills, states, and other points of interest, but the writing will largely be from the third-person perspective. If anybody has anything they specifically find interesting, I’ll be happy to answer questions, or even write chapters on those things, with the possibility of guest chapters or featured authors if I need assistance.

With all that said, I’d like to thank all of you for giving this alternate history idea a read. Now, let’s uncover how This Abominable System meets its demise.​

[1] Sievert, Joel, and Seth C. McKee. “Nationalization in U.S. Senate and Gubernatorial Elections.” American Politics Research 47, no. 5 (August 7, 2018): 1055–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x18792694.

[2] DeSilver, Drew. “The Polarization in Today’s Congress Has Roots That Go Back Decades.” Pew Research Center, March 10, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-r...days-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/.

 

[prolemasses]

Excited to see it! Honored to be of inspiration.

 

[vetinari]

As an alternative, let us look at Australia and it's political system. There is no FPTP, election is for the lowerhouse, the House of Representives is via preferential election - you must effectively win 50+1%. The 50+1% can be gained via preferences. The upperhouse, the Senate is elected via a Hare-Clarke system based on preferential voting, with the exception of the state of Tasmania which uses a modified Hare-Clarke system, just to be different. The result overall is a fairer, more representational system compared to the US System. Voting is essentially compulsory - you are required to attend the polling place designated by the Government and have your name marked off the roll. You can refuse a ballot paper if you desire but you still are required to attend, most people vote because it is easier than not voting. Australia has four major and numerous minor parties. It has the Australian Labor Party - a left-of-centre party. It has the Australian Liberal Party - a relative conservative party which is presently out of Government in favour of the ALP. It has the National Party - a former Country Party, permanently in coalition with the Liberal Party but representing a more conservative viewpoint. Finally it has the Greens - a conservation party.

 

[VengefulWaffle]

His time had come. Gerald Ford had announced he wasn’t running, ostensibly to allow the GOP and the country to move on from the last few years, but anyone acquainted with the inner workings of the Ford Administration knew Ford didn’t want to go out a loser. Poll numbers indicated Ford was finished in the general if he ran again, and even if he did run again his own party was moving away from his establishment moderatism and he may not make it out of the primary. His VP was just as unpopular and seen as unlikely to run either for similar reasons. The path to nomination, which previously looked like it could be a fight, had suddenly opened up, and was his for the taking.

In a call with John Sears, his soon-to-be campaign manager, they celebrated what now felt like a coronation. Reagan had spent the last several years putting in the legwork for the rising right wing of his party, and was the public face of a conservatism that rejected the moderate establishment that’d been dominant for decades. While he harbored some private disagreements with his coalition on guns and immigration, he was more than willing to set those concerns aside in his pursuit for the lead of the GOP, which, with the disarray of the Democrats, was looking like a surefire path to the presidency in his view. His three-legged stool of social conservatives, fiscal conservatives, and foreign policy hawks, was united and motivated, and ready to remake the stale, ineffective party it called home.

Just two days after Ford’s announcement came a piece of news that shocked political observers nationwide. Unpopular VP Nelson Rockefeller announced his candidacy for president, complete with Ford’s rousing endorsement. Reagan, Sears, and the rest of their circle were caught flat-footed. Ford’s acquiescence was a signal that the establishment was responsive to polling numbers and the rising conservative movement, a signal that all but laid out the red carpet for Reagan to be the nominee. Rockefeller’s announcement and Ford’s endorsement before Reagan could announce and take the throne, took serious wind out of their campaign’s sails, making the signal received before look like nothing but smoke.

Nelson Rockefeller hadn’t gone into his meeting with Jerry in July with the intention of becoming a candidate for president, quite the opposite really. He had faith in Jerry, and saw him as the best hope for keeping the party out of the hands of the moralizers and radicals. Instead, when Rockefeller pulled out the letter of resignation, he was stopped, and Jerry outlined his plan to save the party. He would step down, recognizing his pardoning of Nixon, poor economy, and foreign policy conduct were all unpopular, and would throw his full weight behind Rockefeller as a candidate for president. With his own polling rather abysmal, Rockefeller was skeptical to put it mildly. However, over the course of a two-hour conversation, he started to see it Jerry’s way, something Jerry always took great pleasure in.

The path was narrow but it was clear: Rockefeller wasn’t associated with the Nixon scandals, and his unpopularity could be at least partially assumed to be due to his proximity to Ford and the unhappy conservative wing. To best exploit the state of things, Ford would immediately endorse Rockefeller while convincing any unsure moderates to join him. Rockefeller would then essentially take a break from being VP and barnstorm early primary states and big vote states, touting where he was conservative relentlessly, while still highlighting his “acceptable liberalism” on the environment, public education, and civil rights (avoiding abortion) in the more moderate early states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Illinois. The logic went that if Rockefeller could sway just enough conservative support while doing well in the early states geared towards his beliefs, he could get the momentum behind him and beat Reagan early to stop a drawn out fight.

This was midsummer 1975, and by the time Reagan had gathered his team, begun to reach out about endorsements, and reshaped his triumphant message into a competitive one, it had been two months. In those two months, Rockefeller had barnstormed the early primary states, released from his already limited Vice Presidential responsibilities, scooping up endorsements from the center and the right, and highlighting his conservative credentials on crime, drugs, foreign policy, and welfare enrollment to protect himself from inevitable attacks.

Reagan came out of his own announcement furious with the party establishment and it reflected in his campaign efforts. His own 11th commandment was ignored, and he went aggressive early, slamming Rockefeller on abortion and taxes, as well as civil rights in a more veiled way. These attacks began to extend to moderates in early primary states who endorsed Rockefeller and among party leadership, as Reagan went scorched earth in the manner of a scorned lover. With Ford out of the way, Reagan assumed he was the most obvious choice for nominee, with great name recognition, popularity, and an ascendant wing of the party, ready to fund and volunteer. Most of the establishment backing Rockefeller jaded him, as he viewed his past half decade of work building the party as being spit on. Now, his strategy revolved around most of the conservative wing backing him (some already having fallen to Rockefeller’s side), and counting on his national audience and fiery advocacy for true conservatism would inspire conservatives to join him while cowing moderates into line. Instead, Reagan burned most bridges he’d built over the last few years with the moderate wing of the party and even turned off some conservatives who agreed with him over his party sabotage. By the time of the first caucus in Iowa, momentum had already swung behind the formerly unpopular VP.

After an unexpectedly strong victory in the Iowa caucus, Rockefeller handily won the next few primaries, all northeast states that skewed his direction anyways. The narrative surrounding the race was now firmly in his favor. His popularity was surging as he piled up endorsements and good press, and Reagan found himself in need of a big victory. Pouring all his resources into Florida and North Carolina, hopes were high that, with big delegate hauls in southern states, this would reset the narrative heading into other delegate rich states, many of which were southern and therefore more conservative. When Florida firmly went to Rockefeller by nearly 10 percent, Reagan found his campaign on life support, something even his ardent supporters could see. After being brutalized in Illinois a week later, Reagan went into North Carolina hoping the help of Jesse Helms, one of his earliest and most outspoken supporters, would pave the way to a campaign turnaround.

In North Carolina, Rockefeller made a shrewd decision that spelled official doom for Reagan, doom that only became evident more than a month later. Senator Helms had been lambasting Rockefeller since Reagan announced, calling him no better than the Democrats and ordering his state machine to sour the primary base on the Vice President. Recognizing that even if he campaigned he’d most likely lose in an upset that could swing momentum towards Reagan right before a slate of already tough southern states, Rockefeller went all-in on Texas. With Pennsylvania already locked up, and Wisconsin looking decent, Rockefeller enlisted Senator John Tower to manage his Texas campaign, and invested all his efforts for the next several weeks into basically just Texas.

After winning a strong victory in North Carolina, Reagan immediately looked to Wisconsin as the next step in his comeback story. The momentum he gained from North Carolina was blunted somewhat when the lack of effort by Rockefeller was revealed to the press, but it was still enough he hoped to, if not win in Wisconsin, to at least be close so his expected victory in Texas would firmly change the narrative. By the time of the Wisconsin primary a couple weeks later, which Reagan placed a respectably close second in, campaign manager Sears had begun to realize something was off in Texas. The socially conservative state that should have been a shoo-in with Rockefeller’s liberal social views was proving less swayable than assumed. As he attempted to book campaign stops, prime scheduling slots in urban and suburban areas were missing, filled by Rockefeller. County and even state party committees were reluctant to fully endorse Reagan, with some outright refusing, proclaiming neutrality in the primary. The final sign that unveiled the extent of Rockefeller’s Texas operation was when the Texas Triangle parties issued a joint statement endorsing Rockefeller. By this point, only 10 days out from the Texas Primary, insurmountable damage had been done to Reagan’s chances. The state that was supposed to kick off a string of dominance, both in the eyes of Reagan and national media, was suddenly highly competitive, and the floor for Rockefeller was no longer looking like it was in the low 30s, but the low 40s.

Reagan knew that with his devastating loss in Florida, only a blowout in Texas would truly revive his campaign. To this end, he barnstormed the state, using his natural charisma and oratory prowess to woo voters on the fence. At the same time, the operation Rockefeller and Tower had established was making extensive use of surrogates, and limiting the actual candidate to speeches in front of more friendly urban and some suburban crowds. This strategy, of sending more conservative surrogates to areas where Rockefeller’s liberalism wouldn’t play as well while Rockefeller essentially made a home of the Texas Triangle and appeared to large, friendly crowds as often as possible, even throwing out the opening pitch at home games for the Rangers and the Astros.

By the end of April, Texas was tight, with Reagan having a consistent 2-4 point lead in polls. This would end up being the final margin as well, as Reagan would win 51-48, winning just over half the delegates as well. While hopes had been high that he could actually outright win the state, Rockefeller came away nonetheless satisfied. Reagan’s springboard to contention had been thoroughly dismantled. Reagan was never able to capture the momentum he needed, and, after a trouncing in Michigan a couple weeks later, suspended his campaign. Funds had begun to seriously dry up, Rockefeller had managed to unite most of the party, and even if the race went to a contested convention, Reagan risked coming out looking even worse as he had no momentum. Despite his anger, he didn’t want to sabotage his reputation within the party and risk alienating conservatives he could rally in 1980 or beyond. Rockefeller didn’t get the nomination with first-instance votes, but by the time convention roll call votes came in, he’d firmly claimed the mantle of GOP nominee.

At the convention in August, Reagan offered the most half-hearted endorsement of Rockefeller possible, while behind closed doors he raged at the liberals and establishment in the party, and began speaking to “real” conservatives about a new idea he’d had. With Jimmy Carter the Democratic nominee, Reagan and Sears believed conservatives in the country were faced with two fake standard bearers, as Carter was a moderate at his most right-wing, and Rockefeller was simply a liberal. Both parties had made clear their ideological allegiances, and the time had come for the growing but oppressed right-wing movement in the country to make themselves known and have an organization that advocates for them and their interests, not the liberal establishments. To do this well, they’d have to time move perfectly, to avoid sabotaging conservatives in ‘76 or ‘78 and risk pushing away potential supporters, as well as with enough immediate support to demonstrate the organization was more than just a personal vendetta or media stunt. This opportunity was only a couple years away.

 

[PlanetaryIceTea]

Auspicious start you have here. Looking forward to seeing where this goes. Watched!

 

[VengefulWaffle]

Rockefeller running in Ford’s place shocked not only Reagan and the media, but the Democrats as well. They’d been looking forward to a trouncing in ‘76, with an unpopular incumbent with foreign policy slip-ups, ties to Watergate, and a pardon of Nixon weighing him down. This had inspired many previously minor candidates to explore their own campaigns, as victory in the general seemed assured. With Ford out, most of the minor candidates who’d declared or were thinking of it reversed course, as Rockefeller was seen as much less vulnerable, and the endorsements he racked up quickly reinforced that. Seeing the need for a united party and serious effort in the general, the primary coalesced around four candidates: George Wallace, Scoop Jackson, Jimmy Carter, and Mo Udall.


George Wallace, at this point a perennial candidate, announced shortly after Reagan, which took some wind out of the sails of a campaign already seen as doomed. With health issues at the forefront, and racial issues fading as a matter of importance to the Democratic electorate, Wallace’s path to the nomination was generously described as narrow. Still, Wallace hoped to make a splash, cutting into Carter’s southern base and potentially throwing the race to a contested convention where he could either moderate to put himself forth as a compromise, or negotiate using his delegates to influence the party platform.

Scoop Jackson was the standard-bearer for the conservative flank of the party. Hawkish with a strong reputation on foreign affairs, and a focus on law and order and opposition to bussing, Jackson hoped to undermine Wallace’s support among racial conservatives while contrasting his experience with Carter’s lack of it. By the end of 1975, Jackson was much more embattled than anyone in his camp had predicted. The surprising strength of Carter, who they’d laughingly ignored for the first several months, had forced a redirection of advertising and efforts, which put him on the back foot that they needed strong performances to recover from. For this reason, Jackson chose not to participate in Iowa or New Hampshire, seeing his best chance for a big statement win in a couple of the later states, and worrying a middling or poor performance in either of the first two would sink his campaign then and there.

Jimmy Carter took the biggest blow to his candidacy after Rockefeller’s announcement, as a moderate reformer with outsider credentials was less needed against a liberal GOP candidate who wasn’t tainted by Watergate. Spending over a year campaigning still put him in a strong position for the nomination however, as jeers of “Jimmy Who?” faded with Carter’s rising national profile. While blunted, calls for honesty and integrity in Washington still resonated with voters, and Carter’s optimistic attitude and clearly stated moderately liberal ideals drew in voters throughout the Democratic tent, though especially from the moderate and conservative camps.

Mo Udall was the main beneficiary of Rockefeller’s announcement. Most of the voters who left Carter flocked to Udall, while most of the minor candidates who bowed out were from the liberal wing of the party, consolidating even more support behind him. This gave Udall front runner status by the end of 1975, with Carter closely trailing. Udall, while uncontested among liberals, wasn’t the most inspirational candidate either. His brother Stewart, was not the best strategic mind, and with advertisements focused on things voters didn’t care much about and an overconfidence spawned from the liberal consolidation, Udall’s campaign proved lackluster to be lackluster and unable to close the deal against the rest of the field before Iowa. Still, Udall was the favorite without any liberal competition, and they were assuming strong wins in the first two states would bring the expected momentum that would propel Udall to victory.

With Hubert Humphrey reasserting his decision to not run, and Jackson and Wallace not in Iowa, the first primary became a two-man race, one that on its face favored Udall heavily. Papers picked up on this fact, and all but called the race for Udall the night before. What Udall, the papers, and even Jackson in his decision to stay out of the state hadn’t counted on was Carter’s all-in strategy in the early states. By the time polls closed in Iowa, even without liberal contenders, Udall was only squeaking by Carter in most counties. When the final tallies came out, Udall only won by about 4%, a far cry from the 10-15% most pundits predicted. The victory rang hollow for Udall, who had to deal with papers simultaneously putting Carter on a pedestal as the ultimate outsider destined to upset the establishment and decrying the poor state of Udall and his underwhelming campaign. After a nearly mirror image result in New Hampshire, Carter supplanted Udall as the media favorite and front runner, a phenomena that incensed Udall, who’d won both competitive primaries and did as well as expected in liberal Minnesota, but still found himself the loser in the media narrative. For Carter, two close seconds and a narrow victory in Oklahoma was about the best result he could have hoped for, and gave him momentum he sorely needed headed into the bitterly contested state of Massachusetts.

March 2, 1975 became the low point for Carter’s campaign thus far. While he performed strongly in Vermont, his momentum in recent weeks didn’t produce an even passable performance in Massachusetts. No longer uncontested from the right with Jackson and Wallace present, he placed last by nearly 6%, even losing to the abrasive Wallace. Jackson came out with the win due to his strong connections to the state party, as well as the Jewish community and labor movement, but still found himself disappointed. He was hoping that with the expected sweep of his home state, a strong victory in Massachusetts would reset the campaign narrative. Instead, he won by a comfortable but not significant margin, with Udall placing a decently strong second due to Carter’s weakness and a lack of liberal contenders. Wallace’s third place finish placed him in a precarious position. He hadn’t definitively proven his ability to be popular outside the south, and even in the south his popularity seemed suspect due to Carter’s victory in Oklahoma and southern heritage. In hopes of injecting energy into his fading campaign, he pushed all his chips into Florida the next week.

With Udall ceding Florida altogether, the primary became a competition between the three candidates representing the center and right of the party. The week between Massachusetts and Florida was one of the most heated weeks of the entire primary, as Carter and Wallace both needed this state to prevent a campaign collapse. Jackson wasn’t expecting to do all too well, so focused his efforts on shoring up support where he could while he allowed Carter and Wallace to slug it out. Despite this background role Jackson took for himself, Carter swung viciously against racial conservatives and what he was convinced was an establishment aiming to sink him. Jackson, somewhat caught off guard by Carter’s turn on him instead of Wallace, reoriented to try and go on the attack, but it was too little too late. What Jackson didn’t realize was that Carter’s team recognized that a victory rode on swinging enough moderates and hawks who may support Jackson to vote for Carter, as opposed to Wallace’s fiery segregationist base. Wallace meanwhile was also on the attack against Jackson, hoping to pull pro-segregation, anti-busing voters firmly into his camp where they belonged. The two-front assault on Jackson had the expected result, and devastated his results in the state, placing a distant third with 18% of the vote. Carter ended up coming out on top, securing 42% to Wallace’s 32%, effectively sending Wallace’s campaign to the grave, and swinging a massive amount of momentum due to the scale of the victory.

With a convincing win under his belt in a major state, Carter’s re-energized campaign barnstormed Illinois. Wallace’s support drained away, and with Jackson focusing his efforts elsewhere after a disappointing margin in Florida, either found its way to Carter or simply stayed home. Udall attempted to contest the state, even contacting Chicago Mayor Daley about gaining his endorsement in exchange for Udall helping Daley in his battle with Governor Dan Walker. Carter’s team caught wind of the murmurs that Daley could endorse Udall, and in an aggressive move meant to catch everyone off guard, Carter drove to Springfield to meet with Walker. The meeting adjourned, and the reporters waiting outside with bated breath jumped from their seats as Carter left the governor’s mansion. Walker joined Carter in front of the gaggle of reporters, and happily announced reciprocal endorsements for their respective races. An enraged Daley endorsed Udall, but with the momentum (both in reality and in the media narrative) firmly behind Carter, it didn’t matter much for either race. Carter easily secured the Illinois primary, and Walker ended up winning the governor primary by 1.5%.

The next three weeks saw Carter rack up victory after victory, destroying Wallace in North Carolina, narrowly supplanting him in the segregationist stronghold of South Carolina, and cleanly winning Kansas and Virginia. Wallace dropped out after South Carolina, and Jackson was on life support headed into the April 6 races in New York and Wisconsin even with his win in Puerto Rico. Wallace dropping out all but doomed Udall in Wisconsin, as his former 10% or so base of support went to mostly Carter rather than the hated liberal Udall. This secured a solid 6% victory in what was assumed to be an Udall guarantee at the start of the primary, and blunted the sting from Carter being blown out in New York. This blowout was led by Jackson and a close second by Udall with Carter far behind as his weakness in the northeast reared its ugly head. Despite this loss, the win in Wisconsin and the preceding few weeks kept Carter as the clear front runner moving forward.

The relative lull of the next few weeks saw Jackson pick up Alaska and Udall pick up Arizona, but Carter had his eyes on Pennsylvania, hoping to knock out Jackson’s flailing campaign for good and put Udall on the plank. This effort paid off, as Carter took Missouri on his way to convincingly winning Pennsylvania with nearly 46% of the vote. Jackson bowed out the next day, recognizing the momentum and funds were no longer there for a path to victory. The two-man race between Carter and Udall had begun, and Carter’s head start was looking more insurmountable every week. The next month saw Carter rattle off victory after victory, shrugging off token challenges in Nebraska and Maryland, and favorite sons in West Virginia and Washington DC, only losing the empty state of Wyoming and the protesting state of Alabama in the process.

By May 25, the Udall campaign was desperate as they watched their chances narrow with every race that went to Carter. There had been rumblings prior to Wisconsin about an Anybody But Carter movement coming together to deny the inexperienced moderate squish the nomination, but the Udall campaign had never pursued or capitalized on it in any meaningful way. This changed as the May 25 primaries approached, and Udall called a meeting with several prominent liberal voices in the party, with Frank Church and Jerry Brown being two of the top voices. In the meeting they discussed the dire state of Udall’s campaign and the narrow path they hoped to walk to deny Carter the nomination. The fruits of the meeting, which included a new campaign strategy and other investment changes, showed themselves at the May 25 primaries, with Idaho, Nevada, and Oregon eschewing Carter and going for Udall with gargantuan effort from Brown and Church.

The May 25 primaries were a bit of a turning point in the race. Carter had begun to coast, with a substantial delegate lead and feeling all but assured of victory. Udall and his surrogates on the other hand were revitalized by the results of May 25, and the new energy showed itself as Udall won five of the next seven states in Hawaii, Montana, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and, the big statement, California. Victories in New Jersey and Ohio were of little consolation as the Anybody But Carter movement gained real and narrative momentum, as well as enough delegates to threaten a contested convention if just a few more could be convinced to defect. Losing Colorado and North Dakota in the final weeks made this an even more threatening reality for Carter, even when winning Delaware. This forced him into a position he was used to as a moderate governor in the south, one of negotiation.

Having already basically promised the Vice Presidency to his loyal acolyte Walter Mondale, Carter met with Scoop Jackson hoping to offer him enough to swing his delegates behind him and guarantee him the nomination. He knew it wouldn’t be an easy task, as Jackson loved being in the senate, with its traditions, the close working relationship he had with fellow Washingtonian Senator Warren “Maggie” Magnuson, and his ability to be a part of important legislation. He planned on offering him Attorney General, with his law degree and focus on law and order issues pointing that way. Instead, Scoop came into the meeting with one role in mind, one that fit his passions and the impact he wanted to have on the world, and one that was a stepping stone to the presidency if the opportunity arose: Secretary of State. Carter was reluctant on first ask, as Jackson was far more hawkish and pro-Israel than he was, but Scoop’s expertise and stated willingness to tone down some rhetoric eventually won Carter over after a three-hour discussion. The next day, Scoop announced he was endorsing Carter for president, and ordered his delegates to fall in line, which nearly all did. With that, Carter had gone from a peanut farming outsider to the Democratic Nominee in 1976.

 

[VengefulWaffle]

Democrats were stressed. The least exciting nominee since Adlai Stevenson with a message tailored for a different candidate had eschewed a big part of his base by making a deal with Jackson, and didn’t have the experience to realize how much of an issue that was. Rockefeller had a united party (from an outside view) behind him, none of the corruption or foreign policy baggage Ford carried, and had brought on an attack dog in Bob Dole that the party feared would overwhelm Carter and Mondale.

The issues at the center of the race were as unanticipated to Carter as the opponent. He’d launched his campaign against the corruption and incompetence on the international stage Ford was accused of, but with Rockefeller as his opponent those things were no longer viable avenues of attack. Instead, the election focused on the poor state of the economy, which benefited Carter after 8 years of Republican rule, civil rights, which was a mixed bag for both candidates as they dealt with racial conservatives in their parties, and foreign policy, which the inexperienced Carter preferred to avoid. What Democrats didn’t know was that Rockefeller had the killing blow for his campaign hanging like a millstone around his neck.

When Nelson met with Jerry to hash out their plan for the upcoming race, they covered a range of topics. How long they’d wait for Rockefeller to announce his candidacy, the issues he’d focus on, the endorsements he’d pursue. One condition Ford placed on his stepping back and endorsement was for Rockefeller to never talk poorly about him in his campaign. Indirect disagreements, where he didn’t mention Ford by name or his specific ideas he disagreed with, sticking to generalities, were considered acceptable. Direct disagreements, where Ford would be called out by name or by specifics, were not. Ford, as are most men who’d been President, had a pride that came with the nature of the office, and it had been a significant blow for him to not run again and acquiesce to his Vice President. This ego wouldn’t stand for Ford’s name to be discarded or sullied simply for an electoral advantage. He still had a reputation, however battered, to maintain, and his chosen candidate and Vice President publicly denouncing him for any reason was an insult too great to bear. At the time, Rockefeller readily agreed, not seeing any major disagreements policy wise and happy to have Ford fully on his side. Headed into the primaries against Reagan, Ford’s support proved invaluable, securing a trove of high quality endorsements and campaign-ready infrastructure. The honeymoon of this agreement lasted until after the Democratic Convention, when a poll came out showing Carter 15 points ahead nationally.

Rockefeller had his own battle to fight with low approval when he announced his campaign. Largely sidelined and seen as an amoral liberal, he’d undertaken a heavy effort to reshape his image as a liberal conservative, whose conservative policies placed him firmly within the mainstream of the GOP and the public, despite some more liberal stances that would upset the base. These efforts, which included countless public appearances, meetings with state parties, and advocates swarming the country, had paid off by the time he accepted the nomination. His approval was no longer underwater, and the improvement was particularly acute among conservatives. Ford on the other hand, hadn’t made the same efforts, and even with the Bicentennial and British Royal Family visit, still had a middling approval rating. Those closest to Nelson whispered in hushed tones about the need to distinguish himself from the President, as four more years of Ford was not viewed the most positively. Nelson himself had realized the same thing leading up to his acceptance of the nomination, but kept such traitorous musing private. After the national poll showing Carter sweeping in November, calls for separation grew louder, both internally and in national media, who had taken to calling Rockefeller “Jerry’s boy” due to his steadfast refusal to criticize Ford and his advocacy for the same policies. Prior to the first debate in late September, Nelson discreetly approved of sending an assistant to the campaign manager to Ford to request a looser leash in the debate, giving room for criticism and a chance to differentiate Rockefeller. The assistant left without a job. Rockefeller’s camp resigned themselves to what they felt was now a quixotic effort to win in November. Then Carter gifted them their shot.

Jimmy had been giving Robert Scheer for Playboy magazine interviews throughout the campaign, on a variety of topics, both political and not. The week before the first debate, excerpts were released in which Carter talked about his own imperfections in the lens of his Baptist faith, where he went on to bluntly describe his unwillingness to judge someone who “screws lots of women,” and his own failings in which he “looked on many women with lust” and “committed adultery many times in my heart.” The public reaction was swift and harsh. Questions about Carter’s fidelity, about his faith, and his respect for women poured on, and his support with evangelicals and women took a sizable hit. Rockefeller couldn’t capitalize too strongly on the slip-up, as his history with divorce, and his strong statement four years prior that "I do not believe it right for one group to impose its vision of morality on an entire society,” had not endeared him to these demographics. Even still, the hit to Carter was a big one, and after Rockefeller performed strongly in the debate against his inexperienced opponent, the race became much closer. What neither party and neither candidate realized in the follow-up to this episode was the foreshadowing of their doom festering under the surface of the evangelical public.

Reagan and his team watched the entire Carter interview drama and Rockefeller reaction with barely repressed giddiness. Evangelicals hadn’t flocked to Rockefeller, even as they left Carter or remained with tepid support. In interviews with numerous religious organizations in the following weeks, they decried the lack of a real conservative candidate who represented their values. Reagan was aware he was no saint, and he didn’t much care for banning abortion and was a fan of immigrants, but he knew of an opportunity when he saw it. Just as he’d experienced when building the conservative wing of the Republican party, there was a real constituency ignored by party elites on both sides, longing for a champion of their values and morals. That same week he met with some of the more conservative members of the party, including Jesse Helms, Barry Goldwater, Ron Paul, and Phil Crane, before quietly reaching across the aisle to meet with both Mississippi senators, Harry Byrd Jr., Larry McDonald, and Bob Stump. At this point, Reagan’s path had been solidified, all that was in flux was the timing. What he didn’t know was that forces on the left were beginning to feel the same draw.

Beyond Carter’s Playboy slip-up, there was dissension in the ranks on both ideological ends. Liberals were still freshly wounded by the bitter loss of the primary, and were unhappy with Carter as a person with his conservative Baptist character, and his refusal to tack left on a number of issues. The Anybody But Carter movement had only been reinvigorated by Scoop Jackson pledging to support Carter, as this was seen as an in-your-face demonstration of the moderate or even conservative tilt Carter would take as president. Ted Kennedy, the dynastic liberal from Massachusetts had grown tired of kowtowing to that element of their party, preferring permanent minority party status to having to deal with reactionaries and racists. Ted knew George McGovern felt similarly, still licking his wounds from the 1972 race and not being at all on board with Carter. The two senators from Wisconsin were in the same boat, and Kennedy had worked with them to pressure Carter to liberalize his platform to little avail. In the House, Udall had heard from John Conyers (with some encouragement from Kennedy) that many liberal party faithful still stood by him and Carter was driving many of them to reconsider their faith in the party. While discontent stewed on the left of the party, the right of the party was beginning to express their own issues. The two senators from Mississippi, initially fully on board with Carter and willing to campaign for him, were disappointed with his waffling on civil rights and unwillingness to fully condemn abortion or other moral ills. Carter’s dovish foreign policy drove them further away from their nominee, and sowed the seeds of secession in their minds in the spirit of their ancestors. Together with Harry Byrd Jr., the men let Carter and his campaign know in no uncertain terms that a continued move towards liberalism would threaten the support of powerful Southern and conservative democrats. Carter was caught off-guard by this seemingly sudden change of heart with two of his stronger supporters from that wing of the party, and tacked right on busing to attempt to placate them. The dissenters were momentarily satiated, but had much grander plans in mind should Carter fail once in office.

In some ways, the events of the next five years shouldn’t have really caught anyone off guard. Party loyalty in the electorate was at an all-time low, with voters happy to vote for who they liked best regardless of party in many cases. The big tent of both parties had grown too stretched, with Democrats housing reactionaries and bleeding-heart progressives, and the Republicans balancing the far-right and liberals. Both candidates faced revolts from dissenting elements internally, Carter from both sides and Rockefeller from his right. There had been some fringe activists pushing for party splits in the primaries, and even though those voices were sidelined quickly, the echoes of their arguments haunted many a party leader. What little unity the country was pulling back from the tumultuous 60s was torn apart by the continued brutality then ultimate failure in Vietnam, as well as Nixon’s scandal and resignation. As Carter and Rockefeller headed into the October 6th debate, historians recognize that as the first event after the two-party system’s collapse began. They didn’t know it, but they were fighting the last two-man battle for the presidency.