The tale of the Hellenic League

[idomeneas]

Idomeneas,
Thanks for answering,but you have your facts slightly wrong here:Athens started the Peloponnesian War with a treasury holding 9600 talents of gold(look Bury&Meiggs "AncientHistory of Greece to 323 BC" in the chapter of P.War);now that was the entire war budget of the British empire in 1915 if one makes the the financial equasion between prices in 1915...
The income of the empire was 460 minimum to 760 talents per year(look at Russel Meiggs "The Athenian empire"-a monumental work based on the columns of the Tribute lists).Pericles strategy was just attrition through harassment of the enemy which was highly effective;he knew the weakess of the Peloponnesian Alliance in hard cash reserves...the operations then were seasonal,meaning the good weather dictated the movement of large numbers of ships(only small squadrons of Athenian ships operated in the winter),therefore the
bancruptsy was not an event to worry Athenian finaciers(first bank noted in the world was 'Aristarchos Bank' in 600 BC and the Athenians had a long experience of state and imperial finances)- the plague was the unforseen event-and anyway the Peloponnesians were certain to run first out of money and food.
In order to survive,because the danger of defeat was imminent with the Ionian war,the Spartans asked for and received Persian help in gold and ships;the Persians thought that in order to defeat the Athenian navy it would be safer to attract the imperial (not Athenian-islanders) crews with higher pay;the standard pay was two(2) obols a day(a drachma had six obols) and the Persians offered 3 obols a day.The estimate of 1500 talents ws only for the salaries;you would have to add the supplies,equipment and of course a compehensive navy budget.You mention four(4) obols daily wage,a price unheard of at that time or even later.Think that you are talking about a permanent standing army like Phillip's all year round...

Idomeneas,poor metics were serving as peltasts along with thetes in Ificrates new regiments of peltasts,apart from their being used as javeliners or trireme rowers..

Apart from the wall for the defence of the Chersonese that was built at the time of Miltiades senior,the Athenians had to count on Athenian cleruchs in nearby islands who would arrive there in less than a day and also the squadrons of ships defending the Chersonese in case anyone would think to outflank the wall by the sea;you have to understand that the corn ships were vital to the survival of Athens and further the had absolute numerical and qualitative superiority over the tribes of Asia minor...when you speak about 6500 hoplites you are speaking about an army of approximately 20000 men counting a ratio 1:2 auxilliary troops as Cambridge Professor A.R.Burn maintains in his Book "Persia and the Greeks" where he repeatedly mentions that the Greek historians of the time when presenting numbers of forces they counted only the soldiers of the Phalanx...!

Cimon,

we can agree to disagree on Pericles strategy. Yes Pericles transfered the Delian leagues cashier from Delos to Athens and it was circa 10000 talents, but that was before the building of Parthenon. It is estimated that the Athenian operations in the first 2 years costed 2000 talents (I will try to find where I read the estimate). Kleon who changed the strategy was not an idiot (Aristophanes and Thucidides despised him for what were probably personal reasons), he realised that Athens could not win the war this way and he tried to emulate Cimon. Remember that only 40 years before Athens had powned Sparta in the first Pelloponessean war and only Cimon's admirration for Sparta stopped them.

I remember reading that the wage for the skilled laborer was 1.5 dtachmas at Alain Bressons's L' ECONOMIE DE LA GRECE DES CITES // LES STRUCTURES ET LA PRODUCTION but since I have lended the book I can not check so I could be making a mistake. I will research some more and if you are right I will downgrade the payments.

Reg Ellispontos I make it very clear that it was a surprise winter campaign. Also bear in mind that Athens for the last 30 years ITTL has 2 other great sources of grain (Sicily and Egypt) and so, not so much emphasis was given to their defence as in OTL. Many of the men you envision defending are probably somewhere in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia or even further northwest creating new colonies.

 

[idomeneas]

The Thracian war (364-350 BCE)

The reasons behind the Thracian invasion of mainland greece is still debated amongst historians. As the main reason for the event historian speculate that the loot from Byzantium and the steady income from tarrifs king Cotys was able to collect from the Hellespont for 5 years (following his betrayal of the Phrygians) solidified his position as the leading Thracian king and he managed something that no one had managed before and noone has managed since, to unify the Thracians in a single political organisation.

The thracian were considerred one of the largest ethnicities in the balkans. Individually they were excellent warriors but they lacked discipline. Their favourite method of warfare was skirmishing - they were credited after all with the creation of the Peltast type of soldier- allthough some of them preffered to use the Rhomphaia a huge 2 handed weapon that was able to deliver tremmmendous blows. Brasidas the spartan ad faced some of them in his Macedonian campaign and he had realised that ggod order and discipline were essential in defeating such a force.

The temporary weakening of the Athenian presence in the area, the upheaval in eastern Macedonia that the Thessalian conquests brought and the fact that the Macedonian themselves were forbiden to bear arms from the THessalians meant that the initial phase of the invasion was extremmely succesful.

If historians are to be believed Cotys lead a huge 150000 men army allthough in all probability there were various different armies under tribal leaders where Cotys had almost no control. The invasion started with huge successess. The Thessalian effort to win the 3rd sacred war had left the area poorly defended and the huge numberical advantage the Thracians enjoyed meant that very few strongholds were able to hold. In particular some of the coastal cities supported by the Athenian navy did not fall since the Thracians lacked the technology needed for effective sieges.

Onomarchus elder son died trying to defend eastern Macedonia in 364 in a battle near Olynthos. Following this defeat the Thessalians abandoned Macedonia and decided to defend at the Tempi passage. The battle of Tempi in 363 BCE is considered one of the greatest strategic blunders in history. The Thessalian army having been deafeated in Thermopylae the previous year and by being mostly based on mercenaries was not at its brightest day. The new phalanx was very effective in holding its ground but it needed flank support from lighter troops that the thessalians lacked. The Thracian fielded 45000 men while the Thessalian only 24000. The end result was almost predettermined. Cotys had almost no control on his army but the traditional thracian tactics and some common sence from his men lead him to a great victory. THe contacnt thracian skirmishing and harrassment lead some of the phalanx regiments to move forward and the thessalian line lost its cohesion. The thracians charged at the weak spots that appeared and their ferocity meant that many of men broke lines. The problem was that the new type of phalangite was ill suited for single combat with his small shield and light armour and thus the thessalians army broke and lost the battle. Onomarchus tried to lead one of his famous cavalry charges but he was slain before reaching the enemt line (some even claim by his own men).

Followin the battle the Thessalian army was no longer. More than 15000 thessalian were lost in the battle of Tempi and Thessalian power was forever broken. In Macedonia a young man who claimed that he was prince Philip that had miraculously survived was procalimed king and managed to create an army able to stop Thracian advances further west.

The Thessalian defeat in Tempi was great and the rest of the Greek world was greatly allarmed. The three great powers in mainland Greece -Thebes,Athens and Sparta- decided that enough was enough and proclaimed the Hellenic alliance [1]. Almost the entire southern Greece (with the notable exception of the greatly weakened Argos) was united in the cause of stoppin the barbarians.

In 362 BCE the Thracians flooded in Thessaly but they stopped at Thermopylae when they saw the large army arrayed against them. They tried to use the same tactics that had worked so well at Tempi but against the more experienced and better armored Thebans and Spartans they failed spectacularly. Meanwhile the Athenians were anxious to try out their new army. They followed the plan of the new rising star in Athenian politics Conon [2] who proposed a very aggressive campaign in Thracian heartland. So in 361 BCE a double counter attack started by the Hellenic alliance. On the Spartan aknowledged that Epameinondas was the best general the Greeks had and they allowed him to lead them. More than 35000 men went north against the Thracians. Cotys could not keep many of his subordinates who satisfied by the loot and seeing the difficulty of further invading returned home. in 361 BCE only 48000 Thracians stood with Cotys in the battle of Ellason. This time again Spartan discipline coupled with the tactical accumen of Epameinondas lead to a Greek victory. More than 9000 Thracians died in the battle.

Cotys was unwilling to surrender his huge conquests of the previous years and he tried to defend in Tempi but he was forced to retreat further north when he heard that Philip of Macedon was aproaching from the northwest with 8000 men. The Macedonians were accepted in the Greek alliance and they were given assurances that they would reclaim all their lost lands. For the next 10 years a dance of incasion and counterinvasion would be played in easten Macedonia. Cotys and Epameinondas both died from old age but no other battle took place. Eventually in 351 BCE the Spartan general Kladis would comptlete the liberatation of the final greek cities in the region.

The Athenians on the other hand landed 15000 men in Chersonessos in 361BCE and they were prepared to punish the thracians (and the Phrygians as well) for their insulting defeats 10 years earlier. The wage for the soldier that Menandros had proposed was deemed extremmely high and some adjustments were made. The most important was that the wage was lowered but at the end of his 20 year service the soldier would gain a substantial kleros [3]. THe new army performed better than was expected. Conon proved a carefull and dilligent general. He created the concept of tactical reserves by keeping his citizens (who were forced to train far more than the normal soldiers) in the back and sending them at the most crucial points of the conflict. He retook chersonneson in 360 and Byzantium fell after a long and hard 2 year siege in 358. He used the Athenian navy to constantly hit Thracian heartland and thus forcing many men to abandon Cotys's army to return and defend their homes. In 354 Conon attacked Phrygia and complettely destroyed the Phryfian army in Bithynia. The Phrygians were forced to abandon all their gains of the last war and abandon large tracks of land in northwestern Asia Minor.

By 350 BCE the Thracians were no longer a viable danger to the Greek mainland. The Macedonian kingdom had been reestablished under Philip but the Thracian invasion had destroyed almost all the work his predecessors had done. The Thebans had increased their prestige but they knew that the death of Epameinondas left them weaker. The Spartans became somewhat more extroverted following this war - the long relative peace for them meant that their manpower had been replentished. The Athenians were the ones that had lost the most initially and they were the ones that came out of him stronger. The Byzantines citizens were rellocated in various areas gained from Phrygia and Byzantium was ressetled as an Athenian Klerouchia. Its defence was bolsterred. The huge land mass gained from the war with Thracia meant that the Athenians were able to offer their ex soldiers huge tracks of land - it is bing said that the average soldier of Conon lived better in Thrace following the war than the average aristocrat in Athens. The only great greek power that lost from the war was Thessaly. The Thessalian commonwealth was destroyed and Macedonia took their place in the Delphic Amphictiony.

[1] They were defacto allied against Thessaly, the threat of Thracia is far greater
[2] no relation to OTL Conon who was butterflied away
[3] Land piece

 

[cimon]

Cimon,

we can agree to disagree on Pericles strategy. Yes Pericles transfered the Delian leagues cashier from Delos to Athens and it was circa 10000 talents, but that was before the building of Parthenon. It is estimated that the Athenian operations in the first 2 years costed 2000 talents (I will try to find where I read the estimate). Kleon who changed the strategy was not an idiot (Aristophanes and Thucidides despised him for what were probably personal reasons), he realised that Athens could not win the war this way and he tried to emulate Cimon. Remember that only 40 years before Athens had powned Sparta in the first Pelloponessean war and only Cimon's admirration for Sparta stopped them.

I remember reading that the wage for the skilled laborer was 1.5 dtachmas at Alain Bressons's L' ECONOMIE DE LA GRECE DES CITES // LES STRUCTURES ET LA PRODUCTION but since I have lended the book I can not check so I could be making a mistake. I will research some more and if you are right I will downgrade the payments.

Reg Ellispontos I make it very clear that it was a surprise winter campaign. Also bear in mind that Athens for the last 30 years ITTL has 2 other great sources of grain (Sicily and Egypt) and so, not so much emphasis was given to their defence as in OTL. Many of the men you envision defending are probably somewhere in Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia or even further northwest creating new colonies.

Idomeneas,

We will not agree to disagree about something taught in Schools of War(supply line security) and I had done it for at least twenty years:Cleon was a consumate politician-the English historians consider him almost as good as Themistocles-but he was not a general;he promised to the Athenians in Pnyx that "he would bring the Spartans from Pylos in chains in 20 days" he then proposed general Demosthenes in charge of the affair and said to him:"I promised what I promised,but I am a politician not a soldier; I don't care how you do it, but I want the Spartans from Pylos in chains in 20 days".As you know Demosthenes did it since he had the know-how,but that kind of promise made Cleon a demagogue not a true politician,and as such he was defeated in Northern Greece(Amphipolis) by Brasidas who was a professional soldier of a caliber.Simply the Athenians could not face the Spartans on land,none could as yet...Pericles on the other hand had been continuously elected general for almost 30 successive years and knew the value of the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance and was the one to introduce High Strategy concepts that touched on Politics of War.

Pericles new that the Delian League controlled fully the central and north Aegean and that the corn ships from the Dardanelles would sail to Athens in a perfectly protected enviroment.Egypt would require a very strong escort fleet since the south east was a contested area between Persians and Phoenicians and the Athenians,not to mention the fact that most of the Spartan allied states were in southern Asia Minor and Crete(Doric people),in other words the road was to perilous and long;Sicily was the traditional bread basket of Peloponnese and western Greece had naval cities allied to Sparta or Corinth in western Peloponnese and north and that any supply ships should be strongly guarded;the voyage was also too long and had to pass difficult spots with dangerous weather conditions(south eastern Sicily,cape Maleas etc.)

Two more points on that:The Spartans proposed peace terms,favourable to Athens after Pylos that included return in pre-431 BC status quo that included return of the cities of Plataea and Amphipolis to the Athenians...Cleon rejected that(only a fool would reject such terms).

You mention Cimon:Cleon was not a military genius like Cimon,not even by a long shot! also Cimon had united allies behind him and central Greece under the control of Athens whereas at the time of Cleon Athens was counting several powerful revolutions(including those of Thassos and Mytilene look at Russel Meiggs whose information on revolutions is accurate as it is deduced from the Tribute lists) and its position was
a little precarious and it had also lost central Greece after their land defeat from Thebes...

You are a bit wrong on treasury:Bury&Meiggs mentions in the prelude to the Peloponnesian War that Athens started with 9600 talents,that is long after the termination of the building of Parthenon(only the Propylaea were unfinished when the war started) and two thousand talents cost the siege and surrender of Potidaea that had revolted from DL.

Regarding the daily wage,it was 2 obols and one drachma for specialised people,example like Socrates who was a marble curving specialist(he was making also the Hermae-strret guides in Athens),see Bury&Meiggs on that;the book is widely available since it is a standard "A" Level course book on Ancient History.(Depending on where you are I could tell you where to find it if you are outside UK)(I would have liked to mentioned something about cleruchs,if moved from the place where their cleros was they would lose the acquired hoplite status)

Your last update is a good one although what you suggest is that Cotys did the unthinkable:he succeded in uniting the Thracians from Greece to the Danube regions(to explain their army numbers) eternally divided by petty feuds even for a spell!
You have also butterflied generals Hares and Chavrias and other famous ones from first half fourth century Athens(the professional century so called)

 

[idomeneas]

Idomeneas,

We will not agree to disagree about something taught in Schools of War(supply line security) and I had done it for at least twenty years:Cleon was a consumate politician-the English historians consider him almost as good as Themistocles-but he was not a general;he promised to the Athenians in Pnyx that "he would bring the Spartans from Pylos in chains in 20 days" he then proposed general Demosthenes in charge of the affair and said to him:"I promised what I promised,but I am a politician not a soldier; I don't care how you do it, but I want the Spartans from Pylos in chains in 20 days".As you know Demosthenes did it since he had the know-how,but that kind of promise made Cleon a demagogue not a true politician,and as such he was defeated in Northern Greece(Amphipolis) by Brasidas who was a professional soldier of a caliber.Simply the Athenians could not face the Spartans on land,none could as yet...Pericles on the other hand had been continuously elected general for almost 30 successive years and knew the value of the forces of the Peloponnesian alliance and was the one to introduce High Strategy concepts that touched on Politics of War.

Pericles new that the Delian League controlled fully the central and north Aegean and that the corn ships from the Dardanelles would sail to Athens in a perfectly protected enviroment.Egypt would require a very strong escort fleet since the south east was a contested area between Persians and Phoenicians and the Athenians,not to mention the fact that most of the Spartan allied states were in southern Asia Minor and Crete(Doric people),in other words the road was to perilous and long;Sicily was the traditional bread basket of Peloponnese and western Greece had naval cities allied to Sparta or Corinth in western Peloponnese and north and that any supply ships should be strongly guarded;the voyage was also too long and had to pass difficult spots with dangerous weather conditions(south eastern Sicily,cape Maleas etc.)

Two more points on that:The Spartans proposed peace terms,favourable to Athens after Pylos that included return in pre-431 BC status quo that included return of the cities of Plataea and Amphipolis to the Athenians...Cleon rejected that(only a fool would reject such terms).

You mention Cimon:Cleon was not a military genius like Cimon,not even by a long shot! also Cimon had united allies behind him and central Greece under the control of Athens whereas at the time of Cleon Athens was counting several powerful revolutions(including those of Thassos and Mytilene look at Russel Meiggs whose information on revolutions is accurate as it is deduced from the Tribute lists) and its position was
a little precarious and it had also lost central Greece after their land defeat from Thebes...

You are a bit wrong on treasury:Bury&Meiggs mentions in the prelude to the Peloponnesian War that Athens started with 9600 talents,that is long after the termination of the building of Parthenon(only the Propylaea were unfinished when the war started) and two thousand talents cost the siege and surrender of Potidaea that had revolted from DL.

Regarding the daily wage,it was 2 obols and one drachma for specialised people,example like Socrates who was a marble curving specialist(he was making also the Hermae-strret guides in Athens),see Bury&Meiggs on that;the book is widely available since it is a standard "A" Level course book on Ancient History.(Depending on where you are I could tell you where to find it if you are outside UK)(I would have liked to mentioned something about cleruchs,if moved from the place where their cleros was they would lose the acquired hoplite status)

Your last update is a good one although what you suggest is that Cotys did the unthinkable:he succeded in uniting the Thracians from Greece to the Danube regions(to explain their army numbers) eternally divided by petty feuds even for a spell!
You have also butterflied generals Hares and Chavrias and other famous ones from first half fourth century Athens(the professional century so called)

Cimon,

I did not compare Cleon's ability as a general to Cimon's. Cimon was by far the best general the Athenian state produced and it is a shame that most amateur historians know almost nothing of his exploits. Cleon tried to do what Cimon had done in Boetia and failed spectacularly because he was a lousy general (in the tactical level - in the strategic level an Athenian victory at Delion would mean that Sparta would have to abandon everything north of the Pelloponese, ie the Athenians would be able to propose far harsher terms than a simple return to status quo).

You are correct Cotys almost achieved the unthinkable but I make it evident that he had almost no control to the host he commanded and most of the other Thracians abandoned him long before his defeat.

You are correct almost all Athenian generals post 5th century have been butterflied. Too many variables exist to claim that zB Hares would play the same role that he played OTL. The last OTL person to make an apearance was Philip of Macedon.

 

[idomeneas]

The western Hellenes -350 BCE

While the mainland was involved in large scale wars the western colonies prosperred. Four cities in particular -Syracuse, Neapolis, Massalia and Herakleia- enjoyed huge economic and cultural bloom that allowed them to solidify themselves as the leaders of their respective areas.

Syracuse
Syracuse was dominated politically for a long time by the courageous general Dionysios [1] who proposed and followed an extremely pro Athenian policy. This lead to Syracuse becoming the Athenian "enforcer" in the area. Most of the trade from the island ended up going through there.

Following the death of Dionysios in the Syracusian continued following the same policy that allowed the city to prosper. They created many colonies, focusing mainly on the north western African coast. There was a short was with the Carthaginians in 368 BCE but it ended inconclusively following two sea battles - the Carthagonians won the battles but not decicively enough and they feared the Syracusian army so in the end they agreed on a status quo peace. The Syracusian following the war punished the citizens of Lillivaio who were the cause for the war by relocating them to North africa and ressetling the city.

Syracuse became on of the great cultural centers of Greece with realy spectacular building and works of art being created there. Many philosophers preffered to settle in this stable, rich city.

Neapolis

Neapolis faced huge difficulties early in its life but due to the political manuevers of Agathon emerged the stronger city in southern Italy. By being the de facto leader of the Italian league they were able to create a stable economic network of cities.

Their political dominance of the neighbouring Italian cities meant that many of them started to show clear Greek influences but in the other hands the Neapolitan themselves were influenced by them. In 350 BCE we find the first reference of monomachies [2] in the funeral games for Agathon.

The city grew very fast and realy strong. The italian league expanded steadily north and only a few cities refused to join. The most vocal and aggresive was the small city of Roma. The romans felt that the league had not helped them with their celtic problem and they were unwilling to cooperate. Agathon tried for several years to make them a part of the growing league but he always met stern refusal. Eventually in 355 BCE the Romans themselves tried to create a counter league with the other Latins. Unfortunately for them very few followed them and the Neapolitans were not amused. They invaded Roma and by having an almost 4 to 1 numerical advantage destroyed the Romans. Rome itself was ressetled as the city of Romi and the Romans themselves were either ressetled in southern Italy or sold into slavery.

Massalia
Many of the new settlers chose to use Massalia as their stepping stone for further expansion but many of them eventually stayed there. With the newfound manpower the Massaliotes were able to expand further in the mainland and force some of their near celtic tribes to submit. The main source of power for Massalia was that it became the center of trade for the entire western meditteranean. It was said that if someone couldn't find something in Massalia then it couldn't be found at all. All this trade brought great wealth to the city as is attested by the great civic building archaelogists have found.

The Massaliotes tried to expand their trade network and for this reason many expeditions beyond the straits of Hercules [3] were funded. We know that a certain Pitthefs made an inredible 17 voyages in the northern seas. Those trade expeditions/explorations allowed the Massaliotes to gain access to many new markets as well as new land to settle. We know of trade settlements as far north as Scandinavia allthough the Massaliotes preffered not to create large colonies beyond the pillars.

Herakleia

Herakleia was created almost on top of the Pillars of Hercules. While it seemed that the location was not good enough for a city to thrive, Herakleia thrived on trade tolls from its location. Unlike the Massaliotes, Herakleiotes tried to look to the south for new markets. They got into contact with many of the southern African tribes and created quite a few trade colonies beyond the pillars.

In 365BCE some ships were blown out of course and they discoverred the Hesperides [4] where a few colonies were established. The Heracleians tried to explore the Afrikan shoreline and they must have reached quite a bit south given the artifacts archaeologists have found. There is even an obscure mention that they tried to circumvent Libya but the voyage must have been unsuccesful.

[1] OTL the tyrant
[2] Gladiator fights in Greek
[3] Gibraltar
[4] OTL Cannaries Islands