"...new ships put to water in late 1915 were designed more with the intent of being able to quickly ferry soldiers onto land, and by March of 1916 nearly three hundred aero-planes and four hundred landships were coming out of American factories per month. Even without some tactical successes by the Yankees, this superiority in weaponry would have been extremely difficult for Confederate forces to overcome. The disparity in artillery, armor, air support and even simple things like shoes and coats by the spring of 1916 was remarkably vast despite the game efforts of the foundries and arsenals in Birmingham, Anniston, Augusta and Macon, or even the uniform mills in Durham and Greensville; the Confederacy was, quite simply, outgunned on paper.
Two battles occurred in early March - on March 8th the Norfolk Landings, and on March 10th the Rapidan Offensive - that both secured their immediate tactical and strategic objectives and in doing so greatly complicated Lejeune's defenses of Richmond. In the former, the new landing vessels were deployed both from the Chesapeake and the Atlantic to storm the shore of Virginia Beach, a sleepy resort town that nonetheless enjoyed a large, sustained open beach abutting flat (if marshy) land for a thrust at nearby Norfolk. These landings were supported by coastal bombardments from the US Atlantic Fleet that had little else to do at that point in time, shattering most of Norfolk's ample coastal defenses over the course of three days as Marines and Army infantrymen pushed their way in to take the city. Norfolk fell on the 12th, and the next push was the new shipyards in Hampton across the water, captured on the 14th. The fall of the Hampton Roads as a Confederate waterway was timed with a major push by Lenihan in the north, not at the hardened defenses at Fredericksburg where he had failed previously to break through into central Virginia but rather further west, near Culpeper; while the offensive took a whole ten days, the successful breaking through at Culpeper placed Lenihan's forces upon the Rapidan and thus hooking the left flank of Lejeune's forces southwestwards, threatening to break that end of the Confederate line.
For Lejeune, this was disastrous, regardless of how tenacious a fighter he was. For one thing, it did not only create issues for advances towards the capital but also his ability to coordinate with Lee in the Shenandoah, where Hall's push southwards towards Roanoke could now be supported from Lenihan overland directly rather than via a long supply line via Harpers Ferry. This merged both sub-theaters into one single offensive deeper into industrial Virginia and her hinterland where much of her food was grown, and as these attacks were occurring during the spring planting season in the Valley, it seemed fairly obvious to Lenihan that his army, and civilians, had seen nothing yet as far as another winter of starvation might go.
The ability of forces under Charles Farnsworth out of Norfolk to make progress was not to be underestimated, either, though Lejeune had anticipated this enough that he had placed four valuable divisions near Williamsburg to act as a screening defense. The Virginia Peninsula, site of the famous failed attempted by George McClellan Senior to take Richmond in 1862, was the most direct route with the most favorable terrain towards the capital from the Chesapeake Bay, and both sides knew this. Lejeune's only advantage was the small number of landships that Farnsworth was able to put ashore and the marshes south of the James River concentrating all Yankee forces on a fairly narrow pathway; defenses at Williamsburg were easy to construct and man and support with air power, and Farnsworth's advance was for the time being checked.
That was little respite to the men at Fredericksburg, who had to finally abandon their excellent defenses there as Lenihan finally broke through on April 27-28th, with horrific casualties for both sides in the last major battle of the war with such high losses for the United States. There were simply to many planes raining fire from the heavens, too many landship "tanks" barreling through Confederate lines (especially in the Rapidan area), and too much artillery hammering trenches as small, targeted "Hellfighter" shock forces attacked in precise weak points of the trenches to get behind and clear the path for the men force. The Third Battle of Fredericksburg was the charm for Lenihan, who at last had what he'd promised President Hughes he would achieve when he had been moved to this theater a year earlier after the Fall of Nashville - a fairly clear path to Richmond..."
- The Last Days of the Old Confederacy: How the War Was Lost in 1916