Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
So, presumably Vardeman will be elected. Lay down your bets for where Vardeman will be three years after elected...
1) Dead by his own hand
2) Dead by someone else's hand during the war (enough of a true believer that he participates in the defense of Richmond)
3) Executed after "Nuremberg" trial
4) In a USA prison
5) In exile (France?)
I just realized that while the new Brazilian PM would be willing to make peace with Argentina, he might also take in escaping Confederate Leadership. It is *entirely* possible that Vardeman in 1919 may be in Brazil making radio broadcasts supporting having the Confederate population attack those that signed the peace treaty and USA occupying troops.
1) Dead by his own hand
2) Dead by someone else's hand during the war (enough of a true believer that he participates in the defense of Richmond)
3) Executed after "Nuremberg" trial
4) In a USA prison
5) In exile (France?)
I just realized that while the new Brazilian PM would be willing to make peace with Argentina, he might also take in escaping Confederate Leadership. It is *entirely* possible that Vardeman in 1919 may be in Brazil making radio broadcasts supporting having the Confederate population attack those that signed the peace treaty and USA occupying troops.
In the end, these weren’t very bright guys, and things got out of hand
It’s a play on words of the Bourbon (Democrats) coming to be dominant again after the Tillman era
And, yeah. Tough times ahead down Dixie way…
Time to re-watch that movie - maybe I'll fire it up tomorrow night.
And actually, I just had a thought. A *long* time ago, you indicated that you wanted the number of the states in the Union to be a nice "round" 36 after the war. You've made it pretty clear recently the US *isn't* grabbing all of Baja (A nice Naval Station will do), and that Alt-Oklahoma is remaining free.
While it is possible you have decided the US is grabbing West Texas (for some definition of West), there is only one other possibility that we've discussed for State #36. I guess the Wall that the Liberals want to build in the 1980s *won't* follow the Ohio River.
🤐🤐🤐And actually, I just had a thought. A *long* time ago, you indicated that you wanted the number of the states in the Union to be a nice "round" 36 after the war. You've made it pretty clear recently the US *isn't* grabbing all of Baja (A nice Naval Station will do), and that Alt-Oklahoma is remaining free.
While it is possible you have decided the US is grabbing West Texas (for some definition of West), there is only one other possibility that we've discussed for State #36. I guess the Wall that the Liberals want to build in the 1980s *won't* follow the Ohio River.
Antonio Salandra along with his ally the Italian Foreign Minister Sidney Sonnino share responsibility for two calamities that befell Italy not one - WWI and by extension Mussolini too. Giolitti always favored being neutral or he would have opted not to honor the Triple Alliance with Italy. From what I can recall most of Giolitti's allies in Parliament shared his sentiment that Italy should not enter the war and should sit things out. The problem was that King Victor Emannuel and Prime Minister Salandra both wanted war and was willing to pressure Parliament into doing so.
Plus like Giolitti (although less so) they were willing to throw their weight behind Mussolini in 1922 because they thought he could be co-opted. I don't think Giolitti will adopt the wait and sea policy when things kick off in 1919-1920 seeing as alliance with Germany is crucial for Italian security. I can't really see Salandra being able to use the war issue as a wedge to get rid of his rival seeing as the French and the Austrians might not be willing to offer a better deal - unless of course they do offer to cede Venetia/Istria to keep Italy neutral. We know that Italy is going to enter the war anyway; the problem is that they will be too weak to deal with Germany if Germany wins. Because of these concerns it may be more difficult to make Italy fully commit to war if push comes to shove.
Plus like Giolitti (although less so) they were willing to throw their weight behind Mussolini in 1922 because they thought he could be co-opted. I don't think Giolitti will adopt the wait and sea policy when things kick off in 1919-1920 seeing as alliance with Germany is crucial for Italian security. I can't really see Salandra being able to use the war issue as a wedge to get rid of his rival seeing as the French and the Austrians might not be willing to offer a better deal - unless of course they do offer to cede Venetia/Istria to keep Italy neutral. We know that Italy is going to enter the war anyway; the problem is that they will be too weak to deal with Germany if Germany wins. Because of these concerns it may be more difficult to make Italy fully commit to war if push comes to shove.
Hyped for North Virginia to be a state. Gotta find a snapper name tho.And actually, I just had a thought. A *long* time ago, you indicated that you wanted the number of the states in the Union to be a nice "round" 36 after the war. You've made it pretty clear recently the US *isn't* grabbing all of Baja (A nice Naval Station will do), and that Alt-Oklahoma is remaining free.
While it is possible you have decided the US is grabbing West Texas (for some definition of West), there is only one other possibility that we've discussed for State #36. I guess the Wall that the Liberals want to build in the 1980s *won't* follow the Ohio River.
What are the Ideologies of the Individual parties? For got since I read the last thread.
"All the President's Men." The quote from KingSweden is said by Hal Holbrook.
National Liberal: would be seen as center-right today, supportive of increased autonomy, secularization of state institutions; supportive of free enterprise?
Conservative: would be viewed as right wing; traditionalist, supportive of the catholic church; opposed to decentralization; unsure of what their stance on the economy is.
Radical: social liberal; opposes excessive concentration of power in the hands of the state and trusts; primarily secular and opposed to the power of the church.
Not sure where the Progressives would sit; perhaps to the right of the Radicals but to the left of the Liberals. PSOE seems to be trending toward social democracy but is not quite there yet. Still seen as the principle worker's party; main force for left wing militancy but avoids open confrontation with the monarchy.
Good analysis (as per usual!)
The strategic situation for Italy you describe is fairly spot on and that’s really why France/Austria has little to offer them, even if they were to be generous; Italy alone after accepting a short-term bribe of land from the Triangle becomes very insecure without German security guarantees. Besides, seeing as France/Austria are viewing Italian ambitions in the western Balkans as part of the problem here, they’d probably be unwilling to entertain playing ball with Rome anyways.
But a postwar scenario where Germany is resentful of Italy for in their eyes not pulling her fair weight in the war is an interesting solution, certainly…
This is broadly right. I’d just add that the Radicals are fairly Republican, though not necessarily open about that fact, while the Integrists/Mellists are even further right than the Conservatives, probably a tad more economically interventionist
Regionalist and Cuban Nationalist hopefully in the Spanish context is self explanatory
Huh?
Sorry, sort of spitballing how the US and Brazil could manage to be at war with each other for Decades without the ability to really hurt each other and have the Confederate Leadership that had to flee continue to stir the pot. I'm guessing that Long at least is willing to deal with the US at an arms length from a sense of RealPolitick but even with Long's time in Nashville, some consider him to be a traitor for dealing with the US at all.
Giolitti decision will be influenced by this factor
1- trust on the army: OTL is decision to not enter the war (immediately) was also given by the non stellar performance of the army in the war against the Ottoman and the fact that there were not enough money and time to replenish all the material lost in Libya
2 - internal situation: is the situation stable or the nationalist,socialist and in general extremist are causing trouble and this event will surely make the situation much much worse...or there is the possibility of a Union Sacre-like governement. I don't take in consideration the catholic as with the Pope in Malta will be still proibihited to enter the italian political life (OTL in this period things were relaxed and a lot of time the church closed an eye)
3 - geopolitical situation: a short time bribe is ok only if really really there isn't the possibility to enter the war but A-h even OTL was tempted to launch a punitive expedition to teach the italians a lesson (and we were ally) so i image that now things are much worse than OTL in term of relationship. So being alone to face both France and AH will hardly be tempting
French election, 1915
French election, 1915
527 seats in the Corps Legislatif
National Bloc (Poincare): 217 (-51)
Union of Socialist Reform (Briand): 95 (+95) [1]
Action Francaise (Maurras): 73 (+2)
Radicals (Caillaux): 70 (+6)
SFIO (Jaures): 49 (+9)
Ligue des Patriotes (Barres): 9 (-53)
Independents of the Left (N/A): 8 (-)
Parti des Regions (Ribot): 5 (-2)
Independents of the Right: 1 (-3)
----
"...curious decisions in French political history. Under the legislative reforms of 1906 [2] an election was not due until late spring of 1916, and there were a great many allies of Poincaré, Paleologue and [Andre] Tardieu chief among them, who would have preferred to wait an additional five or six months before calling France to the polls. There was no particular impetus for the early election call, not with the Bloc National enjoying an outright absolute majority of its own and supermajority support when taking into account the oft-feuding but support AF and LdP. While economic statistics from the 1910s are by nature quite dodgy, scholarship today suggests that the French economy enjoyed one of her best half-year periods since the Decade d'Or between when Frenchmen went to the polls in October 1915 and when they would have been due in early May of 1916, at the very beginning of the robust 1915-18 European economic boom - put more simply, Poincaré would have had a considerably stronger hand had he merely waited as he could have. In his diaries and correspondences to colleagues, Poincaré defended his unilateral suggestion to the Emperor that the Corps legislatif be dissolved with his supposition that it would catch his rivals, particularly Briand, wrong-footed; it in the end left them more befuddled than caught off guard, particularly the canny Briand who had been preparing for an election since the first breaths taken by the URS the year before.
In practical terms, the elections of autumn 1915 did not change much. The Prime Minister was still, after all, responsible first and foremost to the Emperor, and as the Bloc National remained the largest party in the Corps legislatif by a broad margin and the choice in the end rested with Napoleon V, Poincaré found himself back at the Hotel Matignon, which in the previous six months he had formally established as the official residence of the Prime Minister. In symbolic and historical terms, however, it was a watershed election. France's legislature had always been a weak institution, dismissed by Napoleon IV as a rubber-stamp for his more popular ideas and ignored by a rotating cast of Prime Ministers dating back to MacMahon all the way through Boulanger who regarded it as "a debating society of great pretense and little import," too weak to even bother dissolving when bothersome. Poincaré had positioned himself as something different, though, as a Prime Minister who valued the role of the Corps legislatif, a conservative but a democrat at heart who would make no moves without the confidence of the majority of the voix populaire. When he had a clear majority thanks to his own party and a supermajority with the support of the right-wing cadres, that was a perfectly fine position to take that cost him nothing. But the Bloc National had lost its narrow but absolute majority, shedding fifty seats and falling well shy of being able to do as it pleased. Of course, the Bloc could rely upon the support of Action Francaise, at least to block the opposition, as well as the increasingly conservative Regions Party of Alexandre Ribot, but the AF had shifted even further right in its total and complete contempt for democracy, arguing in favor of the elimination of Parliament altogether and proposing a state ruled exclusively by royal decree, a position that gained increasing traction amongst the ever-reactionary officer corps of the Empire. Democratic, mainstream moderate conservatives like Poincaré were now dependent on the goodwill of monarchist absolutists whose ideas would form the basis of integralist thinking in the decades to come, and the hard-nationalist Ligue des Patriotes, without its north star in Boulanger, had been virtually wiped out in the same election, denying the Bloc its critical outside support from a far-right faction that was not led by the genuinely troublesome figure of Maurras.
Of course, Poincaré had another option - to pivot to the increasingly resilient center and center-left, which had recovered from their nadirs of the 1890s and early 1900s to genuinely flex their muscles again. Had Poincaré been somewhat more astute of a domestic operator than he was, the ability to play the rival factions off each other tactically would have been clear to him. All three of the opposition parties had enough legislators now on their own to be able to carry in alliance with the Bloc any element that Poincaré brought to the floor, even the SFIO, smallest and most radical (theoretically if not always in practice, at least) of the three. As this was also the case with the AF, this meant that Poincaré, had he seized the opportunity better, had a minority government that was strong enough to survive on its own feet and an opposition that could be triangulated transactionally and individually, thus always kept on their toes, and allowed the Bloc not to have to form a permanent coalition with any other party but rather operate in temporary alliances of convenience.
While this came to be in practice how Poincaré addressed the circumstances of French politics over the next several years, it was a circumstance that he approached with improvisation rather than strategy, and frustration rather than the cunning and caution it required. The most immediate problem was that the elections of 1915 had elevated Aristide Briand from first among equals to the clear and most straightforward opponent of the Poincaré regime and indeed much of the increasingly clerical project of the monarchy as pushed by the Dowager Empress Eugenie. Briand was reconciled to the Empire but a staunch atheist and a socialist reformer, keen on using the power of municipalities rather than the entire state to bring about genuine and true improvements in the French standard of living as well as French education, sanitation and worker's rights. As such, while he was impressed and more than a little surprised by how well his URS did in the election, particularly its dominance in Paris and replacing the Radicals as the largest party there, he viewed the results more as a springboard to build his fledgling opposition party up across Paris, particularly in the industrial areas around Lille, Calais and Marseille, rather than doing battle with the hated conservatives as Caillaux and Jaures would have preferred.
What resulted was that Poincaré, always with a sense of embattlement and bitterness, came to perceive himself as ever-further under siege, despite French politics' remarkable placidity in the years that followed. In his worldview, there was always a knife being sharpened to be used on him, even by his erstwhile allies - Paleologue, Tardieu, Castelnau, it could have been any of them - and he was convinced that Briand, who had burst onto the scene as a bonafide new leader of oppositional forces from one member of the Corps legislatif (himself) to nearly a hundred, was now as much a threat from the outside as conservatives questioning his judgement and rigor were from the inside. Dangerously, this sense of insecurity for Poincaré and new questions of stability within the monarchist-conservative alliance created a space in which politicians felt they needed to outdo one another in seeming the most nationalist (and, on occasion, the most pious), and of course the targets of French clerical-nationalist zeal were familiar names - Britain, but more realistically Germany and Italy, the bete noires of Parisian foreign policy since the traumas of 1867..."
- La Politique Mondiale: Poincaré, France and the Waltz of the Great Powers
[1] Recall that Aristide Briand decided to position himself separately from the SFIO and the Radicals with this outfit in this update here, a decision that most certainly worked out in his favor as you can see
[2] Not gonna go into details this is just a throwaway, presume that in all countries things get tinkered with periodically, got enough to cover in this sprawling mess as it is lol