She was the Communist party's Presidential Candidate for 2005 elections.
Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
kham_coc
Banned
Well I think the treaty should specify that the waterways are internationalised, probably neutralised, and I would say that parts of the relevant ports are US concessions.
Though to be honest, the confederate really screwed up the war thing, in the negotiations prior to the war they should just have said that subsequent to the treaty expiring the relevant waterways are confederate and anything US flagged isn't permitted to use them, and if they don't like it they can build a canal to the Atlantic ocean.
Considering how fed up the US was with the CSA at that point, fully nationalizing the Mississippi probably ends with a DoW from whatever administration - Hearst or Hughes - is in place. The CSA only beat the US to the punch by a few days after all and that was with a much milder crisis than that kind of stick in the eye would have yielded
Frankly, I don't think it is even *that* late. If the Confederacy had broken the treaty prior to 1913 by Nationalizing the river, then as soon as the UK and France wash their hands of the situation, the USA declares war. (And the only reason that the CSA has the support of as many other countries as it does in this war is that the end of the Treaty of Havana basically aligned with the opening of the Canal.).
I'd *love* an AH in this TL where the Confederacy abrogates the treaty earlier and somehow ends up with war with the USA and Spain at the same time.
Yeah that would honestly have gone way worse for the CSA, timing wise. Say they do this after Bliss-Blackburn collapses with the Bloc Sud barely even a kernel of an idea… the US Army hasn’t had the Haffen Plan go through yet but that’s not that much of a handicap, and there’s no Mexican/Chilean theater to worry about (also no Canal to shortcut through, either granted)Frankly, I don't think it is even *that* late. If the Confederacy had broken the treaty prior to 1913 by Nationalizing the river, then as soon as the UK and France wash their hands of the situation, the USA declares war. (And the only reason that the CSA has the support of as many other countries as it does in this war is that the end of the Treaty of Havana basically aligned with the opening of the Canal.).
I'd *love* an AH in this TL where the Confederacy abrogates the treaty earlier and somehow ends up with war with the USA and Spain at the same time.
The unholy John Pershing and Valeriano Weyler team up we never knew we needed…
Burning Punjab
"...puffed out his chest and declared, "The Crown has called in her hour of need, and Canada will answer!" The response to the crisis of the Empire in other Dominions was no less ebullient than that of McCarthy; Prime Ministers Merriman (South Africa) and Fisher (Australia) were eager to demonstrate to their monarchist, working-class constituents that they, too, would not hesitate to stand up for British interests, and troops setting off from Durban and Sydney had the added advantage of not having angry Punjabi militants throw rotten vegetables or even stones at them as they boarded Royal Navy vessels bound for Calcutta or Bombay, as was the case for the Canadian divisions departing from Vancouver.
In all, the Dominions supplied close to a hundred thousand men, most of them volunteers. Propaganda across the British Empire in the spring of 1915 played heavily on stereotypes of Indians as an uppity people revolting against their rightful betters, and leaned in on institutional memory in London of the Great Mutiny of 1857. The advantage in present day, of course, was an even greater technological edge for the British Raj than the East India Company had enjoyed sixty years prior, particularly with artillery, but also the speed with which British forces could be routed to India and also the speed with which rumors of atrocities committed against white Britons, in particular women, could be relayed back to an outraged public.
This worldwide eagerness to answer the call to defend the Crown, steeped in grotesquely racist and paternalist sentiment, would support the India Field Force being formed by Lord Kitchener in Aden and then Bombay, drawing upon lessons learned by the British Army in the Boxer War. [1] Kitchener was of course not just famous for his brutally savage but effective service in China in 1901 or his brief tenure attempting to pacify Ireland's sectarian violence but also a long career in the Indian Army and he was familiar with the various princely states he would have to draw on for support, the geography, the capabilities of the Indian Army and the culture and attitudes of the enemy he was meant to crush. Kitchener understood as well as anyone that time was of the essence; the Punjab Mutiny needed to be destroyed before it could capture the imagination of the Indian street.
In that effort, the British counterattack was fortunate that the Ghadarites had failed in their core mission of achieving an all-Indian uprising across the subcontinent, for the variety of reasons discussed in previous chapters. That being said, most of Punjab and much of western Haryana had by early May fallen into enemy hands and a large but ragtag army of rebels was marching north of the Thar Desert towards the Yamuna and the capital at Delhi. General Duff and his men were well aware of the horrifying stories of the sieges of Delhi and Cawnpore in the hot, terrible autumn of 1857 and were keen not to see a repeat; studying Kitchener's own reports of the conditions around Tientsin and Peking, Duff built a massive line of fortifications running from the Delhi Ridge to the Yamuna throughout late April, as the Ghadarites consolidated in Amritsar and then lunged southeast around the upper northern edge of the Thar, really the only direction they had available to go, their force of nearly a hundred thousand men - most of whom were not professional soldiers or even men with any combat experience - aimed straight at the triangle formed by the cities of Panipat, Karnal and Kaithal, north of Delhi and just west of the Yamuna.
The sporadic rioting and communal violence in Bengal notwithstanding, the concentration of the mutiny in Punjab allowed Duff to concentrate his forces near Panipat, near the far end of the realistic supply lines of Ghadarite forces led by Bagha Jatin, who was nobody's idea of a military commander. Duff further had the advantage of artillery and heavy machine guns, which were generally only allowed to be used by European cadres of the Indian Army and thus in short supply for the rebels. Seeking to avoid a situation similar to the Siege of Delhi fifty-eight years earlier, Duff made clear to his men that a decisive rout of the enemy was the only acceptable result at Panipat - a place where in 1761 a battle between the Marathas and the Durranis had augured the end of Indian independence - and on May 11th, 1915, the battle began.
While not the killing blow Duff had boasted of in telegrams back to London, Panipat was still a clear British victory. Nearly ten thousand Indians were killed over the course of a day and thousands more wounded or captured, but the rest of the army was able to retreat back in relatively decent order to Kaithal, and Duff elected for the time being not to pursue them (to Kitchener's chagrin), instead deciding to regroup after the savage violence of the day in which over two thousand of his own men fell and maintain the Yamuna Line to defend Delhi and the Ganges Plain east of the Yamuna.
Both sides had thus at Panipat learned valuable lessons - the British that they could indeed rely somewhat on their superior firepower and the disinterest of the average Indian in the revolt, and the Ghadarites that despite their relative lack of discipline they could still credibly fight even if their threat to the capital was largely over and that their campaign to win over the skeptical, mainstream leadership of Indian nationalism embodied in the Congress was perhaps not entirely at an end..."
- Burning Punjab
[1] Suffice to say, much like Weyler was not a guy you want running loose in the Philippines, Kitchener is not a guy you want running loose in the Punjab
In all, the Dominions supplied close to a hundred thousand men, most of them volunteers. Propaganda across the British Empire in the spring of 1915 played heavily on stereotypes of Indians as an uppity people revolting against their rightful betters, and leaned in on institutional memory in London of the Great Mutiny of 1857. The advantage in present day, of course, was an even greater technological edge for the British Raj than the East India Company had enjoyed sixty years prior, particularly with artillery, but also the speed with which British forces could be routed to India and also the speed with which rumors of atrocities committed against white Britons, in particular women, could be relayed back to an outraged public.
This worldwide eagerness to answer the call to defend the Crown, steeped in grotesquely racist and paternalist sentiment, would support the India Field Force being formed by Lord Kitchener in Aden and then Bombay, drawing upon lessons learned by the British Army in the Boxer War. [1] Kitchener was of course not just famous for his brutally savage but effective service in China in 1901 or his brief tenure attempting to pacify Ireland's sectarian violence but also a long career in the Indian Army and he was familiar with the various princely states he would have to draw on for support, the geography, the capabilities of the Indian Army and the culture and attitudes of the enemy he was meant to crush. Kitchener understood as well as anyone that time was of the essence; the Punjab Mutiny needed to be destroyed before it could capture the imagination of the Indian street.
In that effort, the British counterattack was fortunate that the Ghadarites had failed in their core mission of achieving an all-Indian uprising across the subcontinent, for the variety of reasons discussed in previous chapters. That being said, most of Punjab and much of western Haryana had by early May fallen into enemy hands and a large but ragtag army of rebels was marching north of the Thar Desert towards the Yamuna and the capital at Delhi. General Duff and his men were well aware of the horrifying stories of the sieges of Delhi and Cawnpore in the hot, terrible autumn of 1857 and were keen not to see a repeat; studying Kitchener's own reports of the conditions around Tientsin and Peking, Duff built a massive line of fortifications running from the Delhi Ridge to the Yamuna throughout late April, as the Ghadarites consolidated in Amritsar and then lunged southeast around the upper northern edge of the Thar, really the only direction they had available to go, their force of nearly a hundred thousand men - most of whom were not professional soldiers or even men with any combat experience - aimed straight at the triangle formed by the cities of Panipat, Karnal and Kaithal, north of Delhi and just west of the Yamuna.
The sporadic rioting and communal violence in Bengal notwithstanding, the concentration of the mutiny in Punjab allowed Duff to concentrate his forces near Panipat, near the far end of the realistic supply lines of Ghadarite forces led by Bagha Jatin, who was nobody's idea of a military commander. Duff further had the advantage of artillery and heavy machine guns, which were generally only allowed to be used by European cadres of the Indian Army and thus in short supply for the rebels. Seeking to avoid a situation similar to the Siege of Delhi fifty-eight years earlier, Duff made clear to his men that a decisive rout of the enemy was the only acceptable result at Panipat - a place where in 1761 a battle between the Marathas and the Durranis had augured the end of Indian independence - and on May 11th, 1915, the battle began.
While not the killing blow Duff had boasted of in telegrams back to London, Panipat was still a clear British victory. Nearly ten thousand Indians were killed over the course of a day and thousands more wounded or captured, but the rest of the army was able to retreat back in relatively decent order to Kaithal, and Duff elected for the time being not to pursue them (to Kitchener's chagrin), instead deciding to regroup after the savage violence of the day in which over two thousand of his own men fell and maintain the Yamuna Line to defend Delhi and the Ganges Plain east of the Yamuna.
Both sides had thus at Panipat learned valuable lessons - the British that they could indeed rely somewhat on their superior firepower and the disinterest of the average Indian in the revolt, and the Ghadarites that despite their relative lack of discipline they could still credibly fight even if their threat to the capital was largely over and that their campaign to win over the skeptical, mainstream leadership of Indian nationalism embodied in the Congress was perhaps not entirely at an end..."
- Burning Punjab
[1] Suffice to say, much like Weyler was not a guy you want running loose in the Philippines, Kitchener is not a guy you want running loose in the Punjab
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I believe in India rebels and the Chinese/Indian/French cartels abilities to fund them! In exchange for their demands of course.
The British have managed to protect Delhi, which will definitely sooth some 1857 fears however the rebellion is not collapsing as well as they hope.
However besides the likely very brutal crackdowns against the province which could hopefully drive more people to revolt the best hope is a massive British overreaction and punishment to drive some of the establishment and general population against it.
After all the 1857 revolt saw a restructuring of the Raj and feeling of needing to punish the Indians will be if anything far more widespread given the media. That or feel the need to play the sectarian card and promote other loyal groups above rebel ones.
The British have managed to protect Delhi, which will definitely sooth some 1857 fears however the rebellion is not collapsing as well as they hope.
However besides the likely very brutal crackdowns against the province which could hopefully drive more people to revolt the best hope is a massive British overreaction and punishment to drive some of the establishment and general population against it.
After all the 1857 revolt saw a restructuring of the Raj and feeling of needing to punish the Indians will be if anything far more widespread given the media. That or feel the need to play the sectarian card and promote other loyal groups above rebel ones.
Whatever happens i just hope the independence or lack thereof of the Indian subcontinent in this timeline can avoid the atrocities of the partition.
True, no shortcut, but in a USA/CSA only fight, the USA will be able to more or less strip the Pacific of Naval Forces, doesn't matter if it takes 2 months to reach the Caribbean and gets evil looks from both the Chilean Navy and the Brazilian Navy as it goes by. Taking El Paso might get trickier with a Neutral Mexico on the other side of the border, but on the other hand, the idea of flanking it in Texas and just leaving it to wither seems reasonable. Wikipedia indicates that shipping could not generally be done up to El Paso, but might (unreferenced) have been possible if the river was improved, no clue whether the CSA did so. And even if it is, Pershing could have *relatively* easily make it not navigable.
How did he reach Punjab after suppression of the revolt in Kolkata?
It should have been Marathas.
Also Were you trying to talk about the 1st battle between Mughals and Lodis in 1526
Or 2nd Between Mughals and Hemchandra? cuz India was independent for a long time after the 3rd and it did not begin the end of Independence of India. Ever heard of Maratha resurgence era?
But the 1st and 2nd one also doesn't work by the logic of Mughals we're foreign conquerors cuz the Delhi sultanate began to rule India by that that time since 2nd Tarain at 1192.
Still like the fact that we also have to read about 4th Panipat atop the three.
Suggession: for more unique parallels, could have had 3rd Tarain instead of 4th Panipat.
Or if NWFP is in British Control we can see 2nd Jhelum(Hysdaspes).
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Underrated point right here... watch that space
We will definitely avoid that atrocity
The vibe I got reading up on 3rd Panipat was that it left both parties weakened (and indeed going back and looking, it was the Marathas) to the point that it made it much easier for the EIC to step in and press their influence west.
It could happen, though IMO they're more interesting separately than as one...
Ok, so if you're swapping LatAm and Asia's fates, and China is already going down the route of functionally independent cartel fiefdoms...
Beatriz
Gone Fishin'
I guess that would be a byproduct of post-Mughal fragmentation, and the rapid rise and fall of the Maratha empire followed by turbulence introduced by British conquest
War in the Cone
"...thrusts across the river under cover of dreadnought fire in the early morning, once Argentinean bridgeheads had already been established. As with the Battles of Santa Fe, the central hingepoint of the front was once again the main focus of Operation Repulse (Repulsa in Spanish), with close to a hundred and fifty thousand Argentines punching through Parana while an additional fifty thousand, two divisions apiece, went over to both north and south at Santa Elena and near Rosario.
Contemporary and later historians have generally viewed Repulse as a failure that ended the future political ambitions of Chief of the Army Staff Ricchetti; disaster is too strong a word, but it was definitely not a successful operation. Launched on May 28 to take advantage of late autumn dry and cool conditions and a lull in rains that delayed the operation by two weeks, by June 7th the Argentines were in retreat, pulling back across the Parana to the safety of their lines. The precise reasons why Repulse, which was the first major offensive operation of the Argentinean Army in the war, didn't work are myriad and unclear. Ricchetti himself suggested that he had insufficiently prepared and briefed his commanders and that while his forces were extremely tenacious on defense were unsuited for and undisciplined on the attack. Other less charitable interpretations suggest that the attempted operation was too large and ambitious, with too men untrained men with too few supplies. Brazilian veterans always responded that their superior manpower, weaponry and tactics carried the day.
Whatever the reason, the feints to north and south were total routs, surrounded and destroyed almost instantly, and the main force attacking through Parana was forced to fall back to the river within days, with most of the force retreating while a hardened core of elite troops were left behind in the city under covering fire that prevented Brazilian airplanes from getting in close. In that sense, the operation had one partial success - Argentina once more had a foothold east of the river. However, it had come at the cost of over twenty thousand killed and near three times that figure wounded, captured or both.
As June advanced, Fonseca elected to press his advantage with the collapse of the Argentine offensive and "throw the die," so to speak, on attempting a breakout from the Goya Pocket in the north of the front. Already holding the town of Reconquista on the right bank just south of the impassable Ibera Wetlands, Fonseca sent four divisions across from Goya to march south along the river road, cutting off Argentinean supply routes to Paraguay, while sending another two divisions across from Esquina while his first wave attacked defenders who could have prevented their crossing. Suddenly, a very formidable force of Brazilians was across the river, albeit far from the core of the front. Fonseca's plan was to throw his six divisions down the right bank into the rear of Argentine defenses near Santa Fe, weaken them, and then smash the city once and for all. It was a daring and necessary gamble, considering the frustrations at home with his adamancy that the war had to go on until the green-and-gold Imperial banner flew over the Plaza de Mayo.
Like most of Fonseca's more ambitious gambits in the wake of Uruguay's successful capture, however, the "Goya Breakout" failed. Ricchetti's forces may have been incapable of sustaining an offensive into the teeth of Brazilian defenses but knew how to fight tactically and with discipline when attacked, and had the advantage of not having to face the same kind of overwhelming combined arms tactics of air power and artillery as they had just a month prior during Repulse. The Argentine Army held at San Justo, counterattacked at Ramayon while inflicting disproportionate casualties, and then scattered the larger Brazilian force at San Javier on the marshy banks of the Parana on July 10th. The Brazilians retreated in shambles, with only a single division pursuing at a distance to make sure they put distance between themselves and Santa Fe, to their stronghold at Reconquista to lick their wounds. Fonseca was once again humiliated, unable to force a result even after the enemy had embarrassed themselves, and with Argentina being able to bring the full force of its soldiery to the Parana with Chile out of the war and American naval assets now in the River Plate, Brazil's window of opportunity to strike a killing blow was gone.
The Goya Breakout thus was, in the middle of the Argentine winter, the last major offensive undertaken by Brazil in the entire war..."
- War in the Cone
Contemporary and later historians have generally viewed Repulse as a failure that ended the future political ambitions of Chief of the Army Staff Ricchetti; disaster is too strong a word, but it was definitely not a successful operation. Launched on May 28 to take advantage of late autumn dry and cool conditions and a lull in rains that delayed the operation by two weeks, by June 7th the Argentines were in retreat, pulling back across the Parana to the safety of their lines. The precise reasons why Repulse, which was the first major offensive operation of the Argentinean Army in the war, didn't work are myriad and unclear. Ricchetti himself suggested that he had insufficiently prepared and briefed his commanders and that while his forces were extremely tenacious on defense were unsuited for and undisciplined on the attack. Other less charitable interpretations suggest that the attempted operation was too large and ambitious, with too men untrained men with too few supplies. Brazilian veterans always responded that their superior manpower, weaponry and tactics carried the day.
Whatever the reason, the feints to north and south were total routs, surrounded and destroyed almost instantly, and the main force attacking through Parana was forced to fall back to the river within days, with most of the force retreating while a hardened core of elite troops were left behind in the city under covering fire that prevented Brazilian airplanes from getting in close. In that sense, the operation had one partial success - Argentina once more had a foothold east of the river. However, it had come at the cost of over twenty thousand killed and near three times that figure wounded, captured or both.
As June advanced, Fonseca elected to press his advantage with the collapse of the Argentine offensive and "throw the die," so to speak, on attempting a breakout from the Goya Pocket in the north of the front. Already holding the town of Reconquista on the right bank just south of the impassable Ibera Wetlands, Fonseca sent four divisions across from Goya to march south along the river road, cutting off Argentinean supply routes to Paraguay, while sending another two divisions across from Esquina while his first wave attacked defenders who could have prevented their crossing. Suddenly, a very formidable force of Brazilians was across the river, albeit far from the core of the front. Fonseca's plan was to throw his six divisions down the right bank into the rear of Argentine defenses near Santa Fe, weaken them, and then smash the city once and for all. It was a daring and necessary gamble, considering the frustrations at home with his adamancy that the war had to go on until the green-and-gold Imperial banner flew over the Plaza de Mayo.
Like most of Fonseca's more ambitious gambits in the wake of Uruguay's successful capture, however, the "Goya Breakout" failed. Ricchetti's forces may have been incapable of sustaining an offensive into the teeth of Brazilian defenses but knew how to fight tactically and with discipline when attacked, and had the advantage of not having to face the same kind of overwhelming combined arms tactics of air power and artillery as they had just a month prior during Repulse. The Argentine Army held at San Justo, counterattacked at Ramayon while inflicting disproportionate casualties, and then scattered the larger Brazilian force at San Javier on the marshy banks of the Parana on July 10th. The Brazilians retreated in shambles, with only a single division pursuing at a distance to make sure they put distance between themselves and Santa Fe, to their stronghold at Reconquista to lick their wounds. Fonseca was once again humiliated, unable to force a result even after the enemy had embarrassed themselves, and with Argentina being able to bring the full force of its soldiery to the Parana with Chile out of the war and American naval assets now in the River Plate, Brazil's window of opportunity to strike a killing blow was gone.
The Goya Breakout thus was, in the middle of the Argentine winter, the last major offensive undertaken by Brazil in the entire war..."
- War in the Cone