Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
I would also add in parties but Confederate parties are pretty hazy especially before Longstreet. We know that the Bourbons will stay in power until Long but I doubt that the NAV will remain the vehicle of bourbonism after the next election.
IIRC political parties weren't really a thing in Dixie until Longstreet resurrected the Southern Dems after he won. Before that it was personalist vehicles like the Klan for Forrest as opposed to actual parties.
NAV will get a rebrand, though mostly its the same assholes in charge until Long comes along (heh)
The House of Osman
"...the Porte's recognizance that de facto control of Egypt to the extent of other Arab-majority vilayets was virtually impossible, the de jure arrangements post-1882 nonetheless suited their needs just fine and it was an Ottoman flag that flew over the oasis outposts across northeast Africa and that, symbolically at least, protected caravans of merchants and pilgrims across the eastern Sahel. (A token Ottoman force in Benghazi and her garrison in Alexandria certainly helped, too). In this endeavor the "Turks," as Egyptians were quick to dismiss them as, had the full support of France, which by 1917 had transformed Port Said into one of the Mediterranean's most cosmopolitan port cities and entrepots.
The uneasy fiction of the Khedivate had, surprisingly, endured for thirty-five years under Hussein Kamel Pasha; with the assumption of Egyptian debts by the Ottomans in return for more influence in Egypt and the importance of the Suez Canal, as well as the export of cotton to French and Italian textile factories and establishment of light industries in proximity to the coast, Egypt had emerged just behind the Ottoman Empire proper as the Muslim world's rising power. Hussein Kamel is dismissed in some modern historiography as Constantinople's stooge, but this simplifies a complicated relationship; he was extremely proud to come from the House of Muhammad Ali, and viewed soft Ottoman suzerainty as a hedge against direct European intervention, recalling the shelling of Alexandria by British warships during the 1882 crisis and the time when Egypt's finance and foreign ministries were staffed almost exclusively by Frenchmen; while there were still too many Turks, Greeks and Armenians in the Egyptian bureaucracy for his liking, the Khedive knew that he preferred courtesies towards Constantinople, and not begging for scraps from Paris or London. Nonetheless, the frays in the relationship were starting to emerge apparent upon the eve of the Central European War, and Hussein Kamel's death in October of 1917 at the fairly young age of sixty-three created a severe new strain. Governing virtually unilaterally through Hussein Roshdy Pasha, his Turkish Prime Minister, Hussein Kamel had been the rock upon which the Turco-Egyptian [1] had sat, increasingly precariously, and nobody knew what exactly to expect next.
The ascension of his son Kamal al-Dine Hussein as Khedive marked a new and uncertain era. Kamal was European-educated and had served in the Austrian Army before returning to Egypt to be named commander-in-chief of the Khedivate's army, which he thoroughly reformed to European standards and used to successfully and ruthlessly crush tribal uprisings across the Sudan. He was married to the daughter of Tewfik Pasha, his father's once-rival for the title of Khedive, thus uniting the House of Muhammad Ali under one roof, and was considered an able administrator, brilliant orator, and cunning operator both inside and outside of Egypt. Most crucially, he was considerably less interested in adhering to de jure Ottoman sovereignty than his father, having quietly for years advocated for a return to pre-1882 arrangements and considered himself both an Egyptian nationalist and an Arabophile, a position that appealed greatly to both Hejazi sheikhs who wanted to see a continued Ottoman retreat from the Arabian Peninsula now with the threat of the House of Saud extinguished for a decade as well as to Arab Christians in Palestine and Lebanon. As 1917 drew to a close, Kamal was not an obscure Ottoman vassal but rather a sensation in Egypt and beyond.
This alarmed not only the Ottomans but the French as well, and suddenly there were concerns that a crisis not unlike 1882 loomed again in the future. The Canal, though formally internationalized since the Constantinople Convention of 1888, was easily the most important strategic asset under French control, and Port Said was the "jewel of the Near East" in French eyes, thanks in large part to a major naval station located directly across the Canal from it. Prince Sabahaddin was worried enough about Egyptian interests that he traveled personally to Cairo to treat with Kamal, a move for which he was critiqued in the Parliament and amongst his cousins back home who believed that a "vassal comes to his lord, not the other way around;" while Sabahaddin's meeting with Kamal in December 1917 went well and they established a mutual trust, it nonetheless did little to solve the immediate issue of Egyptian ambitions in the Levant and North Africa, and the potential of European powers to use these ambitions not only to their advantage but as a wedge with which to redraw the maps of West Asia..."
- The House of Osman
[1] I'm being very pointed in emphasizing Egyptian, rather than Arabic, sentiment here; the Great Arab Revolt and later Arab nationalism were major factors in the forging of a uniform(ish) Arab identity. Even today, many Egyptians regard themselves as Egyptians first, Muslims second, and Arabs third.
The uneasy fiction of the Khedivate had, surprisingly, endured for thirty-five years under Hussein Kamel Pasha; with the assumption of Egyptian debts by the Ottomans in return for more influence in Egypt and the importance of the Suez Canal, as well as the export of cotton to French and Italian textile factories and establishment of light industries in proximity to the coast, Egypt had emerged just behind the Ottoman Empire proper as the Muslim world's rising power. Hussein Kamel is dismissed in some modern historiography as Constantinople's stooge, but this simplifies a complicated relationship; he was extremely proud to come from the House of Muhammad Ali, and viewed soft Ottoman suzerainty as a hedge against direct European intervention, recalling the shelling of Alexandria by British warships during the 1882 crisis and the time when Egypt's finance and foreign ministries were staffed almost exclusively by Frenchmen; while there were still too many Turks, Greeks and Armenians in the Egyptian bureaucracy for his liking, the Khedive knew that he preferred courtesies towards Constantinople, and not begging for scraps from Paris or London. Nonetheless, the frays in the relationship were starting to emerge apparent upon the eve of the Central European War, and Hussein Kamel's death in October of 1917 at the fairly young age of sixty-three created a severe new strain. Governing virtually unilaterally through Hussein Roshdy Pasha, his Turkish Prime Minister, Hussein Kamel had been the rock upon which the Turco-Egyptian [1] had sat, increasingly precariously, and nobody knew what exactly to expect next.
The ascension of his son Kamal al-Dine Hussein as Khedive marked a new and uncertain era. Kamal was European-educated and had served in the Austrian Army before returning to Egypt to be named commander-in-chief of the Khedivate's army, which he thoroughly reformed to European standards and used to successfully and ruthlessly crush tribal uprisings across the Sudan. He was married to the daughter of Tewfik Pasha, his father's once-rival for the title of Khedive, thus uniting the House of Muhammad Ali under one roof, and was considered an able administrator, brilliant orator, and cunning operator both inside and outside of Egypt. Most crucially, he was considerably less interested in adhering to de jure Ottoman sovereignty than his father, having quietly for years advocated for a return to pre-1882 arrangements and considered himself both an Egyptian nationalist and an Arabophile, a position that appealed greatly to both Hejazi sheikhs who wanted to see a continued Ottoman retreat from the Arabian Peninsula now with the threat of the House of Saud extinguished for a decade as well as to Arab Christians in Palestine and Lebanon. As 1917 drew to a close, Kamal was not an obscure Ottoman vassal but rather a sensation in Egypt and beyond.
This alarmed not only the Ottomans but the French as well, and suddenly there were concerns that a crisis not unlike 1882 loomed again in the future. The Canal, though formally internationalized since the Constantinople Convention of 1888, was easily the most important strategic asset under French control, and Port Said was the "jewel of the Near East" in French eyes, thanks in large part to a major naval station located directly across the Canal from it. Prince Sabahaddin was worried enough about Egyptian interests that he traveled personally to Cairo to treat with Kamal, a move for which he was critiqued in the Parliament and amongst his cousins back home who believed that a "vassal comes to his lord, not the other way around;" while Sabahaddin's meeting with Kamal in December 1917 went well and they established a mutual trust, it nonetheless did little to solve the immediate issue of Egyptian ambitions in the Levant and North Africa, and the potential of European powers to use these ambitions not only to their advantage but as a wedge with which to redraw the maps of West Asia..."
- The House of Osman
[1] I'm being very pointed in emphasizing Egyptian, rather than Arabic, sentiment here; the Great Arab Revolt and later Arab nationalism were major factors in the forging of a uniform(ish) Arab identity. Even today, many Egyptians regard themselves as Egyptians first, Muslims second, and Arabs third.
I admit still forgot Egypt is still technically apart of the Ottoman empire, alongside Mount Lebanon.
Will be curious seeing them evolve overtime alongside the Middle East here.
Will be curious seeing them evolve overtime alongside the Middle East here.
Will we have something like the Spanish Flu sweep North America since the war is over and the health system in the Confederacy is gone?
I really liked this chapter!
The troubles seem to be brewing for the Ottoman Empire, which I feel will get worse, as Sabahaddin's government gets more and more unstable (I remember that KingSweden24 mentioned that Sabahaddin would get some troubles when I asked about any Ottoman update) and extremely paranoid (he spent practically most of his life fearing he will never inherit the throne and demanded written document which will write that they would support him once the time came from every influential person he knew), and somewhat unstable (it is rumored that he slapped Enver Pasha, who was the Minister of War at the time, during a front visit in front of everyone) Yusuf İzzettin Efendi becoming the new Sultan. (He was a liberal figure though, who heavily disliked CUP, which led to rumors that he was killed by them, though there are also rumors that Germans killed him, as he apparently wanted to make a separate peace treaty with the Entente)
The troubles seem to be brewing for the Ottoman Empire, which I feel will get worse, as Sabahaddin's government gets more and more unstable (I remember that KingSweden24 mentioned that Sabahaddin would get some troubles when I asked about any Ottoman update) and extremely paranoid (he spent practically most of his life fearing he will never inherit the throne and demanded written document which will write that they would support him once the time came from every influential person he knew), and somewhat unstable (it is rumored that he slapped Enver Pasha, who was the Minister of War at the time, during a front visit in front of everyone) Yusuf İzzettin Efendi becoming the new Sultan. (He was a liberal figure though, who heavily disliked CUP, which led to rumors that he was killed by them, though there are also rumors that Germans killed him, as he apparently wanted to make a separate peace treaty with the Entente)
Yes, sort of
There was a lot of the Ottoman Empire that was only “technically” part. Same with the Beylik of Tunisia, and Hejaz’s position was… vague.
What were really seeing here is Arabs noticing quite pointedly that the Ottomans have basically retreated from the Persian Gulf and ambitious local leaders are starting to wonder if maybe it makes more sense to just consider the Sultan a Caliph figure rather than a temporal one
Thank you!
Yusuf was definitely more liberal in the nationalist sense, yes (from what I’ve gleaned at least) - I definitely suspect there was foul play in his death.
That said he seemed like he was fairly traditionalist in other ways, a big part of why he clashed with the more fashy-modernist impulses of the CUP
Probably in the order you stated but likely happy to be technically Ottoman citizens?
Ferdinand: The Last Emperor
"...Andrassy's pledge to expand the male electorate even further and pass a secret ballot along with it, meant to appeal not just to the intransigent Greens but also to the Emperor, who saw the best avenue to Vienna's further control of Hungary being more minorities, particularly Slovaks and Romanians, included in the franchise. Andrassy was a staunch loyalist and his descriptions of Karolyi are not fit to print; however, he was a fundamentally pragmatic man, a technocrat and diplomat at heart, and took the long view that the crisis that the Dual Monarchy found itself in could not be solved merely by window-dressing but real, tangible negotiation and compromise "that would pain all, but for the benefit of the many."
The issue that faced Andrassy was twofold, however. One, he was even less open to Green ideas about a full constitutional renegotiation of the Compromise than Bethlen had been, and Andrassy held Karolyi responsible for Bethlen's failure. The second was that the positions of Karolyi and the other Milan Magyars, as well as the position of Vienna, had also hardened considerably over the previous six months. Accordingly, the December Crisis erupted at the end of 1917 as Karolyi declared from the balcony of the Swiss chalet where he was wintering [1] to a small crowd that "it shall be the course of our partisans in Budapest to defeat any and every measure brought forth in the Diet until constitutional reform is achieved." In case one struggled to read between the lines of what Karolyi was saying, it was a direct threat to bring down the Hungarian government and effectively filibuster every act in the Diet unless his demands mere met, and his proposed Compromise - or some new version of it - was the only acceptable outcome.
Ferdinand was outraged, and a headline from the Sunday Times in London summed up the situation succinctly: "Hungary Hostage!" Karolyi's popularity in other capitals declined sharply, and as the situation in Budapest grew darker over the course of December, King Victor Emanuel pondered refusing to allow Karolyi's return from Switzerland to Milan, but was persuaded by French diplomats not to in order to avoid escalating the situation further. Worsening the situation was inevitable, however, with the impasse showing no signs of breaking. Andrassy, unlike Bethlen, was not willing to humiliate himself on the floor of the Diet and had absolute confidence that the Greens were not bluffing, as they had shown no signs of bluffing previously in the prior year. Accordingly, he journeyed to Vienna in late December to consult with Ferdinand and chart out a course forward.
Andrassy's prewar diaries are an excellent primary source of the various machinations ongoing in Vienna during these critical days and weeks, and they do not reflect well on Ferdinand, Karl von Sturgkh, or anyone in the Prague Circle. Andrassy was a reliable conservative in the contours of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy but showed a number of liberal tendencies (particularly on economics) and, while quite a devout man, was skeptical of the kind of "nationalist Catholicism" that was increasingly in vogue in Vienna amongst the Emperor's nearest advisors. His depiction of Vienna was, unsurprisingly for such an astute political operator, one of a city that was just as much in crisis as Budapest, only that where "everyone can see the conflict in Hungary looming overhead like a thunderstorm, in Cisleithnia there is no sense of urgency, just babble." What he was referring to specifically was the increasingly agitated politics of minority parties in the Imperial Landsrat, particularly the Young Czech Party; Viennese attended parliamentary debates for entertainment, not because they were high-minded experts in public policy but rather because the speeches were long, meandering and fiery, as amusing as opera or the theater and, unlike those diversions, free of charge to the general public. Andrassy himself commented on the immense irony that at just the moment that the Habsburg Crown was most reliant on "national minorities" in Hungary to preserve the throne, it was several national minorities in the other half of the Empire that were bringing the gears of state to a grinding halt.
The trip to Vienna solved little and caused only more problems. Berchtold asked pointedly how to "navigate Scylla and Charibdys," to which Andrassy replied that, fundamentally, there was no solution that did not involve either conceding to Karolyi or simply ruling by decree. Either way, he observed, the spirit of '67 was effectively dead in Hungary; the country could either be a dictatorship within Austria, or a democracy outside of it. Ferdinand was aghast and exploded in a tirade in which he accused the Magyars of treason against the Crown, denouncing Karolyi in particular. Andrassy attempted to calm the room by suggesting that there were some ideas in Karolyi's putative Compromise that were perhaps worth considering, first and foremost relying upon the Palatine of Hungary as a true viceregal representative; he also pointed out that Ferdinand's delay in arranging a coronation in Budapest to symbolically take the Crown of St. Stephen had offended the Hungarian street, and that such a coronation should occur posthaste. Eventually, though, all roads led to one place - Hungary was currently ungovernable, and as long as the Greens and Reds sat in the Diet, there could be no solution.
Dismayed by this outcome, Andrassy returned dutifully to Budapest on December 29, 1917 and announced that afternoon the suspension of the Diet of Hungary, under the reason that there "was no possibility of it functioning to pass laws on behalf of the Magyar public." The adjournment was initially intended to last only three month, even though formally it was indefinite; in practice, the Diet of Hungary would not reconvene again until the conclusion of the Central European War, when the political realities of the country were very different. Andrassy thus became the autocratic Prime Minister of the Transleithnian realm, with every emergency decree he filed taking the force of law; he decreed a two-year extension of the existing Compromise through January 1, 1920, hoping that this would buy time for a major renegotiation of the Dual Monarchy's superstructure that could appease both Vienna and Magyar nationalists.
There was little way this maneuver could indeed have worked even in the best of times, but things were made considerably worse just three weeks later on January 23rd, 1918, when Karl von Sturgkh followed Andrassy into the brink and announced an indefinite adjournment of the Landsrat due to the frequent filibustering and political gridlock, choosing to himself rule by emergency decree. Effectively, both halves of Austria were now absolute monarchies again, their democratic organs "temporarily" suspended, and Ferdinand ruling directly through appointed cabinets of ministers close to himself or the Prague Circle. It was a remarkably quick extinguishing of one of Central Europe's budding young democracies and tipped the hand on the vision Ferdinand had for the long term: a centralized Habsburg state, with Vienna empowered, fundamentally tied to Church and Crown..."
- Ferdinand: The Last Emperor
[1] Real man of the people, Mihail Karolyi
The issue that faced Andrassy was twofold, however. One, he was even less open to Green ideas about a full constitutional renegotiation of the Compromise than Bethlen had been, and Andrassy held Karolyi responsible for Bethlen's failure. The second was that the positions of Karolyi and the other Milan Magyars, as well as the position of Vienna, had also hardened considerably over the previous six months. Accordingly, the December Crisis erupted at the end of 1917 as Karolyi declared from the balcony of the Swiss chalet where he was wintering [1] to a small crowd that "it shall be the course of our partisans in Budapest to defeat any and every measure brought forth in the Diet until constitutional reform is achieved." In case one struggled to read between the lines of what Karolyi was saying, it was a direct threat to bring down the Hungarian government and effectively filibuster every act in the Diet unless his demands mere met, and his proposed Compromise - or some new version of it - was the only acceptable outcome.
Ferdinand was outraged, and a headline from the Sunday Times in London summed up the situation succinctly: "Hungary Hostage!" Karolyi's popularity in other capitals declined sharply, and as the situation in Budapest grew darker over the course of December, King Victor Emanuel pondered refusing to allow Karolyi's return from Switzerland to Milan, but was persuaded by French diplomats not to in order to avoid escalating the situation further. Worsening the situation was inevitable, however, with the impasse showing no signs of breaking. Andrassy, unlike Bethlen, was not willing to humiliate himself on the floor of the Diet and had absolute confidence that the Greens were not bluffing, as they had shown no signs of bluffing previously in the prior year. Accordingly, he journeyed to Vienna in late December to consult with Ferdinand and chart out a course forward.
Andrassy's prewar diaries are an excellent primary source of the various machinations ongoing in Vienna during these critical days and weeks, and they do not reflect well on Ferdinand, Karl von Sturgkh, or anyone in the Prague Circle. Andrassy was a reliable conservative in the contours of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy but showed a number of liberal tendencies (particularly on economics) and, while quite a devout man, was skeptical of the kind of "nationalist Catholicism" that was increasingly in vogue in Vienna amongst the Emperor's nearest advisors. His depiction of Vienna was, unsurprisingly for such an astute political operator, one of a city that was just as much in crisis as Budapest, only that where "everyone can see the conflict in Hungary looming overhead like a thunderstorm, in Cisleithnia there is no sense of urgency, just babble." What he was referring to specifically was the increasingly agitated politics of minority parties in the Imperial Landsrat, particularly the Young Czech Party; Viennese attended parliamentary debates for entertainment, not because they were high-minded experts in public policy but rather because the speeches were long, meandering and fiery, as amusing as opera or the theater and, unlike those diversions, free of charge to the general public. Andrassy himself commented on the immense irony that at just the moment that the Habsburg Crown was most reliant on "national minorities" in Hungary to preserve the throne, it was several national minorities in the other half of the Empire that were bringing the gears of state to a grinding halt.
The trip to Vienna solved little and caused only more problems. Berchtold asked pointedly how to "navigate Scylla and Charibdys," to which Andrassy replied that, fundamentally, there was no solution that did not involve either conceding to Karolyi or simply ruling by decree. Either way, he observed, the spirit of '67 was effectively dead in Hungary; the country could either be a dictatorship within Austria, or a democracy outside of it. Ferdinand was aghast and exploded in a tirade in which he accused the Magyars of treason against the Crown, denouncing Karolyi in particular. Andrassy attempted to calm the room by suggesting that there were some ideas in Karolyi's putative Compromise that were perhaps worth considering, first and foremost relying upon the Palatine of Hungary as a true viceregal representative; he also pointed out that Ferdinand's delay in arranging a coronation in Budapest to symbolically take the Crown of St. Stephen had offended the Hungarian street, and that such a coronation should occur posthaste. Eventually, though, all roads led to one place - Hungary was currently ungovernable, and as long as the Greens and Reds sat in the Diet, there could be no solution.
Dismayed by this outcome, Andrassy returned dutifully to Budapest on December 29, 1917 and announced that afternoon the suspension of the Diet of Hungary, under the reason that there "was no possibility of it functioning to pass laws on behalf of the Magyar public." The adjournment was initially intended to last only three month, even though formally it was indefinite; in practice, the Diet of Hungary would not reconvene again until the conclusion of the Central European War, when the political realities of the country were very different. Andrassy thus became the autocratic Prime Minister of the Transleithnian realm, with every emergency decree he filed taking the force of law; he decreed a two-year extension of the existing Compromise through January 1, 1920, hoping that this would buy time for a major renegotiation of the Dual Monarchy's superstructure that could appease both Vienna and Magyar nationalists.
There was little way this maneuver could indeed have worked even in the best of times, but things were made considerably worse just three weeks later on January 23rd, 1918, when Karl von Sturgkh followed Andrassy into the brink and announced an indefinite adjournment of the Landsrat due to the frequent filibustering and political gridlock, choosing to himself rule by emergency decree. Effectively, both halves of Austria were now absolute monarchies again, their democratic organs "temporarily" suspended, and Ferdinand ruling directly through appointed cabinets of ministers close to himself or the Prague Circle. It was a remarkably quick extinguishing of one of Central Europe's budding young democracies and tipped the hand on the vision Ferdinand had for the long term: a centralized Habsburg state, with Vienna empowered, fundamentally tied to Church and Crown..."
- Ferdinand: The Last Emperor
[1] Real man of the people, Mihail Karolyi
The Central European War
"...a strange sense of geopolitical optimism at Foreign Ministries across the world as 1918 dawned. India and Vietnam were both pacified by their colonial powers, and it looked highly likely that Ireland would be solved; the Great American War had been over for near a year and the Western Hemisphere's economies looked likely to be functional again soon; and in Europe, there were no immediate signs that war clouds were on the horizon, indeed the likelihood of a general war on the continent appeared more remote than ever.
But under the hood of this quiet peace the moving parts were increasingly more clear, between Austrian instability, Italian ambition, German opportunism, and most importantly French paranoia, particularly abroad. The chess pieces were being assembled on the board as 1918 came about, with the maneuvers of that most critical last year of the Belle Epoque ready to be made, and the road to war nearly charted..."
- The Central European War
But under the hood of this quiet peace the moving parts were increasingly more clear, between Austrian instability, Italian ambition, German opportunism, and most importantly French paranoia, particularly abroad. The chess pieces were being assembled on the board as 1918 came about, with the maneuvers of that most critical last year of the Belle Epoque ready to be made, and the road to war nearly charted..."
- The Central European War
Will the War begin, say, on 22 June 1918?
just picking that date with the synonymous date of Operation Barbarossa...
In all seriousness though. Germany possibly annexing Austria and Bohemia into their empire?
@KingSweden24 Amazing work on these chapters as usual.
Hoping the habsburgs at least retain the Archduchy
Hoping the habsburgs at least retain the Archduchy
CEW doesn’t kick off for another year
There’s definitely parts of Austria that Germany will likely want regardless of what they do with the AH Empire more Generally, but by the late 1910s there’s little desire to absorb so many Czechs
I am to please! Especially as the pace of updates is likely to slow down soon - I’ve written myself a bit into a corner with the start of the CEW, so I have a lot of things I need to game out
Make that 2 so we can get a nice and round 1920; also, given Germany's closer relationship with Siam could the germans convince them to invade French Indochina to regain their lost territories? Could also lead to another vietnamese rebellions with german backing, as long as they accpet a soft protectorate status like Cambodia I think.
You know, in OTL - there was a great deal of interest in Hungary and the Duel Monarchy on the part of Irish Nationalists; the reasons being pretty clear. The Settlement between Austria and Hungary, and the fact that the later gained great autonomy and rights while remaining loyal to Vienna was a primary example of what the IPP and Home Rule supporters wanted to achieve for Ireland. During the later 19th century, there were many Irish writers and journalists who traveled to Hungary in order to write about it and for a while Magyarphilia was very high indeed.
I wondering if the constitutional difficulties present in AH in the ATL and the stresses between Vienna and Budapest are going to get echoed in the Irish debate. Yes, the Chamberlain government is pretty wedded to some form of home rule at this point, and so I'd say that it comng about is almost a certainty. But I'd suspect that Tories and Unionists may try to play the Hungary card against the nationalists, flipping the script from just a few decades earlier. It won't be enough, but it would be fascinating all the same
I wondering if the constitutional difficulties present in AH in the ATL and the stresses between Vienna and Budapest are going to get echoed in the Irish debate. Yes, the Chamberlain government is pretty wedded to some form of home rule at this point, and so I'd say that it comng about is almost a certainty. But I'd suspect that Tories and Unionists may try to play the Hungary card against the nationalists, flipping the script from just a few decades earlier. It won't be enough, but it would be fascinating all the same