296. Russia, Sudan, Ethiopia, etc. #2
“Besides the fanatical frenzy, which is as dangerous in a man as hydrophobia in a dog, there is this fearful fatalistic apathy.”
W.Churchill
“Her Majesty took a very poor view of armies led by British officers being cut to pieces by sword-armed savages.”
Neillands
“Success in military affairs is based on the will”
“And what in the military can be more contemptuous than fear, which paralyzes both mind and will?”
“Excessive speed of shooting is not necessary at all in order to shoot a person who can be killed only once.
Dragomirov
“The Zulus shot from their outstretched arms so that the shoulder would not hurt from the recoil of the trophy Martini-Henry. Ndebele thought that if you set the sight to the maximum range, the bullet would hit harder at close distances. The Mahdists cut off the rifle barrels to make it easier to carry. The Ethiopians used quite modern guns as an assault weapon, that is, they run to attack in dense crowds and shot on the run at close range.”
unknown author
Dragomirov’s (almost) ideal army.
There was an army which looked almost as Dragomirov’s pipe dream. Its soldiers were extremely brave, well physically trained and capable of making the long and fast marches across a difficult terrain not burdening themselves with a big baggage train, had a high spirit and were not afraid of a death. The commanders were highly respected for showing their personal bravery. What else do you need from the soldiers ready to attack the artillery and machine guns across the open plain and not giving a blip about the magazine rifles or being killed?
The only issue he could have with them was that they did not aim well but this was such a trifle and, anyway, most of them did not have the firearms. Their tactics can be described in two words: surprise and shock (which, if properly interpreted by someone like Dragomirov, was just what Suvorov had in mind; fortunately for everybody involved, the Generalissimo was dead and could not object against
any interpretation of his somewhat erratic writings)
. Indeed, all their attacks were spontaneous and unexpected for their enemies. They often used the local terrain for their maneuvers and attacks and always sought to attack from both sides. They were incredibly fast, which was used to get closer to the enemy: they run so fast that they overcame tens and hundreds of meters in a matter of minutes (Suvorov’s “speed and push”). Knowledge of the area allowed them to make ambushes using every opportunity for an unexpected and successful attack. It was just plain strange that Dragomirov did not have any dream about them like one about a bear and magazine rifle. Well, perhaps he did but just forgot to publish it due to his well-known modesty [1].
The important thing was that, given an opportunity, in hand-to-hand combat they were plain scary.
Of course, I’m talking about the Mahdist army.
Tactically, they were placing those with the rifles closed to the enemy in a hope that they’d somewhat “soften” enemy’s formation before those armed with the spears and swords will charge. Characteristic of the Mahdists was the wedge type formation, ahead of which stood the bravest and fastest warriors (and the military leaders [2]). When the wedge penetrated the enemy formation, the back rows rushed forward, as a result of which wedge was transformed into a phalanx. They placed the best warriors in the front parts and another part in the rear, in case the enemy breaks through their formation. But the Mahdists had no preparations and training, so keeping in line was not an easy task for them, and therefore most often the Mahdists attacked as a chaotic mass on a wide front. And this mass was going from from all sides, leaving the enemies no chance of fleeing.
Of course, the Mahdists did not have uniforms and had been wearing their tribal clothes so the only “uniform” thing were the square patches worn to commemorate Mahdi who was wearing a patched
jibbe to underscore his poverty.
Besides infantry they had cavalry riding horses and camels. The Mahdist cavalry consisted mainly of people of the Baggar tribe, and was armed with long spears and swords. Few had rifles but quite a few had been wearing protective armor and the shields.
The army also had its own artillery, 11 6-gun batteries [3] served by 156 artillerymen trained in the Egyptian army [4] . All these artillery pieces, just as the rifles, had been captured at various times from various enemies.
The army,
presumably, was distributed as following (as you may notice, the number of artillery pieces is more than 66):
- Omdurman: 15,000 shooters, 45,000 spearmen, 3,500 cavalrymen, 46 guns;
- Border of Egypt: 4,600 riflemen, 8,000 spearmen, 1,200 cavalrymen, 18 guns;
- East Sudan: 6,900 riflemen, 1,100 spearmen, 2,150 cavalrymen, 4 guns;
- Western Sudan: 6,000 riflemen, 2,500 spearmen, 350 cavalrymen, 4 guns;
- South Sudan: 1,800 riflemen, 4,500 spearmen, 3 guns
To be fair, for a while, spirit was winning and the Mahdists became pain on everybody’s butt. But then fighting with Ethiopia and Egypt dwindled and an army of the Free State of Congo stopped their westward expansion. Which left two main opponents, the Brits and Italians. Out of these two the Italians were regularly active trying to move to the Eastern Sudan from Eritrea (targeting Kassala) and the Brits were for a while dormant, just holding the port of Suakin and contemplating, if they want to get further involved. Which did not mean that they were less dangerous to the Mahdists than the Italians. Actually, it was other way around.
Italian time of military glory.
In Eritrea the Italian administration did one very intelligent thing, created
ascary, western-style (more or less) units of the local soldiers with the Italian officers and NCOs in charge. The first Eritrean battalions were raised in 1888 from Muslim and Christian volunteers, replacing an earlier
Bashi-bazouk corps of
irregulars. The four Indigeni battalions in existence by 1891 were incorporated into the
Royal Corps of Colonial Troops that year and later four more battalions had been added.
Initially the Eritrean Ascaris comprised infantry battalions and 2-nd artillery battery (the 1st was Italian). The battery had three sections of two pieces each for a total of 5 officers, 108 artillerymen and 85 pack animals. In 1891 the batteries were split in 1st and 2nd Native artillery, on 4 pieces each. The strength of each battery was of 4 officers, 16 NCOs and national soldiers, 165 Ascaris and 85 quadrupeds. All the Ascaris of the battery, due to the delicacy of their service, were recruited between the Sudanese tribes, fierce opponent to the Ethiopian empire and strong people.
The Ascaris battalion was composed by 4 companies, every company were split into two half companies, which were formed by 4 buluks (assimilable to Italian platoons), the only original native structure remained. The strength of a battalion was of 15 officers, 40 NCOs, and Italian soldiers, 750 ascaris.
The equipment of the native soldier was simple and economic: haversack, leather bag, field blanket and blue cape as Bersaglieri. The armament was based on the rifle Vetterli mod. 1870 with long sabre-bayonet.
The Ascaris were all volunteers, aged from 16 till 35, enrolled after a medical examination and after a long march of 100 km. They signed for a duty service of at least annual. At the end of their service they would became part of a new social class of former soldier from where to draw reserves in case of necessity (Mobile Militia) or native reliable administrative personnel for the Colony.
In 1890 two companies of the ascari (approximately 200) defeated 1,000 Mahdists at Agordat killing 250 and losing only 3. In 1892 120
ascari and 200 Baria tribe warriors defeated at Serodeti 1,000 Mahdist troops invading Eritrea losing 3 killed and 10 wounded vs. 100 dead and wounded Mahdists. It became obvious that Mahdist weapons and fire discipline were extremely inefficient. C’mon, what are the weapons and other nonsense comparing to the
will of which the Mahdists had plenty?
Well, the idiots, especially
strong-willed ones, rarely learn even on their own mistakes and, after all, these two encounters, which the Italians proudly called “battles”, were just minor skirmishes so in 1893 Wad Ahmed Ali, Amir of Gheraref went on a campaign against the Italian forces in eastern
Sudan. Strategic goal of the whole operation was to get access to the sea [5]. Amir had around 6000 dervishes armed with Remington rifles, 4,000 dervishes armed with spears and 1,500 horses. The warriors were disciplined, motivated and veterans of the wars against the Abyssinians and the Egyptians. They were arranged into 4 Rub (bodies) led by emirs Abdalla Ibrahim (former Egyptian army colonel), Abdel-er Rasul, Ahmed Abdalla Daggasc and Addacher.
Second Battle of Agordat. The Italian forces, aware of the Dervishes preparations, were concentrated to the Agordat fort, in the north area of the Colony. In the left wing were positioned the 2nd native infantry battalion (757 men in 4 companies). The 3rd company overseed the fort with the 2nd Mountain Battery (4 pieces). Between the fort and the Barka river was the 4th company, led by Colonel Cortese.The two companies formed the reserve in a central position with the bands of the Barka (252 men) and with the indigenous cavalry Asmara squadrons (123 men) and Kheren (101 men). In the right wing, on a hill, Colonel Giuseppe Galliano led a mixed battalion (734 men), consisting of the 1st and 3rd company of the 3rd battalion and the 1st and 3rd company of 4th battalion with the 1st mountain battery (4 pieces.). A total of 42 officers, 33 Italian national and 2,106 native soldiers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Arimondi, assisted by Captain Tommaso Salsa, Colonel Cortese and Colonel Giuseppe Galliano. [6]
The dervishes cut the telegraph line, cross the Barka River and loot the villages Algheden and Sebdorat, 3 kilometers from the fort, then decided to wait until the night to attack the fort or circumvent it.
12:15. Arimondi decided to prevent their attack and colonels Cortese and Galliano to move towards the left flank of the opponents. At the same time his left wing advanced through the palm trees beside the Barka River with the 2nd and 4th company of the 2nd battalion. Reserve held fort and the hill.
12:30. After a brief stop at the river Damtai, the right wing was attacked on the left bank of the river Inchierai and opened fire with guns, then with rifles, while the artillery of the fort supported the frontal attack. The dervishes reacted by attacking the battalion of Galliano with numerical advantage of 6 to 1, while the dervish cavalry tried to overlap the right wing. The Italians lost 4 officers (and,
tragically, Galliano's horse was injured as well [7]), and the enemy pressured forces of the right wing to retreat behind the Damtai creek. The battery was abandoned after a last canister was shot at just 50 meters, as there was no time to recover it. The two companies of the left side were forced to retreat in disorder as well.
13:00. Arimondi decided then to send the reserves ahead. The 1st company of the 2nd battalion with two dismounted squadrons supported the
right wing which crossed the creek Damtai at the second attempt, recovering his artillery. The 3rd company of the 2nd battalion supported the left wing, now reordered.
14:20. The Italians continued the advance converging to the left, sweeping the field of the enemy who was now retreating. A shrapnel exploded nearby Ahmed Ali, killing him. Without the emir of Ghedaref, the dervishes started fleeing.
At 17:30 Colonel Cortese ceased the pursuit, without managing to catch any of the fugitives [8].
In three hours the Italians have fired 80,000 rounds from the rifles and 210 rounds from the batteries of the fort.
The dervishes left on the field body of Amir Ahmed Ali, a thousand dead, thousands wounded, and prisoners, 73 flags, 700 rifles, a machine gun, several coats of mail, the red tent captured from Negus Johannes at Metemma, a trumpet brass manufactured in Milan and two camels with chains, prepared for the expected prisoners.
Some prisoners told that the deployment in line taken by the Italians surprised the Dervishes, being accustomed to face the English square and then concentrating the attack in a single point. The Italians have 3 officers killed and two wounded, an Italian soldier dead and one injured, 104 Ascaris killed and 121 wounded.
The battle was described as “
the first decisive victory yet won by Europeans against the Sudanese revolutionaries.” Surely, this could be formulated in a better way…..
In 1894 the Ascaris were used to occupy the Sudanese city of Kassala and therefore secure the northern border. In retrospect, this was probably a serious mistake because the Brits started paying attention to what is going on…
Russia - Ethiopia. It was finally decided by those who mattered in the Russian Empire (or rather by “only
one who mattered”) that the Ethiopians are the brotherly
Orthodox people worthy of a moral support, selling few guns and, of course, ethnographic studies. And on another side of the equation Emperor Menelik II was eager to get the Russian support against Britain and Italy: after all, Russia did not have any
direct colonial interests in Africa and was not the British best friend. Russian attitude toward Italy was not known but it was reasonable to assume that friend of one’s enemy is not going to be one’s friend.
AIIIs interest toward Italy was more or less limited to the Italian ballerinas performing in Russia (he was generally interested in a ballet) but in most other aspects he did not see any reason to take it too seriously. In this specific case Italy was definitely a nuisance: its grabbing of Eritrea was preventing Russian navy from establishing a coaling station on the Red sea. And Ethiopia was fitting well into a semi-mystic ideology which was getting increasingly popular in Russia: as the “junior brothers” the Ethiopians were much more attractive and less troublesome than the Balkan candidates to this honorable position. The Russian Church also was quite enthusiastic and unconcerned with the doctrinal differences as long as there was a realistic chance to put Ethiopian church under the Russian influence (so far it was an autonomous branch of the Coptic Orthodox Church).
The unofficial communications started in 1889 when
temporarily retired Lieutenant V.F. Mashkov arrived to Ethiopia and got an audience with Menelik. Mashkov stayed at Menelik's court for a whole month, during which time he managed to win the sympathy of the Ethiopian negus and eventually the monarch handed him a letter and a gift weapon for the Russian emperor. Having reached Russia, Mashkov was awarded the reception of Alexander III himself, to whom he personally conveyed the message and gifts of Menelik II. Since Ethiopia interested the Russian emperor, and the letter of the negus needed to be answered, Mashkov had to make a second expedition to East Africa. In Ethiopia, Russian representatives (Mashkov was accompanied by his fiancé and brother) were waiting for the warmest welcome. Almost every day Mashkova took the negus Menelik. The Emperor of Ethiopia sought to convince the Russian envoy of the need to send Russian military instructors to the country - well aware of the danger of the situation surrounded by colonial powers, Menelik wanted to strengthen and modernize the army as much as possible. To do this, he needed the help of the Russian Empire, which Ethiopians hoped for as an Orthodox state, which also had no colonies in Africa and devoid of outright colonial appetites. In March 1892, Mashkov's expedition went back to Russia. The Russian envoy carried with him the answer of the negus Menelik, in which he assured the Russian emperor that he was not going to accept the Italian protectorate under any circumstances (Italy, which seized part of the Red Sea coast, had long wanted to "take away" Ethiopian territory). In St. Petersburg, Mashkov was again received by Emperor Alexander III. Vannovsky still was quite reluctant to get involved in any way but Grand Duke Alexey was more enthusiastic and anyway the final decision was Alexander’s. A secret operation was arranged. The Russian steamer carried 30 thousand rifles, 5 million cartridges, shells for artillery and 5,000 sabers for the Ethiopian army. Besides weaponry, Alexander sent a military mission led by captain (actually, esaul, he was a Cossack) N. Leontiev.
Upon return, Leontiev delivered to AIII message from Menelik and soon enough got back to Ethiopia followed by more volunteers (officers and medical personnel). From the late 1894 Russian deliveries of weaponry ceased to be a secret and Italian protests were ignored. French arm dealers provided Menelik with 50,000 more rifles. All these supplies were not charity: Menelik’s forces plundered the Somali gold fields and raided nearby granaries. With the captured wheat, Menelik could keep his armies fed, and with the Somali gold he could arm them with the latest military hardware (the minus was that these rifles were of a variety of systems including British Martinis, German Mausers, American Winchester lever-action rifles and Russian 3-line rifles). Besides rifles Menelik got a number of quick-firing 37mm Hotchkiss cannons capable of firing 68 rounds per minute with an accuracy range of 2,000 yards (1,800 m).
Britain pretended that it was not there by a number of reasons:
- Rosebery’s government was weak. It represented the Liberal Imperialist faction of the Liberal Party and was opposed even by the rest of their own party. William Harcourt, his main opponent within the Liberal Party, controlled the Commons where he often undercut the prime minister, especially in foreign policy, such as expansion of the fleet. The Unionist-dominated House of Lords stopped the whole of the Liberals' domestic legislation. Internationally, he managed to alienate most of the European powers.
- Getting against consensus of other Great Powers on Italian-Ethiopian conflict was both risky and foolish: Italian claim was not too popular even in Britain.
- Italian military success against the Mahdists and occupation of a part of Eastern Sudan were not sitting well with the British public creating unfavorable contrast with the British shameful failures and potentially endangering the British own plans regarding Sudan.
Leontiev became Menelik’s close military advisor.
_______
[1] What a pity that he did not join his dream army.
[2] Dragomirov is whipping tears of joy.
[3] Organization seemingly existing in theory rather than in practice, judging by the artillery breakdown by the regions. AFAIK, neither 46 nor 4 can be divided by 6 but, OTOH, even in the late 1990s I was explained that arithmetics is not a precise science and, AFAIK, this theory much advanced since then. Well, after all there is non-Euclid geometry so why non-arithmetic arithmetics? I wonder if IRS is advanced enough to appreciate this idea? 😉
[4] Their extremely unimpressive performance speaks volumes about training of the Egyptian troops. OTOH, it is quite possible that these people were just former soldiers and non-coms trained only how to load their guns.
[5] My
uneducated guess is that they may want to restore slave trade which would allow them to buy more weapons. Of course, I may be completely wrong and their reasons were purely cultural or Khalifa, like Peter I, just liked the sea, or whatever… 😉
[6] Insignificant number of the
Italian troops in the force may explain the victory. Interesting enough, the wiki-like sources tend to use “Italian and Ascari”. Perhaps I missed something fundamental but I did not see “Belgian and British” in the descriptions of Waterloo. Well, I do not pretend reading all or even most of them…
[7] There is no record about the further fate of a poor animal. Hopefully, it recuperated.
[8] As was noted earlier, the Mahdists were very good at running fast and if you can do it in one direction, you can do the same in the opposite one.
[9] Somewhat different views about specifics of the Christ’s anatomy were not critical for a big picture.
