Could WWII in Europe Have Lasted Long Enough for the Atomic Bomb to be Dropped on Germany?

There are many threads on this site discussing what might have happened had the atomic bomb been first used on Germany, instead of Japan. After all, the bomb was first developed as a deterrent against Hitler's own program. I've seen various threads discussing what cities might have been hit, how the bomb would bee seen today if it had been used on Germany instead of Japan, etc.

But the atomic bomb was not ready to be deployed until August 1945, three months after Germany surrendered and was all but reduced to ashes. Could Germany have possibly held out until August 1945? I think that by the end of the Battle of the Bulge, Germany is going to surrender by spring 1945 (as Eisenhower correctly predicted at the time). But is there a POD earlier in the war that could result in Germany holding out until August 1945, at which point it would presumably be hit by the atomic bomb?
 
Germany lasted 68 months. I don’t see why they can’t last 71. A large number of PoD could accomplish this.

Japan attacking the Soviets or America committing to a Japan First strategy could accomplish this. Germany doing moderately better against the USSR early is feasible, and might change the balance of power to extend the war a few months. The US could limit Lend Lease. America and Britain could commit to a peripheral strategy and go for Greece/Norway instead of France. The Soviets could outright fall. Italy could be more competent.
 
Yes. If D-Day had been delayed by bad weather until the end of July/August the likelihood is that the war could easily have been dragged out to at least the end of Summer 1945.

However, there would have been so few large intact cities or towns to justify the use of an Atomic bomb unless the intent was to scare the Russians crapless.
 
If you want to extend the war, but not materially alter its outcome, you need to fiddle with the events on the Eastern Front after Kursk.

I would suggest the best possible POD for that would be Operation Bagration, as it was Bagration, more than anything else, which broke the operational back of the Wehrmacht. Wholly a quarter of the German army was lost (~450,000 men in Army Group Center) or permanently sidelined (~300,000 men in the Courland Pocket) as a result of Operation Bagration's success. And once Operation Bagration had run its course, the contours of the war's remaining months were fairly well-established, because the Russians could not meaningfully be checked.

I just don't know how you salvage anything from Army Group Center's performance, given the degree to which it was absolutely vaporized during the offensive and the focus of the Soviets upon mauling it beyond repair. Evacuating the Courland Pocket could satisfy the goal of the POD, however, as any troops released from there would immediately go into line holding back the Soviets and the insertion of the remnants of Army Group North would be a heck of a lot more effective than what the Germans scrounged up OTL. But that requires Hitler to be willing to evacuate the pocket, which seems unlikely, given how adamant he was about holding it OTL. And it's not like an alternative commander on the spot could simply make a choice, given the nature of sealifts and the fact that they'd be heading for territory where Hitler's word was law.
 
Germany lasted 68 months. I don’t see why they can’t last 71. A large number of PoD could accomplish this.

Japan attacking the Soviets or America committing to a Japan First strategy could accomplish this. Germany doing moderately better against the USSR early is feasible, and might change the balance of power to extend the war a few months. The US could limit Lend Lease. America and Britain could commit to a peripheral strategy and go for Greece/Norway instead of France. The Soviets could outright fall. Italy could be more competent.

I have heard some say that if Hitler had not split his army as it approached Stalingrad, the Germans might have taken the city in late 1942. I do not think this would change the ultimate outcome of the war. But would it delay Germany's downfall long enough for the Third Reich to fall victim to the atomic bomb?
 
You don't need a POD that has Germany merely survive to August 1945 (not really that hard), you need one that keeps Germany so tough and allied armies so far away that it is actually chosen for first deployement (much harder).

Its not like if the Bomb was ready in April, that they would have dropped it on one of the barely defended, already bombed out cities in direct proximity to their own units...
 
You don't need a POD that has Germany merely survive to August 1945 (not really that hard), you need one that keeps Germany so tough and allied armies so far away that it is actually chosen for first deployement (much harder).

Its not like if the Bomb was ready in April, that they would have dropped it on one of the barely defended, already bombed out cities in direct proximity to their own units...
So something to piss off the Allies, like V2 gas attacks on children and mass televised slaughter of POWs.
 
So something to piss off the Allies, like V2 gas attacks on children and mass televised slaughter of POWs.
They most likely wouldn’t do this. Hitler didn’t use chemical weapons when he had nothing left to lose and Soviet soldiers were a mile from his bunker in 1945. They also never televised mass killing since there would be no point and even Hitler knew some things were too far or better kept quiet. He wasn’t completely ignorant of public opinion.
 
If you want to extend the war, but not materially alter its outcome, you need to fiddle with the events on the Eastern Front after Kursk.

I would suggest the best possible POD for that would be Operation Bagration, as it was Bagration, more than anything else, which broke the operational back of the Wehrmacht. Wholly a quarter of the German army was lost (~450,000 men in Army Group Center) or permanently sidelined (~300,000 men in the Courland Pocket) as a result of Operation Bagration's success. And once Operation Bagration had run its course, the contours of the war's remaining months were fairly well-established, because the Russians could not meaningfully be checked.

I just don't know how you salvage anything from Army Group Center's performance, given the degree to which it was absolutely vaporized during the offensive and the focus of the Soviets upon mauling it beyond repair. Evacuating the Courland Pocket could satisfy the goal of the POD, however, as any troops released from there would immediately go into line holding back the Soviets and the insertion of the remnants of Army Group North would be a heck of a lot more effective than what the Germans scrounged up OTL. But that requires Hitler to be willing to evacuate the pocket, which seems unlikely, given how adamant he was about holding it OTL. And it's not like an alternative commander on the spot could simply make a choice, given the nature of sealifts and the fact that they'd be heading for territory where Hitler's word was law.
I always thought an interesting what-if would have been if the Germans had the same advanced intelligence for Bagration as the Soviets did for Citadel.
 
No TV in 1945.

The equivalents were headline stories & photos in the morning & afternoon news papers (yes most major papers had afternoon editions and some specialized in only afternoon or evening publication.) Then there were the news shorts in the cinema threaders. And of course radio, which carried frequent news shorts, the mid century equivalent of the news crawl on the bottom of the TV screen.
 

Garrison

Donor
If the bomb is dropped on Germany it will largely be as political statement, showing its power to the Soviets and allowing the US to claim it was the threat of nuclear annihilation that brought about German surrender in the end. I can see them dropping it somewhere more symbolic than pragmatic, such as Nuremberg.
 
A radically alternate scenario is France survives 1940 & is still in the fight, & then late that year lucks into the proper course to a atomic weapon by mid 1944, or earlier. One can find such 'radical luck' scenarios for the Brits & US as. All three had much of the key information at hand in 1940, but were not seeing how it fit together.
 
Specifics I don't have. They were preparing for a majorRed Army offensive, they had the usual puzzle pieces from signals intel, air recon, prisoners, ect... The flip side is the Red Armies Maskrova was effective, like the Allied deception ops in the west. But in both cases deception success depended on the Germans not analyzing correctly the information they had. In the West that took the form of OKW depending heavily on a narrow set of sources, and ignoring the broader data set. I'd not be surprised if the same were occurring in the east.

The short version is OKW was predicting a less powerful attack, occurring later, and aimed primarily elsewhere, not against Army Group Center as priority.

The ability of the Allied deception ops to have the top nazi leaders flailing at shadows is not well examined in the events of 1942-1944.
 
They also never televised mass killing since there would be no point and even Hitler knew some things were too far or better kept quiet. He wasn’t completely ignorant of public opinion.
This would have been an interesting alternative or corollary to the Nero orders to destroy the Reich.

Imagine ordering newsreels and footage of the camps to be sent to the allies along with files of everyday Germans ratting out Jewish neighbors. Basically everything he knew the Allies would hate so that they’d destroy Germany even if the Germans wouldn’t wreck it themselves.
 
If you want to extend the war, but not materially alter its outcome, you need to fiddle with the events on the Eastern Front after Kursk.

I would suggest the best possible POD for that would be Operation Bagration, as it was Bagration, more than anything else, which broke the operational back of the Wehrmacht. Wholly a quarter of the German army was lost (~450,000 men in Army Group Center) or permanently sidelined (~300,000 men in the Courland Pocket) as a result of Operation Bagration's success. And once Operation Bagration had run its course, the contours of the war's remaining months were fairly well-established, because the Russians could not meaningfully be checked.

I just don't know how you salvage anything from Army Group Center's performance, given the degree to which it was absolutely vaporized during the offensive and the focus of the Soviets upon mauling it beyond repair. Evacuating the Courland Pocket could satisfy the goal of the POD, however, as any troops released from there would immediately go into line holding back the Soviets and the insertion of the remnants of Army Group North would be a heck of a lot more effective than what the Germans scrounged up OTL. But that requires Hitler to be willing to evacuate the pocket, which seems unlikely, given how adamant he was about holding it OTL. And it's not like an alternative commander on the spot could simply make a choice, given the nature of sealifts and the fact that they'd be heading for territory where Hitler's word was law.
It wasn't just the Courland Pocket though. Hitler's entire strategy in '44, also known as the feste Plätze doctrine, was to hold on to anything vaguely fortified-looking and hope that this would sideline more Soviet forces than German ones. The Courland pocket is just the most obvious-on-a-map example, but Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruysk, Minsk... were really a whole lot of mini-Courlands.

If Hitler doesn't do this, the Soviets still win Bagration but Heeresgruppe Mitte should be able to withdraw to the Vistula in good order. And if he doesn't order the Bulge, Army Group B still exists by the time Eisenhower reaches the Rhine. At which point Germany lasting into August '45 starts to look vaguely realistic.
 
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