Well they did talk about the possibility of a bomb since 1939-1940 and became certain by 1942 of its viability. Not sure where you've got a lack of resources from? Germany was mining Uranium since 1939 from the biggest European Uranium mine in Czechia (Jáchymov) and had captured thousands of tons of Uranium and Thorium ores from Belgium and France. They had access to heavy water from Norway until 1943 and then from their own production facilities at IG Farben. They had everything they needed and as for electricity... well... Germany was one of the most electrified countries at the time, with various sources of power at coal plants, hydrogenation plants (They would burn 15% of the product/waste to power the whole operation and surrounding areas) and dams.
Could nuclear weapons have gotten Germany to surrender in 45-47 without a Western Allies invasion of Germany?
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Delivering the blows in one swoop in a compounding series of hits. Not only have they lost more killed than WW1 in a space of hours, but it has also had the same psychological effect as Hamburg, twenty times over, from single weapons that can't be defended against.
The Ruhr is gone - a smoking, radioactive ruin. Hamburg, their chief port, gone. Regensburg, a major production centre of Messerschmitt 109s, gone. Frankfurt, ball bearings and metal plants, gone. Stuttgart, Daimler and Porsche factories, gone. Leipzig, railway intersection and aircraft, gone. Hannover, fifth most important industrial centre, gone. Nuremberg, with armaments and the spiritual home of Nazism, gone.
That is psychologically devastating. There might be armies in the field, but they've lost their industrial base at home. Not damaged, not had the transport impaired, but, to use that word I used a lot in the last paragraph, gone.
Once we go up over 50 bombs at a time to over 100 or even 200, as the OP mentioned (and what caught my eye), for Germany, we enter the territory of national breakdown. Not a nervous breakdown, but a physical collapse that can't be recovered from.
That is still well behind the Manhattan Project. From viability to an actual production effort of a working bomb that yields tangible results is a different thing. The Germans considered they would need five years to separate the necessary isotopes (https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1942-1945/rivals.htm ).
The scale required was a bit above what the Germans had, but you will note that my mention of resources did not go into fissionable material.
The Manhattan Project used 1/7th of all the electricity produced in the United States from 1943-1945, or 14.28%. In 1940, the USA produced 179.9 billion kilowatt hours compared to 63 of Germany (https://www.statista.com/statistics/1261019/wwii-electricity-output-major-power/ ). Now, if those numbers stayed completely static, which we know that they did not, then we'd be looking at 77 billion kilowatt hours equivalent, or 40% of all electricity that Germany produced in a three year period, just for arguments sake.
We do know that US electrical generation capacity increased over the course of the Second World War, and that German electrical generation capacity decreased, particularly once the Combined Bomber Offensive really hit its pomp. We also know that Germany had quite a few competing priorities apart from the relatively distant possibility of nuclear weapons.
That article while alright to an extent, glosses over many things and gets a bunch of stuff wrong. It doesn't even mention the centrifuge or electromagnetic separation paths taken for example and the test facilities built. As for the 5 years? Well they did succeed doing so in 1943-44 with Harteck's centrifuge and Bagge's Isotope Sluice apparatus given they started in 1938-39. Or the lack of funding, as Speer offered Heisenberg's team 5 million Reichsmarks in 1942 but he refused and asked for 5 thousand instead.
Well there's not really that much else they would need, they had osmium, calcium, high purity graphite, bismuth and so on. The Soviets for example were getting the calcium from Germany for their program post war until the 50s.
It doesn't really matter, just as with the K-25 plant, the Germans could build additional coal boilers for the required electricity, though I doubt they would need as much with the centrifuge, and given their dispersion strategy, they would rather build smaller, less costly UE plants spread-out through the Reich. They don't have to follow the Manhattan Project to get the bomb.
A floating PoD isn’t a real one, but many, many ones.
Further, by focussing on individual trees, we miss the forest.
The Germans were out by very large amounts of scale - 5 million Reichsmarks is a princely 2.5 million USD, for example. Resources include electricity, manpower, steel, cement, copper and silver and a lot more, is another.
They were not close to anything in @, having a tiny programme that missed the point and missed the bus.
cosmosmagazine.com
frontline.thehindu.com
ahf.nuclearmuseum.org
Whilst a simple collection of sources on their own isn’t conclusive evidence, their collective weight, and the time that this opinion has been held, is fairly strong. To counter it, there would need to be a comprehensive argument with evidence as to how Nazi Germany was in fact within close reach of an atomic bomb.
Handwavium on the question of electricity and saying that ‘it doesn’t really matter’ isn’t an argument. Now, it is true that they don’t have to follow the Manhattan Project, but piling multiple contrivances upon multiple shifted goalposts isn’t a firm foundation.
Without multiple changes - and I would suggest that they don’t necessarily follow logically from an extended WW2 as outlined in the OP - those fundamentals don’t alter. Multiple independent PoDs aren’t the hallmark of hard alternate history, but of a good ripping yarn or a well crafted story.
Moving back to the topic, even though a Nazi bomb is beyond the horizon of reality for us in 2024, there is no reason in 1946 to give a sucker an even break, from the perspective of the time. This would suggest a concentrated blow rather than a piecemeal approach that could give the Nazis room to wriggle.
Further, by focussing on individual trees, we miss the forest.
The Germans were out by very large amounts of scale - 5 million Reichsmarks is a princely 2.5 million USD, for example. Resources include electricity, manpower, steel, cement, copper and silver and a lot more, is another.
They were not close to anything in @, having a tiny programme that missed the point and missed the bus.
From the vault: How close did the Nazis come to building an atomic bomb?
Nearly eight decades ago, when Allied forces and Nazi Germany were locked in mortal combat in World War II, American and German scientists were engaged in
cosmosmagazine.com
NOVA | Hitler's Sunken Secret | Nazis and the Bomb | PBS
Find out just how close the Nazis came to building atomic weapons during World War II, and view the only known diagram of a German nuclear bomb.
www.pbs.org
HISTORY | Why did Oppenheimer beat out the Nazis?
Fear of a German nuclear bomb spurred the Manhattan Project. But how far behind were the Nazis?
German Atomic Bomb Project - Nuclear Museum
“I don't believe a word of the whole thing,” declared Werner Heisenberg, the scientific head of the German nuclear program, after hearing the news that the United States had dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima.Germany began its secret program, called Uranverein, or “uranium club,” in April 1939...
ahf.nuclearmuseum.org
Whilst a simple collection of sources on their own isn’t conclusive evidence, their collective weight, and the time that this opinion has been held, is fairly strong. To counter it, there would need to be a comprehensive argument with evidence as to how Nazi Germany was in fact within close reach of an atomic bomb.
Handwavium on the question of electricity and saying that ‘it doesn’t really matter’ isn’t an argument. Now, it is true that they don’t have to follow the Manhattan Project, but piling multiple contrivances upon multiple shifted goalposts isn’t a firm foundation.
Without multiple changes - and I would suggest that they don’t necessarily follow logically from an extended WW2 as outlined in the OP - those fundamentals don’t alter. Multiple independent PoDs aren’t the hallmark of hard alternate history, but of a good ripping yarn or a well crafted story.
Moving back to the topic, even though a Nazi bomb is beyond the horizon of reality for us in 2024, there is no reason in 1946 to give a sucker an even break, from the perspective of the time. This would suggest a concentrated blow rather than a piecemeal approach that could give the Nazis room to wriggle.
The US and UK would not ignore new electrical plants that are not going into the general grid or are just feeding a certain factory or area. They know what electricity they need for the bomb and how much they need for each stage of the process, once these plants show up they are not going to leave them alone even if they are for general use in Germany.
Good point, especially since electrical plants are going to be targeted on general principles. It is hard to run a modern economy without electricity. I supposed you could used local small coal fired plants to power individual factories, but that is inefficient and requires transporting coal to the factories. If they don't have gas for vehicles, it gets harder.
Another thing to note on that thread, the Germans appeared to have started production of the 12.8 cm FlaK 40 gun early at some point in the late 1930s, since the Kriegsmarine ordered Rheinmetall to modify the design of the 12.8 cm SK C/34 gun into a Duel Purpose weapon, the Luftwaffe and Goring noticing that the Navy had a larger anti-aircraft weapon than them were definitely not happy and must have ordered Rheinmetall to get the FlaK 40 gun into production earlier.
So why am I talking about the FlaK 40?
Well in that thread the author of the story said that the Navy developed a special anti-aircraft shell for the 128mm DP guns, these Pfeil Sabot shells look remarkably similar to mid cold war Soviet APFSDS rounds and are fitted with a tracers. The tracers are important since they make the weapon far more effective as a psychological weapon against Allied pilots and deadly when it hits a aircraft.
The Luftwaffe and Goring as usual were furious when the Navy developed the Pfeil Sabot shell, it was clearly superior in every way to their normal FlaK 40 shells, so they demanded that the Navy hand over the design of the shells, which they did in March 1940.
So the Germans have better AA defenses against B-29 bombers in that thread.
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Err, no. Tracers on heavy shell just provide a psychological impact when first used. After that, they are no more impressive than the flak bursts. They certainly don't increase the damage at all. If a plane takes a direct hit from a flak shell, it is probably already dead, so any increased damage from from the tracer is irrelevant.
The purpose of tracers is to enable the gunners on light AA guns (.50 cal to 40mm) to see where their shells are going. The gunners on heavy flak don't aim the guns, they just make sure it is firing where the director is telling the gun to shoot.
As for sabot shells, they help by getting the round to the aim point faster, so it reduces the time of flight error. The negative trade off is that they have smaller HE payloads so have smaller flak bursts. It is probably a worthwhile trade off, but is not a pure positive.
So, additional PoDs upon PoDs upon fictional German admirals, followed up by further changes?
That seems fine for a story, particularly an ASB one (and I have liked the author’s previous works), but the approach is perhaps parallel to what is the more rigourous one cultivated in Post 1900.
It is very difficult to appraise the merits of a a situation that doesn’t ‘run straight’ after an initial change, or to map it using existing history. I am reminded in general principle of WW3 in 1946, which was story driven, had entirely original protagonist characters, multiple PoDs and a real passion for the promotion and lauding of German WW2 bits and pieces; this is not to tar whatever story this is from with that brush, but simply to point out the common difficulty that arises from such creations.
In any ordinary sense, a Nazi Germany that somehow lasts in 1946 or 1947 ends up copping many buckets of sunshine to the face. We can explore this and use history to analyse the likelihood of some things happening. Maybe even have some nice debate.
“Ah, but what about this special Nazi Germany* that Gentleman X has created in ASB? It has this, that and the other…”
One is not like the other. The second is a bit like being asked to describe what they would do if they were in someone else’s dream, with all that entails, without getting more than a perfunctory set of facts.
Apples and oranges.
That seems fine for a story, particularly an ASB one (and I have liked the author’s previous works), but the approach is perhaps parallel to what is the more rigourous one cultivated in Post 1900.
It is very difficult to appraise the merits of a a situation that doesn’t ‘run straight’ after an initial change, or to map it using existing history. I am reminded in general principle of WW3 in 1946, which was story driven, had entirely original protagonist characters, multiple PoDs and a real passion for the promotion and lauding of German WW2 bits and pieces; this is not to tar whatever story this is from with that brush, but simply to point out the common difficulty that arises from such creations.
In any ordinary sense, a Nazi Germany that somehow lasts in 1946 or 1947 ends up copping many buckets of sunshine to the face. We can explore this and use history to analyse the likelihood of some things happening. Maybe even have some nice debate.
“Ah, but what about this special Nazi Germany* that Gentleman X has created in ASB? It has this, that and the other…”
One is not like the other. The second is a bit like being asked to describe what they would do if they were in someone else’s dream, with all that entails, without getting more than a perfunctory set of facts.
Apples and oranges.
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Yeah I'll admit @Trevayne should have placed this thread on the ASB section since the entire premise of the mentioned thread is that a Space Bat wants the Kriegsmarine to develop sophisticated U-boats with 1940s technology and have them controlled and led by competent Admirals who aren't idiots.
Of course we could just ditch the entire premise and just focus on Germany somehow surviving in 1945 and guessing if Nukes alone can win the war for the Allies.
In fairness to the author of the original scenario, I fully expect allied technology continues to develop as well. That TL is in Jan 1941, so there are lots of things yet to happen.
My question is whether Germany has any chance of avoiding a surrender. I doubt it because the longer it lasts after 1945, the more nukes it will get.
We know the Germans will be trying to intercept B-29s, which are more difficult targets than B-17s or B-24s. I expect the rest of allied technology will improve as well, and ASW tech has probably reached the early 1950s because of the US boat threat.
The real problem for Germany is that when it sees a bomber formation, they have to shoot down every bomber. Especially when formations of 200 B-29s have 10 bombs. Certainly flak and fighters will get some, but they aren't stopping all of them and even if only 5 bombs get through per raid, Germany is getting wrecked. One the synthetic fuel plants are gone, along with Ploesti, they are no longer going to fly fighters or sail U-boats or move tanks.
In answer to 22000 Kevin:
As I said in my most recent post above, that is like an 8 year old asking someone
“I had an amazing dream last night about outer space! Describe what you would do if you appeared halfway through it, just after the jug-eared alien.”
There is nothing inherently wrong with the approach, or with dreams, or with enthusiastic stories, but it requires a different ‘headset’ to the one used in Post 1900; I’d reserve caution regarding jug-eared aliens, naturally.
What we can do is answer the question in your second paragraph. Based on the balance of 20 years of content here and historical evidence, it would seem that an apt answer could be:
“A surviving Nazi Germany, depending on the month, gets nuked X amount of times until it surrenders. The specifics of what gets nuked, in what order and in what concentration can be debated, but by that point, the Hitlerites aren’t going to change the overall result.”
As I said in my most recent post above, that is like an 8 year old asking someone
“I had an amazing dream last night about outer space! Describe what you would do if you appeared halfway through it, just after the jug-eared alien.”
There is nothing inherently wrong with the approach, or with dreams, or with enthusiastic stories, but it requires a different ‘headset’ to the one used in Post 1900; I’d reserve caution regarding jug-eared aliens, naturally.
What we can do is answer the question in your second paragraph. Based on the balance of 20 years of content here and historical evidence, it would seem that an apt answer could be:
“A surviving Nazi Germany, depending on the month, gets nuked X amount of times until it surrenders. The specifics of what gets nuked, in what order and in what concentration can be debated, but by that point, the Hitlerites aren’t going to change the overall result.”
Again, the purpose of the thread was to ask the question if a Germany that still ran most of Europe in 1945 could be forced to surrender by nuclear weapons. The exact reason why it survived this long is less relevant. Instead of better German submarines, how about better German performance on the Eastern Front, as per the Anglo-American/Nazi War timeline? The exact reason the premise exists matters less than the premise itself.
Didn't Anglo-American/Nazi War start out in post -1900 or was it originally ASB?
Post 1900.
I’m loathe to defend that 2009 story, but it did have a single PoD, as well as a very clear authorial declaration that it was being muddled through to get the story going.
I’m loathe to defend that 2009 story, but it did have a single PoD, as well as a very clear authorial declaration that it was being muddled through to get the story going.
Rhoades in his study of the Manhatten Project, 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb'. presents two items on the probable production numbers. First he cites Maj Gen Groves report on the expectation of the Plutonium breeder project when it was under construction. He stated the goal was 36 Plutonium bomb cores in the first year. Construction defect reduced the estimates when the two breeder reactors started. Various estimates were offered by the plant management and associated physicists. Since the breeder reactors were shut down in August-September 1945 to correct defects we don't have more to go on that those estimates. Rhoades identifies the third core being shipped to Tinian Island in august 1945, and another partially machined into a core, material for three more cores was either awaiting shipment from the Haniford site, or expected in the output September through November. So a total of five more bombs by December 1945. Rhoades then offers an estimate that a minimum of 18 more cores could have been available from January through December 1946. That a total of 24 Plutonium bombs minimum over a 16-19 month period. or up to 36 Pu bombs if the original goal is achieved. That does not include the one Uranium bomb used, or any other Ur bombs made available
Politically and practically, it's more reliable and probably more effective to use existing and available ground troops than a small number of weapons that need better control of the air than the allies had. Given that troops were coming in from both east and west, defeat was inevitable and only the cost of the allied win was going to change. Nuclear bombs could have helped against specific objectives, but creating the circumstances where nuclear bombs could be used would likely be similar effort to overruning them with ground troops.
But for sub pens a daring minisub raid could pave the way for invasion by removing an alt-Uboat threat. It could make a pretty good film - when casting it, please can I have a minor role as a white coated scientist for Tube Alloys?
After WW1, it was important to send a message that Germany had not only lost but been thoroughly beaten to avoid "Ah, but we would have won without the bomb/ the stab in the back/ losing millions to satisfy some madman's inadequacies...", so nukes or not an occupation would have been needed.
But for sub pens a daring minisub raid could pave the way for invasion by removing an alt-Uboat threat. It could make a pretty good film - when casting it, please can I have a minor role as a white coated scientist for Tube Alloys?
After WW1, it was important to send a message that Germany had not only lost but been thoroughly beaten to avoid "Ah, but we would have won without the bomb/ the stab in the back/ losing millions to satisfy some madman's inadequacies...", so nukes or not an occupation would have been needed.
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Do we see the same shut down occurring as in @ with an active war against a better positioned Nazi Germany? I’m not so sure.
Some of figures I have seen refer to 3 plutonium bombs and 1 uranium bomb per month, and more:
Atomic Bomb: Decision -- Bomb Production Schedule, July 30, 1945
The Manhattan Project could make atomic bombs at an ever-increasing rate
www.dannen.com
- 3/month in August, 5/month in November, 7/month in December