Can Case Blue Be Successful

Pretty much what the title says. Is there any possibility that Case Blue could be successful? I don't necessarily mean a war winner for Germany, but simply seizing the Caucuses or the oil fields.
 
I'm not going to go into a lengthy debate with anyone over this but the answer is yes.

The Germans could have done much much better than OTL, they could and did take Maikop, they likely could take Grozny, but the real troubles begin when it comes to Baku. Unless the Soviet forces in the Caucasus fall apart (lack of logistics, morale, etc) the Germans would likely not be able to break through the Caucasus mountains and capture Baku, Tiflis, and Batumi in 1942.
 
.... Unless the Soviet forces in the Caucasus fall apart (lack of logistics, morale, etc) the Germans would likely not be able to break through the Caucasus mountains and capture Baku, Tiflis, and Batumi in 1942.

I wonder if this happens how large a army group the US/Brits form in Persia in 1943? The Commonwealth had the skeleton of such formed in the ME, and the expansion of the Persian railway was well underway.
 

Deleted member 1487

Do a forum search, it's been done several times already. There are only so many times we can argue the same point.

Disclaimer aside, Case Blue did achieve some of it's aims in that it did seize a major oilfield, but was unable to exploit it or maintain the position long enough to eventually exploit it. Baku was a pipe dream and even Grozny was a field too far. Blue could have taken Stalingrad and secured the flank, but then that would make the push into the Caucasus either highly delayed or deferred for another campaign season and therefore unlikely or unable to happen entirely. Securing the flank was the plan first and doable had Hitler not interfered and diverted 4th Panzer Army.
USA-EF-Decision-26.jpg



Versus the historical mess:

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No directive 45 = Likely succesful case blue.

But Baku's fields would have been destroyed and useless for at least a couple of years, and the WAllies will just send more oil to the USSR. The germans have already lost by the time.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
No directive 45 = Likely succesful case blue.

But Baku's fields would have been destroyed and useless for at least a couple of years, and the WAllies will just send more oil to the USSR. The germans have already lost by the time.
Except for some high octane aviation fuel the USSR produced all of its oil. That is very difficult to substitute (probably impossible). Taking Stalingrad and cutting the Volga would go a long way to deprive the Soviet Army from its oil.
 

Deleted member 1487

Except for some high octane aviation fuel the USSR produced all of its oil. That is very difficult to substitute (probably impossible). Taking Stalingrad and cutting the Volga would go a long way to deprive the Soviet Army from its oil.
The Volga was cut IOTL at multiple places, the Caspian Sea was the highway of oil shipments with tankers shifting to the Ural river instead of the Volga.
 
As I recall Baku oil accounted for 3/4 of the annual soviet fuel consumption , which was about 18 million tons.

Shutting it down would help but not halt the fuel supply.

Cover that with some third rate corps. Maybe some ally formations? It'll be fine.

That's got to be a 300-400 km front. I would think an entire army would be needed.

https://www.joelhayward.org/Too-Little-Too-Late.2.pdf

This interesting article suggests that if the amount of bombs dropped on Stalingrad in fall of 1942 - had instead been dropped on Baku, it could have crippled the soviet war economy for 'several months'.
 
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nbcman

Donor
As I recall Baku oil accounted for 2/3 of the annual soviet fuel consumption , which was about 18 million tons.

Shutting it down would help but not halt the fuel supply.



That's got to be a 300-400 km front. I would think an entire army would be needed.
That's no problem. Put two allied armies there plus some other allied formations to the north and south of the main German forces. That should be more than enough.
 
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The Volga was cut IOTL at multiple places, the Caspian Sea was the highway of oil shipments with tankers shifting to the Ural river instead of the Volga.
Not so much. I read most of the oil went by rail (built that year, because they needed it that bad) to Astrakhan- the Caspian shipping supplemented, but would have taken investment to cover the full load.
 
What good is the oil to the Germans considering that there is no refineries there and they would need to ship it all back to Germany to refine it and then send it back. How do they get the oil from the oil fields to the Black sea Harbors? I presume that the German would want to go that way and not the long way around the Black sea over land
 
Here is a quote from the article.....

The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction.2 During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still relatively weak. ByOctober, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was much reduced and most forward airfields had been badly damaged by Soviet air forces which were then far stronger. The conclusion is unmistakable: Hitler had missed a golden opportunity to hurt the Soviet economy and war effort.


2. HermannP locher'sin fluentialt hree-volumes tudy of the Luftwaffein Russia (The German Air Force Versus Russia, U.S. Air Force Historical Studies, Nos. 153-55
[Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1965-671),r emainst he foundationo f the relevant historiography. Yet Plocher' work, which does not deal with the issues under discussion in this article, is now outdated, havingb een supersededb y severalb ooksb asedo n a far wider range of sources than Plocherh ad access to. Easily the best book on the Luftwaffe'esa stern offensivei s RichardM uller'sT he GermanA ir Wari n Russia (BaltimoreN: auticala nd Aviation PublishingC o., 1992), whichp rovidesa thoughtfual nalysiso f the Luftwaffe's strategic bombing campaigns but even Muller misses the significance of Hitler's lost opportunity in August 1942 to inflict a punishing blow on the Soviet war economy and effort. My argumenits consistent, however, with Muller's main thesis that the German High Command's emphasis on providing air support to ground forces, with that emphasis's corresponding influence on the development of operational art and aviation technology( including aircraft types), inhibited its ability to undertake strategic campaigns even after Luftwaffe commanders began attempting them in the east in the second half of the war.


770 * THE JOURNAL OF Too Little, Too Late

https://www.joelhayward.org/Too-Little-Too-Late.2.pdf
 
I believe that they didn't used enough mountain troops, considering the relief. They had mountain formations kept in Norway, Finland, Grece and the italian alpini corps where destroyed in the russian steppes, instead of being used in the Caucasus.
 

Deleted member 1487

Not so much. I read most of the oil went by rail (built that year, because they needed it that bad) to Astrakhan- the Caspian shipping supplemented, but would have taken investment to cover the full load.
Do you have a source on that? Even if the Caucasus is lost totally the USSR was still getting Iran's oil and had 30% of it's oil production outside of the Caucasus left.
 
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