Barbarossa WI: Could Germany invade (more) through Finland?
- Thread starter KN1
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The Finnish Front had more than enough manpower from the Finnish side along, but was hampered by the Finns not pressing forward when things were going good. If the Finns hadn't held back they could've taken St. Petersburg and possibly won the war for the Axis.
You have to move Wehrmacht Troops and there Equipment by Ship to Finland before Invasion
That could raise some question in Moscow, at war with Finland...
That could raise some question in Moscow, at war with Finland...
The logistics through Finland would be problematic, the more north you go. The troops Germany had in Lapland IOTL were at the very limit that could be supplied through the terrain they were operating in.
If German troops could attack through south-central Finland directly around both sides of Lake Ladoga, logistics would be somewhat easier. Still, the area north of the lake is difficult terrain for large formations as it is and the Karelian isthmus south of it is very narrow for an attacker, making for problems with congestion, etc, and benefiting the defender, something that the Red Army found out in both 1939-40 and 1944.
Politically, it would be difficult to make the Finns accept such a German attack, especially if Mannerheim is still the top military leader. I guess the only way to achieve a German attack through southern Finland would be if an earlier POD makes Finland Fascist, more pro-German or at least Mannerheim is sidelined and the Finnish leaders do not have the balls to oppose the German demands for this. A German occupation of Finland might also achieve this, but achieving that occupation itself and its specifics would be another can of worms entirely.
It would have needed the Finnish state and military to be led by pretty much a madman to do this. Not only would it be very costly for the Finns to take the city (even if they could, by some miracle, do it), handling the aftermath would have been even more of a resource hog for the Finns, what with the occupation of the city and all those civilians the Finns could not feed. And of course the USSR, if it still rebounds from this, would have been fanatically out for the Finns' blood afterwards, making sure Finland is conquered and punished. It is no wonder Mannerheim wanted nothing to do with the city and the political leadership agreed, being made of men of mostly sound mental health.
If German troops could attack through south-central Finland directly around both sides of Lake Ladoga, logistics would be somewhat easier. Still, the area north of the lake is difficult terrain for large formations as it is and the Karelian isthmus south of it is very narrow for an attacker, making for problems with congestion, etc, and benefiting the defender, something that the Red Army found out in both 1939-40 and 1944.
Politically, it would be difficult to make the Finns accept such a German attack, especially if Mannerheim is still the top military leader. I guess the only way to achieve a German attack through southern Finland would be if an earlier POD makes Finland Fascist, more pro-German or at least Mannerheim is sidelined and the Finnish leaders do not have the balls to oppose the German demands for this. A German occupation of Finland might also achieve this, but achieving that occupation itself and its specifics would be another can of worms entirely.
It would have needed the Finnish state and military to be led by pretty much a madman to do this. Not only would it be very costly for the Finns to take the city (even if they could, by some miracle, do it), handling the aftermath would have been even more of a resource hog for the Finns, what with the occupation of the city and all those civilians the Finns could not feed. And of course the USSR, if it still rebounds from this, would have been fanatically out for the Finns' blood afterwards, making sure Finland is conquered and punished. It is no wonder Mannerheim wanted nothing to do with the city and the political leadership agreed, being made of men of mostly sound mental health.
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Losing access to Murmansk Archangel ports will have limited effect on lend-lease shipments. Eventually most of it was trasported through trans siberian railway and Iran IIRC most of the stuff received through Murmansk was used in the northern theatre. Otherwise the only strategically important target is Leningrad. If we hand-wave Finnish objections in taking the city AND the fortified zone guarding the Karelian isthmus, then taking Leningrad might open Novgorod-Tver line for possible push towards Moscow in 1942, maybe.
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No need really, they needed to concentrate more instead of trying to go after everything with limited strength. The Germans just needed to make sure there was enough force in place to defend the nickel mines of the north, while focusing their power to cut the Murmansk RR and then attacking north to roll up the city from the south. Instead they spread out their strength so the attacks on the city failed.
I would presume sea supply to Helsinki or any other port in southern Finland and then use Finnish transport network. Doable as long as Germany had control of the Baltic Sea and air superiority. Plus the necessary shipping. I think all three conditions held but I haven't studied the last point or the capacity of the Finnish road and rail network. The latter might be the choke point.
Thanks.
So Germany could deploy more troops on the Karelian Front. But Mannerheim was to say the least not keen to involve Finland in the capture of Leningrad so this is pointless for Germany. There's no ability or reason to intervene in the middle sector of the Finnish Front.
With hindsight the capture of Murmansk would justify the use of more German troops in the Far North. But could they supplied through either Norway or Finland? I suspect the latter is out and the capacity of shipping and rail to northern Norway and through that to Ptesamo ?) might be too limited. Any expert know whether the troops deployed there OTL were the maximum that could be supported?
Turku was the main port in Finland during the war, along with the other western ports such as Rauma and Pori. Even northern ports like Vaasa and Oulu were used for German transports. In comparison, Helsinki was closer to the front and behind some of the mine barrages that were meant for closing the Gulf of Finland from the Soviets. Here only the safe "coastal route" from the west could be used. Remember as well that the Finnish coasts will be iced up for several months a year, requiring the use of icebreakers during this time if they are to be used at all.
The Finnish transport network struggled to cope with the wartime needs of the Finnish military and nation in general as it was, so wringing a lot more from it would be problematic. Just a couple of problems to consider: many locomotives and a lot of the rolling stock were lost in Winter War, and this could not be remedied with the help of war booty IOTL (the quality of Soviet locomotives, especially, was abysmal) and the Finnish rail network is predominately made of single-track lines, which will make for problems if there is significantly more need to transport troops, supplies and materiel to the front. Also, as Finland mobilized comparatively a lot of manpower for the military during the war, also the railways suffered from very limited resources in terms of workforce.
Given that with the ports and the railways we are talking about the very lifelines of the Finnish nation, I also find it difficult to believe the Finns would relinquish control over them to the Germans, even if German troops would for some strange reason be allowed to attack the USSR through southern Finland. So there is bound to be friction about the use of the Finnish logistics infrastructure, and this would cause various problems and delays in any case. In many things during the war IOTL, the Finns IMO managed to do a lot of things pretty damn well with very limited resources, and in great part this was due to the fact that they could make most decisions and plans for themselves. Add the Nazis to the mix, and the whole Finnish system will be a lot less smooth and streamlined, and more prone to bureaucratic conflict, mix-ups and inefficiency, even when factoring in added German resources (which would have to be taken from somewhere else in the Nazi war effort, naturally). Generally, IOTL, I think the Axis extracted a lot of benefits from Finland as a (limited) ally, given the Finnish resource base as a small nation, and in such a TL where the German military is mixing things up in Finland, I think the Finns would not be a similar asset, in comparative terms.
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Certainly in 1941 and 1942 the Arctic routes were at least as important. From June to December 1941 the Persian Gulf routes carries 3.7% of Lend-Lease shipments (by mass) and the Far East routes 53.6%, while the northern routes carried 42.7%. In 1942 the percentages are 28.8% (Persian Gulf), 29.9% (Far East) and 38.7 (North). It's only in 1943 the the percentage carried via the northern routes dips below 15%; 33.5% (Persian Gulf), 49.8% (Far East) and 14.2% (North). Though even that 14.2% represented more than 650,000 tonnes of supplies.
In 1944 the amount of supplies carried to the USSR via the northern routes more than doubled, to over 1.4 million tonnes, while the total Lend-Lease shipments increased by 30% (to about 6.2 million tonnes). This represents an increase to 23.4% of the total shipments being carried by the northern routes.
Well, I didn't say it was going to be easy or the smart thing to do, but in his memories Mannerheim notes that they actually had sufficient resources and manpower to take St. Petersburg from the Russians, but elected not to proceed with such a plan due to playing the long game and hoping for a decent peace treaty and post-war relations.
Turns out he was right, but it's still an intriguing notion how things would've gone from there if he'd ordered a general advance and took St. Petersburg... no matter how briefly.
Assuming that was his reasoning at the time, it's fascinating since it strongly implies he thought that even with the Fall of Leningrad the Nazis couldn't ultimately win the war against the USSR. And this would be before the US joined the war openly.
Whether he was right in this view is a different matter but he was in a good place to judge. I'd not second guess him without a lot of contradictory information and simulations of military possibilities.
There is some speculation that Finnish leaders hoped that Germany would crush Soviet Union and Western Allies would then crush Germany Finland would then make peace with WAllies.
It is perhaps intriguing, in an academic sense, but I think the results would be rather interesting in the Chinese sense. Definitely it would mean more deaths for the Soviets, and later, if and when the USSR rebounds, more deaths for the Finns as well. A lot of Finnish soldiers would come home wearing wooden longcoats also as a direct result of the attack, which would culminate in bitter hand-to-hand combat in urban conditions, something that the Finns had neither the training nor the weapons for.
A Finnish assault on Leningrad would be devastating to the way the Allies viewed Finland, and in the postwar the USSR would want to punish the Finnish nation for it. The Western Allies would not really object to this in the light of the Finnish actions during the war. We would probably see a Soviet occupation of Finland and at least some of the Finnish wartime leaders might be actually executed for their deeds - even old, frail Mannerheim. In fact, the possible results for Finland seem pretty dire.
There is a small chance that a Finnish assault on Leningrad would, by making the city fall, help Hitler beat Stalin and win the war. In which case it would not be just the Finns that would definitely lose, but the world in general as well. Personally, though, I don't think it is likely that losing Leningrad alone would cause the USSR to lose the war. It would probably just draw WWII out, with the Allies being finally able to beat Nazi Germany in 1946, with the Red Army on the Vistula, say, and Berliners frying in atomic fire.
IF they thought that, shouldn't they have been more willing to help the process by taking Leningrad? Or perhaps that was their hope and best-case scenario but they (rightly) weren't willing to bet their country's future on it?
It was the best hope but. even if the Soviet Union fell Finland would have to live with some kind of Russia in the future and taking Leningrad will have consequences