Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Hi RampRat, I love your summaries, you seem to have a better handle on what I'm doing than I do.

Thank-you good sir for the compliment, I do not have a better handle on this than you do, but unlike some others I am prepared to look at the Japanese side of the argument, and how they given their cultural views might see the situation. No Japanese officer who had presided over a defeat such as Gort did, and failed to make good on his personal honour by sacrificing his life for the Emperor. Could expect to be allowed to continue in the Army, or ever be appointed to a command position again. As for Park he was a colonial, and thus could never be seen as equal to those who had pure blood, and his appointment to the Far East was far more than he could have expected. Add to this the failure of the Japanese to realise that equipment that beyond its best before date in Europe, was perfectly adequate in the Far East.

RR.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
Hi Driftless, yes there is a difference here between what the IJA and IJN can do in response to changes in the Allied dispositions...
On this note, here is a little known fact that you could incorporate in your 'personal touches' during the narrative: Yamashita was one of the few IJA officers who got along reasonably well with his IJN counterparts.
 
Have the Japanese noticed the various changes that have taken place in the British and Dutch Far East colonies, of course they have, they have an extensive intelligence system in place. However they have a number of problems, the first of which is their interpretation of what these changes mean, and the effect they have on their plans. A prime example is the appointment of the Lord Gort and the change in the command structure, it can be viewed as a sop to a failure who has significant influence within the establishment, and has been given a position and title to soothe his supporters and massage his ego. After all this is the former commander of the BEF, who lost to the Germans, and failed to regain his honour by sacrificing his life for his Emperor, as any Japanese officer would have done. And much the same can be said of Park, who as the successful leader of the defence of Southern Britain during the Battle of Britain, should have replaced Dowding as the head of Fighter Command on his retirement. Has instead been sent out to what is a colonial backwater, which only goes to show that there is something lacking in him, or that being a colonial himself he is viewed as a second class leader.

Nor not having a trans dimensional crystal ball, and any knowledge of the events IOTL, do the Japanese realise just how much the numerous changes minor and major, have made to the British position. The withdrawal of the majority of the Hong Kong garrison, can be viewed in two ways, a sensible action that takes into account the impossibility of defending the colony, and strengths the defence of Malaysia. Or a desperate measure taken in desperation, by a nation that has been significantly weakened by events in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that unlike IOTL all the combat troops have received basic jungle warfare training, and also have a basic knowledge of Japanese tactics. Is something that significantly improves the British ground forces, in acomparison to those of OTL. The appointment of Park and the major improvements made to the tactics, and facilities of the British Airforces, is going to be a huge shock to the Japanese. Malaya and Singapore now have a basic air defence system, under the control of a very skilled leadership.

In the same way the improvements made to the Civil Administration, and the deployment of trained troops to support the Civil Power. Along with the better preparations made, in all areas, mean that there is very little chance of a breakdown of control, as there was IOTL. The improvements made to the local naval forces, especially on the West Coast, where the Japanese have no naval assets, or any chance of them prior to a complete collapse and surrender of Singapore. Will mean that the Japanese are not able to as they did IOTL, gather together local shipping and carry out outflanking operations, but will instead have to batter their way against the British defence forces directly. The various improvements made to the air defence system in Malaya and particularly Singapore, mean that the Japanese will not be able to dominate the skies as they did IOTL. And given just how much they relied on luck to achieve their goals, every little setback is going to seriously impact their ability to achieve their plans. Yes the Japanese are receiving up to date intelligence about events in the British and Dutch colonies, but given just how overstretched their are, they do not have the strategic depth to seriously change their plans.

In 1941, the Japanese were very much out on a limb, desperate for vital resources, and four years into a costly war in China. The best of their officers were concentrated on this war, and the best of their intelligence analysts, were focused on the threat from China and the United States, not Britain or Holland. The principal naval threat was the USN, which had a large uncommitted fleet in the Pacific, which had been recently forwarded deployed to the Hawaiian Islands. The rag tag and bobtail naval forces available to the British and Dutch were not seen as a threat, and were not the subject of interest that the American fleet was. The British didn’t have heavy bombers to spare unlike the Americans, nor did they have any of their most modern fighters available, all they basically had were European rejects and obsolescent aircraft. So a constant question for the Japanese was, were the British truly committed to the defence of their colonies, and were the Dutch able to defend their colonies. All questions that needed to be addressed without allowing their own biases of Japanese superiority to cloud their judgement.

RR.
Then, as pointed out, there is the time lag between getting in the information, sorting through it, filtering it out as to what's vital and what's not, then getting the right people to listen. This last counts, as it is was also pointed out, intelligence work wasn't highly thought of in the Japanese forces. Plus it seemed to not attract the best talent which I also imagine affected the overall performance of the arm, as it seems to not performed overly well during the campaigns against the US from the Bismarcks on.
 
Hi Butchpfd, I agree, humour, in all it's forms is often misunderstood by people living in different areas of our lovely plant, lost in translation as it were, I don't think anyone who contributes here wishes to offend. we're all much to old for that nonsense. It's funny how I often catch myself using sayings, that make sense to a cockney, but is nonsensical to others. And yes, lets not have a Cal Bear visit, in his moderator role, although I'd welcome his input in general discussion on the thread.
It doesn't help that the written word lacks that all important tone of voice and facial expressions that can make sarcasm obvious.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
An excellent example of racial bias was Mac Arthur's discounting the Japanese ability to begin a war prior to late Spring 1942, and his refusal to allow adequate recon of Formosa. Had he done so he would have found that the Far East AirForce, was out numbered 3 to 1., not counting the CVL deployed from Truk

Of course Allied forces were never guilty of seeing what they wanted to see **cough** Market Garden ** cough**
Don't forget this gem of a quote from Air Vice Marshal Pulford, circa October 1941: "Japan's best fighter is the Navy 0. It is on a par with our Buffalo, certainly not much faster." Gotta wonder what words the folks of every Buffalo pilot lost to A6Ms would have for him.
 
An excellent example of racial bias was Mac Arthur's discounting the Japanese ability to begin a war prior to late Spring 1942, and his refusal to allow adequate recon of Formosa. Had he done so he would have found that the Far East AirForce, was out numbered 3 to 1., not counting the CVL deployed from Truk
To be fair, Emperor Mac wasn't alone in that assessment. But making that assessment without any backing evidence was boneheaded. On the other hand, doing reconnaissance over flights of someone else's sovereign territory during a time of tense international relations when your government is in desperate last minute negotiations to head off a war is not the worst call. Doing such a thing would be breaking a lot of international rules even then, and a tad hard to explain should it kick off the very ear your bosses are trying to stop, and made your nation look like the aggressor.
Unlikely, but could happen. There's been flimsier caus belli after all. So that I'm hit him too hard on. Should've done it, cause yeah, the Japanese are spoiling for a fight in any case. But I get Mac's reasoning.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
To be fair, Emperor Mac wasn't alone in that assessment. But making that assessment without any backing evidence was boneheaded. On the other hand, doing reconnaissance over flights of someone else's sovereign territory during a time of tense international relations when your government is in desperate last minute negotiations to head off a war is not the worst call. Doing such a thing would be breaking a lot of international rules even then, and a tad hard to explain should it kick off the very ear your bosses are trying to stop, and made your nation look like the aggressor.
Unlikely, but could happen. There's been flimsier caus belli after all. So that I'm hit him too hard on. Should've done it, cause yeah, the Japanese are spoiling for a fight in any case. But I get Mac's reasoning.
In all fairness, what's Japan going to do? Complain to the League of Nations?
 
Mac was apparently trying to avoid a fight despite all his bluster. Both likely to buy time, and more likely to not piss off the powers-that-be in DC who were neck deep in desperate negotiations. Mac being worried about Japanese feelings? Unlikely. Well, beyond pissing them off into attacking before his bosses in DC were ready for such a thing to kick off on their own schedule themselves.
From what I can tell, everyone that mattered in Tokyo and Washington DC believed war was all but inevitable by the latter half of 1941, but the 'when' it would kick off, and how, was the matter of contention. Both sides were thus very cautious to not kick things off until they felt all their ducks were in a row for their side. The Japanese apparently won that race hands down.
 
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Don't forget this gem of a quote from Air Vice Marshal Pulford, circa October 1941: "Japan's best fighter is the Navy 0. It is on a par with our Buffalo, certainly not much faster." Gotta wonder what words the folks of every Buffalo pilot lost to A6Ms would have for him.
Pretty damning IMO!
 
Mac was apparently trying to avoid a fight despite all his bluster. Both likely to buy time, and more likely to not piss off the powers-that-be in DC who were neck deep in desperate negotiations. Mac being worried about Japanese feelings? Unlikely. Well, beyond pissing them off to attack before his bosses in DC were ready for such a thing to kick off on their own schedule themselves.
From what I can tell, everyone that mattered in Tokyo and Washington DC believed war was all but inevitable by the latter half of 1941, but the 'when' it would kick off, and how, was the matter of contention. Both sides were thus very cautious to not kick things off until they felt all their ducks were in a row for their side. The Japanese apparently won that race hands down.
MacArthur, refused to believe any intelligence sources from any sources but his imagination. Admiral Hart had the same info and was prepared to go to war by 0345 8 December 1941 (FET). MacArthur believed that he could hold off the Japanese wit what he had, and defeat them if they waited until April or May 1942, something the Japanese were not going to do. While negotiations were under way, the Army was shipping all they could put together to Mac Arthur, even though he was not prepared to use what he got. MacArthur had already made the decision to throw out WPO in all it's variants and defeat the Japanese on the beaches. One thing, MacArthur had neglected to tell anyone in Washington about his decision. Hart was not informed until the 5th of December.
When it come to preparations for reinforcements Mac Arthur had 2 armor battalions arrive on the 2nd and by the 8th had barely gotten the tanks unpacked let alone tested. While Hart's 4th Marines HHQ Company 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company arrived on the 6th and 7th and by the 8th had married up with the Olopango Battalion as their 3rd Battalion and prepared to move into the field.
 
Apparently you are the only one here, to see scarcasm based on actual documented British@ 1941 positions and statements.. as current racism, ..calm down...please.
Yes there was an assumption that some of the new Japanese aircraft the British and Americans had seen or been made aware of up to 1941 were German designed aircraft

And despite information from China where the Japanese Pilots where achieving a very one side kill to loss ratio the British and Americans did not rate the Japanese air force

All this based on little more than institutionalised racism that took up to 18 months to be beaten out of them

There is a reason 169 of the 170 British Buffalos were relegated to the far east including Malaya and Singapore as they would not be fighting German or European aircraft.

And to be fair they did shoot down a fair few of the IJA aircraft in air to air combat with a loss rate of 1.3 (claimed) : 1 and that while being badly out numbered.
 
From 20,000 feet 3 miles offshore, a B-17 C/D photo recon@ 1941 can cover all the harbors, and 90% of the airfields on Formosa. Without radar, the planes might not even be spotted. ADM. Hart's PBYs, routinely flew to within 3 miles of Cam Rahn Bay, in Indochina,and along the coast, without interception, to get detailed counts of ships types and numbers from 15, 000 feet.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
There is a reason 169 of the 170 British Buffalos were relegated to the far east including Malaya and Singapore as they would not be fighting German or European aircraft.

And to be fair they did shoot down a fair few of the IJA aircraft in air to air combat with a loss rate of 1.3 (claimed) : 1 and that while being badly out numbered.
The Far East locale where the Buffalo performed best, interestingly enough, was Burma. They did pretty alright against JAAF Ki-21s and bagged the odd Ki-27 or even Ki-43 here and there. Only eight Buffaloes were lost during the entire campaign.
 
MacArthur, refused to believe any intelligence sources from any sources but his imagination. Admiral Hart had the same info and was prepared to go to war by 0345 8 December 1941 (FET). MacArthur believed that he could hold off the Japanese wit what he had, and defeat them if they waited until April or May 1942, something the Japanese were not going to do. While negotiations were under way, the Army was shipping all they could put together to Mac Arthur, even though he was not prepared to use what he got. MacArthur had already made the decision to throw out WPO in all it's variants and defeat the Japanese on the beaches. One thing, MacArthur had neglected to tell anyone in Washington about his decision. Hart was not informed until the 5th of December.
When it come to preparations for reinforcements Mac Arthur had 2 armor battalions arrive on the 2nd and by the 8th had barely gotten the tanks unpacked let alone tested. While Hart's 4th Marines HHQ Company 1st and 2nd Battalions and Machine Gun Company arrived on the 6th and 7th and by the 8th had married up with the Olopango Battalion as their 3rd Battalion and prepared to move into the field.
And I question nor differ in none of this assessment of Mac. Just in the guessing why he made some of the decisions, primarily the lack of Taiwan overflights. And we can't know that as everything we have on that time is based on other's assessments. He didn't write anything himself down except when to cover his ass long after the fact, so effectively useless.
Remember, in the end, getting into another's mind is largely guesswork unless you have their unaltered, unedited diaries and journals. And even then...
 
From 20,000 feet 3 miles offshore, a B-17 C/D photo recon@ 1941 can cover all the harbors, and 90% of the airfields on Formosa. Without radar, the planes might not even be spotted. ADM. Hart's PBYs, routinely flew to within 3 miles of Cam Rahn Bay, in Indochina,and along the coast, without interception, to get detailed counts of ships types and numbers from 15, 000 feet.
Agreed, and again not disagreeing with any of this. It's also 20/20 perfect hindsight. Indochina was still TECHNICALLY French territory and you could even claim it got lost getting to Luzon, and thus a fig leaf could be claimed. Formosa was Japanese integral territory and a bit off the beaten path. If the B17 is spotted, well, no way in hell you're claiming it got lost and no fig leaf, and the political situation is, to use a understatement, explosive.
Should've Mac taken the risk? Probably. Likely. But to be fair we're also making that judgement with the overwhelming benefit of hindsight. Oh, not to mention opinion being colored by a great deal of not undeserved-loathing of Mac to be found here!
 
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