It'd be interesting to know if the Japanese had noticed the changes to British and Commonwealth strengths and dispositions and adjusted their strategy.

Or their arrogance meant that they'd just go with the existing plan would work regardless.
 
It'd be interesting to know if the Japanese had noticed the changes to British and Commonwealth strengths and dispositions and adjusted their strategy.

Or their arrogance meant that they'd just go with the existing plan would work regardless.
Why of course the Japanese won't notice! Everyone knows that they have bad eyesight. This would require
airborne reconnaissance, which they cannot do. Their paper covered planes will simply not handle the monsoons
or the airspeeds required.

The IJA/IJN existing plan hasn't been disproven in battle yet. The Japanese are sending their best. If anything,
the invasion is likely to be even more brutal.
 
I love the way this story is developing, the amount of detailed research necessary to build an accurate and realistic scenario is considerable. It is often said, with the benefit of hindsight, that just a couple of decisions needed to be changed to save Malaya and Singapore from ignominious defeat, however as we have seen so far in this timeline there has needed to be root and branch reform of leadership, planning, training and resource allocation over a long period to even stand a chance of holding the Japanese at bay. We now know the quality and quantity of Japanese forces brought to bear on Malaya. Even with all the improvements wrought to the Empires defences there is still a lot of incorrect assumptions, commonplace at the time about the Japanese and their equipment that will cost us dearly in the early stages of the fight to come. It will probably be harder and bloodier than OTL as both sides are pushed to their limits. I can’t wait to see it all unfold.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Is this OTL or are there Butterfly induced changes?
Hi edgeworthy, there are no butterflies here, this is as historical as I can get, but hands up, I'm positive there will be errors. A couple of things to note ships classified as AP AA have 6-8 AA guns of the Type 88 75mm, manned by Army gunners., the landing craft are manned by the Engineer (landing) Regts. The Japanese really crammed the troops in, little consideration was given to soldier comfort, he was expected to bear it without complaint, but to be fair to them, their sea journeys were relatively short, days, instead of the weeks British soldiers spent coming from the UK. I've provided a very detailed OOB as your going to need it to follow the action as it unfolds.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
It'd be interesting to know if the Japanese had noticed the changes to British and Commonwealth strengths and dispositions and adjusted their strategy.

Or their arrogance meant that they'd just go with the existing plan would work regardless.
and
Why of course the Japanese won't notice! Everyone knows that they have bad eyesight. This would require
airborne reconnaissance, which they cannot do. Their paper covered planes will simply not handle the monsoons
or the airspeeds required.

The IJA/IJN existing plan hasn't been disproven in battle yet. The Japanese are sending their best. If anything,
the invasion is likely to be even more brutal.
Hi Ihagambia and Nevarinemex, I'll be honest, I don't think I've written about Japanese intelligence of what troops they face, and if that is different to their historical calculations. I'd have to say here that in my Timeline, Japanese intelligence still rates the British forces as poor, with a lot of Indian troops, antiquated aircraft, and a lack of a true fleet. Secondly, there's not much more the Japanese can do, they are stretched pretty thin logistically speaking, but the true Japanese spirt of Bushido (1940s version) along with troops well practiced in their arms will carry them forward. This isn't a time for faint hearts.
 
That was uncalled for.
Why of course the Japanese won't notice! Everyone knows that they have bad eyesight. This would require
airborne reconnaissance, which they cannot do. Their paper covered planes will simply not handle the monsoons
or the airspeeds required.

The IJA/IJN existing plan hasn't been disproven in battle yet. The Japanese are sending their best. If anything,
the invasion is likely to be even more brutal.
 

Sekhmet_D

Kicked
It'd be interesting to know if the Japanese had noticed the changes to British and Commonwealth strengths and dispositions and adjusted their strategy.

Or their arrogance meant that they'd just go with the existing plan would work regardless.

and

Hi Ihagambia and Nevarinemex, I'll be honest, I don't think I've written about Japanese intelligence of what troops they face, and if that is different to their historical calculations. I'd have to say here that in my Timeline, Japanese intelligence still rates the British forces as poor, with a lot of Indian troops, antiquated aircraft, and a lack of a true fleet. Secondly, there's not much more the Japanese can do, they are stretched pretty thin logistically speaking, but the true Japanese spirt of Bushido (1940s version) along with troops well practiced in their arms will carry them forward. This isn't a time for faint hearts.
The IJA was never particularly renowned for their intel work. With the exception of Kenji Doihara, personnel who chose to enter that particular vocation, which was regarded as a third-rate assignment, never got very far in their careers. I would not expect them to make any alterations to Operation Centrifuge.
 

Driftless

Donor
I would guess there's also an element of system inertia going on too, for military intelligence processing. Our author has added some units and material arriving fairly late in the lead up to invasion. Even very sharp local intelligence gatherers are forwarding some of those updates piecemeal, and the upstream intelligence analysts in the IJA would need time to sort that data out to create a clear picture. Basically, there's a time lag between eyes-in-the-field seeing things, reporting them, and decision makers doing something as a countermeasure.

Crucially, as FBC has pointed out, the IJA has committed pretty much all the forces they feel are available for Malaya. Their other commitments: China fighting, Indochina occupation, Oceania occupation and Impeding assault forces, along with the coming invasions of the PI and DEI. Too little butter scraped over too much bread in many ways.

Thirdly, something that remains to be seen in this tale, is how the changes in top leadership of the British and Commonwealth forces impact the impending fight.
 
Last edited:

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
Have the Japanese noticed the various changes that have taken place in the British and Dutch Far East colonies, of course they have, they have an extensive intelligence system in place. However they have a number of problems, the first of which is their interpretation of what these changes mean, and the effect they have on their plans. A prime example is the appointment of the Lord Gort and the change in the command structure, it can be viewed as a sop to a failure who has significant influence within the establishment, and has been given a position and title to soothe his supporters and massage his ego. After all this is the former commander of the BEF, who lost to the Germans, and failed to regain his honour by sacrificing his life for his Emperor, as any Japanese officer would have done. And much the same can be said of Park, who as the successful leader of the defence of Southern Britain during the Battle of Britain, should have replaced Dowding as the head of Fighter Command on his retirement. Has instead been sent out to what is a colonial backwater, which only goes to show that there is something lacking in him, or that being a colonial himself he is viewed as a second class leader.

Nor not having a trans dimensional crystal ball, and any knowledge of the events IOTL, do the Japanese realise just how much the numerous changes minor and major, have made to the British position. The withdrawal of the majority of the Hong Kong garrison, can be viewed in two ways, a sensible action that takes into account the impossibility of defending the colony, and strengths the defence of Malaysia. Or a desperate measure taken in desperation, by a nation that has been significantly weakened by events in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that unlike IOTL all the combat troops have received basic jungle warfare training, and also have a basic knowledge of Japanese tactics. Is something that significantly improves the British ground forces, in acomparison to those of OTL. The appointment of Park and the major improvements made to the tactics, and facilities of the British Airforces, is going to be a huge shock to the Japanese. Malaya and Singapore now have a basic air defence system, under the control of a very skilled leadership.

In the same way the improvements made to the Civil Administration, and the deployment of trained troops to support the Civil Power. Along with the better preparations made, in all areas, mean that there is very little chance of a breakdown of control, as there was IOTL. The improvements made to the local naval forces, especially on the West Coast, where the Japanese have no naval assets, or any chance of them prior to a complete collapse and surrender of Singapore. Will mean that the Japanese are not able to as they did IOTL, gather together local shipping and carry out outflanking operations, but will instead have to batter their way against the British defence forces directly. The various improvements made to the air defence system in Malaya and particularly Singapore, mean that the Japanese will not be able to dominate the skies as they did IOTL. And given just how much they relied on luck to achieve their goals, every little setback is going to seriously impact their ability to achieve their plans. Yes the Japanese are receiving up to date intelligence about events in the British and Dutch colonies, but given just how overstretched their are, they do not have the strategic depth to seriously change their plans.

In 1941, the Japanese were very much out on a limb, desperate for vital resources, and four years into a costly war in China. The best of their officers were concentrated on this war, and the best of their intelligence analysts, were focused on the threat from China and the United States, not Britain or Holland. The principal naval threat was the USN, which had a large uncommitted fleet in the Pacific, which had been recently forwarded deployed to the Hawaiian Islands. The rag tag and bobtail naval forces available to the British and Dutch were not seen as a threat, and were not the subject of interest that the American fleet was. The British didn’t have heavy bombers to spare unlike the Americans, nor did they have any of their most modern fighters available, all they basically had were European rejects and obsolescent aircraft. So a constant question for the Japanese was, were the British truly committed to the defence of their colonies, and were the Dutch able to defend their colonies. All questions that needed to be addressed without allowing their own biases of Japanese superiority to cloud their judgement.

RR.
 
All questions that needed to be addressed without allowing their own biases of Japanese superiority to cloud their judgement.
The last bit is, I think, spot on. Combined with, probably, the correct intrepetation by the Japanese why Lord Gort and Park ended up in Malaya.
Most likely the Japanese will disregard the information of the improvements and reinforcements and see it as ''pathetic panic play of the Europeans'', or at least the Japanese Imperial Army would likely see it, since as far as I understood they were the most biased of the Japanese Imperial Forces
 
Last edited:
That was uncalled for.
You apparently, payed no attention to context, scarcasm, or the fact that Neverinmex, was stating and paraphrasing factual public opinions prevalent across the UK and USA about the Japanese, at that time, including America Army intelligence estimates.
 
Last edited:

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
You apparently, payed no attention to context, scarcasm, or the fact that Neverinmex, was stating and paraphrasing factual public opinions prevalent across the UK and USA about the Japanese, at that time, including America Army intelligence estimates.
Hi Butchpfd, I agree, humour, in all it's forms is often misunderstood by people living in different areas of our lovely plant, lost in translation as it were, I don't think anyone who contributes here wishes to offend. we're all much to old for that nonsense. It's funny how I often catch myself using sayings, that make sense to a cockney, but is nonsensical to others. And yes, lets not have a Cal Bear visit, in his moderator role, although I'd welcome his input in general discussion on the thread.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Crucially, as FBC has pointed out, the IJA has committed pretty much all the forces they feel are available for Malaya. Their other commitments: China fighting, Indochina occupation, Oceania occupation and Impeding assault forces, along with the coming invasions of the PI and DEI. Too little butter scraped over too much bread in many ways.
Hi Driftless, yes there is a difference here between what the IJA and IJN can do in response to changes in the Allied dispositions. Yamashita, commanding the 25th Army forgo the deployment of the 56th Infantry Division, choosing to use the assets detailed to transport them to providing more supplies and ammunition, such was their logistical limitations. However, Malaya is their priority rather than the Philippines, aircraft assigned to Malayan operations are slated to later transfer to the Philippines once air dominance is achieved. Yamashita's artillery park is also slated to shift units to the Philippines later. Burma, other than the seizure of airfields in Lower Burma, will wait

The IJN has some flexibility, we've just recently seen the redeployment of part of the Kanoye air group with its G4M Betty's, and the four submarines of the 5th Submarine Division, but they're stretched too. But overall things are not going to improve in time for the Japanese, this is a now or never thing, and never is not an option.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
Have the Japanese noticed the various changes that have taken place in the British and Dutch Far East colonies, of course they have, they have an extensive intelligence system in place. However they have a number of problems, the first of which is their interpretation of what these changes mean, and the effect they have on their plans. A prime example is the appointment of the Lord Gort and the change in the command structure, it can be viewed as a sop to a failure who has significant influence within the establishment, and has been given a position and title to soothe his supporters and massage his ego. After all this is the former commander of the BEF, who lost to the Germans, and failed to regain his honour by sacrificing his life for his Emperor, as any Japanese officer would have done. And much the same can be said of Park, who as the successful leader of the defence of Southern Britain during the Battle of Britain, should have replaced Dowding as the head of Fighter Command on his retirement. Has instead been sent out to what is a colonial backwater, which only goes to show that there is something lacking in him, or that being a colonial himself he is viewed as a second class leader.

Nor not having a trans dimensional crystal ball, and any knowledge of the events IOTL, do the Japanese realise just how much the numerous changes minor and major, have made to the British position. The withdrawal of the majority of the Hong Kong garrison, can be viewed in two ways, a sensible action that takes into account the impossibility of defending the colony, and strengths the defence of Malaysia. Or a desperate measure taken in desperation, by a nation that has been significantly weakened by events in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that unlike IOTL all the combat troops have received basic jungle warfare training, and also have a basic knowledge of Japanese tactics. Is something that significantly improves the British ground forces, in acomparison to those of OTL. The appointment of Park and the major improvements made to the tactics, and facilities of the British Airforces, is going to be a huge shock to the Japanese. Malaya and Singapore now have a basic air defence system, under the control of a very skilled leadership.

In the same way the improvements made to the Civil Administration, and the deployment of trained troops to support the Civil Power. Along with the better preparations made, in all areas, mean that there is very little chance of a breakdown of control, as there was IOTL. The improvements made to the local naval forces, especially on the West Coast, where the Japanese have no naval assets, or any chance of them prior to a complete collapse and surrender of Singapore. Will mean that the Japanese are not able to as they did IOTL, gather together local shipping and carry out outflanking operations, but will instead have to batter their way against the British defence forces directly. The various improvements made to the air defence system in Malaya and particularly Singapore, mean that the Japanese will not be able to dominate the skies as they did IOTL. And given just how much they relied on luck to achieve their goals, every little setback is going to seriously impact their ability to achieve their plans. Yes the Japanese are receiving up to date intelligence about events in the British and Dutch colonies, but given just how overstretched their are, they do not have the strategic depth to seriously change their plans.

In 1941, the Japanese were very much out on a limb, desperate for vital resources, and four years into a costly war in China. The best of their officers were concentrated on this war, and the best of their intelligence analysts, were focused on the threat from China and the United States, not Britain or Holland. The principal naval threat was the USN, which had a large uncommitted fleet in the Pacific, which had been recently forwarded deployed to the Hawaiian Islands. The rag tag and bobtail naval forces available to the British and Dutch were not seen as a threat, and were not the subject of interest that the American fleet was. The British didn’t have heavy bombers to spare unlike the Americans, nor did they have any of their most modern fighters available, all they basically had were European rejects and obsolescent aircraft. So a constant question for the Japanese was, were the British truly committed to the defence of their colonies, and were the Dutch able to defend their colonies. All questions that needed to be addressed without allowing their own biases of Japanese superiority to cloud their judgement.

RR.
Hi RampRat, I love your summaries, you seem to have a better handle on what I'm doing than I do.
 
An excellent example of racial bias was Mac Arthur's discounting the Japanese ability to begin a war prior to late Spring 1942, and his refusal to allow adequate recon of Formosa. Had he done so he would have found that the Far East AirForce, was out numbered 3 to 1., not counting the CVL deployed from Truk
 
Hi Butchpfd, I agree, humour, in all it's forms is often misunderstood by people living in different areas of our lovely plant, lost in translation as it were, I don't think anyone who contributes here wishes to offend. we're all much to old for that nonsense. It's funny how I often catch myself using sayings, that make sense to a cockney, but is nonsensical to others. And yes, lets not have a Cal Bear visit, in his moderator role, although I'd welcome his input in general discussion on the thread.
I agree,much more fun to get CAl's conribution rather then ruler. I'm of the generation that had WWII veterans for fathers and uncles and moms and Aunts as veterans or war workers. My Dad and Father in law fought in Europe my maternal grandad (retread) was with the USAAF in N.Africa and Italy, and paternal granddad merchant marine in the Atlantic. My Father in laws Brothers were Army and USMC in the Pacific. Their opinions and comments about the Japanese and Nazis and Germans would boil CAlBears blood.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Have the Japanese noticed the various changes that have taken place in the British and Dutch Far East colonies, of course they have, they have an extensive intelligence system in place. However they have a number of problems, the first of which is their interpretation of what these changes mean, and the effect they have on their plans. A prime example is the appointment of the Lord Gort and the change in the command structure, it can be viewed as a sop to a failure who has significant influence within the establishment, and has been given a position and title to soothe his supporters and massage his ego. After all this is the former commander of the BEF, who lost to the Germans, and failed to regain his honour by sacrificing his life for his Emperor, as any Japanese officer would have done. And much the same can be said of Park, who as the successful leader of the defence of Southern Britain during the Battle of Britain, should have replaced Dowding as the head of Fighter Command on his retirement. Has instead been sent out to what is a colonial backwater, which only goes to show that there is something lacking in him, or that being a colonial himself he is viewed as a second class leader.

Nor not having a trans dimensional crystal ball, and any knowledge of the events IOTL, do the Japanese realise just how much the numerous changes minor and major, have made to the British position. The withdrawal of the majority of the Hong Kong garrison, can be viewed in two ways, a sensible action that takes into account the impossibility of defending the colony, and strengths the defence of Malaysia. Or a desperate measure taken in desperation, by a nation that has been significantly weakened by events in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that unlike IOTL all the combat troops have received basic jungle warfare training, and also have a basic knowledge of Japanese tactics. Is something that significantly improves the British ground forces, in acomparison to those of OTL. The appointment of Park and the major improvements made to the tactics, and facilities of the British Airforces, is going to be a huge shock to the Japanese. Malaya and Singapore now have a basic air defence system, under the control of a very skilled leadership.

In the same way the improvements made to the Civil Administration, and the deployment of trained troops to support the Civil Power. Along with the better preparations made, in all areas, mean that there is very little chance of a breakdown of control, as there was IOTL. The improvements made to the local naval forces, especially on the West Coast, where the Japanese have no naval assets, or any chance of them prior to a complete collapse and surrender of Singapore. Will mean that the Japanese are not able to as they did IOTL, gather together local shipping and carry out outflanking operations, but will instead have to batter their way against the British defence forces directly. The various improvements made to the air defence system in Malaya and particularly Singapore, mean that the Japanese will not be able to dominate the skies as they did IOTL. And given just how much they relied on luck to achieve their goals, every little setback is going to seriously impact their ability to achieve their plans. Yes the Japanese are receiving up to date intelligence about events in the British and Dutch colonies, but given just how overstretched their are, they do not have the strategic depth to seriously change their plans.

In 1941, the Japanese were very much out on a limb, desperate for vital resources, and four years into a costly war in China. The best of their officers were concentrated on this war, and the best of their intelligence analysts, were focused on the threat from China and the United States, not Britain or Holland. The principal naval threat was the USN, which had a large uncommitted fleet in the Pacific, which had been recently forwarded deployed to the Hawaiian Islands. The rag tag and bobtail naval forces available to the British and Dutch were not seen as a threat, and were not the subject of interest that the American fleet was. The British didn’t have heavy bombers to spare unlike the Americans, nor did they have any of their most modern fighters available, all they basically had were European rejects and obsolescent aircraft. So a constant question for the Japanese was, were the British truly committed to the defence of their colonies, and were the Dutch able to defend their colonies. All questions that needed to be addressed without allowing their own biases of Japanese superiority to cloud their judgement.

RR.
Of course Allied forces were never guilty of seeing what they wanted to see **cough** Market Garden ** cough**
 
Top