Stars and Sickles - An Alternative Cold War

Chapter 66c: Calm for Now - The South Pacific (Until 1980) (Part 3)
  • For the most part, the immediate post-war period in Polynesia was largely defined by shifts towards independent self-governance, particularly in the former British colonies.

    The Cook Islands remained a NZ dependent territory until 1965, but afterwards became a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand. The Cook Islands' relations with the rest of the world were peaceful, with the only real point of friction being minor territorial disputes with the United States over the atolls Tongareva, Pukapuka, Manihiki and Rakahanga. These disputes were settled in 1980 after the ratification of a bilateral treaty between the Cook Islands and United States, where the latter relinquished claims over the disputed atolls.

    Western Samoa was granted independence from New Zealand on 1st January 1962. The first Prime Minister of Samoa was paramount chief Fiame Mata'afa Faumuina Mulinu'u II. Western Samoa, or Samoa i Sisifo in the local tongue, became the first Polynesian people to gain sovereignty (although the Tongans had technically never ceded their sovereignty). In neighbouring American Samoa, which was technically an unorganised territory as there was no Organic Act passed for the territory, a constitution came into effect on July 1st 1967, making American Samoa de facto self-governing, although it is not consider as such by the United Nations. In 1970, Tonga's status as a protectorate ended, making it a fully-independent nation under King Tāufaʻāhau Tupou IV, who was the largest head of the state in the world, weighing a hefty 200 kilograms.

    four_col_tupouiv.jpg

    Tongan king Tupou IV

    Niue was governed as a New Zealand territory until the restoration of self-government in 1974 following a referendum where the Niueans selected self-government. There had been a degree of hostility to New Zealand administration after the controversial imprisonment of three young Niueans for the murder of Resident Commissioner Cecil Hector Watson Larsen, who had abused the locals and treated Niue as his own personal fief.

    French Polynesia was not granted self-governance, but in 1946 the islands became a French overseas territory, and received partial autonomy in 1977. Separatist sentiment in Tahiti was stoked by nationalist leader Pouvanaa a Oopa. In October 1947, Pouvanaa founded his own political party, the Democratic Rally of the Tahitian People. Becoming the Vice President of the local government administration in 1958, Pouvanaa's party swept the local elections with slogans such as "Tahiti for the Tahitians; Frenchmen into the sea!". Pouvanaa accused the French administration of allowing the local economy to deteriorate, and successfully campaigned for the introduction of income tax on the island, in order to raise funds from the Chinese and French businessmen who dominated the local economy. This campaign was met by a strike by local business owners, and a riot in Papeete, during which the French Polynesian assembly was pelted with stones, forcing the repeal of the income tax. Soon after, Pouvanaa was charged with arson and sentenced to eight years in prison and fifteen years in exile in metropolitan France.
     
    Chapter 67: A Seismic Shift - China (1970-1980)
  • For more information on China see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-3#post-7786930
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-3#post-8485910
    and
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-19#post-11088102

    ===

    The Chinese experience of the 1970s was one of massive change. Moving away from the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and towards a denunciation of Maoist policies (in deed, although not in rhetoric), the People's Republic of China began to align itself more and more with the rest of the socialist world. The rapprochement with the Soviet-led bloc was largely achieved by Hua Kuo-feng and his clique, which included such figures as Yeh Chien-ying, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-k'ui and Wang Tung-hsing.

    As Mao Tse-tung aged, he became in many ways a more mercurial ruler. Partially as a response to the anarchy of the Cultural Revolution, he became increasingly hostile to challenges to his authority. He considered himself responsible for many of China's achievements, including the detonation of China's first H-bomb in 1968 in Northern Gansu [164], the launch of the Dongfanghong ("the East is Red") satellite in 1970 and the commissioning of China's first nuclear submarines. Nevertheless, feeling a need to bolster national unity and silence the remnants of the ultra-leftist movements who had years before openly defied the government, Mao decided that it would be useful to utilise the more radical Red Guards in the liberation of Tibet [165]. In doing so, he believed that he could incorporate the feudalist Tibetans into the Great Chinese Proletarian Project, whilst also ensuring that a good number of the troublesome student activists could be done away with permanently. The invasion of Tibet commenced in the August of 1969, but was stalled as the autumn settled in and the mountainous terrain, paired with cold weather and Tibetan resistance, claimed a great number of lives. The situation deteriorated even more rapidly as Indian troops intervened in March 1970, bolstering the Tibetan forces and turning back the Chinese, who had advanced at a crawling pace throughout the campaign. As the Red Guards advanced along the long road from Bomi to Lhasa, they were routed by a vigorous Indo-Tibetan counterattack at Maizhokunggar, a mere 68 km east of Lhasa. Over the next few months, the Indian forces, supported by the Tibetans, recaptured most of the territory captured by the Chinese, with only Amdo remaining in Chinese hands. Some nationalist Tibetan and Indian figures considered the possibility of an attack into the Chinese Qinghai province, considered by many Tibetans to be an integral part of 'Greater Tibet'. However, the Chinese government claimed that the Red Guards had acted of their own volition, and that any attack on Chinese territory would be met with nuclear retaliation. As Indian troops advanced towards Amdo, they were halted by heavy resistance from Red Guard forces, assisted by Korean commandos. Indian warplanes also found themselves buzzed by PLAAF fighters as they approached the skies near the Tanggula pass, which separated Tibet from Qinghai. The Chinese, Indians and Tibetans started tripartite negotiations, which resulted in a recognition of Tibet's borders and the demilitarisation of Tibet north of the Nyenchen Tanglha mountain range.

    Hua_Guofeng-1.jpg

    Hua Kuo-feng, Chinese premier, 1978

    During the post-Cultural Revolution period, Mao became increasingly distant from government, noticing but intervening little in the power struggles occurring within the Chinese Communist Party, as various factions positioned themselves from the power struggle that would occur after Mao's death. These power struggles rose to a head after Mao's death in 1976, when the Gang of Four, composed of Mao's wife Chiang Ch'ing, theorist Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, literary critic Yao Wen-yüan and labour activist Wang Hung-wen attempted to seize power. Opposed by Mao's chosen successor Hua Kuo-feng and his supporters, the Gang of Four were deemed a "counter-revolutionary clique" and sentenced to extensive prison terms. The other force of opposition opposed to Hua Kuo-feng was the market reformist wing led by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who was killed in a house fire in 1976 [166].

    Hua's clique immediately went upon reforming the Chinese model of socialism to correct the "regretful aberrations" of the Maoist period. This included major economic reform under the direction of Chen-yün and Li Hsien-nien. Li Hsien-nien promoted heavy industrial development along the Soviet model, including the adoption of Soviet cybernetic production practice, which was trialed in Dongbei steelmills with notable success. Chen-yun, meanwhile, encouraged the utilisation of price mechanisms in order to more accurately determine demand and thus increase the utility of production. Along with imitating Soviet cybernetic practice, Hua's clique, particularly Yeh Chien-ying, were instrumental in building rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which was governed by the Kosygin-Podgorny-Kirilenko triumvirate. Whilst tensions did exist over some foreign policy issues, particularly developments in Indochina, Burma and Indonesia, the Sino-Soviet Split was effectively healed. Whilst China could not by any means be considered a "puppet" or "satellite" of the Soviet Union, and there was an implicit understanding that the Chinese were the preeminent socialist state in the Asia Pacific region, this rapprochement still panicked the American foreign policy establishment, which hoped that the two socialist giants would remain divided.

    ---
    [164] Historically this test was in Xinjiang, which is the East Turkestan Republic ITTL.
    [165] Whilst Tibet was invaded much earlier IOTL, the damage sustained by the PRC against the Americans during the Chinese Civil War limited Chinese expansionism, although Taiwan was taken in the late 1950s.
    [166] Deng Xiaoping, for those more familiar with hanyu pinyin than Wade-Giles. Best known as the architect of China's OTL market liberalisation policies.
     
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    Map 2 - 1972
  • Surprise Map!

    Hi readers,

    I haven't written any more stuff in the past few days and may not do so in the next few either so I'm gonna throw up this map I've made of the S&S Universe circa 1972.

    I've got a bunch of notes on Japan so that will probably be the next post to be written up (I will warn however that there isn't much in terms of divergences there), but I'd love comments on what people would like to see next, especially now that the 1960s are *mostly* done.

    Anyways, without further ado, here's the map:

    2wokdb4.jpg

    The S&S Universe, 1972.
    Key: Blue = United States or member of collective security agreement with USA
    Light Blue = France and French-oriented states
    Dark Blue = Miscellaneous pro-Western countries
    Red = Soviet Union and allied states
    Dark Red = Socialist states not aligned with the USSR
    Brown = United Arab Republic
    Cyan = Western-aligned Arab states
    Cream = Traditionalist states
    Yellow = Andean Community of Nations (ACoN)
    Lime Green = Brazil
    Saffron = Bharatiya and allied states
    Olive = pan-Africanist/African Socialist states
    Orange = Republic of South Africa and allied states
    Dark Green = Portuguese overseas possessions
    Pink = British overseas possessions
     
    Chapter 68: Three Brothers - Indochina (1970-1980)
  • For more information on Indochina, see https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-17#post-10989768
    and
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-17#post-10999005

    ===

    Having achieved regional dominance through military intervention in the neighbouring states of Laos and Kampuchea and the reunification of Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists spent the 1970s consolidating their power, both internally and amongst their client states. This would eventually culminate in a controversial regional integration policy. Several critics, amongst them their nominal allies the Chinese, considered Vietnamese hegemony over Kampuchea and Laos to constitute 'social imperialism'. By contrast, the Vietnamese saw themselves as liberators, disestablishing 'feudalism' and acting as the 'vanguard' for the construction of socialism in Indochina. The local view of the Vietnamese presence was often more complicated.

    The seizure of Cambodia and the toppling of the Lon Nol government was met with outrage by the American and Thai representatives at the United Nations. The Soviet and Congolese delegations defended the Vietnamese particularly vigorously, although the Chinese were conspicuously silent on the issue. Whilst Vietnamese aggression towards Cambodia was clearly blatant expansionism, criticism was largely silenced with the return of Prince Norodom Sihanouk to his country. Sihanouk denounced Lon Nol and his rightist allies, entering into an alliance of convenience with the Vietnamese in order to retain his throne and his privileged position in the country. Aware of the high standing of the Prince in the eyes of his people, the Vietnamese sought to utilise Sihanouk to legitimate their occupation in the eyes of the Cambodian people. The Khmer Rouge, the local Communists, were installed into power, led by Nuon Chea, who revealed a new flag and renamed the country 'Democratic Kampuchea'. The leadership of the Khmer Rouge countered anti-Sihanouk sentiments, pushed by figures such as Saloth Sar, by claiming that Kampuchea was still in essence a feudal society and required the unity represented by the monarch to pursue "internal national liberation" and provide both legitimacy and stability to the new regime. "In our country, the peasant need not know the dialectic" said Chea, "he need only that the Prince know it, or at least follow it".

    904px-Flag-map_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_Kampuchea.svg.png

    People's Republic of Kampuchea

    From the beginning, Kampuchea proved a problem for the Vietnamese. Whilst dependent on Hanoi, the Khmer Rouge noticeably chafed at their leash. Compared with the Pathet Lao, the Kampuchean Communists were downright rebellious, often openly contradicting and even disrespecting the Vietnamese in meetings between the Communist parties. Despite this fact, the Khmer Rouge leadership knew who their control depended on, and the more vocal and radical anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge such as Saloth Sar were sidelined within the Party[167]. Aside from being a political weak link for the Vietnamese, it was also an area of constant guerrilla warfare. Khmer nationalists, primarily from the Khmer Serei issarak continue to strike at Vietnamese occupation forces from the Thai border, where they received support from the Thais and Americans in the form of arms, food and training. In response to these attacks, the Vietnamese regularly engaged, with assistance from Kampuchean forces, in raids deep into Thai territory. Diplomatically, the Vietnamese dismissed these instances as cases of accidental 'hot pursuit' over the border by its forces, but Vietnamese persistence eventually resulted in skirmishes with Thai forces, who more often than not were ambushed or fired upon first by the Vietnamese. In response the Thais situated artillery in sites along the border. In a sense, some of these skirmishes illustrated the callousness of proxy conflicts during the Cold War, with the Thais training artillery on refugee camps inhabited by anti-Communist Khmers, knowing that the Vietnamese would be drawn to these camps as targets. The resulting barrages often killed more Khmers than Vietnamese. Recognising that these raids were both ineffective and risked escalation, and uncertain whether they would be able to decisively defeat the Thais should it come to all-out war, the Vietnamese changed their defense strategy in Kampuchea. Le Duc Anh, commander of the PAVN forces in Kampuchea, was architect of the K5 Plan, known in the West as the 'bamboo curtain'. The plan involved clearing long patches of tropical forest as well as slashing and uprooting tall vegetation in order to cut a 700km-long, 500m-wide swathe along the Kampuchean-Thai border, bristling with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines at a density of 3,000 mines/km of frontage. This solution was expensive and irritated local farmers, who were tasked with cutting down regrowth. Eventually, the local farmers were resettled in plots confiscated from landholders in other parts of the country, and prisoners were used to cut the regrowth. The K5 Plan, whilst ambitious, was largely ineffective. Constant maintenance proved a drain on resources and it failed to effectively deter Khmer guerrillas, who persistently found gaps along the 700km border. Nevertheless, there was little doubt that it would prove a formidable obstacle should the Thais attempt an offensive into Kampuchea[168].

    220px-Vientianne1973.jpg

    Pathet Lao soldiers in Vientiane, 1973. At this point, Caltex had not operated that particular gas station for a few years

    In neighbouring Laos, the Communist takeover was followed by a period of severe repression. Whilst the Pathet Lao declared a moderate policy, pleasantly surprising much of the population, particularly the small professional and business classes, Souphanouvong, half-brother of Prince Phetxarat and leader of the Pathet Lao, soon went back on his word and demanded immediate change. Prince Souvanna Phouma, leader of the Neutralists and Prime Minister of Laos, resigned and King Sisavang Vatthana was forced to abdicate. The King and his immediate family would die in a re-education camp near the Vietnamese border. Souphanouvong became the figurehead President of the newly-declared Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), although the real power lay with Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane. The inception of the Pathet Lao regime saw the cessation of printing of non-Communist newspapers and a large-scale purge of the civil service, army and police. Thousands were sent to "reeducation camps" deep in the remote jungles of Laos. The professional and intellectual classes fled en masse, and anticommunist leader Vang Pao led thousands of his Hmong fighters and their families into Thailand. Those Hmong that remained were discriminated against severely, granted few of the relatively rudimentary rights of ordinary Lao citizens. Political power in the LPDR was concentrated in the hands of four men: Prime Minister and General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane; economics chief Nuhak Phumsavon; planning minister Sali Voykhamxao; and security chief Khamtai Siphandon. This small clique, with the acquiescence and assistance of the Vietnamese, monopolised governance of the LPDR. Unchallenged as leader of the LPDR, Kaysone introduced collectivisation of agriculture. All land was declared state property and farms were merged into cooperatives. Unlike in states like China however (and even Vietnam), there existed no real feudal landholder class in Laos. Most of the farmland in Laos was owned by smallholders, meaning that there was little benefit that could be gained from collectivisation at all. The productive farmland was also primarily situated in areas inhabited by the culturally-dominant Lowland Lao. The Pathet Lao had always relied not on the Lowland, but the Highland Lao for support. Thus most of the Lowland Lao farmers, who already had no particular loyalty to the Communists, were alienated by their land reform. Rebelling against collectivisation and rice procurement, many Lao farmers sold their crops at low prices in Thailand. As state procurements fell sharply in both volume and value, and with the cutoff of US aid being replaced by a mere trickle of Soviet, Chinese and Vietnamese aid, shortages, unemployment and economic hardship emerged in the towns. Of even greater concern to the Pathet Lao regime, the royalist Lao National Revolutionary Front began to operate from bases in Thailand. In response, the Lao government began to restrict movement, institute tight censorship and curtail "decadent" activities such as cinema entertainment or nightlife. By 1977, recognising the failures of their repressive mode of governance, controls on movement were limited and agriculture was decollectivised.

    In Vietnam itself, the Communists sought to institute a socialist system throughout the country. The newly-annexed south was gradually communised, although initially some degree of private enterprise was deemed necessary to maintain international trade. The Second Five Year Plan, from 1976 to 1980, set unrealistically high goals for the average annual growth rate of industry (set at 16 to 19%), agriculture (8 to 10%) and national income (13-14%). Development plans were to focus equally on both agricultural and industrial development, intended to allow Vietnam to bypass the capitalist stage of development. The influence of Trotskyist groups in southern Vietnam on this policy is disputed by historians. Whilst on the surface such a policy appears Trotskyist, not only had the Trotskyists been decimated in the immediate postwar period by the Viet Minh, but the DRV engaged in a purge of many 'left communist' Viet Cong groups, including Maoists and those that appeared to hold "Trotskyist ideas" (even though no group claimed affiliation with the Fourth International). Regardless, collectivisation and repossession of crops had a negative impact on economic development, which stagnated. With the death of Mao Tse-Tung and the rise of the Hua Kuo-feng clique in China, the Vietnamese, concerned with the developing Sino-Soviet Rapprochement, sought a means to permanently tighten its hold on Laos and Kampuchea, precluding any struggle with China over regional hegemony. In order to do so, Pham Van Dong resurrected Ho Chi Minh's idea of an "Indochinese Socialist Federation". In 1979, the Hue Declaration was announced, where Vietnamese, Laotian and Kampuchean leaders declared the Socialist Federation of Indochina (SFI), comprised of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (as the DRV was renamed in 1976), Democratic Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Each nation maintained their own head of state (for instance, Sihanouk in Kampuchea) and even their own armed forces, although they were all under the overall command of the Minister of Defence (always Vietnamese). The Khmer Rouge and Pathet Lao became the Indochinese Communist Party-Kampuchea and Indochinese Communist Party-Laos respectively, but their operation stayed largely the same. The SFI was largely a project that limited the ability of the Kampuchean and Laotian elites to act independently of Hanoi, but ensured military, financial and diplomatic support from Vietnam to the elites of Kampuchea and Laos. In 1978, collectivisation in Vietnam began to be reversed, although it was maintained in Kampuchea into the 1980s.

    propaganda-vientiane-laos-a05fwf.jpg

    A Laotian propaganda poster showing revolutionary women of Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam standing in solidarity, gazing towards a brighter future

    ---
    [167] I thought sidelining Pol Pot would be much better than doing something corny like killing him. I assume that in difference circumstances (i.e. where the Vietnam War didn't happen) that even though anti-Vietnamese sentiment will still be there in the Khmer Rouge (and Cambodian society in general), that the radicals like Pol Pot should be able to be sidelined. That goes double without Mao being able to poke his nose in too much.

    [168] The K5 plan was done IOTL, and is the primary reason why the modern Thai-Cambodian border is one of the most heaviest-mined on the planet. Unfortunately a lot of people have been killed or disabled by unexploded ordinance and mines. IIRC more so in Cambodia than in Vietnam. Anyhow, ITTL the plan isn't abandoned as it was IOTL, due to the more permanent nature of Vietnamese presence.
     
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    Chapter 69: Coming Apart at the Seams - Pakistan (1970-1980)
  • For more information on Pakistan (1960-1969), see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-22#post-11230254

    ===

    Yahya-Khan.jpg

    Yahya Khan, final military leader of Pakistan, who saw the secession of Bangladesh

    The Pakistani defeat in the 1965-1967 Bharati-Pakistan War fundamentally destabilised the emerging political order in Pakistan. The military leaders of the country had been severely discredited by their failure to secure the borders of the fledgling nation. Ayub Khan was replaced by Yahya Khan, who had commanded the 7th Infantry Division in the Bharati-Pakistan War. Despite his incompetence as a military commander, he was promoted by Ayub Khan to Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army. Yahya Khan took the mantle of political leadership after Ayub Khan's fall from grace, but proved as incapable as a civilian politician as he had been as a general. He immediately placed the country under martial law, and became known for his alcoholism and whoring. Despite these personal and professional failings, he was expected by anti-Ayub political factions to transition effectively to a democracy. Already difficult enough, these challenges were compounded by the regional divide between East and West Pakistan, which was inflamed by an uncertain constitutional relationship between the two areas. Whilst East Pakistan was the larger of the two Pakistans in population size, and was more politically-united through representation by the Awami League, West Pakistan was the traditional seat of power and produced most of the Pakistani military and business elite. Yahya Khan responded to these challenges by abolishing the 'One Unit' system, which had abolished the provinces and caused unrest in the various regions since its introduction in 1955. He also made attempts to redress the regional imbalance, leading to the seizure of a greater number of seats in the National Assembly by the Awami League. Rather than appeasing the Bengalis, in fact this confirmed their accusations of prior political marginalisation, whilst threatening the West Pakistani representatives with legislative irrelevancy.

    By 28th July 1969, Yahya had established a framework for a set of democratic elections to be held in December 1970. In the 1970 general election, the Awami League won a total mandate in East Pakistan, whilst the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto won a majority in all the provinces of West Pakistan. The Awami League won 160 seats, whilst the PPP secured 81 seats and the conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML) held 10. The fundamental split between the East and the West of the country was now unquestionable. The PPP and Awami League began bilateral negotiations in order to form a coalition government, but hit an impasse when Bhutto refused to endorse the 'Six Points' of the Awami League, which sought maximum devolution for East Pakistan, including a separate currency and an autonomous military force. Frustrated by the political deadlock, Yahya Khan ordered the commencement of Operation Searchlight in support of the PPP, which would involve the seizure of towns in East Pakistan and the eradication of political opposition. Yahya Khan is quoted himself as saying "kill three million of them [Bengalis] and the rest will eat out of our hands" at a conference in November 1971. Yahya Khan claimed that the operation was in response to the killing of 300 Biharis (West Pakistanis) in Chittagong in March 1971 by Bengali mobs. The overall commanders of the Pakistani military resigned in protest to the operation, which went ahead anyway. In the run-up to the operation, Bengali military forces were scattered and officers were put on leave or sent to less sensitive areas in order to ensure a greater likelihood of success. On 25 March, Operation Searchlight commenced. Pakistani special forces commandoes captured Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) almost immediately, and almost all of the League's leadership was captured by the 29th. The 22nd Baluch Regiment, which was charged with security near the East Pakistan Rifles (EPR) HQ, subdued the largely disarmed and disorganised EPR remnants during the night of the 25th (most of the EPR units had been deployed near border posts). Pakistani forces then secured Dhaka University, killing unarmed students and professors, before moving on to Hindu areas, where troops continued killing innocents. The 2nd EPR wing began to counterattack on the 26th, but after some initial success, the Pakistanis were able to halt and then subdue the Bengali resistance in Dhaka. The attack on Dhaka was followed by the seizure of Chittagong. Despite outnumbering the Pakistanis, the Bengalis failed to take the offensive as a result of disagreements between the EPR commanding officers. The Pakistani Army and Navy mounted a joint attack on the city. Bengali organised resistance collapsed and thousands of civilians were slaughtered.

    By the 10th of April, the Pakistani Army was in possession of Dhaka, Rangpur-Saidpur, Comilla, Chittagong and Khulna. They had lost control of Rajshahi, Sylhet, Pabna, Dinajpur, Mymenshing and Kushtia to the EPR. The brutality of the Pakistani army in Operation Searchlight and subsequent campaigns provoked strong opposition from the Bengalis, who flocked to the Mukti Bahini ('Freedom Fighters', MB), a Bengali guerrilla movement that sought to liberate East Pakistan from West Pakistani occupation. The Pakistanis were surprised at the stiff Bengali resistance, their dismissive attitude towards the Bengalis symptomatic of the racist views held of Bengalis by many West Pakistanis as spineless and submissive. Operation Searchlight also suffered from its ambitious scope, and the objective of pacification by April 10th was not achieved. Despite Pakistani control over the major cities and airfields, the inability of the Pakistani army to crush Bengali resistance would prove the catalyst for the eventual dissolution of Pakistan in its entirety. The scattered Bengali forces were left with few arms and supplies, despite having a large recruitment pool, and were ordered by Mukti Bahini leader M.A.G. Osmani to fight autonomously, whilst Awami League political leaders sought support from Bharatiya. As would be expected, the poorly-trained MB fighters were incapable of besting the Pakistani Army in conventional combat. They also proved rather ineffective at fighting guerrilla war, with their ambushes of Pakistani convoys doing little more than delaying the Pakistani advance, as West Pakistani units fanned out from the towns to seize large swathes of the countryside using aggressive hunter-killer air cavalry tactics. The Pakistani Army also mobilised a number of paramilitary formations, most notably the Razakars, largely composed of collaborationist Bengalis, who were often guilty of the more heinous atrocities against Bengali villages. Several Islamist militias also supported the Pakistani Army against the MB, but were of mixed effectiveness.

    Mukti_Bahini_posters.jpg

    Mukti Bahini propaganda posters

    The Bengalis' saving grace came in the form of Bharati intervention. Whilst the Bharati government and the Awami League were strongly opposed ideologically, the Bharatis sought to weaken Pakistan and improve their international diplomatic position through the liberation of East Pakistan. The international community had become aware of the plight of the people of East Pakistan, and a number of benefit concerts were held to send badly-needed aid. The intervention was a propaganda coup for the Bharati government, which could dismiss claims of hostility towards Muslims through the intervention, as well as making a convincing claim that the Pakistani government has been more oppressive to the Muslims they are supposed to protect than the Bharati Hindu nationalists. Whilst such claims obscure the situation within Bharatiya itself, it nevertheless improved the view of Bharatiya in the West. Realising the undesirability of association with Yahya Khan's government, the United States cut ties with Pakistan and began developing a close relationship with the fiercely anti-Communist Bharati government which had been courting them for years. The intervention itself occurred after a preemptive strike was launched by Pakistani Air Force warplanes on Bharati Air Force bases in December 1971. Bharati units, including troops which had participated in the Tibetan campaigns, poured into East Pakistan, overrunning the country with the support of auxiliary MB units. The Bharatis largely bypassed fortified areas, surrounding them and forcing the Pakistani forces into a surrender, which was signed on the 16th. Most of the United Nations voted in favour of the recognition of the new nation of Bangladesh, although this was vetoed by the Chinese, who still maintained a close relationship with Pakistan.

    With the surrender of East Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh, the position of Yahya Khan back in Pakistan became untenable. Street demonstrations by outraged citizens became commonplace, and rumours abounded in Karachi of an imminent coup d'etat against Yahya Khan. In order to prevent further unrest, Yahya Khan handed the reins of power over to PPP leader Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on December 20th 1971. Pakistan was facing a political crisis unlike it had ever faced before. Emboldened by Bangladesh's independence, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi nationalists began to push for their own states. With the very existence of the country at stake, Bhutto began a military crackdown against separatists. Bhutto embarked on an ambitious reform programme, promulgating a new constitution in 1973 and engaging on economic reform driven by nationalisations and improvement of conditions for workers. Unfortunately, the nationalisations didn't operate as effectively as expected, largely because many of the nationalised businesses were too small to be effectively operated as state enterprises. His education policy was controversial: whilst he established thousands of new schools, he also abandoned Western education in favour of solely domestically-produced academic materials. A particular obsession of Bhutto's was with physics, which he strongly promoted as a means to produce the intellectual resources necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, a priority that became more urgent after the detonation of Bharatiya's first atomic weapon in 1974, the so-called "Parashurama" test. Bhutto also began to articulate a programme for land reform, which was to empower the Sindhi masses, despite upsetting the feudal landowners. He was toppled from power before this programme could achieve significant results. Irritated at America's abandonment of Pakistan, Bhutto turned to the Soviet Union as an alternative superpower patron. The Soviets, eager to gain direct access to the Indian Ocean, participated in a number of development projects, including the establishment of Pakistan Steel Mills in 1972 and the construction of Port Qasim in Karachi.

    Suppressing separatist movements still remained, however, the primary concern for Bhutto and his government. Rising unrest in Balochistan province in the country's southwest had prompted Bhutto to dismiss two provincial governments within two months, arrest to Balochistani chief ministers, two governors and dozens of parliamentarians. He also banned the National Awami Party, which had significant support within Balochistan, and charged everyone with high treason to be trialled before a court stacked with handpicked judges loyal to Bhutto. As a result of Baloch outrage with these actions, the insurgency lead by tribal sardars (chiefs) began to intensify. In response, Bhutto ordered the military to suppress the Baloch nationalists in January 1973. A month later, an arms cache was discovered in the UAR embassy in Karachi[169]. The Pakistan Navy began a blockade of the Balochistani coast, intercepting UAR attempts to smuggle arms. However, they proved unable to prevent aid trickling down from Afghanistan to the Baloch tribal warriors. Wary of the Baloch insurgency in Pakistan supporting the Baloch separatists in Iran, the Shah also providing air support for the Pakistani Air Force. The two air forces pummeled the mountain hideouts of the Baloch fighters. Nevertheless, the Baloch kept fighting until they were granted independence in the wake of Pakistan's collapse. In the North-West Frontier Province, the situation was more complicated. Whilst Pashtun nationalists fought for an independent Pashtunistan, their co-ethnics in the Afghan government would provide only limited support. This was largely as a result of internal security issues caused by the support of Islamist mujahideen such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud by Bhutto's government. Nevertheless, as this support began to wither up with Pakistan's fall, the Afghans would take advantage of the situation wholeheartedly.

    3933477041_b8ec141880.jpg

    Sher Mohammad Marri (in sunglasses) and some of his Baloch guerrillas

    Concerned with the increasing Soviet presence in Pakistan, the CIA and US State Department officials began to make encouraging overtures to Bharati leaders. With the death of M.S. Golwalkar in 1973 and his succession by Balasaheb Deoras, the relationship between the United States and Bharatiya strengthened rapidly. Deoras agreed to an attack on Pakistan, which was to result in the annihilation of Pakistan and the fall of the Bhutto government, in return for generous aid grants, a favourable trade relationship, and the assertion of Bharati dominance over Sindh, the most economically-valuable part of Pakistan. On 5 June 1975, two years to the day after M.S. Golwalkar passed away, Bharati troops crossed the border into Pakistan. Falsely claiming that Bhutto was the patron of the numerous Communist insurgencies active within Bharatiya, Deoras had ordered a full-scale invasion. Denounced by many of the nations of the UN, but supported by the United States, the invasion brushed aside Pakistani resistance. Attacking along three axes, the Bharati forces, armed with heavy artillery, tanks and US-made warplanes such as the F-4 Phantom II, overwhelmed the Pakistani forces at every part of the front. The Pakistani tank forces were gutted in the Thal Desert as the Bharatis made the most of their air superiority after annihilating Pakistan's small interceptor force of Shenyang J-6s. A smaller central column pushed through the Cholistan desert, whilst the most powerful thrust pushed south and seized Karachi. The Pakistani Navy was bettered in a number of sorties by the Bharati Navy, and a blockade was instituted. Within two weeks the Bharati forces were in control of the majority of the country. Baloch tribals seized Gwadar and even Quetta, whilst Daoud Khan participated in a small, undeclared war, sending in Afghan troops disguised as tribal fighters, taking a page out of Pakistan's own playbook in the 1947-9 war. These troops, with assistance from local, authentic tribal warriors, occupied Peshawar and proclaimed the 'State of Pashtunistan'. Bhutto and his government escaped to Aden, where they were initially determined not to surrender. However, after some time, Bhutto caved, and signed an instrument of surrender. Deoras announced the dissolution of Pakistan, announcing that no longer would the peoples of the area be shackled to such an artificial concept of nationhood. The independence of Balochistan and Pashtunistan was confirmed. A mere month later, after a loya jirga in Peshawar, Pashtunistan committed to union with Afghanistan. The incorporation was complete by September. Balochistan was given independence as a constitutional monarchy, with the Bharatis demanding that the last Khan of Kalat, Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmedzai, sought be named Khan of Balochs. This was intended to counteract the influence of the leftist Baloch politician Khair Bakhsh Marri and Marxist guerrilla leader Sher Mohammad Marri. This coalition would remain uneasy but stable through the rest of the 1970s, as Ahmad Yar Khan Ahmedzai kept largely aloof from politics, except to step in as a moderating influence. Of the post-Pakistani states, the only one to arise not out of an armed struggle, but purely out of a domestic politic movement was Sindhudesh. Sindhudesh arised out of nationalist agitation in Sindh province as a result of the dominance of the Punjabi and incoming Urdu-speaking Muhajir peoples who had fled India during partition. Feeling marginalised in their own home province, Sindhi nationalists flocked around G.M. Syed, who positioned himself as the preeminent Sindhi nationalist intellectual, proposing an independent Sindhi homeland in 1972. Publishing books with titles such as Now Pakistan Should Disintegrate and Sindhu Desh - A Nation in Chains, and establishing an independence organisation, the Jeay Sindh Mahaz (JSM), Syed would become known as the 'father of the nation' once he became the President of Sindhudesh after his installation by the Bharatis. The extent to which he facilitated Bharati domination of the Sindhi economy would prove controversial in later histories, with arguments over whether or not he was their willing patron, or that he simply recognised his vulnerability vis-a-vis the Bharatis and sought to appease them for the sake of his own people. Nevertheless, he engendered criticism in his failure to even attempt to break the power of the Sindhi aristocracy, who became the primary agents of Bharati imperialism, according to Marxist historiography.

    Sheikh-Mujibur-Rahman.jpg

    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh's 'father of the nation'

    After being released from captivity by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the aftermath of Yahya Khan's downfall, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman assumed the provisional presidency of Bangladesh and became the country's first Prime Minister. The MB and other militias were combined to form the Bangladeshi Army, which took over protection of the nation from Indian forces after their withdrawal. Despite the avowed secularism of the Awami League and the Bangladeshi government, Mujib began to move closer to political Islam as a means to shore up his support, aware that the Communists on the far left were opposed to his rule. Mujib declared a common amnesty to shore up his support amongst the Islamic right, aware that many of the Bengalis who had fought on the Pakistani side had done so out of pan-Islamist sentiment. Mujib had the provisional parliament draft a new constitution, which incorporated the fundamental principles of "nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism", which would be referred to amongst Bangladeshis as "Mujibism". Mujib commenced widespread nationalisation, whilst pushing through land reform intended to bring millions of tenant farmers out of abject poverty. He also initiated nationwide education, sanitation and infrastructure programmes to modernise the country. Proclaiming a constitution in 1973, and holding elections shortly thereafter, Mujib won a sweeping victory and the Awami League remained in power. The Awami League government continued to tackle the severe challenges facing the ravaged country, including attempts to provide homes for 10 million refugees displaced during the Liberation War, as well as combating the 1974 famine, which killed 27,000[170]. Mujib managed to build a constructive relationship with both superpowers, and received generous aid from Eastern European, Japan and the UAR. Partially as a result of these policies, and partially out of dissatisfaction with the government's response to the 1974 famine, a Maoist offshoot of the Bangladesh Chhatra League (the Awami League's student wing), known as the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal ('National Socialist Party', JSD) began an armed insurrection. The JSD's armed wing, the Gonobahini ('People's Army), attempted an attack on the Home Minister Mansur Ali's residence, which was repulsed. They then held a major rally blockading the residence. Stirring the crowd into a frenzy, the JSD engaged in street battles with riot police. The Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (RB), which was formed as a government death squad to counter the JSD, arrived on the scene and began to fire live bullets into the crowd, resulting in the 1974 Ramna Massacre, killing at least 40 protestors, many of whom were lying on the ground already. Faced with this brutal response, the JSD was driven underground, where it remained an insignificant political force. The only legal political force in Bangladesh was the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BaKSAL), which was comprised of the Awami League, the Communist Party of Bangladesh, the National Awami Party and the Jatiyo League after the fourth amendment of the Bangladeshi Constitution in June 1975. Despite this monopolisation of the political party system, Mujib's government started to suffer from dissatisfaction with his nepotism, preoccupation with national over local problems, and what was generally seen as a lack of political leadership brought on by post-liberation complacency. The industries which he had nationalised were performing poorly, and the expensive social programmes introduced could not be supported by a dwindling economic base. The Rakkhi Bahini, who had immunity from prosecution, engaged in widespread killing of political opponents. The RB has been accused of killing as many as 40,000 dissenters. Facing growing opposition, Mujib declared martial law in late 1974.

    On 15th August 1975, Mujib was assassinated in a CIA-backed coup led by junior military officers and headed by Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, a colleague and friend who had become disillusioned with Mujib. Ahmad became President of Bangladesh and purged much of the senior pro-Mujib leadership, but was himself overthrown by a coup on November 6th by Khaled Mosharraf and Shafaat Jamil. A day later, Mosharraf was killed by a mutiny of left-wing non-enlisted personnel led by JSD leader Abu Taher. Col. Jamil was arrested by the mutineers. On the same day, a group of army personnel from the 2nd Artillery rescued Ziaur Rahman (Zia) from the mutineers. Ziaur Rahman was reinstated as chief of the army. At this point, army discipline had all but disappeared, and Zia recognised the need for a firm response to maintain discipline in the Bangladeshi Army and suppress the JSD mutiny. With the forces at his disposal, Zia cracked down on the JSD, arresting Abu Taher and other JSD leaders. Abu Taher was sentenced to death and executed in 1976, whilst other leaders were given lengthy prison terms. Zia managed to bring a semblance of stability to the country and embarked on an ambitious reform programme oriented around rural development, decentralisation, self-reliance and free markets. Without antagonising Bharatiya, he began to move away from its orbit, forging ties with the United States and the Islamic world, including both the UAR and the pro-Western monarchies such as Iran, Libya and Morocco, as well as the Turkish Republic. Zia began a mild Islamicisation campaign, promoting Islam and drifting further away from secularism. By promoting Islam, he brought into the fold of Bangladeshi nationalism a number of non-Bengali ethnic groups, but this had the negative effect of alienating the Hindu Bengali community.


    ---
    [169] IOTL such a cache was allegedly discovered in the Iraqi embassy in Islamabad. Whilst it is impossible to be certain of the veracity of this claim, the Pakistani government stated that the Iraqis were seeking to assist in the creation of an independent Balochistan that would also cause trouble for their main rival, Iran. This doesn't seem unreasonable, and as Iran is the UAR's primary rival ITTL, I'm transferring that logic to this situation.

    [170] IOTL, it killed 30,000, with such a high toll blamed by Mujib on the United States, which criticised US restrictions on food shipments to Dhaka as a result of Bangladesh's sale of jute to Cuba. Without the embargo in place ITTL, there is no need for such a policy, and the food shipments should save a few thousand people.
     
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    Chapter 70: The Great Game - Afghanistan (to 1980)
  • King_Zahir_Shah_of_Afghanistan_in_1963.jpg

    Last Badishah of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah

    Nestled amongst the mountains of the Hindu Kush, the Kingdom of Afghanistan had grown accustomed to sitting between major powers. Situated at the confluence of Persia, India and Turkestan, the region had a long and bloody history. Fought over since time immemorial, from the Achaemenid Empire to the modern day, the peoples of Afghanistan were accustomed to conflict and intrigue, both from within and without. Achieving ascendancy under the Durrani Empire, Afghanistan's frontiers gradually receded under the rule of the Barakzai dynasty, whose borders were redrawn as a result of British and Russian competition for dominance of Central Asia. Briefly coming under the British aegis, the Afghans won their sovereignty in the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Nevertheless, the Afghans had never accepted the validity of the Durand Line, an arbitrary line drawn by the British in order to separate British India from Russian Turkestan. The British would not budge from this delineation of the frontier, however, hoping to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer between their Indian possessions and Russia. This policy was continued with the success of the Russian Revolution and the consolidation of power under the Bolsheviks.

    Mohammad Zahir Shah was the last Badishah of the Barakzai dynasty, ruling over his nation since acceding to the throne in 1933. Despite temptation to take action against the British, Mohammad Zahir Shah wisely rejected German overtures to join the Axis Powers through the Second World War, as his predecessor and co-dynast Habibullah Khan had resisted German and Ottoman calls to arms in the First World War. In 1946, in the aftermath of WWII, during which the Kingdom of Afghanistan had stayed neutral, Sardar Shah Mahmud Khan was appointed as Prime Minister. Recognising the feudal backwardness of Afghanistan may have dire consequences in an era of nuclear war, Shah Mahmud Khan began to experiment with a more open political system. The results worried Shah Mahmud Khan, who worried that the proliferation of new political ideas, whether Islamist, socialist or democratic, threatened the ancien regime in Afghanistan. From 1953, Shah Mahmud Khan was replaced by Mohammad Daoud Khan, Zahir Shah's cousin and brother-in-law. Daoud sought a closer relationship with the USSR to weaken dependence on Pakistani ties for interaction with the outside world. Disputes with their neighbour to the south prompted a temporary embargo by Pakistan and resultant economic dislocation, forcing Daoud Khan to resign. A number of politicians served as Prime Minister in the following years, but Afghan politics remained dominated by Zahir Shah.

    In 1964, Zahir Shah promulgated a liberal constitution, providing for a bicameral legislature to which the King would appoint third of deputies, with another third elected by the people and the last third selected indirectly by provincial assemblies. The democratic experiment resulting from this opening of the political system (and the introduction of a political franchise for commoners) resulted in few lasting reforms, largely due to the widespread poverty and backwardness of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, it permitted the growth of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Soviet historian Alexander Tarasov[171] sought to explain the development of a radical Communist party in the feudal Afghan environment by suggesting that the lack of a "national bourgeoisie" in the form of a significant commercial or burgher class. Instead, the vanguard of the party became the relatively educated students and military officers, who sought a radical overturn of the monarchical system. In 1967, the PDPA split into two factions, the Parcham (Banner) faction, led by Babrak Karmal, which was dominant amongst middle class students and sought a gradual move to socialism, recognising that Afghanistan was not industrialised enough to enact a genuine proletarian revolution along Marxist-Leninist lines; and the Khalq (Masses) faction, led by Nur Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, composed of military officers, largely of tribal extraction, who believed revolution could be achieved through the close coordination of a vanguard party and the forceful creation of the socialism. In many ways, the divide between the Parchamis and the Khalqists reflected the ongoing debate between Soviet-style Marxist-Leninism and the more radical Maoist strain in Communist parties worldwide. Throughout the 1970s the Soviets maintained contact with both wings of the PDPA, doing all that they could to prevent the tension between the two factions erupting into violence.

    Sardar-Mohammad-Daud-Khan.jpg

    Mohammad Daoud Khan, first and only President of the Republic of Afghanistan

    Soon the royal family were faced with corruption and malfeasance allegations in the wake of the severe 1970-71 drought. Whilst Zahir Shah was overseas receiving medical treatment, Daoud Khan seized power in a bloodless coup on July 17th 1973. Daoud abolished the monarchy, abrogated the 1964 constitution, and declared Afghanistan a republic with himself as both Prime Minister and first President. His attempts to reform Afghanistan met with little success, and despite Daoud Khan's best efforts, the new constitution promulgated in February 1977 failed to quell chronic instability. Daoud Khan had turned to repressive measures to maintain his authority, outlawing all political parties except for his National Revolutionary Party (NRP). Daoud Khan had, however, managed to quell an Islamist uprising backed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan. Many leaders of the insurrectionists were executed or imprisoned, such as Hekmatyar and Ahmad Shah Massoud, who were handed over to Daoud Khan's forces by the Pashtunistan government upon its accession to Afghanistan[172]. The Soviets remained Daoud Khan's primary backers, supporting him not only with arms and education, allowing Afghan army officers to study in the USSR, but through development, education and medical projects also. Daoud Khan sought to receive aid from the United States, which refused, citing Afghanistan's ties with the USSR. Nevertheless, the Shah of Iran and a number of Western European countries such as West Germany began to send aid and participate in development projects.

    During the 1970s, despite Daoud Khan's occasional repressions, Afghanistan had begun to resemble a modern state. The campuses of the large cities were teeming with young men, beardless and wearing jeans, with their miniskirt-clad girlfriends. Kabul's skyline, whilst still dominated by the Arg and Dar-ul Aman palaces, was dotted with modern buildings sitting next to ancient bazaars and medieval mosques. But just outside of the cities, the villages of the countryside still lived by the old ways. The simple, otherwise hospitable villagers settled disputes with blood feuds, the dark side of the ancient honour code of Pashtunwali. The attempts to drag these villagers into the twentieth century would prove the most significant challenge for the Communist forces which seized control of the government from Daoud Khan. The Khalq faction's position was strengthened by Col. Kadyr, who had participated in the coup that overthrew Zahir Shah. Kadyr established a covert group within the Afghan military, the United Front of Afghan Communists. In July 1977, under Soviet pressure, the two factions of the PDPA agreed to reunite. The PDPA elected a new Central Committee and Politburo, and appointed Taraki as their General Secretary and Babrak Karmal as his deputy. Amin's candidacy was contested. His opponents accused him of having connections to the CIA while he was studying in New York. He responded by stating that he was in dire straits financially and fed the CIA disinformation. Daoud Khan grew increasingly paranoid of the PDPA, and rightfully so. Col. Kadyr had advocated a coup, and had the support of the Khalqists. On 17th April, Parchami ideologue Mir Akbar Khaibar was murdered, either by the government or on the order of Hafizullah Amin. Khaibar's funeral saw a demonstration of tens of thousands of PDPA sympathisers. The demonstration was brutally suppressed by riot police. Daud had a number of PDPA leaders arrested, including Karmal and Taraki, on 25th April. The next day the Khalqists in the army commenced the coup. Officers sympathetic to the PDPA moved the 4th Tank Brigade into Kabul, arriving outside the Arg (the presidential palace which was also designed as an old fortress) at around midday. Troops loyal to the Khalq seized key position throughout the city, and were joined by commando forces in the evening. The putschist troops neutralised loyalist troops, liberated the PDPA leadership, and aircraft from nearby Bagram air base began bombing the Arg. That night a commando force breached the palace and demanded Daud's surrender. Refusing to lay down his arms, Daud shot and wounded their commander. The commandoes responded by slaughtering Daud and his family. Resistance in Kabul had ceased by the next morning. 43 military deaths were recorded, with some civilian casualties.

    42-20433360.jpg

    Afghan Communists marching in support of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan


    The coup presented a surprising fait accompli for the Soviets. Whilst most of the international community (understandably) presumed Moscow was behind the coup, the Soviet government had strongly promoted peaceful coexistence between the PDPA and Daoud Khan's government. The PDPA, aware that the Soviets would not approve, and fearful that they would in fact tip off the coup attempt to Daoud Khan, had launched the coup without informing their local KGB contacts. The new government immediately established a Revolutionary Council to govern the new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). On 9th May, the new government issued a radical programme of reform. The government proclaimed as their goals the eradication of illiteracy; women's equality; an end to ethnic discrimination (the Pashtuns had traditionally been favoured as the expense of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras); a state-directed economy; and the "abolition of feudal and pre-feudal social relations" (i.e. the power of landowners, traditional leaders and mullahs). The DRA government immediately began to purge political opposition, including Islamists as well as Daoud supporters. Tribal leaders, members of influential clans and clergy were also targeted. On 15th May 1979, an uprising in Herat targeted Soviet construction workers. The men and their families were rescued from the angry mob by Afghan special forces at the request of senior Soviet military advisor Stanislav Katichev. They were flown to Kabul and housed in the embassy school until it was safe to send them back home. A handful of Soviets in the city (believed to have numbered three) were killed in the uprising, however. Amongst these dead was Maj. Nikolai Bizyukov, a military advisor with the 17th Afghan Division, who was killed in a mutiny. Amin irritated the Soviets when they contacted him demanding an explanation around the rioting and mutiny in Herat. Amin dismissed the seriousness of the situation, flippantly claiming that the governors had the situation under control. Nevertheless, Kosygin in particular was irritated at the fact that the Afghan leaders were being evasive when pressed for information about the situation on the ground. Podgorny was enraged by the gall of the Afghans, who responded to criticism of their extrajudicial killings of political opponents by stating that it had worked for Lenin and Stalin. Despite having the "situation under control", Amin requested the intervention of Soviet troops to fight increasing numbers of mutineers. When the Politburo refused, he suggested that the Soviets send tank crews with Afghan markings and staffed by Uzbek and Tajik troops. The Soviets refused, although in the end they accepted Amin's request to send military materiel and a small number of Central Asian spetsnaz units for training and specialised combat purposes.

    ---
    [171] Alexander Tarasov is an OTL Russian Marxist academic. IOTL he hasn't (as far as I'm aware) written anything on Afghanistan, so this is a fictionalised version of him.
    [172] IOTL these men would become major mujahideen leaders supported by Pakistan. With the dissolution of Pakistan, they are unable to escape to safety and are 'gotten rid of'.
     
    Chapter 71: The French Connection - France (to the mid-1970s)
  • For more information on France, see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-3#post-8549239
    and
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ernative-cold-war.280530/page-11#post-9802091

    ===

    The seizure of power by the French junta was a pivotal moment in European politics. The bullet holes which pocked the surface of the Arc du Triomphe in the immediate aftermath of Red Monday symbolised an assault on liberal democracy in Paris, the city which had been the cradle of the French Revolution, a revolt against absolutism and oppression. The bodies of young socialists littered the streets. The scene paralleled the fate of the Paris Commune nearly a century earlier. De Gaulle stood trial on counts of treason, but was sentenced to house arrest at his estate at La Boisserie in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. In the days after the putsch, the bullet holes in the Arc du Triomphe were covered up. The junta attempted the same fiction with regards to democratic representation. The Parti Communiste Français (PCF) was outlawed, and immediately a "Council for National Rejuvenation" was appointed as the supreme executive body. By early 1963, the Council was disbanded, but reforms to the French Senate and Council of Ministers enabled the generals to continue to dominate appointments to the legislative bodies. Nevertheless, the banning of the PCF prompted another challenge to the putschists. Unwilling to go as far as to ban the Socialist Party, the generals found the Socialists, who received an upsurge of support from Communists unwilling to go underground, difficult to control. Thus the junta sought a means to intellectually legitimise their policies. They found this in the Nouvelle Droite movement. Emerging in the mid 1960s as a response to increasingly frequent and provocative industrial action [173], the Nouvelle Droite was staunchly anti-Communist and anti-multiculturalist. Whilst encompassing a variety of viewpoints, they generally saw a need for a united European civilisation to reverse the decline of European power. As such, they were staunch supporters of the federal European project.

    junger-benoist.jpg

    Alain de Benoist, most prominent of Nouvelle Droite theorists (right), next to Ernst Junger

    With support from the French junta and members of the German elite, Nouvelle Droite commentators became increasingly frequent contributors to publications such as Le Figaro and Der Spiegel. A top-down implementation of a number of Nouvelle Droite ideas became increasingly common in France, the Netherlands and Germany. As European integration, pushed ahead in particular by the governments of France, Germany and Italy gained momentum, these nations began to parallel each other in a number of fields: labour relations, corporate law, investment grants and even police cooperation. Whilst initially ignored by American policymakers, who were largely concerned with maintaining the suppression of Communist agitation on the continent, declarations by French and German leaders of the need for Europe to be "self-sufficient" began to concern Washington. The French in particular had been arguing since the Gaullist period that the United States was not a reliable defense patron. They were concerned that the United States would commit to a policy on 'sanctuarisation' upon Moscow's creation of a large ICBM arsenal: that the United States and the USSR would come to an agreement limiting any future conflagration to European soil. Such a policy would make war more likely and virtually doom Europe. De Gaulle had thus build a Force de Frappe, an independent nuclear deterrent. Under the regime of the generals, France would be the centre of a European defence agreement encompassing Italy, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. The Ligue de défense occidentale (LDO), known colloquially as the 'Paris Pact' split from the NATO command structure in 1971, essentially ousting the United States from continental Europe. A number of defense treaties were drafted up with the United States allowing the basing of nuclear bombers by the US, but requiring joint sign-offs on any flight missions by both the USAF and the air force of the respective host country.

    One of the considerations that prompted the creation of the LDO was the perceived need by right-wing European leaders of the 'Turkicisation' of Western Europe. Recognising that the primary battlefield for preeminence between the superpowers had shifted from Europe to the Third World, the French generals and the German leadership decided that independence from US military presence would actually increase European security. Furthermore, they were free to maintain economic ties with the Soviet Union, which would discourage the USSR from attempting to undermine Western European regimes. As a result, many of the left-wing terrorist attacks which plagued Europe throughout the 1970s were from Maoist groups. These groups emerged in an environment which had saw the consistent forceful suppression of mass action, such as the 1968 protests throughout France, the May 1970 Wallonie Riots, and the BMW massacre, where 11 automotive workers were shot dead when security forces opened fire during a strike at the BMW motor plant at Dingolfing in 1973.

    23_2663979.jpg

    French policeman taking aim with tear gas launcher, 1968 riots.

    ===

    [173] IOTL, the Nouvelle Droite emerged in 1968. ITTL, it emerges a few years earlier as a more polarised European political situation, and more aggressive Communist expansion worldwide, provokes reactionary sentiments.
     
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    Chapter 72: A Great Civilisation - Iran (Until 1980)
  • For more information about Iran (1940s), see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-an-alternative-cold-war.280530/#post-7699657
    ===

    266px-Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi.png

    Shahanshah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last monarch of Iran

    From the anti-Mossadegh coup of 1953, the Iranian regime was haunted by a crisis of legitimacy. Having overthrown a popular nationalist leader with support from the 'imperialists', the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi desperately needed a raison d'être for his autocratic control of the state. He would eventually find this purpose in the modernisation and Westernisation of his country. At first, however, he would be preoccupied with reestablishing monarchical control over the domestic political landscape in Iran. After the coup, the real power behind the throne lay with the Shah's Prime Minister, General Fazlollah Zahedi. At this stage, American and British diplomatic circles, as well as large parts of the Iranian elite, held the Shah in contempt, seeing him as a weak-willed figurehead. Mohammad Reza proved a surprisingly astute politician, and learn to consolidate his power by playing off various factions of the elite against each other. The Shah cultivated an image of a merciful ruler, imprisoning political opponents, such as the supporters of Mossadegh's National Front, and then pardoning them. Many had instead expected a bloody purge. Seeking to broaden his support base, Mohammad Reza ended up adopting many of the policies of the banned National Front, hoping that popular approval could counteract any planned sedition from elites that opposed his reform plans. In 1955, the Shah dismissed General Zahedi and appointed Hossein Ala', who governed as Prime Minister until 1957. In the mid-1950s, the Shah also intended to develop a non-Islamic identity in Iran. In order to do so, he emphasised Iran's Achaemenid imperial past, drawing parallels between himself and Cyrus the Great. He also promised to bring Iranian living standards to the level of the Western nations. To satiate the ulema, who were critical of his de-emphasising of the Islamic past of Iran, he resumed the traditional persecution of Baha'i faithful, razing the primary Baha'i temple in Tehran and passing a law banning Baha'i from publicly congregating.

    Privately, the Shah's marriage with his second wife, Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary, was becoming increasingly strained, as Queen Soraya clashed with Ernest Perron, a homosexual Swiss who was the Shah's personal secretary, confidante and best friend. Perron seemed to enjoy antagonising the Queen, offending her greatly when he arrived at her palace and proceeded to ask lewd questions about her and the Shah's sex life. The marriage between the two would end in 1958, when no remedy could be found to the Queen's infertility. Despite his constant philandering, those close to the Shah would attest that he always loved Soraya, even after their divorce, and she lived out the rest of her days as a wealthy socialite in Paris, her favourite city.

    On 27th February 1958, Iranian commander Valiollah Gharani attempted a coup d'etat against the Shah. The coup failed, but it was soon discovered by SAVAK, the Iranian intelligence agency, that Gharani had met with American officials in Tunisia [174]. The Shah demanded that from thereon American officials were not authorised to contact the opposition. Insecure in US support for his regime, in January 1959 the Shah began negotiations for a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Receiving furious telegrams from President Eisenhower, in the end the Shah refused to sign an agreement. Soviet dissatisfaction with the Shah's refusal to pledge non-aggression against the Communist superpower led the KGB to attempt to assassinate Mohammad Reza on multiple occasions, nope of which were successful, largely due to the leaking of these plots by KGB station chief in Tehran, Vladimir Kuzichkin.

    Mohammad Reza's first major dispute with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a prominent Shi'a cleric, came in 1962 when the Shah altered the laws for swearing in members of municipal councils, allowing non-Muslims to swear oaths upon their own holy books. Khomeini opposed this, feeling that it was a demotion of the primacy of the Quran in a country which was officially Muslim. In what would become Khomeini's modus operandi, he organised demonstrations against the Shah.

    Portrait_of_Ruhollah_Khomeini.jpg

    Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

    In 1963, the Shah launched an ambitious reform programme that became known as the White Revolution. The clergy vociferously opposed the programme, especially the introduction of women's suffrage. Demonstrations against the Shah's rule continued throughout 1963 and 1964, centred in the holy city of Qom, a city full of religious seminaries and the centre of theology in Iran. Clashes with police throughout the period led to over 200 deaths. When criticised for the autocratic nature of his rule, he retorted that "when Persians act like Swedes, then I will act like the King of Sweden". In 1967, he had himself crowned Shahanshah, "King of Kings" or Emperor. He claimed that he chose this moment because he had not deserved it prior, and that "there is no honour in being the Emperor of a poor country". Mohammad Reza felt that Iran was now sufficiently prosperous for him to adopt such a grandiose title. After his coronation, the Shah began to live an ever more grandiose lifestyle. In 1971, he hosted a spectacular commemoration of the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, Iran's economy continued to grow rapidly. With a growth rate equivalent to fast-growing economies such as Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines, Western commentators expected Iran to reach first-world status within a generation. Taking a strong etatist role in economic development, Mohammad Reza supported emergent industrialists, who quickly developed an innovative automotive and engineering sector. The Shah introduced labour laws to ensure that ordinary Iranians gained some benefit from these new, profitable industries. Iran also received generous economic and military aid from the United States during this period, which armed them with some of their most advanced weaponry as a bulwark against the United Arab Republic. As the key remaining US ally in the Persian Gulf region, the Shah exploited his "reverse leverage" against the US, extracting ever greater concessions from the democratic superpower.

    By 1975, the Shah had abolished the existing two-party system in favour of the newly established Rastakhiz ("Resurrection") Party. Even prior to the introduction of the one-party state, discontent had simmered below the surface from a number of sources. Some were disaffected labourers, missing out on the nation's newfound prosperity. Others were religious zealots, who saw the White Revolution as Gharbzadegi ("Occidentosis", "Western infection"). A number of guerrilla groups, which blended Marxist and Islamic teachings, began to operate in the regions and cities of Iran. The most significant of these loosely-allied groups was the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), or People's Mujahedin, which followed the thought of Iranian sociologist Ali Shariati. Shariati divided Shi'ism between 'Black Shi'ism' and 'Red Shi'ism'. Black Shi'ism was deemed to be 'Safavid Shi'ism', which had been instrumentalised to bolster feudalism. Red Shi'ism, which he believed to be the Shi'ism of Ali, was a method of revolutionary praxis, which would bring about the liberation of Third World peoples. The membership of underground organisations swelled, as the oil boom of the 1970s caused runaway inflation and a growing wealth divide. As austerity measures were introduced to bring inflation back under control, those who suffered most were poor migrant workers who had left their homes in the countryside to service the construction boom in Iran's cities, especially Tehran. Ali Shariati died of a heart attack in 1977, but many ordinary Iranians blamed his death of SAVAK.

    In early 1978, Ayatollah Khomeini wrote a newspaper article criticising the Shah. In response, the Shah denounced Khomeini as a "British agent" and a "mad poet". Angered by the insult, crowds of religious students clashed with police in Qom. Demonstrations against police brutality then sprang up across major cities throughout the country. The military got involved in suppression of the protests, which only led to an increase in the size of the crowds that took to the streets. On May 10th, army personnel fired upon the residence of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a moderate cleric who supported democratic reform. The cleric was unharmed, but one of his students was killed. He immediate made public statements calling for the reinstatement of the 1906 Constitution, as well as a shift from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Despite unrest, the Shah continued his reforms, hoping for democratic elections to the Majlis to take place in 1979 (albeit with only the Rastakhiz Party represented). Protestors were tried in civilian, rather than military courts, who had traditionally presided over sedition cases. Many were promptly released. The head of SAVAK was replaced by a less hardline chief, and the government entered into negotiations with the moderate clergy, represented by Shariatmadari. By summer, the protests had started to die down.

    In August, 422 were killed as four arsonists trapped moviegoers within the Cinema Rex in Abadan and set the theatre ablaze. Khomeini blamed SAVAK and the Shah for the attack, whilst Tehran blamed Islamic Marxists. To this day, no-one is entirely sure who was responsible for the arson. As the economic situation resulted in more layoffs, and as outrage over the Cinema Rex incident boiled over, massive demonstrations manifested in the streets of Tehran. Some protestors went as far as to chant "Burn the Shah!". In the following months, attacks on Western businesses and workers became increasingly frequent. The Shahist regime attempted to appease the public. The Rastakhiz Party was abolished, all other parties were legalised, SAVAK's authority was severely curtailed and 34 of the organisation's commanders dismissed. Casinos and nightclubs were shut down, and the imperial calendar (which had been adopted during the 2500th anniversary and started from that the founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Great) reverted back to the Islamic calendar. The government cracked down on corruption, including within the royal family itself. The government also entered into negotiations with Shariatmadari and National Front leader Karim Sanjabi in order to organise future elections.

    On 4th September, during the holiday of Eid-e-Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan, large marches which had been organised by the clergy occurred in Tehran and provincial centres across the country. Even larger demonstrations followed a few days later. This led the Shah, on 8th September, to declare martial law in the capital, as well as 11 other major cities. All street demonstrations were banned and a curfew imposed. Troops in Tehran were commanded by the notoriously ruthless General Gholam-Ali Oveissi. 5,000 protestors squared off with troops in Jaleh Square, who fired into the crowd, killing 64. Clashes throughout the day claimed even more lives. The Shah was horrified by the events, and ordered troops not to fire on protesters. This did little to rehabilitate his image, however, as he lost ever more credibility through the brutality of his underlings. The next day, 700 workers at Tehran's main oil refinery went on strike. On the 11th, refineries in five other cities were shut down by industrial action. On the 13th, all central government employees in Tehran went on strike simultaneously. By late October, a nationwide general strike brought most major industries to a grinding halt. The Shah attempted to appease workers with general pay increases, to no avail. His advisors began to push him to take forceful measures to bring strikers back into line. As the Shah pondered his options, the situation in Iran turned into even more of a tinderbox. Ayatollah Khomeini, who had been living in exile in Najaf, Iraq, was assassinated by agents of the UAR's State Security Investigations Service, who were concerned that his ideology of Shi'a theocracy could undermine their position in Iraq. Nevertheless, it was widely believed that the culprits of Khomeini's murder was SAVAK[175], and that the assassination was ordered by the Shah.

    As news of Khomeini's death broke in Iran, all hell broke loose. Massive rioting engulfed Qom, Tehran and Isfahan. By late October, the military and police had effectively left the University of Tehran to be occupied by student protestors. The opposition acquired weapons from sacking police stations, and began to use them in attacks of police and military personnel. Sanjabi was arrested, and the British embassy in Tehran was burned, along with a number of other Western-owned or Western-inspired businesses (i.e. movie theaters, bars etc.) by youths who had been sent by mullahs from mosques in Southern Tehran. On 6th November, martial law was declared in the Southwestern province of Khuzestan. Navy personnel were used as strikebreakers and oil production rose. A number of public voices, notably that of Mahmoud Taleghani of the Freedom Movement of Iran, denounced the Shah and his government. Taleghani had been strongly influenced by Marxist currents of thought, as well as Shariati's writings. Whilst he personally disliked Khomeini for what he considered his reactionary and autocratic tendencies, he exploited widespread grief to inflame the opposition to the royalist regime. Organised by clerics such as Taleghani, a massive demonstration of two million people, 10% of Tehran's total population, marched onto the streets on muharram, the 2nd December 1978. As Tasu'a and Ashura approached, the Shah began to negotiate with the opposition, releasing Sanjabi and 120 other political prisoners. On 11th December, Ashura, a dozen officers were shot dead at the Lavizan barracks in Tehran by mutinous troops. Fearing further mutinies, many army officers ordered their troops to retire to their barracks. Mashhad, the second-largest city in Iran, was left in the hands of protestors.

    On 28th December, prominent National Front leader Shahpour Bakhtiar was appointed Prime Minister. A furious Sanjabi immediately expelled him from the National Front. The Shah had decided that the royal family would go on a holiday, and whilst they were away, Bakhtiar would hold a referendum to determine whether the Iranian people wished to keep the monarchy intact or to transition to a republic. On 16th January, the Shah and his family fled to what would become exile in Lebanon [176]. Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK and freed all remaining political prisoners, announcing free elections. On 9th February, a rebellion broke out amongst Air Force technicians at Doshan Tappeh AFB in Southeast Tehran. A unit of the Shahist Immortal Guards of the Iranian Imperial Army sought to apprehend the rebels, resulting in a firefight. Soon large crowds emerged in support, building barracades and bringing the rebels supplies, whilst MEK guerrillas seized a weapons factory, distributing 50,000 automatic weapons and ammunition to locals. They then began to storm police stations and army bases, disarming personnel onsite. Seeking to avoid a general bloodbath, commander of Tehran's martial law, General Mehdi Rahimi refused to use his 30,000 strong Immortal Guards to crush the insurrection. On 11th February, all army units were ordered back to their bases, effectively abandoning the country to the various rebels, and the Bakhtiar government collapsed.

    220px-Masoud_Rajavi_1970%27s.jpg

    Massoud Rajavi, leader of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq

    In the next few days, anarchy reigned in Tehran. Various factions vied over control of city blocks. Whilst the National Front had tried to assert some degree of leadership, they were forced off the streets by the more violent factions. These largely consisted of the followers of various conservative mullahs, who Mohammad Beheshti, Khomeini's close friend and right-hand man, had unsuccessfully tried to reunite under his leadership; against a loose coalition of leftist guerrillas, dominated by the primus inter pares MEK. The Tudeh Party had been largely marginalised by the MEK, seen as it was as a puppet of Soviet interests. Given that the Soviet Union had retained a 30% share of Iranian oil since the crisis in the 1950s, the USSR was seen as just another foreign power seeking to exploit Iran's natural wealth. The MEK, under the leadership of the adept Massoud Rajavi, would systematically seize territory from the fractured Islamists. The left-Islamist coalition was now the most powerful force in Iran. Mahmoud Taleghani provided a spiritual voice and religious legitimacy, whilst Rajavi had managed to bring about a coalition of organisations until his general leadership (including the People's Fedai Guerrillas, National Democratic Front, and the League of Iranian Socialists). Rajavi's right-hand man and commander of the MEK's armed wing, Mousa Khiabani, proved capable of destroying the poorly-organised and equipped fedaiyeen who followed the mullahs. The MEK linked up with other uprisings in Khuzestan, Gilan and elsewhere. By the late quarter of 1980, the Revolutionary Council, headed by Taleghani and Rajavi, had full control over the territories of Iran. In the resultant political wrangling, the MEK purged fully-secular Marxist parties, including Tudeh and Peykar, accusing them of being 'Social-Imperialist Russian spies'. The 30% oil exports to the USSR were halted, causing a diplomatic crisis from which the Soviets eventually backed down, seeking to court the new regime in Tehran. Mahmoud Taleghani was increasingly supported in debates against more conservative clergy, who were ignored and mocked by the MEK regime. In a political masterstroke, Rajavi at once appeased Taleghani and removed him as a potential threat to his leadership by granting political sovereignty to Qom (similar to the Vatican's arrangement with Italy) and establishing Taleghani as the Marja' and Prime Ayatollah of Qom.

    ===
    [174] IOTL, Athens.
    [175] IOTL, Khomeini was exiled from Iraq to France after the Shah put significant pressure on the Iraqi government.
    [176] IOTL, Egypt.
     
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    Chapter 73: Under the Shadow of Shwedagon (Burma until 1980)
  • For more information about Burma (1950s), see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-22#post-11194220

    ===

    Burma's future looked relatively promising at the beginning of the 1960s. Whilst domestic instability had resulted in a myriad of armed rebellions amongst the various minority groups of the country, the "Father of the Nation" Aung San had managed to maintain a grand coalition under the leadership of the AFPFL, including the White Flag Communists and the Buddhist Arakanese followers of U Seinda. The Tatmadaw, the armed forces of the republic, gradually suppressed groups such as the Rohingya mujahideen and convinced a number of Shan groups to lay down their arms. With the majority of the major ethnic groups involved in the political process, opposition to central government control was largely confined to the Northern highlands. The Tatmadaw retained a strong garrison in these frontier regions, but the local commanders were essentially independent, and became involved in the profitable smuggling and opium trades which dominated the border regions with China and Thailand.

    Aung San himself had become the sole major political figure in the country with the suicide of U Saw. A number of army commanders and civilian politicians were concerned by the degree of communist influence in the government, but were content with Aung San's ability to maintain a status quo that balanced the interests of the various factions. In mid-1962, Aung San was briefly hospitalised as a result of a sudden illness, with the leadership of the civilian government passing to U Nu in the interim. U Nu bungled an economic crisis arising from a fall in rice prices, which undercut social welfare programmes, failed to slow runaway inflation and put significant pressure on working urban Burmese. Twin demonstrations in Mandalay and Rangoon, organised by the Burma Workers Party on behalf of unpaid workers, quickly degenerated into crisis. Ne Win, the Chief of Staff of the Tatmadaw, blamed the demonstrations on a communist conspiracy, which he claimed was backed by influential commander Bo Zeya and other members of the Thirty Comrades, Kyaw Zaw, Bo Yan Aung and leader of the CPB Thakin Than Tun. U Nu invited Ne Win to head a military government until the crisis had been handled. Instituting martial law in all the urban areas of the country and implementing strict curfews, the Tatmadaw dispersed the more intractable elements of the demonstrators by force. By February 1963, Aung San had miraculously made a full recovery from the severe fevers which had afflicted him the previous year. It was announced by U Nu that full civilian control of the functions of government would be taken up in June, with parliamentary elections taking place in July to determine the composition of government. It was widely expected that Aung San would return to the leadership of the nation. The night before civilian governance was to be restored, the Tatmadaw seized key government and media buildings in towns throughout Burma. An address written by Ne Win was announced over all radio stations in the country.

    2993715125.jpg

    General Ne Win, putschist and leader of Burma after the coup of 1963

    "Burmese, this is a message from your faithful chief of staff. It has been the Tatmadaw's duty in the past months to ensure the integrity of the Burmese nation and the protection of its citizens from elements which seek to harm our glorious nation. The government of the politicians is ridden with corruption, incompetence and cowardice. They do nothing to punish the communists whose mission it is to overturn our independence and bring us into the servitude of the Chinese and Vietnamese. These elements are courted by the soft leaders who huddle in their palaces. We could not allow this. We promise that the Tatmadaw will protect Burmese peace, independence and dignity. It is we who will cleanse this nation of corrosive elements and who will guide the destiny of the nation with decisive action and wise foresight. The reintroduction of civilian government is henceforth suspended. The military will continue to govern on behalf of the peoples of Burma until such time as we are satisfied that our help is no longer needed. From now on, the Union Revolutionary Council will be the sole fount of all political authority in this beautiful land."

    Aung San disappeared, his whereabouts unknown. U Nu was imprisoned. Army units associated with Bo Zeya resisted the attempted disarmament by the main body of the Tatmadaw, retreating north to join elements of the CPB who had taken refuge amongst the Wa and Kokang in the north. The CPB immediately entered into open revolt against army rule. The numerous rebel groups of the Shan separatists largely reactivated in defiance of Ne Win's seizure of power, and of the various ethnic groups, only the Bamar and Arakanese stayed docile. A number of political figures, including Aung San's older brother Aung Than (who headed the National United Front party) and ordinary supporters of the CPB and Worker's Party were sent in Great Coco Island in the Andaman chain. Ne Win introduced a new range of economic and political reforms, dubbed the "Burmese Way to Socialism". The programme was intended to allow for self-reliance for Burma and to promote national unity. All political parties were banned, with the exception of the new state-sponsored party, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). Some of the instituted policies legitimately aided the Burmese poor. Medical care was made entirely free and a new public education system was introduced, with a particular focus on the extermination of illiteracy. He also introduced important laws to limit usury and to regulate landlordship. However, the overall programme was an abysmal failure. The black market began to take an ever-bigger share of economic activity in the country, with smuggling rampant. Meanwhile government coffers continued to empty. In an attempt to combat inflation, the Union Revolutionary Council declared 100 and 50 kyat notes to no longer be legal tender, to be replaced by 45 and 90 kyat notes (Ne Win considered the number 9 to be particularly auspicious). Only a small amount of compensation was provided to those with their savings in banks, with official skimming most of that money into their own pockets. The vast majority of Burmese, whose savings were largely kept 'under the mattress' had their life savings wiped out overnight. Furious, the Kayan revolted in response to this development.

    Despite having Chinese ancestry himself, Ne Win introduced policies which disproportionately affected ethnic Chinese negatively. The Enterprise Nationalisation Law brought a number of industries under state control, and no new factories would be built under Ne Win's rule. Many of the entrepreneurs who were dispossessed were Chinese, and laws were introduced limiting the citizenship status of Burmese Chinese, making them ineligible for many forms of government support. Chinese language education was banned, and the Chinese were often scapegoated for economic problems. As a result, Chinese-owned businesses and homes were regularly targeted in riots. The Ne Win regime expanded this xenophobia in general. Fearful of corrupting foreign influence, they introduced heavy censorship, and visas for foreigners were limited to 24 hours. They allowed some travel abroad for Burmese, but only students and technicians, who were sent to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for training. Yugoslavia in particular became a close ally, providing arms and technical training for the regime.

    Whilst Ne Win had visited Beijing, and the Chinese leadership assured him that they were not supporting the Communist Party of Burma's insurgency in the border regions with China, relations became increasingly strained during the Cultural Revolution. For some time during the revolution, the CPB had actually become less active, as Thakin Than Tun, leader of the CPB, had himself launched his own 'cultural revolution' in the party, which quickly spiralled under control. Whilst Than Tun, along with the other leadership of the CPB (including the so-called 'Peking returnees' who returned from exile in 1966 for failed peace talks with Ne Win) managed to bring the party back under control, the PRC began to initiate clandestine support for the CPB. In 1968, Thakin Than Tun was assassinated by a young cadre, who soon defected to the central government.

    Ne Win's apparent detente with China and the announcement of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was viewed with increasing concern in Bangkok and Delhi. Those two states, with staunchly anti-communist governments and a fair of 'Red expansionism' began to become involved with the internal politics of Burma. The Thai government began covert support for the Shan State Army, whilst Bharati diplomats began to get into contact with various military figures, particularly those that came from a Buddhist background. According to the "ideology of the Dharma" which was state policy in Bharatiya and increasingly gaining traction in Thailand, Burma was a key strategic area for the creation of a cordon sanitaire limiting the spread of communism and precluding its extension into South and Southeast Asia.

    Throughout the 1970s, the economic stagnation of Burma continued, whilst insurgent groups gained traction throughout the country. Arakanese nationalists, supported by Bharatiya, engaged in communal violence against the Rohingya. The government stayed aloof from these disturbances, essentially allowing the Arakanese to wipe out most of the Rohingya population in Burma. The remainders largely fled to Bangladesh. In 1973, the Chinese began an undeclared invasion of northern Burma, after the Ne Win government ousted the CPB from their central Burmese base at Pyinmana. The CPB increased their activity in the north, whilst Wa state become de facto governed by the Chinese. Threatened by the Chinese incursion, the Shan State Army asked for direct intervention and protection from Thailand, which would come to be with the full collapse of the Ne Win government in 1983 at the hands of the Bharati-backed coup in Rangoon.
     
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    Chapter 74: A Pack of Hyenas - East Africa and the Great Lakes Region (Until 1980)
  • For more information about the balkanisation of Kenya, see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-7#post-9096189
    and
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ternative-cold-war.280530/page-7#post-9148081
    ===

    Having collapsed into a number of rival statelets at the end of the 1950s, the various successors of the British Kenya territory spent the early 1960s aligning themselves with various regional and international powers.

    In a prolonged civil war that commenced immediately following independence, the Kenyan Peoples' Popular Front (KPPF) gradually drove out the traditionalist Kirinyaga National Union (KNU), which sought refuge with the pan-Africanist government of Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. Isolated and surrounded by relatively hostile powers, the KPPF sought outside support. They attempted to court the Soviet Union, but the Khrushchev government, relatively uninterested by African affairs and preoccupied with events elsewhere, refused to support the KPPF. However, the KPPF found a more sympathetic ear with the Mao regime in China. Chinese support in arms and money entered Kirinyaga-Kenyaland via the dirt roads along the border with Tanganyika, a state which hosted exiled opposition leaders Stanley Mathenge, Waruhiu Itote and Musa Mwariama of the KNU. This precarious strategic situation fueled paranoia in the ruling KPPF junta, which boiled over as a result of the political aftermath of the 1965 famine, where thousands starved to death as a result of poorly-handled land reform. In a number of areas, local farmers and pastoralists violently resisted the requisition of their yield, resulting in the burning down of a number of villages by government militia. As his government became increasingly shaky, President Bildad Kaggia became increasingly reliant on Interior Minister Dedan Kimathi to maintain rule by force. Claiming that the opposition were "imperialist stooges" and referring to the hopelessly outnumbered armed peasants as "askaris", Kaggia introduced martial law. In March 1966, seeking to take advantage of turmoil in Kirinyaga-Kenyaland, and seeking to prove the effectiveness of their new army, which had expelled British officers, Nyerere ordered an incursion into Kirinyaga-Kenyaland in order to topple the KPPF and put the KNU troika into power.

    Marching over the border, supported by a small number of armoured cars, the KNU militia with support from the Tanganyikan People's Defence Force were engaged by Kirinyagan troops which held the line in the Namanga Hills. Kimathi immediately travelled to the region to take total command. Rather than attempting to destroy the enemy forces, Kimathi successfully drew the attackers into the forested hills, where they were unable to take advantage of the Tanganyikans' firepower superiority due to the broken terrain and poor lines of sight. Armoured cars were incapable of moving within the elevated cloud forest, constricted to the poor roads between the two nations, where they were susceptible to ambush by Maasai warriors armed with RPGs. Reinforcements by Gĩkũyũ troops from central Kirinyaga put huge pressure on the poorly-trained invading forces, which collapsed and fled across the border back into Tanganyika. Kirinyaga troops engaged in a number of cross-border raids, which were notorious for the scale of sexual violence. These attacks halted when Chinese diplomats informed the KPPF junta that any attempt to invade Tanganyika would result in the cession of support from the PRC. A ceasefire ensued, with the Zanzibari revolutionary government brokering peace between the warring states. One major result of the war was that Kirinyaga was forced to turn to the Swahili Coast for trade with the outside world. Despite distaste for Kirinyaga and its government (intensified by Mau Mau attacks on Mijikenda villages during the independence struggle), Kirinyaga was allowed to trade out of Swahili ports in exchange for major dues. This arrangement would continue, with Kirinyaga becoming increasingly dependent on petroleum products imported from the Arab world via Swahili ports. In 1969, after political maneuvering, Dedan Kimathi took advantage of his status as victor of the war against Tanganyika to overthrow Kaggia in a coup, having forged documents falsely claiming that he was taking money from the British. Throughout the 1970s, Kirinyaga continued to stagnate, with Kimathi ruling increasingly despotically, taking a number of concubines and embezzling money through Swiss bank accounts. Opposition was dealt with viciously, and aside from state-dominated trade with commercial cartels in the Swahili Coast, the state pursued autarky. Unlike other socialist states, which at least pushed education and full-employment, the Kirinyagan state kept people in agrarian occupations. As a result, they had one of the worst literacy rates in Africa. Only government bureaucrats and military families were given a state-sponsored education. Starvation was common, as the increasingly militarised state was funded by the requisitioning of grain.

    CGZPqnXWwAAkH0A.jpg

    Dedan Kimathi, victor of the Kirinyaga-Tanganyika War and later President of Kirinyaga

    In the north, the Rift Valley Republic grew increasingly close to the Ethiopian Empire. This was as a result of the creation of the Greater Rift Valley Community, whose first major project was the construction of a major American-funded and American-constructed highway system centred on Addis Ababa beginning in 1969. One circuit of the system ran through Lodwar on the way to Kisumu in Kavirondo. Later expansions would further integrate the Rift Valley Republic with the East African pro-Western bloc by establishing connections to Marsabit and Malakal. Commercial activity intensified as a result, with low-interest loans underwritten by the Imperial Solomonic Bank (ISB) of Ethiopia, which rapidly became the largest financial entity in East Africa. The bank's emblem, the Conquering Lion of Judah, became ubiquitous from the Great Lakes to Juba in Equatoria. Through the 1970s, Rift Valley integration with Ethiopia also began in the security sphere, the Rift Valley Defence Force being trained by Ethiopian officers and armed with American weaponry. A mutual defense treaty was signed in 1974 as a counter against the potential threat of Somali irredentism along the frontier. Whilst most Somali-inhabited areas of Kenya were absorbed by Mogadishu, a few disputed villages remained governed from Lodwar.

    The Kingdom of Kavirondo, the elective monarchy on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria, was lead by ker Oginga Odinga throughout this period. Unsurprisingly, given that Odinga was a businessman, head of the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation, the government was dominated by his family members. His sons Raila and Oburu Odinga were being educated in West Germany to prepare for eventual rule. The economic life of Kavirondo was shaped from the mid-1960s onwards by Barack Obama, who had returned from study at University of Hawaii and Harvard with his American wife Ruth Beatrice Baker. Obama promoted economic cooperation with the United States and Ethiopia, convincing Oginga Odinga to sign off on joining the Greater Rift Valley Community, which paid off virtually immediately with the construction of the Jackson highway which connected Kisumu with the Ethiopian port of Massawa and the outside world. Kavirondo become one of the wealthiest nations in central Africa, relatively peaceful and stable, with a burgeoning middle class, although nepotism and corruption remained a major issue. Politically, Kavirondo focused on relations with the other countries surrounding Lake Victoria. In reaction to Idi Amin's alignment with the Soviet Union, Kavirondo built up its armed forces with relatively modern Western weaponry. They sheltered Tutsis which escaped persecution in Rwanda and Burundi, building strong ties with the Tutsi monarchists. This support for the Tutsis was borne out of realpolitik, rather than humanitarian considerations. The Congolese government of Patrice Lumumba supported Hutu revolutionaries in Rwanda and Burundi in order to spread socialist control in Central Africa, with the Kavirondo elite viewing the expulsion of the Tutsis as a class struggle, not an ethnic struggle. This dynamic would turn Burundi and Rwanda into a battlefield for Kavirondo's proxy conflicts with Uganda and Congo.

    kenyan-politician-oginga-odinga-opposition-leader-to-the-present-picture-id497024421

    Ker Oginga Odinga, monarch of Kavirondo


    The Swahili Coast was an oddity in East Africa. Relatively wealthy, the Swahili commercial elites of the state opportunistically exploited shifts in the regional economic and political situation. Attempting to utilise their traditional position as an entrepot to the East African interior, they charged severe transit dues for the transport of goods into Kirinyaga. However, the inability of goods to be transported via Kirinyaga to other markets cut the Swahili Coast off from the lucrative Great Lakes region, imports to which were dominated by Massawa. As a result, the Swahili Coast began to rely on blockade running and money laundering/tax evasion, particularly with regards to becoming an intermediary with South Africa for countries unwilling or unable to openly trade with the apartheid regime. The Mijikenda of the interior littoral remained relatively undeveloped, with some migration to Mombasa and Malindi, where they typically performed menial jobs such as sanitation and housekeeping for the urban Swahilis.
     
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    Chapter 75: Black Gold - Gulf of Guinea States (Until 1980)
  • For more information about coastal West Africa, see: https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-15#post-10768273
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-24#post-11743219
    and
    https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-23#post-11595527

    ===

    Throughout the 1970s, many of the states sitting along the shores of the Gulf of Guinea began to be revolutionised by the exploitation of offshore oil deposits. The fledging energy industry in these nations would eventually become the vehicle for major economic development and modernisation in these states, but this was still a far-off prospect during this decade. However it was also a period that experienced conflict, rebellion and revolution in a number of states.

    In Gabon, Jean-Hilaire Aubame's diplomatic prowess was instrumental in maintaining stability in the country. He maintained close relations with the French and the rest of the pro-French states of Sub-Saharan Africa, but also managed to keep the relationship with the revolutionary Congo to the east. By keeping most diplomatic partners relatively satisfied, Aubame prevented other states from sponsoring opposition candidates. He also oversaw consistent (if somewhat modest) economic growth until the discovery of offshore oil in the early 1970s. The relatively concurrent discovery of offshore oil deposits by several West African nations prompted the establishment of the Gulf of Guinea Council of Petroleum Exporting Countries (GGCEP), which included Biafra, Benin, Cameroon, Ghana and of course Gabon, along with Cote d'Ivoire and France as permanent observers. In order to avoid the impression of one country having leadership, the organisation was based in Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire), with a major branch office in Paris. The development of the offshore oil industry prompted an economic boom in both oil drilling and construction in Libreville and the surrounds.

    Biafra was governed throughout the 1970s by Chukwuemeka "Emeka" Odumegwu-Ojukwu. Having discovered major oil deposits in the Niger Delta region, Biafra actually experienced a number of uncomfortable economic shocks due to overenthusiastic exploitation of offshore oil, but this eased over time as Biafran specialists and policymakers became more experienced. The oil deposits funded a relatively well-equipped (by the region's standards) military and strict security state. This expenditure was motivated first and foremost by the looming presence of Nigeria in the north, which Biafrans believed still harboured an intent to forcefully reintegrate them. There was economic growth, but the distribution of this new wealth was highly uneven, with significant unrest centred on Port Harcourt amongst the Ijaw and Ogoni people, who felt that they received little benefit from this new industry.

    Cameroon, led by President Ahmadou Ahidjo, waged a long war against UPC guerrillas in the littoral provinces. As a result of the violence, the population of the region dwindled as civilians left for other provinces of the country. In 1961, the UPC leader Ernest Ouandié was exiled to Ghana, but he managed to secretly return to Cameroon in order to lead the Armée de libération nationale Kamerounaise (ALNK). The capture of ALNK commander Tankou Noé and the January 1964 public executions of fifteen captured rebels motivated Ouandié to lead a "long march" through the West, Centre and East provinces into Congo. Equipped by the Congolese, and trained with the aid of Chinese and Korean advisers, the ALNK would re-enter Cameroon in 1973. The "March on Yaoundé" successfully brushed aside the Cameroonian troops that rallied against them, who were outgunned by the newly-equipped and reconstituted ALNK. The government's resistance effort was further undermined by mutinies from Bamileke and Bassa soldiers who were underpaid and identified more with the ALNK leadership than Ahidjo. Ahidjo fled to exile in Gabon whilst the UPC leadership led a procession through the streets of Yaoundé. Notably, the French failed to come to Ahidjo's aid. This was largely due to Ahidjo's hesitancy to align himself with French-led organisations such as La Francophonie and his problematic insistency on pushing for unrealistic claims on what was once British Cameroons. Ernest Ouandié, who was initially but one leader of the UPC but had risen to the top leadership due to his guerrilla experience and his sympathy for communism (which pleased the UPC's Congolese backers), became the new president. The UPC regime engaged in a campaign of political violence against the northern Muslims, Fulani and Peuhl. The Red Terror in Cameroon generated a flow of refugees from these regions to other nations bordering Lake Chad.

    In Togo, the government of Nicolas Grunitzky retained close ties with France and Cote d'Ivoire, with French banks promoting increased exploitation of Togo's phosphate mines. Grunitzky altered the constitution in order to allow unlimited consecutive presidential terms, and went on to develop an extensive election rigging operation. When rival parties demonstrated against the constitutional trade, they were attacked by police, accused of "formenting unrest and threatening the safety of the citizenry" and were thus dissolved. Grunitzky ensured that two shell parties were created, which it was ensured would fluctuate between 10 and 15 percent each of the vote in order to give the appearance of legitimacy.

    Yorubaland was ruled by a traditional aristocracy, headed by the Alaafin (Emperor of the Oyo Empire). From 1960 to 68 this was Bello Gbadegesin Oladigbolu II, followed by Lamidi Olayiwola Adeyemi III. The latter was a massive boxing fan, hosting major international fights, including Muhammad Ali's famed 'Rumble in the Jungle' against George Foreman. The Alaafin built in his capital, the massive city of Ibadan, the world's largest boxing-only arena, as well as an adjacent boxing development facility.

    In Dahomey, the 1970 election was contested by each of the three regional leaders. Hubert Maga threatened to secede the North if he failed to win the presidency after Paul Émile de Souza decided to nullify the results from Atakora, the region where Maga received the most votes. The other two regional leaders accused Maga of electoral fraud, and Sourou-Migan Apithy threatened to join Yorubaland. Despite these threats, the triumvirate managed to come to an agreement in order to prevent a civil war. A presidential council, consisting of each member of the triumvirate, was set up on May 7 with a revolving presidency set to change each two years. The first president under this system was Maga. Cabinet positions were divided to be roughly balanced between supporters of each triumvirate member. Under Maga's presidency, he cracked down on tax evasion and cut expenditure, giving Dahomey a budgetary surplus for the first time since independence. Despite the favourable economic outlook, there existed a great deal of discontent amongst the military. Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin was ambushed whilst en route to a rally in Abomey on May 7, 1971 but managed to escape. To this day the details of this ambush are unclear. January 1972 saw an unsuccessful uprising at an artillery camp at Ouidah. The rebels were overpowered but they were given amnesty. Maurice Kouandété attempted to usurp power again in February. It came closer to success than the previous month's, with Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin believing it to be a coup attempt by Maga to prevent the rolling presidency shifting to Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin. Kouandété failed in his attempt to seize government buildings. A 12-member military commission set up discovered another plot by officers allied with Kouandété to wait until Kouandété seized power to then murder him and install Émile Derlin Zinsou. Maga transferred power to Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin on May 7, 1972. This was the first time that the head of state shifted in a non-military fashion. Kouandété was sentenced to death, but the sentence was never carried out. Lt. Col Mathieu Kérékou , a cousin of Kouandété , would be successful in overthrowing the state on October 26. Maga and Ahomadégbé-Tomêtin were imprisoned, whilst Apithy managed to escape to the east and declared secession from Dahomey. Kérékou initially mobilised the military to fight the Yoruba, being unsuccessful in pushing the Yoruba back, but halting their initial advance. As Yorubaland mobilised more materiel and troops, the situation for Kérékou looked dire. However, the diplomatic intervention of a number of other nations, including Biafra, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon, convinced the Yoruba to halt their advance and entrench. A UN-brokered peace agreement was reached, with Dahomey ceding the occupied territories to Yorubaland. In order to be more inclusive of the non-Yoruba inhabitants of the country, to add legitimacy to their claim to these new territories and to increase the prestige of the monarchy, Yorubaland renamed itself 'Oyo'. Dahomey itself declared itself Marxist, and in 1975 changed its name to the People's Republic of Dahomey. After four years of governance under the Military Council of the Revolution (headed by Kérékou ), Kérékou won an election where he was the only candidate, and dissolved the Military Council. Governing alongside his cousin, Kouandété , Kérékou oversaw a significant economic downturn, with an exodus of educators and professionals from the state. In order to make ends meet, the PRD became a major site for the dumping of French and Soviet nuclear waste. The petroleum and banking sectors were nationalised, but poorly and inefficiently run, and the loss of the port centre of Cotonou to Oyo had gutted the economy, as Oyo would trade with Dahomey but instituted severe customs duties on the PRD. Poverty was ubiquitous, and every year the country got closer and closer to outright famine.

    Cote d'Ivoire experienced economic growth due to the success of selling cocoa and coffee as cash crops. A close relationship with France led to the growth of a French expatriate community in Cote d'Ivoire and the growth of banking in the area. Along with Ivoirian leadership in diplomacy in Francophone Africa, Cote d'Ivoire developed as a key entrepot into the Gulf states. Despite being a one-party state, Cote d'Ivoire escaped the political instability of many other African states due to Félix Houphouët-Boigny's strategy of incorporating dissident factions into the ruling party through minor concessions, providing government jobs and outright bribery. French troops were stationed at Port-Bouët in order to ensure Ivoirian security and the entrenchment of the Houphouët-Boigny regime. There were few major challenges for Houphouët-Boigny after 1963, although there was a short-lived uprising by Sanwi rebels in 1969. Houphouët-Boigny started increasing the development of his home village of Yamoussoukro with the intention of creating a future capital there.

    Ahmed Sékou Touré's regime in Guinea, having rebuffed the Portuguese attempt at overthrowing it, continued to consolidate power throughout the 1970s. In 1977, the economic controls imposed by Sékou Touré, including restrictions on trading in the traditional open-air markets, led to the Guinean Market Women's Revolt. The regime relented, and reduced restrictions on trading controls. In the late 70s, Sékou Touré also began to expand trading relationships with the USA.
     
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    Chapter 76: Camus on the Shore - Japan (until 1980) (Part 1)
  • EDIT: I realised after writing this update that there was a fair degree of overlap with Chapter 55. I would recommend reading that post immediately before reading this one. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...rnative-cold-war.280530/page-23#post-11268152
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    Gennady Yevgenyevich Kotov's lips upturned in a toothless smile as his nostrils took in the gentle wafting vapours rising from his teacup. He much preferred the softness of the Japanese sencha, its grassy flavour and mild aroma over the vigorous and smoky Russian caravan tea he had been raised on. The slowly waning sunlight of the autumn afternoon streaked through the trees, broken by the bare branches and reflecting from the spectacles that sat atop Gennady Yevgenyevich's high aristocratic cheekbones. Kotov was in his early 30s, but his slight frame dressed in a boxy, ill-fitting grey suit (in the typical Soviet diplomatic style) gave the distinct impression of a schoolboy borrowing his father's suit for a job interview. Kotov had preferred to wear good quality suits fitted by Japanese tailors, but had been gently chastised upon his return to the Soviet Union for his "unproletarian" appearance. For such an unfashionable bunch, the Soviet bureaucrats sure did follow trends. The militarist costume of the Stalin years had given way to the "peasant's Sunday best" style of the Khrushchev years. Gennady Yevgenyevich was much more of an aesthete. After all, he had spent most of his formative years in Japan, the son of a diplomatic official. Given his fluency in Japanese and his familiarity with the local culture, he was offered a diplomatic posting here after graduating from university, and he was quite to accept. Kotov was far from a firebrand, quite the opposite, but he never felt accepted in the Soviet Union. Back home he would endlessly hear babushkas telling him off for not eating enough, men being dismissive of him due to his unathletic, almost sickly build. He found it difficult to get excited for borscht and kholodets. In Japan he was more often a source of fascination for the locals. In the USSR, it was likely he would have no friends at all, as introverted as he was. But here, people were curious. They were often surprised when he told them he was 'Roshiajin'. More often they thought he was an 'English gentleman". Maybe it was his close-cropped hair, his glasses, his leanness. Gennady Yevgenyevich got the distinct impression that the ordinary Japanese expected Russians to look like some kind of oni, some ogre. Definitely they expected someone more barbarous. It didn't really offend Gennady Yevgenyevich. He had come to think the same of Russians, particularly the leadership. It bothered his father in particular. More than once he had reminded his son of the melancholy soulfulness of classic Russian literature. Gennady Yevgenyevich had retorted "I should be proud of Russia because its a land of writers who wrote about how terrible life in Russia is?". As he got older he understood why the elder Kotov had grown so frustrated with him. It wasn't merely from nationalistic pride. Sure, there was a little frustration that the wartime enemy had seemingly conquered his only son, but also he had lived through the Stalinist purges. Gennady Yevgenyevich's private tirades, if repeated in public, would have been more then enough to see him shipped to a Siberian gulag during the Stalin years. With his bean stalk body, he knew his son wouldn't last long in the hard labour camps. Such a fate had never come to pass. The Khrushchev years had loosened the muzzle around the mouth of the Russian, but not removed it entirely. Public officials in particular had to be careful about what they said. They wouldn't be executed, but they would lose their career and be blacklisted from the little luxuries; a well-heated home with electricity, a decent, if unspectacular lifestyle. Gennady Yevgenyevich was educated, but not in any technical capacity. Without this diplomatic posting, he would be hard-pressed to find work outside being a shopkeeper's assistant or working in a textile factory spinning coats in Uzbekistan. So he had learned to keep his sedition to himself.

    Looking before him, Kotov saw a peaceful scene; elderly Japanese picked up the ripe fruits that had fallen from the trees. The Koishikawa-Kōrakuen were an oasis of beauty and peace in a Tokyo which had been wracked by violent protests. The small Koishikawa neighbourhood had been a short walk from the centre of the Red Army's postwar occupation zone in Tokyo. Much smaller than the sector they had occupied in Berlin, the area was given back to the Japanese government as a sign of goodwill in 1949. Nevertheless, the Soviet embassy remained, and Korov would often escape to the tranquil gardens whenever he could. This was the only area in the country where any of the locals spent some semblance of Russian, although it was admittedly rudimentary. Furthermore, many of the blended consonants found in Russian were unable to be imitated by the Japanese, used to a syllabary language. "Kaku daera?" they would ask him, trying to say "kak dela". No matter that he would reply in perfect Kanto dialect, they would nevertheless always respond in broken Russian, as if he would be unable to understand if they spoke their own language. He thought to himself that he should be more positive about it. After all, it beats the constant meetings with the Japanese Communist Party leadership in Yoyogi. They had been besides themselves, having lost control of the Zengakuren student leagues who had been engaging in protests against the US-Japan treaties. As their membership had swelled, and individual members' egos with them, Trotskyist and Maoist sects had broken away, the latter becoming preeminent. They were now attacking JCP-led student unions as often as the police. Not to mention that the police and Yakuza had been violently engaging with the students as well. The Soviet government had long given up on the JCP as a potential driver of revolution in the Land of the Rising Sun. Their primary use for Moscow now was popular front coalitions to push forward individual policies advantageous to Soviet interests: demilitarisation, an exit from self-defense treaties with the United States, crackdowns on organised crime (the Yakuza crime syndicates were, like most criminal groups, stridently anti-Communist) and so on. Nevertheless, the Soviet diplomats were growing tired of the JCP's incompetence and panic. Of course, they could not support the Maoist or Trotskyist Zengakuren factions, but frankly, they were proving more useful than the JCP. Gennady Yevgenyevich sipped the last of his tea and stood up, taking one last impression of the beautiful park before going on his way.


    The beginning of the 1950s saw the reconstitution of the Japanese state as a functional entity as the American occupation was lifted. Nevertheless, significant numbers of US military personnel remained in military bases throughout the country, an issue that would incite considerable discontent amongst the Japanese civilian population. One of the most influential postwar political forces was the national university students league, the Zengakuren. With the failure of the 1947 general strike, the Japanese Communist Party organised the myriad student associations into a single organisation. By September 18, 1948, the Zengakuren had been established, led by Communist Party member and Tokyo University student Teruo Takei. The Zengakuren first came to the forefront of political struggles in Japan in the "Bloody May Day", a series of protests against the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 and its attendant security pact between the United States and Japan. The treaty allowed a number of privileges for the United States military, essentially making them unbeholden to the sovereign authority of the Japanese government. Almost immediately there were Japanese calls to revise the treaty, which initially gave no US guarantee to defend Japan from outside aggression. It also allowed US forces based in Japan to operate without notifying the Japanese government. Furthermore, Okinawa was to be retained as essentially a military protectorate of the US Navy. 3 days after the signing of the peace treaty, on May 1st, the left-leaning (pink rather than red) Sōhyō labour federation led a nationwide series of protests against the "subordinate independence" secured in the treaty and the failure to achieve the retrocession of Okinawa. The Sōhyō had largely swelled as a result of a crackdown on JCP-led labour unions, which had become widely accepted by the Japanese public after the events of 1950, where, in response to Cominform criticism about the JCP's peaceful electoral strategy, the JCP adopted a programme of violent revolution, encouraging Communist students to "go into the mountains" and forment a socialist revolution. This was, unsurprisingly, an abject failure. Not only were the small number of fighters quickly rounded up by the Japanese government, but the electorate responded furiously, with the JCP losing all of its seats in the Japanese diet to the non-Soviet-affiliated Socialist Party. The Sōhyō federation was established by conservative and socialist labour unions, and would continue to drift left. Still seeking to forment violent revolution, the JCP sought to infiltrate and influence the protests through their affiliates, radical students from the Zengakuren and Zainichi Korean activist groups. Whilst most of the May Day protests were peaceful, there were some scuffles in central Tokyo when demonstrators sought to occupy the plaza in front of the Imperial Palace. The Japanese government declared that the plaza would be closed to the protestors. Sōhyō followed these new regulations, gathering instead in Meiji Shrine. However, the JCP affiliate groups, seeking to provoke a heavy-handed government response, led a large group to the Imperial Palace to reoccupy the "people's plaza". Shortly thereafter, police arrived in order to disperse the protestors. These protestors fought back with paving stones, bats, staves and Molotov cocktails. The police fired what they would later claim "warning shots" with their service pistols directly into the crowd, killing two protestors and wounding twenty-two others. The protestors fled, leading to other skirmishes throughout the city, as well as vandalism against American military vehicles, as well as attacking American bystanders with chants of "yankii ho homu". Over one thousand protestors would be arrested, with more than two hundred put on trial for sedition. These trials would stretch on for decades with many appeals. As a response to the Bloody May Day incident, the Japanese Diet pushed through the Subversive Activities Prevention Act, which set out stiffer penalties for "terroristic activities" and giving the government permission to suppress or dissolve organisations involved in these activities. Sporadic violence continued, and the public backlash caused the Japanese Communist Party to return back to an electoral strategy.

    By 1955, the Japanese economy had surpassed prewar levels. The Japanese economy had recovered due to effective economic organisation, restrictions on labour organisation, enabled by a system of "lifetime employment" which would retain experienced and loyal workers, who would be provided job stability. As requested by the United States, Japan began reconstituting its armed forces in 1954. Despite the greater degree of economic prosperity, the flame of militancy among the Japanese left continued to burn bright. 1955 saw the beginning of the Sunagawa Struggle, a series of protests against the expansion of the USAF Tachikawa airbase into the neighbouring village of Sunagawa. The expansion plans would have involved the confiscation of farmland and the eviction of 140 families. Local families formed the Sunagawa Anti-Base Expansion Alliance and barricaded their lands against government surveyors and their vehicles. The struggle attracted the attention of other anti-base organisations, and soon came to include labour unions affiliated with the Sōhyō labour federation, Zengakuren students and Socialist Party members. The struggle escalated dramatically when the police were sent in to remove the barricades. Aware of the media coverage, the students began to hold 'sit-ins' rather than arming themselves for clashes with police. Wearing white headbands and clothes (so that blood would show more clearly on their clothes), the students put no resistance against the police assaults. This attracted sympathy for the cause amongst the media and wide swathes of the population. The climax of the protests came in October 1956, when two thousand police officers, trying to evict the farmers, attacked six thousand protestors. A thousand people were injured, but the police were unable to dislodge the demonstrators. The protests took on a wider significance, being portrayed as a pitched battle to protect the post-war "Peace Constitution" and resistance against American imperialism. On July 8, 1957, some protestors infiltrated the airbase. Seven were arrested and charged with trespassing. Their case became a cause celebre as it wound its way through the courts. In the 1959 case Sakata v. Japan, the Tokyo District Court initially found the US bases, as well as the entire US-Japan Security Treaty, unconstitutional and fully exonerated the protestors. This decision was rapidly overturned by the Japanese Supreme Court. The US military surveyors unable to do their preparatory work, the expansion plans were "indefinitely shelved" in late 1957. The Sunagawa Struggle made it apparent to both Japanese and American leaders the depth of Japanese public antipathy to the US military bases in the Land of the Rising Sun. In '57, the Eisenhower administration, wary of alienating the Japanese, announced a 40% drawdown of US troops in Japan.

    Within the Japanese student movement, rifts were growing as a result of dissatisfaction with the JCP from some student radicals. When the JCP had backed down from its militant guerrilla position, it had attempted to save face with the general public by blaming the students for the violence, leaving a bitter taste in the mouth of the remaining student radicals. The JCP had also discouraged student involvement in the direct action at Sunagawa, and had drawn further anger from the students due to their failure to denounce Stalinism or sever ties with the Soviet Union after the revelations of Khrushchev's "Secret Speech". The bold, firebrand students were repulsed at what they saw as a lack of ideological commitment from the JCP, which insisted that students run potlucks and sporting events to get back in the good graces of polite society, rather than engaging in militant praxis. The resulting schism led to the formation of a number of radical student groups within the Zengakuren which were independent of the JCP. The most significant of these was the Communist League (Kyōsandō, commonly known as The Bund), which split with the JCP in December 1958. The Bund, naming itself after the original Communist League of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, announced its twin pillars as "anti-imperialism" (i.e. anti-US military presence in Japan) and "anti-Stalinism" (anti-JCP), proclaiming steadfast opposition to the "bureaucratic Yoyogi faction". In response, the pro-JCP factions denounced the Bund as "Trotskyist provocateurs" and "adventurists". Through 1959, the Bund, allied with the Revolutionary Communist League (Kakukyōdō), another anti-JCP faction which took inspiration from Trotskyist philosopher Kan'ichi Kuroda, sought to take control of the national Zengakuren organisation through rigging the elections of local jichikai (student associations) leadership at universities throughout Japan. Through this method, the Bund had taken control of 60% of the Zengakuren jichikai by November 1959, becoming the "mainstream faction" (shūryū-ha) opposed by the JCP-affiliated "anti-mainstream faction" (han-shūryū-ha).
    etudiants-gauchistes-zengakuren-lors-dune-manifestation-de-soutien-picture-id1269063819

    In 1960, the US and Japanese governments agreed on a revised version of the security treaty, which committed the United States to the defense of Japan, removed the authorisation for US forces to unilaterally suppress Japanese domestic disturbances and requiring prior consultation with the Japanese government before the US forces stationed in Japan commit to any actions. Although the 1960 iteration of the treaty was undoubtedly a major improvement over the original version of the agreement, there was still a great deal of resentment over the continued US presence on Japanese soil and many hoped to do away with the treaty entirely, neutralising Japan. 1959 saw the formation of the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty to coordinate the various anti-treaty movements who were seeking to prevent ratification of the agreement. Initially consisting of 134 member organisations, the Anpo's ranks swelled to 1,633 affiliate organisations by March 1960. Faced with the protest movement and parliamentary stonewalling by the Socialist Party in the National Diet, Prime Minister Kishi, desperate to ratify the treaty in time for a scheduled visit by President Eisenhower, called for a snap vote on the security treaty, but had the Socialist Party members ejected from the Diet by police. Kishi's anti-democratic actions provoked outrage from Japanese across the whole political spectrum. The anti-treaty protests grew to an even greater size, with the Sōhyō carrying out a series of strikes involving millions of unionists. On June 10th, Eisenhower's press secretary James Hagerty was rescued by US marines when his car was mobbed and attacked by members of the protesting crowds near Haneda Airport. On the 15th, radical student activists from the Zengakuren attempted to storm the Diet itself, causing a fierce battle with police which resulted in the death of female Tokyo University student Michiko Kanba. Kishi called on the JSDF to come to the streets, and had ultranationalist underworld figure Yoshio Kodama mobilise right-wing thugs and Yakuza gangsters to 'keep order' in the streets.

    The treaty was nevertheless ratified. Kishi's replacement, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, promoted the Income Doubling Plan in order to shift public focus away from the contentious issue of the security treaty. The Plan incorporated various mechanisms, including tax breaks, targeted investment and social welfare programmes in order to encourage growth. Japanese economic development exceeded expectations: to double the size of the economy in ten years, it was required to have an annual growth rate of 7.2%. The actual growth rate during this period was 10%, with the economy doubling in under seven years.

    With the failure of the 1960 Anpo protests, inevitably the various factions of the Zengakuren threw around blame as to who was responsible, who was insufficiently revolutionary or excessively adventurious, and so on. The nationwide Bund splintered, but the local Bund jichikai in the Kansai region remained intact, and in 1966 would join with other splinter groups to form the Second Bund. Shortly thereafter, the Second Bund would unify with two other radical student sects, the Chūkaku-ha (which had split off from a Kan'ichi Kuroda-associated group) and the Kaihо̄-ha ("Liberation Faction", which was a splinter group from a Socialist Party-aligned student organisation, which had been dissatisfied by JSP gradualism) in order to form the "Three-Faction Zengakuren" (Sanpa Zengakuren). In 1962, student unrest at Wakeda University led to the foundation of the Waseda Zenkyōtō. This Zenkyōtō would be the precursor organisation for a new form of decentralised, autonomous student organisations associated with the Japanese 'New Left'. By contrast, the other Zengakuren groups still followed the principles of democratic centralism, whether or not they were pro-JCP. Within the Japanese Communist Party itself, there was also a shift in power. Having provoked the Hagerty Incident, they had been successful in precipitating the downfall of the Kishi cabinet. The Maoists had already been purged from the party by the time of the Anpo demonstrations, but the party had continued to be ideologically divided between the Rōnō Ha (Worker-Farmer Faction) and the Kōza Ha (Lecture Faction). The primary disagreement between the two groups was what stage of Marxist development theory that Japan occupied: the Rōnō Ha believed that Japan had achieved full capitalism, and as such was ripe for revolution. The Kōza Ha instead believed that Japan still required a two-stage revolution to overthrow American imperialism and establish true democracy, then to have a socialist revolution. Kenji Miyamoto, the leader of the JCP, was a member of the mainstream Kōza Ha, although the Rōnō Ha still comprised 40% of the party. The Anpo crisis strengthened the Kōza Ha. Whilst many Zengakuren had broken off, the peaceful stance of the JCP with regards to the protests boosted the JCP's popularity with the wider public.
     
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    Chapter 77: Kyōko no Ie - Japan (until 1980) (Part 2)
  • The tension that existed throughout the 1950s and early 1960s in Japanese politics and society failed to give way in the late '60s and throughout the '70s, despite the consistently strong performance of the Japanese economy and the resultant rise in living standards for the average citizen of the Land of the Rising Sun. A major driver for this was the leftist student associations. The Zengakuren engaged in constant mitosis, schisms splitting them into smaller and smaller, and increasingly more radical, and often violent, groups. The various Zengakuren factions did not have a monopoly on student political action, however. By the end of the decade they had largely been eclipsed on the campuses themselves by the emergent All-Campus Joint Struggle Committees, or "Zenkyōtō". With leftist militancy in the ascendancy on Japanese campuses, a wide array of forces of reaction began to rally against them. Aside from the police, the students were opposed also by various groups affiliated with the Yakuza crime syndicates, as well as the followers of influential writer Yukio Mishima.

    The first Zenkyōtō of note was the one founded at Waseda University in 1962. Whilst initially founded in opposition to construction plans for a new student hall, but soon shifted to demonstrating against a proposed raise in tuition fees. These demonstrations were interspersed with violence between the students and police. The incidents at Waseda University would not subside until June 1966. The organisation of Zenkyōtō would soon be imitated by students throughout Japan. Disputes concerning tuition fees, university management corruption and the use of violent guards on campus (often recruited from far-right groups or criminal organisations) would prompt students to gather in "Kyōtō Kaigi" ("action committees") which would organise against the university authorities.

    27e21acc5e38426fb6ae2a2dba19771e.jpg

    Zenkyōtō students demonstrating at Hibiya Park​

    In May 1968, a demonstration was held in Nihon University, traditionally the most conservative university in the country, as a reaction to the university authorities' lack of transparency surrounding the expenditure of 3400 million yen. On May 27th, the Nihon University Zenkyōtō was formed by Akehiro Akita, who also was its first chair. Despite most universities' Zenkyōtō being dominated by radical leftists, the elite Nihon University's Zenkyōtō consisted of anti-Communist and non-sectarian radicals. In order to negotiate between students and authorities, university authorities held a conference at the Ryogokan Auditorium on September 30. 35,000 students attended the rally. After 12 hours, the authorities accepted the students' demands, leading to the resignation of the university directors involved. However, following this capitulation, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared that "establishing relations with popular gangs deviate from common sense". In response, the Nihon University authorities reneged on their commitments to students. Provoked by this volte-face, students sports associations began to riot in Ryogoku Auditorium. Riot police were mobilised and stormed the auditorium. With the violence halted, students would eventually resume classes, but in an enclosed compound ringed with a barbed-wire fence, which was soon given the popular epithet of "Nihon Auschwitz".

    Meanwhile, at Tokyo University, a dispute arose over the status of graduate medical students. The new Medical Doctor's Law had restricted employment opportunities and a judgement on militant students by the university's board of directors which furthered threatened these students' future prospects led to mass protests. This provoked the establishment of a Zenkyōtō, which would soon become the epicentre of left autonomist political action in Japan. Students occupied the Yasuda Auditorium, barricading it and battling the police with staves. In January 1969, 8500 police were called to take on the protestors. Throughout the country, Zenkyōtō were established in solidarity with the one at Tokyo University. Operating independently from the Zengakuren. Committees were organised by levels (students, staff, researchers etc.) and by departments (humanities, medicine, literature etc.). Each committee would operate with a degree of autonomy within a confederal structure in cooperation with the other committees. Committee members participated in debates, and openly voted by a show of hands, in a form of direct democracy. A National Federation of Zenkyōtō was set up at Hibiya Park in September 1969. However, Yoshitaka Yamamoto, leader of the University of Tokyo Zenkyōtō and chair of the National Federation, was arrested. The genesis of the National Federation of Zenkyōtō was a result of the wide proliferation of autonomous Zenkyōtō in universities all over Japan, from Tokyo to the most far-flung provinces. Initially focused on issues specific to their university that stood beyond the jurisdiction of the Zengakuren councils, experiences with the violent suppression of their demonstrations by riot police radicalised them. The Zenkyōtō students were galvanised against the concept of universities themselves, conceiving them as "factories of education" embedded in "imperialist forms of management" and characterised faculty councils as "terminal institutions of power". To the student radicals, university autonomy was an illusion, and universities should be dismantled through violent political action, as summarised by their motto "daigaku funsai" ("smash the university"). The Zengakuren factions had been an intermediary stage between the 'Old' and 'New Left', being anti-capitalist, often anti-Soviet and engaging in self-criticism and anti-state action, they still followed the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism", taking orders from an established hierarchy within the faction. By contrast, the Zenkyōtō were truly a "New Left" movement, eschewing democratic centralism in favour of broad-based decision-making and ideological purity over pragmatism. Observers noted that the Zenkyōtō movement began to adopt an almost religious degree of zealotry and ideological puritanicalism. It is no surprise that the most influential academic figure vis-a-vis the Zenkyōtō movement was Takaaki Yoshimoto, who was commonly referred to as a "prophet".

    Ideologically-driven infighting would intensify as the Zenkyōtō movement began to lose momentum. Many of the issues with universities were stuck in stalemates, as university authorities were unwilling to negotiate, aware that the Zenkyōtō would continue to push for the abolition of the universities anyway. In August 1969, the Act on Temporary Measures was passed by the Japanese Diet, allowing universities to unilaterally mobilise riot police units against the students. The Act would come into effect in late 1970. The lack of nuance or willingness to compromise weakened the Zenkyōtō movement. Whilst initially a thriving autonomist movement, it soon alienated those outside the National Federation of Zenkyōtō. They deemed everyone complicit in the university system, including lower administrators, as "kagaisha" ("victimisers"). During the 1968-69 protests, the Zenkyōtō students had driven Yoshimoto's rival Masao Maruyama ou of the university system. Maruyama would retire in 1971. The Japanese university conflicts of the late '60s held a wider significance than mere disruption of the academic life of the country. Unlike the Zengakuren, which were largely comprised of undergraduates, the Zenkyōtō broadened the scope of student protest - postgraduate students, concerned at the increasingly limited and restricted employment opportunities in a Japan dominated by major corporate and industrial conglomerates, were a major force in these autonomous student federations. Even some members of staff at the universities also engaged in political organisation and rebellion against the university system. Although the Zenkyōtō largely operated parallel with the Zengakuren, there was some overlap of course: most notably the November 1968 hostage situation, where members of the Kakumaru-ha Zengakuren faction took nine professors hostage. Several of the professors were beaten and interrogated, with the hostage-takers demanding that they "admit" their role as instruments of imperialism. Other groups would also become involved in the following stand-off with police, including the Shaseidō Kaihō-ha and the Minsei Dōmei, a JCP-affiliated Zengakuren clique.

    The left-wing student movements in Japan (both Zenkyōtō and Zengakuren) must be understood as part of the global '68 movement of the newly-matured "baby boomer" generation, but there was a distinct militancy that arose out of the post-war Japanese context. The generation that was coming of age had no memory of the deprivation of the Second World War and the immediate post-war years. They did see Japan incorporated into an American-led world order defined by capitalism and, in their eyes, the commodification of everything, including human experience. Furthermore, the setbacks experienced by the American-led "Free World" in other parts of Asia led many young Japanese to the conclusion that their homeland had been "shackled to a corpse". Furthermore, the discrediting of pre-war Japanese imperialism was met with impassioned reactions on both sides of the political spectrum. Whilst the older Japanese who had lived through WWII largely saw the imperialist project as ultimately foolish and self-destructive, preferring the ruling LDP's project of pacifism and economic development, to younger Japanese who hoped for something more meaningful than simply accumulating more goods, Japanese imperialism was not a fully resolved issue. On the left of the political spectrum, the student rebels of the 1960s and early 1970s saw around them a society which engaged in post-imperial arrogance, largely failing to acknowledge the bloodshed that Japan had unleashed on the other nations of East Asia. They saw Japanese imperialism as switched for a lieutenant role in the global American imperialist project. In that worldview, the Japanese elite were compradors, enriching themselves on the work of the ordinary Japanese and kowtowing to American interests. The emergent right-wing reaction to the new order in Japan was to look back favourably on this era of imperialism; to them it was not only wrong for Japan to bow to a foreign power in the United States, but they saw the democratic government as weak-willed and decadent, too 'soft' to suppress the communist threat emerging from the universities. Many of these right-wingers hadn't lived through the bloodshed of the Second World War. They of course knew of Japan's defeat, but they saw not the folly of Japanese militarism. They saw an honourable death in the service of the Emperor preferable to the meaningless, materialist life of the modern, capitalist Japan. Whilst the todestrieb of the far-right was not an unusual element of the psychology of the extremist, in Japan it took a particularly aesthetic flavour, especially amongst the acolytes of writer Yukio Mishima. Whereas the fascist instinct in the West was often driven by a desire to dominate, to manifest the brutality of the darkest corners of the human psyche, in Japan there was a certain perceived harmoniousness to it. The tradition of bushido, the code of conduct of the samurai of ages past, glamorised the concept of the triumph of personal will, duty and self-sacrifice. To those enamoured with these ideas, their actions did not seem thuggish. In reality, however, their violence against Japanese leftists and cooperation with organised crime syndicates seemed to indicate the opposite. Like the samurai, they had a certain self-righteousness to their aggression and contempt for those they deemed below them.

    Yukio Mishima was a character whose internal turmoil coexisted with a rapidly changing, and often disorienting, world around him. Raised by a stern military father who was critical of his 'effeminacy' and a doting mother, Kimitake Hiraoka, who would later go by his pen name Yukio Mishima, fell in love with the traditional Kabuki and Noh theatre styles at a young age. His attraction to traditionalist Japanese literary styles would not end there. Whilst in secondary education, he developed a passionate appreciation for classical Japanese waka poetry. As a teenager, he was taken under the wing of Zenmei Hasuda, a member of the board of prestigious literary magazine Bungei Bunka, who highly praised him in the magazine: "this youthful author is a heaven-sent child of eternal Japanese history. He is much younger than we are, but he has arrived on the scene already quite mature". Hasuda was an ardent nationalist and fought for the Japanese Empire in China in 1938, and despite his relatively advanced age was recalled to active service in 1943 to fight in Southeast Asia. At a farewell party, he uttered words that would carry a great weight with Mishima: "I have entrusted the future of Japan to you".

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    Yukio Mishima, one of the most influential (and bizarre) figures of the postwar Shōwa era​

    Mishima was drafted into military service in 1944. He barely passed his physical examination, and was classified as a "second class" conscript. During a medical check in 1945 on his day of convocation, Mishima was suffering from a cold, which was misdiagnosed by the doctor as tuberculosis. As a result, he was declared unfit for duty and sent home. Mishima's failure to be deployed was one of many instances in Mishima's life which contributed to an inferiority complex. He had been mocked by his school's rugby team for his membership in a literary society. He was naturally a man of slight frame, and was not particularly vigorous. His father had criticised him as a "sissy" as a child. His diaries also detailed several instances of homosexual love during his life, none of which were acted on, and which proved to be a sensitive topic with his wife when later brought up by biographers and journalists. After the war, as a result of this crisis of masculinity, Mishima would become obsessed with physical fitness, particularly bodybuilding. For Mishima and his mentor Hasuda, the surrender of Japan and Emperor Hirohito's declaration of mortality were traumatic events. Mishima, who was devoutly Shinto, vowed to 'protect' Japanese culture. He wrote in his diary: "Only by preserving Japanese irrationality will we be able to contribute to world culture 100 years from now". Zenmei Hasuda, deployed in Malaya, shot dead a superior officer for criticising the Emperor before killing himself. A few months later, Mishima's sister died of typhoid fever. Around this time he found that Kuniko Mitani, the sister of a classmate who Mishima hoped to marry, was engaged to another man. This string of traumatic and disillusioning experiences changed Mishima forever. Although he had shown some interest in the pursuit of an honourable, meaningful death before (telling his mother that he had hoped to join a "special attack" unit in the IJA), the loss of his mentor, his beloved sister, and his hope for a marriage with Kuniko Mitani reinforced his drive to make some meaning out of his life. Domestic bliss was no longer an option. He developed a great sense of anger against the progressive literary and academic establishment in the post-war period. American-imposed bans on any "reminiscent" portrayal of Japanese militaristic nationalism left Japanese literature almost entirely monopolised by progressives. Many of the literary figures who Mishima respected were denounced as "war criminal literati". Despite the opposition of some in leftist literary circles, Mishima's postwar works, both plays and novels, were well-received by the public and made him a major public figure, an "enfant terrible" who revived the Japanese Romantic literary style that had dominated the literary landscape of the 1930s. Many of his famous works prior to 1960 were very popular, and were denounced by left-wing academics who noticed the seed of conservative ethics, but it was until the Anpo protests that Mishima's works became undeniably political in tone. Mishima criticised Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi for subordinating Japan to the United States, but reserved harsher criticism for the Japanese Communist Party and the Zengakuren organisations, seeing the treaty issue as a Trojan Horse for promoting their own ends. Shortly after the Anpo protests, Mishima made several works that lionised the ultranationalist army revolt of the February 26 Incident.

    Mishima had particular hatred for Ryokichi Minobe, who was a communist and the governor of Tokyo beginning in 1967. Mishima had influential connections within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and was asked by several senior members to run for the position of governor, but at this time, Mishima didn't seek a career in politics. This would later change [177]. That year, Mishima and his wife would travel to India, where Mishima became enamoured with the spirituality of Indian culture and the determination to maintain Indian cultural identity in the face of Westernisation and modernisation. Whilst in New Delhi, he befriended a colonel in the Indian Army who had seen action against the PLA in Tibet. He warned of the dangerousness of the Chinese troops, contributing to Mishima's anxieties about Chinese communist expansion. Mishima stated in his The Defense of Culture, that the postwar era was one of fake prosperity: "In the postwar prosperity called Shōwa Genroku, where there are no Chikamatsu Monzaemon, Ihara Saikaku, Matsuo Bashō, only infestation of flashy manners and customs in there. Passion is dried up, strong realism dispels the ground, and the deepening of poetry is neglected. That is, there are no Chikamatsu, Saikaku, or Bashō now." From 12 April to 27 May 1967, Mishima underwent basic training with the Ground Self-Defense Force. He had initially wanted to train for six months, but was met with resistance from the Defense Agency. Mishima utilised connections of his and eventually it was settled that Mishima would secretly train for 46 days. From June 1967, Mishima, along with other right-wing figures, promoted the creation of a 10,000 man "Japan National Guard" (Sokoku Bōeitai) as a civilian militia to complement the JSDF. Mishima began leading groups of right-wing students, having them go through training with the aim of having them form an officer corps as the National Guard expands. Alarmed by the 1968 riots of the Zenkyōtō, Mishima and other right-wing figures signed a blood oath to die if necessary to prevent a left-wing revolution in Japan. With a lack of interest in the National Guard amongst the Japanese public, Mishima formed the Tatenokai ("Shield Society"). The Tatenokai was essentially Mishima's private militia, composed mostly of right-wing college students and which spent much of their time with physical training and practicing martial arts. Initial membership was 50, but it would soon expand to several hundred [178]. The Tatenokai would, in the early 1970s, regularly engage in battle with left-wing militant groups in street fighting. This was largely enabled by Mishima's successful campaign for the governorship of Tokyo. Mishima was a reluctant politician, but had finally capitulated to requests by right-wing members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to run against the communist governor Ryokichi Minobe, largely due to increased concerns about the vulnerability of Japan to leftist revolutionaries as American military presence wound down. The doveish US President Chuck Percy had renegotiated the US-Japan Security Treaty, removing US forces from mainland Japan (limiting them only to Okinawa) and abandoning limitations on the Japanese armed forces. Within the Liberal Democratic Party, there had been debate about whether to alter the pacifist elements of the Japanese constitution. In any other time the issue probably would've split the party in two, with the right faction strongly in favour of expanding the military whilst the centrists (there was no real 'left' per se in the LDP) sought to focus solely on economic development and normalisation with Korea and China. The social turmoil of the time would keep the party together, even if this internal turmoil remained. The right of the party sought through Mishima to continue to strengthen their views in order to seize control of the LDP and promote rearmament and anticommunism. Mishima narrowly defeated Ryokichi Minobe in the 1971 Tokyo gubernatorial election. To this day it is debated how much the close result in favour of Mishima was influenced by the meddling of Yakuza gangs, most notably the Yamaguchi-gumi and Sumiyoshi-rengō syndicates. Both of these Yakuza groups had tendrils in certain labour unions and thus were able to effectively mobilise their resources to intimidate political opponents. Their underground connections would also make them key in the efforts to suppress the left militants of the 1970s, able to engage in activities beyond the scope of the police and leveraging both their resources and their capacity for violence to secure concessions from the civilian government in exchange for assassinations against leading left terrorist figures.

    By 1968, Japan had become the second-largest economy in the 'Free World', surpassing that of West Germany. The United States returned the Ogasawara Islands to Japanese sovereignty. Moscow and Tokyo had been in negotiations about the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands in the Kurils, but these had stalled with the Soviet condition that the American base in Okinawa must be shut down. In December 1970, a major riot against the American military presence on Okinawa flared up in the city of Koza. By this time, the American and Japanese governments had agreed that Okinawa would be transferred to Japanese sovereignty in 1971, but the locals were enraged by the revelation that a significant US military presence was to remain. The Okinawans had been soured on the American presence as a result of a number of incidents, including extortion, assault, rape, theft and criminal nuisance by US servicemen, none of whom were punished for their misconduct. 5,000 Okinawans clashed with roughly 700 American MPs. Fortunately there were no deaths, but 60 Americans and 27 Okinawans were injured. Some rioters even broke into Kadena Air Base and burning down several buildings inside. The riot fizzled out overnight. A year later, a Zengakuren demonstration turned into a riot in Tokyo, against the terms of the Okinawan return agreement, seeking a full departure of US military personnel. A month later, Okinawa was returned to Japan, albeit with US military bases still on Okinawan soil.
    Despite the efforts of the right-wing forces in Japan, the Japanese Communist Party had its strongest showing ever in the 1972 election, winning 38 seats in the Diet.

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    Fusako Shigenobu, leader of the Sekigun-ha (Japanese Red Army)​

    Emboldened and increasingly radical, the Zengakuren organisations continued to fracture. In 1963, the Marugakudo group had split into the "Central Core Faction" (Chūkaku-ha) group led by Kuroda Kanichi's former right-hand man Nobuyoshi Honda; and the "Revolutionary Marxist Faction" (Kakumaru-ha) cell which more staunchly followed Kuroda's line. By the mid-1970s, these two groups were in outright warfare against each other. In 1975 there were 16 deaths in this conflict alone, including the assassination of Honda. Between clashes between each other and with Yakuza groups and the Tatenokai, the Chūkaku-ha and Kakumaru-ha were illustrative of the difficulties experienced by the urban leftists of 1970s Japan: slowly being whittled away despite the odd crackle and pop amidst the dying embers. The Kakumaru-ha also came under fire from the Shaseidō "Liberation Faction" (Kaihō-ha) which had split off from the JSP-affiliated Zengakuren groups and would be expelled from the party in 1971. The Shaseidō Kaihō-ha would claim the lives of 20 Kakumaru-ha members by 1980, and would also be one of the three founding groups (along with the Chūkaku-ha and the Second Bund) of the "Senpa Zengakuren" (Three-Faction Zengakuren) in 1966. The Second Bund birthed the splinter group referred to as the "Red Army Faction" (Sekigun-ha) which would be the precursor of both the United Red Army and the Japan Red Army urban guerrillas. The Raison d'être of the Sekigun-ha was typical of the Kanto urban guerrilla groups: their parent organisation was apparently insufficiently militant for their tastes. Most of their members were regional Japanese who had moved to Tokyo's elite universities. Isolated from their families, and embittered by the newfound knowledge that they were, regardless of their academic capacity, 'yokels' in the eyes of some of their old-money peers, they had turned to radical, iconoclastic politics. The Sekigun-ha would merge with the JCP Kanagawa Prefecture Committee (which had begun to operate in opposition to many of the JCP's core tenets) to form the United Red Army. The URA and its precursor groups had engaged in a number of robberies of banks and gun stores. Banding together to pool their complementary resources (i.e. guns and money), the formation of the URA was announced on July 15 1971 in a magazine the group had published named Jūka ("Gunfire"). The URA committed to "fight a war of annihilation with guns, against the Japanese authorities". It was not long, however, until the URA devolved into self-dissolution as a result of a cultish obsession with "self-crit" and "struggle sessions". Physical punishment from the autocratic and increasingly-unhinged co-leaders, Mori Tsuneo and Nagata Hiroko, resulted in several deaths. By early 1972, the remaining members of the URA had largely been arrested by the police. A few members of the group had attempted to fight their way out of Tokyo, but died in battle with Yakuza thugs and the Tatenokai [179]. Whilst the URA was operating in Japan, a small core group of militants led by Sekigun-ha leader Fusako Shigenobu left Japan for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Trained in urban guerrilla tactics by the Korean military, this small group which became known as the "Japan Red Army" would be sent to Europe, where they engaged in a number of operations in support of urban guerrilla groups in Italy, France and Germany.

    In 1972, the long-running Prime Minister Eisaku Satō was succeeded by Kakuei Tanaka, who would soon become known by the nickname of the "Shadow Shogun" (Yami-Shōgun). Tanaka was far from a paragon of civic virtue: his tenure would later be infamous for a number of embezzlement scandals, where he was found guilty but never punished; the Japanese Supreme Court would keep these as "open cases", accepting the appeals but never actually processing the case, thus allowing Tanaka to remain free and politically-active. Tanaka had placed himself at the centre of a number of political axes: he has myriad contacts in the American diplomatic corps, had built a political machine in his home region of Niigata through the Etsuzankai association. Tanaka's close ties to the construction industry also meant close cooperation with Yakuza syndicates. His ascension to the post of Prime Minister was the emblematic beginning of the leadership of the right wing of the LDP.
    ---
    [177] Historically, he never sought a career in politics, but would commit ritual suicide after a failed attempt to induce army troops into a coup d'etat.
    [178] IOTL, the grand total was 100, but ITTL the Tatenokai movement grew at a greater rate.
    [179] Historically, the remnants of the URA were arrested after a hostage situation at Asama Sanso Lodge. The trial process after was highly irregular.
     
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    Chapter 78: Il Lupo Perde il Pelo ma Non il Vizio - Italy (Until 1970)
  • The immediate post-war period saw the dissolution of the Italian monarchy and the establishment of a new constitutional order with the establishment of the Italian Republic. This major shift was followed by the most significant election in Italian history. The 1948 election was the first immediate postwar election, and was both a major test of the viability of liberal democracy in Italy, as well as the election that would determine whether Italy, a state strategically located in the centre of the Mediterranean, would be aligned with the Eastern or Western bloc. The two primary groups contesting the election were the Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats; DC) on the right and the Fronte Democratico Popolare per la libertà, la pace, il lavaro (Popular Democratic Front for Freedom, Peace, Labour; FDP) which was comprised of a coalition between the Partito Comunista Italiano (Communist Party of Italy) and the Partito Socialista Italiano (Socialist Party of Italy; PSI). Largely due to the Yalta agreement, the PCI had abandoned armed revolutionary struggle in the post-war, despite the majority of Italian anti-fascist resistance forces being Brigate Garibaldi, PCI-affiliated partisans. The PCI disarmed voluntarily and PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti would even serve as Deputy Prime Minister for a time under the national unity government. By 1947, however, the PCI had been expelled from the government. This left the "salami tactics" used in some Eastern European nations as untenable in Italy, forcing the PCI to seek power through legitimate electoral means. The exclusion from government also created a more adversarial atmosphere in the 1948 election. PCI leadership of the FDP was solidified by the internal split within the PSI as a social democratic faction led by Giuseppe Saragat left the party and joined the Christian Democrat-led coalition. Whilst maintaining strong control of the other parties in its electoral coalition, the PCI did have some difficulty with restraining militant followers concentrated in the triangolo rossa ("Red Triangle") of Emilia-Romagna, as well as the shipyards of Liguria.

    With such high stakes, the 1948 election was also one marked by intensive foreign meddling. The Soviet Union did finance the PCI efforts to a degree, but this was dwarfed by the full-scale campaign mounted by the United States to influence the 1948 election in the favour of the Christian Democrats. The American government funneled millions of dollars to Christian Democrat politicians, of course, but also engaged in a multifaceted psy-ops campaign to sway public opinion. Complementing the Christian Democrat warnings about the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, the United States spread propaganda via radio programs, books, academic papers with false data and conclusions. The Holy See was also strongly involved in the elections. Concerned at the prospect of encirclement by an officially atheist Communist state, the Vatican backed the Christian Democrat slogan "In the secrecy of the polling booth, God sees you - Stalin doesn't" by denouncing Communism and declaring that any Catholic who voted for the PCI should consider themselves excommunicated. The Irish government also funneled money to DC politicians through the Vatican. Perhaps surprisingly, this threat didn't sway some of the most devout rural regions in Italy. Communist support was particularly high in the rural regions of Tuscany, Umbria and Emilia-Romagna. Political scientists have come to the conclusion that this was due to dissatisfaction about the common sharecropping arrangements found in these regions, the mezzadria. The tension between leftist politics and devout Catholicism in the region was notably explored in author Giovanni Guareschi's Don Camillo series, based in the Emilian village of Brescello.

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    Anti-Communist election poster. The text translates to "vote or it will be your master"

    American efforts would pay off. The 1948 election resulted in a victory for the Christian Democrats, who won enough seats to govern alone, but instead formed a coalition government with liberals and republicans. Italy become a founding member of NATO in 1949, and Marshall Plan aid would help revive the economy which had been devastated by the Second World War. The Italian colonial empire ceased to exist, Libya having been given independence under King Idris, and Italian Somaliland was made into a UN Trust Territory under Italian administration until 1960. The per capita economic growth of the 1950s, driven by Marshall Plan aid as well as both fiscal and agrarian reform became known as the "Italian Miracle", as per capita income grew more rapidly than any other European country, despite still being lower than France or Britain by 1960. Despite this rapid growth, the benefits of this newfound economic expansion were distributed highly unevenly. A 1953 parliamentary commission into poverty in Italy found that one quarter of Italian families were "destitute", and that 52% of homes in the mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) had no running water. 43% didn't even have lavatories. There were some efforts to promote development in the South, but this often fell short. What funds were committed to development in the mezzogiorno would predominantly end up in the pockets of corrupt politicians and mafia figures. The concentration of increased prosperity in the industrial North, especially in Lombardy, prompted massive waves of migration from the South to the North. This would create tension between the established "worker aristocracy" and the new "operaio-massa" from the mezzogiorno. The new arrivals were largely excluded from existing labour unions and occasionally tensions would boil over into brawls in industrial workplaces. By the end of the 1960s, there would still be over 4 million Italians who were unemployed, underemployed or casual labourers.

    The mezzogiorno regions issues were exacerbated by the corrosive effect of organised crime on civic and economic life. Nowhere was this more true than in Sicily. On June 12, 1943, after the fall of Pantelleria to Allied troops, a separatist proclamation was made by the so-called Provisional Action Committee that would in the following weeks rebrand itself as the Committee for Sicilian Independence. The main promoter of the initiative was Andrea Finocchiaro Aprile, considered the father of contemporary Sicilian separatism. Whilst there had long been distaste for Italian governance over the island ever since the time of Garibaldi, and there was a strong regional identity, the reality of the Sicilian separatist movement was that despite a handful of genuine believers (such as Aprile), for the most part it was an instrument of the mafiosi that bankrolled the organisation. Ever since Italy's unification, the police power of the Italian state was the biggest obstacle to complete dominance of the entrenched elites (including the Mafia). The fascist regime of Benito Mussolini had been particularly vicious in its suppression of the Cosa Nostra. By supporting the cause of Italian independence, Mafia leaders sought to rid themselves of meddling from the mainland. The Committee for Sicilian Independence also had an armed wing, the Esercito Volontario per l'Indipendenza della Sicilia (Voluntary Army for the Independence of Sicily, EVIS) led by Antonio Canepa (nom de guerre Mario Turri). Canepa viewed Italian governance over the island as a state of "colonial repression". Canepa would give his life for his cause, dying in a shootout with the carabinieri in 1945. Command of EVIS was inherited by Canetto Gallo. Italian troops arrested Gallo and began to chip away at the strength of EVIS, which was largely composed of rural bandits. Negotiations between the government and Sicilian separatists led to a compromise establishing a 'Special Autonomy' to the region, which would have its own legislature and presidency. The Mafia leaders largely withdrew their support for any remaining separatist guerrillas, as the guaranteed autonomy would essentially allow them to co-opt the official power structures anyway. What was left of the separatist movement would peter out after the 1948 election. By the 1960s, the mainland meddling had resumed. The Italian parliament voted in December 1962 for an anti-mafia commission. A year later the Ciaculii Massacre confirmed the need for such action. seven police and soldiers were killed attempting to defuse a car-bomb in a suburb of Palermo. The bomb itself was planted in an assassination attempt on Salvatore Greco, the head of the Sicilian Mafia Commission, within the context of the First Mafia War. This gang war was largely driven by a shift in the economic circumstances caused by rapid urbanisation and the growth of the heroin trade with North America. This conflict claimed 68 lives within the two years from 1961 to 1963. At this time, the mafia was strongly integrated with local politics. The period 1958-1964 would be remembered as "the Sack of Palermo" as mafia-operated construction companies would be granted false contracts in order to embezzle government funds. The notoriously corrupt Mayor of Palermo Salvo Lima and Assessor for Public Works Vito Ciancimino (both of the Christian Democrat party) enabled this corruption.

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    The 'Trinacria', the flag of Sicily depicting a triskeles around a central Gorgoneion

    The 1953 general election was marked by controversy over new electoral rules that had been introduced by the ruling Christian Democrat party. These rules, referred to as the 'Scam Law' by its detractors, established a total monopoly over law-making in the republic for any party which could single-handedly attain 50% of the vote. The Scam Law was opposed not only by the PCI/PSI Popular Front, but also by the smaller parties which were in coalition with the Christian Democrats. In the election, the Christian Democrat-led ruling coalition would attain 49.9% of the vote, only a few thousand votes short of the required supermajority. Despite the comfortable victory, the failure to secure the hoped-for supermajority led to the resignation of Christian Democrat leader De Gaspari. The office of the Prime Minister would be further weakened by a 'musical chairs' of DC Prime Ministers during the rest of the parliamentary term. Amintore Fanfani, the party secretary of the Christian Democrats from 1954 to 1959 would be the most powerful political figure in Italy at this time. Fanfani reorganised and rejuvenated the national party organisation of the Christian Democrats and lessened their dependence on support from the Catholic Church. His vigorous and at times authoritarian style did alienate many conservatives in the party. A significant outcome of this election was that it was the first time that the so-called "Constitutional Arch", the norm of ruling parties only allying with parties which had supported the post-war republican constitution, was broken. Attempting to get over the 50% threshold, the Christian Democrats allied with the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement; MSI). The Christian Democrats had first collaborated with the MSI in the late 1940s to prevent PCI membership on the Roman civic council. Nevertheless, such cooperation was discreet, with the neo-fascists still a fringe political force.

    The 1963 general election further confirmed the shift of Italian democracy to partitocrazia, rule by the parties, as opposed to the executive or the legislature as a whole. This was symbolically represented by the secretary of the Christian Democrats refusing to take the mantle of Prime Minister, preferring to retain the more influential position in the party. The 1963 election was also much more narrow than any of the other post-war elections, with the Popular Front winning 45.2% of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and the right coalition winning 47% of the vote. Whilst falling short of including the MSI in the coalition government, a confidence and supply agreement was reached with the neo-fascists. The MSI was willing to ingratiate itself with the Christian Democrats, having adopted a policy of insertimento ("insertion") seeking to regain lost legitimacy through alliance with the ruling electoral centre-right. The architect of this strategy was Arturo Michalini, who would lead the party from 1954 until the late 1960s. The most hardline fascists in the party, who rejected cooperation with democratic parties regardless of position on the political spectrum, would split off to form their own factions. 1956 saw the formation of the Ordine Nuovo ("New Order"); and the Avanguardia Nazionale ("National Vanguard"). These groups would contribute to the politicised urban violence of the 1970s. The Christian Democrats had come under fire for their dealings with the MSI even before the 1963 election. In March 1960, the MSI had become the sole backer of the minority Tambroni Cabinet, and held a congress in Genoa to celebrate the alliance with the ruling party. Militant anti-fascist protests erupted in the industrial districts of Genoa, and demonstrators clashed with police. Similar events occurred throughout northern towns in the following fortnight. The government would temporarily turn their back on the MSI, banning the congress from taking place. It also caused the resignation of the Tambroni Cabinet, although the DC was able to maintain their hold on power. Nevertheless, the enduring Popular Front between the PSI and PCI left the Christian Democrats with few alternatives when faced with losing ground with the Italian electorate, and as such the MSI were members of the ruling coalition from 1963[180]. The greatest benefactors of this alliance within the Christian Democrat party were the 'rightists' Antonio Segri and Fernando Tambroni, who largely marginalised Amintore Fanfani and his supporters, who had sought in vain to peel the PSI away from the PCI. Notably, both Segri and Tambroni had taken left-wing positions in the past. Like many notables of the Christian Democrat party, they were experienced opportunists.

    As outrage amongst the left-wing elements of the electorate over the DC's marriage to the MSI generated a greater deal of assertiveness against the ruling government, and as general elections appeared to be trending in the direction of an imminent victory by the Communist-led FDP, the Christian Democrat leadership spent much of the period between the 1963 and 1968 elections desperately attempting to divorce the PSI from the PCI, which would split the left vote, ensure the dominance of the DC coalition, and allow the coalition to do away with the troublesome association with the fascist right. Nevertheless, the PSI/PCI alliance stayed strong, the results in the 1963 election having been encouraging, and the noticeable increase in engagement and organisation amongst left-wing supporters throughout the country giving hope to the dream of a left-wing coalition victory in '68. The Christian Democrats were not above dirty tricks in attempting to divide this union: In 1965, the SIFAR intelligence agency was forced to reform into the SID as a result of controversy surrounding an abortive coup, codenamed Piano Solo, which was supposed to concentrate power in the hands of Carabinieri commander General De Lorenzo. The coup never came to fruition, as it very quickly became an open secret among elite circles. Piano Solo became public knowledge in 1967, due to the uncovering of documents related to the plot by investigative journalists Lino Jannuzzi and Eugene Scalfari of the news magazine L'Espresso. Both Jannuzzi and Scalfari were sued for libel by General De Lorenzo[181]. They were both found guilty and sentenced to the maximum punishment of three years of imprisonment. This caused outrage amongst the general public, who saw the authorities at covering up an attempt at subverting democracy. In actual fact, historians now believe that Piano Solo was never a genuine plot to overthrow the government, but rather part of a failed misinformation campaign intended to convince the PSI to join the Christian Democrat-led alliance in order to prevent an anti-democratic coup. Nevertheless, the punishment was blatantly unjust, and the calls to free the L'Espresso journalists would become a common sound at left-wing demonstrations through the late '60s.

    Like many other nations in the so-called "Free World", the tensions of a modernising world, concepts of feminism, racial equality and economic redistribution and the coming-of-age of a generation born after the great conflagrations of the early 20th century would erupt in waves of political action in 1968. This period, the so-called "Sessantotto" was not limited to student occupations of university campuses, but also included demonstrations by jobless farm workers and unrest in the factories of the industrialised north. Conservative and reactionary forces throughout the country sought to intimidate progressives, and the military engaged in sabre-rattling, making apparent an ever-present threat of an imminent coup, only this time for real. Violence broke out in several incidents in 1968, most notably at the Battle of Valle Giulia. In this early clash, far-right and far-left students both occupied the Sapienza University of Rome, with right-wing and left-wing groups occupying different buildings. Members of the Avanguardia Nazionale initiated violence against the police, which soon sucked in left-wing activists into anti-police violence as the state security forces counter-attacked indiscriminately. Hundreds of police and students were wounded, and around 280 students were arrested. Social tensions boiled over into the events of the Autunno Caldo ("Hot Autumn") of 1969. At the very end of 1968, on the 2 December, in the town of Avola near Syracuse, police fired on workers who were demonstrating after the end of negotiations for the renewal of employment contracts, killing two demonstrators. On 9 April 1969, near Battipaglia, Campania, the police shot workers demonstrating against the incoming closure of a tobacco factory, killing a nineteen-year-old worker and a young teacher. Unrest in the mezzogiorno was eclipsed by the scale of industrial rebellion in the north. The student demonstrations in the universities had influenced and somewhat inspired a newfound assertiveness amongst the northern proletariat. Many of these workers had migrated from the mezzogiorno, but with a decrease in the rate of south-north migration, employment in the north was at near 100% levels. This gave the factory employees more boldness in asserting themselves as organised labour. There was a great deal of resentment against the managerial class, who were considered to have exploited the workers for years. The southerners were also disillusioned by the experience of leaving their families to work in the north, only to be able to afford to send back a pittance to their hungry families back home. Furthermore, there was a general angst against the clientelism of the Christian Democrat government and the fail to secure a left-wing government in the 1963 election led the activists to seek extra-electoral means of furthering their political goals. Turin saw a series of wildcat strikes centred on the FIAT factory. The automotive factory workers sought a flat pay increase and the same conditions as white-collar employees. Violence was ever-present at these strikes, and clashes with municipal police were common. A strike against high rents outside the factory gates in Corso Traiano was attacked by riot police, who would be targeted in reprisal attacks by workers and their sympathisers in running battles throughout the city. These strikes took place within the context of heterogenous leftist activism. At times the PCI-affiliated labour league, the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) would support the strikers and the latter would follow their lead. At other times, the workers would organise in autonomist councils in imitation of the student rebels.

    rome-italy-left-and-right-wing-student-battle-with-flag-staffs-on-the-picture-id515536056

    Left and right-wing Roman students clash

    Italy's 'swinging Sixties' would end with a tragic foreshadowing of the violence that would engulf the 1970s. On 12 December 1969, a number of bombs would explode in Italian cities, the most damaging of which detonated at the headquarters of the Banca Nazionale dell'Agricoltura (the National Agricultural Bank) at the Piazza Fontana in Milan. 17 Milanese were killed and 88 wounded. The same afternoon, other bombs would go off in Milan and Rome, and another would be found unexploded. The bombing was initially attributed to anarchists. 80 persons were arrested and suspect Giuseppe Pinelli, an anarchist railway worker, 'fell' from to fourth-floor window of a police station to his death. Another anarchist, Valpreda, and five others were convicted and jailed for the bombings. Years later, it would come to light that the bombings were in truth the actions of fringe neo-fascist militants.
    ---
    [180] IOTL, the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary facilitated the break-up of the Popular Front, as the PCI was unwilling to denounce the Soviet actions. ITTL, the intervention never occurs, therefore the impetus to break up the coalition doesn't exist.
    [181] IOTL, the journalists were acquitted due to the PSI utilising political leverage to free them. This was because the PSI had joined the Christian Democrats after splitting away from their partnership with the PCI.
     
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    Chapter 79: Men Among the Ruins - Italy (Until 1980)
  • Vito Miceli gazed wistfully at the smooth, light and somehow hopeful crema sitting atop his espresso. It irked him somewhat that he was wearing his fedora at the table, even when dining al fresco. It was an unfortunate necessity. He was, after all, the Italy's spymaster. Appearing incognito was somewhat key. Why couldn't the generals tell him to meet somewhere more discreet than damn Saint-Tropez! The French generals were a lot of things, but in his opinion, the worst was their venality, and that is coming from a former Bersaglieri... Miceli always had felt ridiculous wearing those feathers. The junta spent much of their time gallavanting around the French riviera with their mistresses, predominantly would-be starlets that are soon thrown away for younger, bustier models. Miceli reflected that this fact more than any other proves that France and Italy are fraternal nations. The old spy sipped again on his coffee. At least the baristas in this country hadn't all fled abroad alongside the artists and filmmakers.

    "My friend!" Maurice Challe's voice cut through the peaceful quiet like a lightning bolt. "He can't help but make a scene", thought Miceli. In contrast to Miceli's civilian facade, Challe was dressed head to toe in full dress uniform. Subtly was clearly not the order of the day. Miceli's teeth clenched in anger, but his face retained the image of amicable shyness. He stood to shake Challe's hand. "You have somewhere to be?" Miceli joked, seething inside. Challe replied, "you are a representative of another nation, a guest of state!". Miceli wondered how this man could possibly have toppled a government. Surely the alarm bells would have gone off before? Or perhaps he got this kind of confidence only after taking power? Miceli glanced around the room, and one of the waitresses caught his eye. Not because of her admittedly considerable attractiveness, but because of the intentness in her face. A Soviet spy? An American plant? An anarchist? Miceli turned back to Challe. "You... want to speak in detail elsewhere, correct?". A huge grin spread across the tanned face of the aging, but still spry general. "Of course not! You think with such important things to discuss, I would do it here for the whole world to hear?". Exactly what Miceli DID think he would do. "No, come, we speak on the yacht. And do not worry about payment, you could say I'm a regular here". Miceli glanced over at that waitress again, catching her eye. She furtively glanced down and walked over to the other side of the restaurant, picking up a cloth and polishing cutlery. Miceli stood up, following the Frenchman, who strode confidently out of the restaurant. "I really hoped they checked for bugs on this boat" thought Miceli.

    ---

    "Buona notte, Italia" the uniformed man stared into the camera, his thick Triestini accent quivering ever so slightly. "I am Lt. Col Amos Spiazzi, leader of the armed forces of national salvation. As we have all seen, the red threat looming over our Republic has been emboldened. Anarchists and communists murder good law-abiding Italian citizens seemingly without consequence. The decadent politicians who ruled this country did nothing. But Italy is not weak! The beating heart of our country is strong, our bravery and commitment to our way of life is still steadfast as ever. Tonight, real Italians, people of heart and principle, are now leading the Republic. We implore you to stand with us against the criminals, the degenerates and the communist sympathisers working to erode away Italian pride and freedom..."


    The night of 9th December 1970 was a pivotal time in modern Italian politics. After two and a half decades of Italian democracy, the Republic was toppled by a right-wing coup d'etat. Army dissidents under the command of Lt. Col Spiazzi, supported by hundreds of neo-fascist militants from Stefano Delle Chiaie's National Vanguard and members of the Forestry Corps, seized key positions throughout Rome and Milan. Giuseppe Saragat, the President, was kidnapped. National police chief Angelo Vicari, was murdered. The Italian public television broadcaster, RAI, was occupied by the putschists, with Spiazzi broadcasting their message nationwide. The next morning, Saragat was trotted in front of the cameras, forced to resign as president whilst a National Vanguard gunmen stood just out of frame. The Ministry of Defense headquarters, the Quirinale and the Ministry of the Interior headquarters (including its armoury) were also seized. On Spiazzi's orders, his Milan-based battalion marched into Sesto San Giovanni, a stronghold of the PCI inhabited mostly by blue-collar workers. Protests by the locals were met with gunfire.

    Outside of Rome, army units were mobilised and surrounded the various government buildings now occupied by the putschists and settled in for a siege as the coup plotters threaten to kill Saragat and other government employees that had been captured as hostages. In the early hours of the morning of the 12th, French military cargo planes landed at Rome Ciampino airport. French paratroopers disembarked. Confused by the arrival of the French paratroopers, and unwilling to risk conflict with the French, the local military commanders allowed the newcomers to land unimpeded. The French commanders that arrived claimed that they were there in a peacekeeping capacity and travelled to the centre of the city. Italian army commanders were outraged with the unannounced French intervention, and refused to allow the French troops to position themselves between the putschist-occupied buildings and the Italian military. In the meanwhile, a steady stream of French foreign legion troops, armoured cars and tanks were trickling into Rome via Ciampino airport. By this point, the French were sufficiently entrenched at the airport to prevent expulsion without a full-scale attack by Italian forces. Protests to the US embassy by the Italian government representatives fell on suspiciously deaf ears. As talks broke down by the 15th, French troops attacked Italian troops at several points in Rome, opening channels to resupply the putschists who were running low on water and food. The French regime broke their silence on their activities in Rome, claiming that they were there to mediate the shift to a new negotiated government and that the Italian military units besieging the putschists were initially unwilling to do so. The French show of force gave the Italian government no other option than to come to the negotiating table, "mediated" by the French.

    A new constitution was promulgated, banning the PCI. The PSI was allowed to remain to maintain appearances, but would be institutionally marginalised over the next few years. The new President of Italy would be "the Black Prince" Junio Valerio Borghese, a scion of a Sienese noble family who had been a commander in the Italian navy during the Second World War. The man responsible for the development of frogmen commando units, Borghese had established anti-Communist bona fides in his stalwart defense of Veneto against Tito and Italian Communist partisans in 1945. Spirited away by the OSS, he would spend only four years in prison before being released and becoming a major figure in the Italian far-right. Perhaps unsurprising for a member of the aristocracy, Borghese believed in a neo-fascism that was significantly more hierarchical than that of Mussolini's. Borghese ensured that the leaders of multiple neo-fascist groups' leaders were given official positions, whilst the groups themselves would remain to harass political opponents. The coup caused massive protests, particularly in Genoa and Emilia-Romagna. Neo-fascist thugs were shipped in by the trainload to these areas to support police suppression of these protest movements. Hundreds were arrested in the next few days. PCI protests were fired upon, and in response left-wing militants engaged in assassination of police officers and bombings throughout the north of the country. By 1974, attacks by the Brigate Rosse and other left-wing militant groups were increasing in frequency. The PCI had no official connection to these groups, which were often derided by them as being cowards, given that the leadership of the PCI had fled to Prague. Although the Eastern Bloc denied any support for the Brigate Rosse, the left-wing militants were almost always armed with Czechoslovak weapons, the Škorpion SMG becoming emblematic of the left-wing terrorist movement in Europe through its ubiquity.

    Junio_Valerio_Borghese.jpg
    Junio Valerio Borghese shortly after the successful coup

    The regime of Borghese maintained close ties with the French military regime and a friendly, but more distant relationship with the United States. Their staunch anti-Communist stance relieved the US foreign policy establishment, who had long been worried that Italy, which had Western Europe's largest Communist party, could be peeled away from NATO. Italian economic growth slowed significantly during this period. Violence in the streets and the leftist militants' strategy of bombings of banks and other financial infrastructure spooked international capital, reducing the rate of foreign direct investment. There was, however, a greater degree of integration with other European economies, particularly the French and German economies. This allowed some concentrated growth and development in Italy's north, particularly in Lombardy and Liguria, whilst the Italian south remained poor and agrarian. Wealth in the south remained in the hands of organised crime groups such as the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, Neapolitan Camorra and Sicilian Cosa Nostra, which cooperated with the ruling kleptocracy to maintain the wealth inequality and extractive nature of the mezzogiorno's economy. During the late 1970s, a few Brigate Rosse groups from the north migrated to the South. Influenced by Maoist ideology of peasant's war, these cells believed that it was in the south where a peasant insurgency could be ignited in order to bring about revolution more effectively than urban militancy. These groups found some degree of following in the mountainous regions of Basilicata, a region where mass emigration had slowed demographic growth, government neglect had degraded infrastructure, and which had a tradition of political brigandage.
     
    Chapter 80: No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 1)
  • Since 1932, southern Europe's Atlantic outpost of Portugal had been governed by the Novo Estado regime of António de Oliviera Salazar. By 1960, this was the oldest right-wing authoritarian government in Europe. The Salazar government had never seriously considered aligning with the Axis powers, both due to economic dependency on Britain and major ideological differences between the traditionalist Catholic and assimilationist views of the Salazar regime and the race-obsessed Nazi government in Germany. After the Second World War, the Estado Novo was embraced with open arms by NATO despite some misgivings about its anti-democratic governance due to its staunch anti-communism. From the beginning of the 1950s, Salazar began to promote the national character of Portugal as pluricontinentalism, that is, the idea that Portugal as a nation was a product of overseas expansion during the Age of Exploration, and as such that the overseas possessions of Portugal were just as much a legitimate part of the nation as the metropole. The legacy of the once-lucrative spice trade that took the caravels of Portugal around the Cape of Good Hope and all the way to the Far East and back remained in the form of a handful of colonial possessions: Goa had been annexed by India, but Macao, Mozambique, Angola, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde remained under Lisbon's authority. By the 1960s, however, this grip was tenuous. All of these territories began to see political organisation amongst their small educated indigenous class and Salazar had come under intensifying diplomatic pressure from Washington to follow the same decolonisation process in their sub-Saharan African colonies as the British and French had done. A failed coup attempt, the Botelho Moniz coup, was mounted in 1961 with the tacit support of Washington. Consolidating power after this failed putsch, Salazar ramped up the commitment to retaining Portuguese control in the far-flung colonies.

    The struggle for independence in Portugal's West African holdings of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was headed by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, PAIGC), established in 1956. Initially seeking self-determination through peaceful dialogue with the Salazar regime, it rapidly became apparent that Lisbon would not part ways with the territory without violence. The Pidjiguiti Massacre of 1959 was a major turning point for the Bissau-Guinean nationalists; fifty protesting dockworkers were killed by Portuguese troops. This event outraged the indigenous population of the colony and provided a great deal of propaganda value for the PAIGC. Preparing for armed resistance, PAIGC started to establish camps across the border in Guinea-Conakry. In March 1962, PAIGC operatives mounted an abortive attack on the Cape Verdean capital of Praia. Portuguese control of the seaways meant that there would be no further attacks on Cape Verde by PAIGC-aligned militants, but they would have a significant clandestine presence on the island. Many of PAIGC's leaders, including Amílcar and Luís Cabral, were Cape Verdean creoles and maintained strong links with the community. As such, there was a fairly extensive network of informants and saboteurs operating on the archipelago on their behalf.

    amilcar-cabral-1.jpg

    Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC

    In early 1963, hostilities on the Guinea-Bissau mainland commenced. PAIGC militants began to ambush Portuguese patrols. Whilst being poorly-equipped, the raids gradually allowed them to begin accumulating arms and ammunition. The Portuguese troops were taken somewhat by surprise. They had prepared for cross-border raids originating from the camps in Guinea-Conakry, but the initial attacks instead came from within the territory. Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, had ensured that the national liberation forces had ingratiated themselves with the rural peasantry. A trained agronomist who had encountered anti-colonial ideology whilst at university in Lisbon, Cabral ensured that his troops were trained in modern agricultural techniques so that they could give advice to rural farmers, garnering goodwill. They were also ordered that when not engaging in combat operations, to assist with labour on the local plantations, thus earning their food, rather than requisitioning produce by force, an action which would almost certainly turn the population against them. As the war went on, Cabral would also orchestrate a programme of roving markets and hospitals, ensuring that the rural peasantry would have access to goods and medical services that would have been prohibitively expensive if purchased from the colonial-run general stores. PAIGC initially avoided engagement with any Portuguese force beyond platoon level, but nevertheless had consolidated its position in the southern littoral and gained a modest foothold in the north. Initially the independence PAIGC cells were organised around tribal relationships, and as such engaged in occasional abuse when interacting with peasants of neighbouring groups. This horrifies the PAIGC leadership, which recognised how this jeopardised their entire campaign. In 1964, PAIGC held the Cassaca Congress, which restructured the PAIGC cells, bringing them under a central command. The armed rebels were organised into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (Forças Armadas Revolucionárias do Povo, FARP). This change immediately improved discipline amongst the insurgents. All FARP units would be under joint command from both a military commander and a political commissar in order to combat what the PAIGC referred to as "commandism". This made FARP relatively unique amongst national liberation movements in the Third World, where it was typical that the brutalising nature of asymmetrical warfare would precipitate a descent into brigandage.

    In 1964 FARP opened a new front in the north of the country as they consolidated further control of the south. After occupying the estuary island of Como in the south, FARP came under attack from a combined armed offensive from the Portuguese, Operação Tridente, involving all three branches of the Portuguese military. Poor coordination between the branches resulted in slow progress for the Portuguese counteroffensive. A particularly embarassing incident during this battle was the bombing of Portuguese troops by their own planes, which had misidentified them. Some reports suggest that barracks brawls occurred between soldiers and airmen in the aftermath, although these reports cannot be verified. After the recapture of Como, Portuguese forces redeployed to support the besieged garrisons on the peninsulas of Cantanhez and Quitafine. In 1965 the war had spread to the country's east; FARP would have less control over this area than the rest of the country due to the close relationship between the colonial government and the local Fulbe chiefs. Fulbe were also overrepresented in the Portuguese army. In the same year, FARP took action against the only other armed group of any note on the territory, the Struggle Front for the National Independence of Guinea (Frente de Luta pela Independência Nacional da Guiné, FLING). Unlike PAIGC, FLING solely sought independence for Guinea-Bissau, disregarding the Cape Verdean self-determination movement. It maintained close links with the national trade union federation and was largely comprised of Manjak people. Their funding largely originated from the Manjak diaspora in Senegal, Gambia and France. Having rebuffed attempts by the Organisation of African Unity to join a united front with PAIGC, FLING came under attack from PAIGC and was largely crushed, their leaders fleeing to other West African nations such as Cote d'Ivoire. Amílcar Cabral, who had a past as an asset of the Czechoslovak State Security Bureau (StB) also managed to acquire shipments of relatively modern weaponry form the Soviet Union, China, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

    1200px-Combatentes_do_PAIGC_%28FARP%29_com_lan%C3%A7a_granadas_e_pistolas-metralhadoras.png

    FARP guerrillas pose for a photo, Guinea-Bissau (note the Soviet weapons)

    By 1968, when António de Spínola arrived in Portuguese Guinea from Angola, he immediately began to implement a more modern approach to counter-insurgency. At the time of his arrival, PAIGC had by then taken control of two-thirds of the territory. Spínola commenced a construction and infrastrucure-building campaign in order to improve economic development in the hopes that this would begin to improve the Portuguese reputation in the eyes of native peoples. Spínola did, however, also oversee the introduction of new weapons to the conflict; Portuguese bombers started to drop napalm on suspected FARP positions; and the dense forests were attacked with chemical defoliants to limit ambush opportunities for the rebels. Spínola also began the process of "Africanisation" of the Portuguese fighting force in Guinea. Two elite forces comprised of indigenous Africans was established: the Special African Marines and the African Commandoes. The Special African Marines were tasked with riverine operations in order to harass and interdict FARP activity. The African Commandoes were used in 'search-and-destroy' missions and deep-insertion missions. The commandoes were notable for their effectiveness, but also their ruthlessness.

    Improved battlefield performance bolstered operational confidence; Portuguese troops started engaging in bolder actions, including air cavalry infiltration raids and most notably Operation Green Sea: an amphibious raid on the capital of neighbouring Guinea. Operation Green Sea had a couple of objectives, the foremost of which was to free Portuguese POWs who were being held in Conakry. The secondary objectives were, if given the opportunity, to capture Amílcar Cabral and/or Sékou Touré. On the night of 22 November 1970, the Portuguese soldiers landed from several unmarked ships and quickly fanned out to seize several points throughout the capital, facing only ineffectual resistance from local militia. The attackers were unable to locate Sékou Touré, who was hiding in the Presidential Palace, or Amílcar Cabral, who was in Eastern Europe at the time. Half of the raiders then withdrew, a small force of around 200 staying around for some hours afterwards, apparently expecting an uprising by locals against the Sekou-Toure government. When it became clear that such an uprising wasn't coming, this force also withdrew. Almost immediately after Operation Green Sea, Sékou Touré's government started to purge suspected defectors or sympathisers with the opposition, becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of a coup with Portuguese backing. The Portuguese raid was condemned by the United Nations and the Soviets responded by increasingly the provision of advanced armaments to the FARP forces and to the Guinean military, including four Ilyushin Il-4 bombers which were provided to the Bissau-Guinean separatists. Additionally, a permanent Soviet naval force, the West Africa Squadron, was stationed in Conakry to ensure that Portuguese operations in Guinea-Bissau didn't spill over to neighbouring states.

    DC_-_Foto_Iris_No_07_-_Render_da_Guarda_-_Pal%C3%A1cio_do_Governo_-_Bissau.jpg

    Portuguese troops on parade through a colonist settlement, Guinea-Bissau, 1962

    Between August and November 1972, PAIGC held elections in the "liberated zones" to establish regional councils, whose representatives would then elect a National Assembly. Despite only PAIGC candidates being eligible for election, this process was still the most democratic to occur in Guinea-Bissau's history. Previous elections held by the Portuguese had limited suffrage to a mere few thousand who met tax and literacy requirements. By contrast, the 1972 elections saw 78,000 participants. On 20th January 1973, Amílcar Cabral survived an assassination attempt by FARP naval commander Inocêncio Kani (with the assistance of the PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) who intended to start a coup [182]. Kano would be executed along with ten other conspirators. On 24th September 1973, PAIGC unilaterally declared the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which was recognised by an overwhelming majority of the UN General Assembly. Amílcar Cabral would be the first President of the infant nation.

    ---

    [182] IOTL, Amílcar Cabral was killed and his brother Luís would become President of the new republic.
     
    Chapter 81: The One Who Throws the Stone Forgets; The One Who is Hit Remembers Forever - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 2)
  • Unlike the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, Angola's war of independence was characterised by the factionalism of the resistance movements. The three primary parties involved, the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA, were notable not only for their willingness to fight each other rather than just the colonial occupiers, but also their tendency to shift their patronage constantly, limiting their ability to maintain a strong relationship with overseas backers. Furthermore, the discovery of large off-shore oil reserves partway through the war ensured that the meddling of foreign powers was everpresent.

    Recognising a higher degree of unrest amongst the native traditional rulers of Angola, in 1951 the Portuguese government changed the status of the territory, from a formal "colony" of Lisbon into a "overseas province". Despite this shift, governance of Angola remained under the control of a white-operated government bureaucracy, with only local input required from traditional native leaders. This was seen as a particular affront in the northwest of Angola, in the territories that had once made up the Kingdom of Kongo. In 1954, the União dos Povos do Norte de Angola (Union of Peoples of Northern Angola, UPA) was established under the leadership of Holden Roberto, a descendant of Bakongo royalty. Despite the name, the UPA was almost entirely comprised of Bakongo people, seeking to resurrect their independence from Portugal, with little consideration for the other Angolan peoples. Two years later, the Angolan Communist Party and the Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola merged to form the Movimento Popular de Liberação de Angola (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA). The MPLA drew its ranks primarily from Luanda's urban intelligentsia and the Ambundu people who lived on territories centred around Luanda and the Cuanza river. These Ambundu were the historical heirs to the legacy of the Ndongo Kingdom, but the MPLA promoted a message of unity between the various peoples of Angola, including (at least rhetorically) a willingness to accept Angolans of European descent into their organisation.

    On January 3, 1961, the tensions that were building up in Angola came to a head. Agricultural workers employed by Belgian-Portuguese cotton plantation operation Cotonang staged a protest in Baixa de Cassanje demanding an improvement in working conditions. The demonstrators would go as far as beating Portuguese traders that were onsite. Spontaneous shows of support broke out in nearby settlements, and was suppressed by a Portuguese terror-bombing campaign which targeted twenty surrounding villages. The MPLA claimed that the death toll was 10,000, and while this is most likely an exaggeration, historical estimates range between 400 and 7,000 dead native Angolans. A couple of days later, the Portuguese liner Santa Maria was seized by operatives of the Iberian Revolutionary Liberation Directorate (DRIL) operating under the command of Henrique Galvão, a military officer and general secretary of DRIL's Portuguese branch. Intending to establish an opposition Portuguese government in Angola, he was instead forced to redirect to Brazil, liberating the crews and passengers in exchange for political asylum. Between the fourth and tenth of January, a number of armed incidents took place in Luanda. Whilst the exact details are unclear, with several parties having given contradictory accounts, there were a number of attacks on police by black militants armed with machetes, followed by a police response in black-majority neighbourhoods in the city. Some claim that the police response was also accompanied by lynchmobs of white settlers, whereas others claim this to be a fabrication intended to strain relations between the communities. Responsibility for the initial attacks was claimed by the MPLA, although the Portuguese secret police claimed that a local nationalist priest was behind the incident.

    On March 15, the UPA staged a major uprising in the Bakongo territories; farmers and coffee plantation workers took up arms and what ensued was a slaughter. A thousand white settlers were killed, along with thousands more native workers, mostly ethnic Ovimbundu people from the central highlands, who were in the north as contract labourers. Arson attacks were carried out on police stations, plantations, ferries and many other targets. Journalists published images of raped and mutilated white settlers in newspapers in the metropole and throughout the rest of the colony, manufacturing consent for a heavy-handed response from the military. Later testimony also claimed that some UPA forces engaged in cannibalism of killed Portuguese soldiers. Whilst there were plenty instances of farms and smaller hamlets being completely overrun, many of the Portuguese settlers in the area retreated into regional hubs and entrenched themselves, forming militias in order to rebuff the disorganised assaults from the untrained insurrectionists. These militias would afterwards be organised into the Organização Provincial de Voluntários de Defesa Civil (OPVDC), a paramilitary force tasked with settlement defense and auxiliary support for the Portuguese regular military. This caught Roberto and the rest of the UPA leadership by surprise, as they expected the white settler population of the region to flee in panic. It is worth noting that this revolt wasn't simply an anti-colonial rebellion; it was an attempt by the UPA leadership to reassert political and economic authority over the northern regions. Attacking Ovimbundu contract workers with the same savagery as white colonists, the UPA insurrectionists sought to create conditions of Bakongo supremacy in the former Kongo territories.

    On July 10, after having reoccupied some of the smaller northern towns, the Portuguese military commenced Operação Viriato to conquer the town of Nambuangongo, which had become the UPA headquarters. Converging on the town along three axes, the Portuguese occupied the town a month after the commencement of the operation. The Portuguese also captured the village of Quipedro to interdict the UPA's line of retreat from Nambuangongo. The attack on Quipedro was achieved through an airborne assault which took the revolters by suprise and resulted in the capture of the village without effective resistance. Attempting to provide a carrot to go along with the stick, on August 6 the Novo Estado adopted the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of the Provinces of Guinea, Angola & Mozambique, giving all indigenes equal citizenship rights and obligations as ethnic Portuguese. On 16th September, the UPA's last base in northern Angola, Pedra Verde, was captured by Portuguese troops in Operação Esmeralda. The UPA had no choice but to flee over the border to Congo, the Portuguese having killed 20,000 in this suppression campaign. Despite some misgivings about the UPA's refusal to adopt pan-Africanist ideology, Lumumba's government nevertheless allowed the UPA to establish bases on their side of the border in order to harass the Portuguese colonialists. The 9th October also saw a small incident that would have major consequences for the future of Angola: a UPA patrol took 21 MPLA personnel prisoner and executed them, precluding any chance of cooperation between the two resistance groups. After fleeing to Congo, the UPA merged with the Democratic Party of Angola and renamed itself the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA).

    February 1962 saw the establishment of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE) in Congo, with Holden Roberto as its President and Jonas Savimbi as Foreign Minister. Later that same year, an MPLA congress replaced General-Secretary Viriato da Cruz with Agostinho Neto. Da Cruz and Neto had clashed on several occasions, particularly on the subject of the racial composition of the party. Da Cruz, despite being of mixed ancestry himself, wanted to reserve a number of party seats for black African members. Whilst there was some diversity amongst MPLA ranks, the leadership, being drawn from the Luanda intelligentsia, was predominantly mestiço. In the enclave of Cabinda in the north, 1963 saw the merging of three nationalist groups into the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) which began low-level engagements with Portuguese security forces, mostly police. Their cause was bolstered diplomatically by the declaration of Cabinda as an independent state by the Organisation of African Unity. Nevertheless, they would pose very little threat to the Portuguese military. Dialogue did however, commence between the government of Congo and the FLEC.

    In 1964, frustrated by Holden Roberto's unwillingness to spread the guerrilla operations of the FNLA outside of the Bakongo territories, his insistence on refusing support from the Soviet Union and China, and the lack of a political programme, Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA and relocated to China with some supporters. Meanwhile, the MPLA started slowly building up its strength, receiving armaments from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic. Relative to the more unified and effective FARP in Guinea-Bissau, the MPLA received only older surplus weaponry, particularly from the GDR. Whereas the image of the AK-47-toting militant may have been associated with the various national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it was far more common in Angola to see MPLA insurgents armed with old Mauser bolt-action rifles. In May of 1966, Daniel Chipenda of the MPLA established a new area of operations, the Eastern Front, almost doubling the MPLA's reach. Jonas Savimbi, returning from China, establishing the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) in a conference at Moxico province in the southeast on March 13. UNITA would commence armed operations on Christmas Day, derailing trains passing along the Benguela railway at Teixiera de Sousa, on the border with Rhodesia-Nyasaland. Immediately UNITA had an impact, with their forces being much better-led and trained than either FNLA or MPLA guerrillas. UNITA operations along this railway would especially frustrate the leadership of the neighbouring white-ruled Central African Federation, which relied on the Benguela railway to bring its copper exports to a port where it could reach foreign markets. The following year, UNITA would be successful in two more major derailings along this line, although increasing pressure from the Portuguese military in the region caused Savimbi to himself relocate to Cairo. Savimbi also established some contacts with Portuguese intelligence, where he would pass on information about the location of MPLA bases in order to undermine his pro-Soviet rivals.

    May of 1968 saw FNLA fighters cross for the first time into Eastern Angola. By this time, it was clear that Eastern Angola would become an important battlefield, allowing any group which controlled this region to monopolise the control of blood diamonds in this area, as well as to interfere with the ability of their rival rebel groups to get support from their neighbours such as Congo and Rhodesia-Nyasaland. As may be expected by an organisation that was so strongly tied to one particular ethnic group, the FNLA operations in Eastern Angola were typically brutal, aimed at control of diamond production and with little care for the wellbeing of the local populations. In October, the Portuguese mounted Operação Vitória to root out MPLA bases in the east. Portuguese forces also managed to capture important documents that revealed the position of various other MPLA troops positions. For their part, the MPLA did also discreetly pass on the location of FNLA patrols to Portuguese troops. Despite the continued operation of the rebel forces, by this point in the war the momentum was clearly in the favour of the Portuguese. All separatist forces were secretly sending intel on their rivals to the Portuguese, and the colonial forces were also increasingly utilising the most modern counterinsurgency techniques. Whilst elements of the Portuguese command still distrusted African troops, there was an increase in recruitment of them, as other notable figures in the army such as Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes promoted their use, claiming that they're cheaper than European troops, more accustomed to the local climate and terrain and better able to develop relationships with local communities. The PIDE even established its own elite paramilitary force, the Flechas (Portuguese for Arrows) comprised predominantly of Khoisan bushmen. Specialising in covert operations, close quarters combat, desert warfare, jungle warfare, and virtually all other skillsets that would later come to be known as "black operations", these forces didn't operate under the command of the army but where entirely an instrument of the Portuguese secret police. They were particularly feared due to their brutality and their ability to sudden strike with no warning. Some of the more superstitous rebels even believed them to have supernatural powers garnered from black magic, a reputation that the PIDE didn't try to dispel. The regular military established Battle Group Sirocco, a highly mobile task force assisted by a dedicated air cavalry arm that would engage in rapid response operations throughout Eastern Angola. Whilst at the onset of the colonial war, the Portuguese forces had somewhat struggled to find their footing due to their initial composition as a component of overall NATO, and later LDO command, by the late 1960s they were well-versed in irregular combat in difficult terrain. In response, the rebel forces were forced to begin former larger squadrons in order to have any combat effectiveness at all. The MPLA began operating squadrons of 100 to 145 militants rather than the old platoon-sized cells. Armed with 60mm and 81mm mortars provided by the USSR, they were limited to attacks on small outposts and patrols, but were unable to make any real notable headway. To make matters worse for the MPLA, in 1972 South African Defense Force (SADF) units began engaging them in Moxico province with Portuguese consent. Operating through Rhodesia-Nyasaland, the SADF forces were there to take revenge for MPLA support for the South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) which operated in the territory of South-West Africa, which South Africa administered initially under trusteeship but had de facto annexed despite condemnation from the United Nations. The SADF campaign forced the MPLA out of Moxico province. The combined Portuguese and South African offensives in the east effectively pushed the MPLA out of that territory. This turn of events precipitated infighting amongst the leadership of the MPLA. Neto and 800 of his fighters retreated into Congo, whilst Chipenda began secret negotiations with the Soviets to shift their support away from Neto.

    On 17th March, 1,000 FNLA fighters mutiny at camps in Kinkuzu within Congolese territory, but were suppressed by Congolese troops on behalf of FNLA leadership. In 1973, Daniel Chipenda left the MPLA, and forming a rival group, the Revolta do Leste (Eastern Revolt) with 1500 followers and covert Soviet and South African support (motivated by the desire to further undermine the MPLA). Despite Soviet support, he was privately wary of Soviet influence, and strongly opposed to the mestiço leadership of the MPLA. Later that year, Neto was invited to Moscow and told that Chipenda planned to assassinate him. These events have raised some speculation that Soviet support for the Eastern Revolt was part of a KGB operation seeking to maintain MPLA integrity by passing along information about rivals to Neto. China also shifted aid away from MPLA, sponsoring UNITA but also the FNLA, presumably in order to undermine the pro-Soviet MPLA. 1973 saw another split in MPLA, with founder Mário Pinto de Andrade clashing with Neto and establishing their own group, the Revolta Activa. Neto managed to reassert his authority soon thereafter, with Pinto de Andrade fleeing to Guinea-Bissau. The Revolta do Leste merged with FNLA. The internecine fighting amongst the rebel groups would have almost certainly lead to eventual victory for the Portuguese colonial forces, but events in the metropole changed the destiny of Angola and left the nation's future in the hands of these warring factions.

    Disparities between the settler population and indigenous Africans was even more severe in Mozambique. Under the Estado Novo regime, indigenous farmer were compelled to produce cash crops such as cotton for export, forcing them in many instances to forage or to buy food at raised prices from ethnic Portuguese farmers, whilst selling their cash crops at reduced rates, despite living on arable land that would otherwise be able to sustain their nutritional needs without issue. Over a quarter of a million native Mozambicans also worked in Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa (in the latter, they comprised over 3/10s of underground miners) and were heavily taxed by the Mozambique colonial administration for their remittances. In 1950, out of a total indigenous Mozambican population of over 5 and a half million, a mere 4,000 or so natives possessed voting rights. Rates of ethnic intermixing were also the lowest in Mozambique of all the Portuguese colonies, by 1960 only numbering around 31,000. This number also underscores the vast degree of segregation between native and settler communities, which resembled the conditions in neighbouring South Africa more so than in Angola or Cabo Verde. The Liberation Front of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) was established in 1962 in Zanzibar [183] under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, a historian and sociologist who had briefly worked as a professor at New York's Syracuse University. FRELIMO had been created as a union of a number of smaller, disparate independence movements which had sprouted up, inspired by the pan-African liberation movements and the newfound independence of several states which had once been under British, French and Belgian rule. FRELIMO was initially completely reliant on support from friendly regimes, as the Estado Novo's ruthless intelligence apparatus had forced the Mozambique independence movement into exile. FRELIMO guerrillas were allowed to train (with Chinese assistance) and operate from bases in southern Tangyanika. With only around 7,000 fighters, a conventional victory against the Portuguese was a hopeless proposition; but a protracted guerrilla war had potential to force Lisbon to the negotiating table.

    1964 saw the first FRELIMO attacks in Mozambique, negotiations with the Portuguese having proven fruitless. FRELIMO guerrillas, with assistance from the local population, attacked the administrative post at Chai in Cabo Delgado province. The monsoon season and the poor infrastructure and rough terrain of Northern Mozambique posed severe difficulties for colonial troops pursuing the guerrillas. After the initial attacks were confined to the north, FRELIMO began to mount attacks in Central Mozambique too, around Tete and Niassa. Guerrilla actions by FRELIMO were typically mounted by units no larger than 15 men, and widely dispersed in order to prevent the Portuguese from concentrating their forces. These widespread actions were largely able to be accomplished utilising the Ruvuma and Lugenda rivers to redeploy and supply units throughout the north. Lake Malawi, however, was largely off-limits due to the hostility of Rhodesia-Nyasaland to the Mozambique self-determination struggle [184]. In 1965, with popular support for FRELIMO growing and a successful recruiting drive, FRELIMO strike teams began to increase in size. The insurgents also began to lay landmines behind them as they withdrew after strikes, pulling pursuing forces into minefields. This had the impact of increasing casualty rates as well as demoralising the colonial forces.

    By 1967, FRELIMO had de facto control of vast swathes of the north, comprising one-fifth of the total landmass of Mozambique and containing one-seventh of the population. Mondlane began looking for more foreign support, the success of the guerrilla movement now requiring more guns, ammunition and training for new recruits. He secured support from the Soviets, Chinese and East Germans, who predominantly sent WWII-vintage weapons, along with some tactical rocket batteries. One of the Portuguese responses to the growing insurgency was an increase in rural development, seeking to turn local support in their favour by improving infrastructure. The most notable of these infrastructure projects was the Cahora Bossa Dam, construction of which began in 1969. Aside from its practical functions, the dam was also intended to symbolise the permanence of the Portuguese colonial project. Three thousand troops and a million landmines were sent to defend the construction site. This proved sufficient to defend the project from multiple attacks from FRELIMO forces, although the guerrillas had occasional success at interdicting supply convoys, delaying construction somewhat.

    In 1969, Mondlane was killed by a mailbomb sent to his office in Dar Es Salaam. The assassination is believed to have been orchestrated by Aginter Press, the Portuguese branch of the Gladio system of stay-behind networks in Western Europe. Lazaro Kavandame, the FRELIMO commander of Cabo Delgado province who had been openly critical of Mondlane, was suspected to be involved. He handed himself in to the Portuguese in order to prevent execution by his former allies. After a short period of internal discord, Samora Machel would be appointed the new president of the organisation. Under Machel, FRELIMO would continue its leftward political shift at an accelerated pace. A change in the command situation of the Portuguese forces, with General Kaúlza de Arriaga taking over from General António Augusto dos Santos in 1970 marked a profound shift in Portuguese strategy. de Arriaga had little faith in the effectiveness of African soldiers under colonial command, and as such largely replaced them with regular Portuguese troops from the metropole, with small numbers of native auxiliaries. This approach didn't prove any more effective than dos Santos' tactics, and under pressure from his subordinates, most notably his second-in-command General Francisco da Costa Gomes, authorised the use of native flecha units. Costa Gomes believed that the indigenisation of the Portuguese colonial army was necessary in order to win the "hearts and minds" of the indigenous population, and would help limit the issues of adaption to local conditions which many draftees from the metropole experienced. During the early 1970s, FRELIMO's combat actions also spread to urban centres, further broadening the scope of the anticolonial insurgency. June 1970 saw the most major offensive of the war, Operation Gordian Knot. Involving some 35,000 Portuguese troops, the seven-month operation targeted cross-border infiltration routes and insurgent bases in the north. To this day, the effectiveness of Operation Gordian Knot is a matter of debate. At the time it was seen as a failure, with the monsoon season and a lack of effective cooperation between ground and air forces seeing the Operation fall short of its expected results. Nevertheless, it did severely weaken the ability of FRELIMO to hold many territories long-term and significantly weakened the offensive potency of FRELIMO guerrillas. On December 16, 1972, the massacre of the entire civilian population of the village of Wiriyamu by Portuguese forces started to shift public opinion in the metropole about the war in Mozambique. By this point, the various wars in the Portuguese colonies were taking up 40% of Portuguese GDP and as such was applying major stress to the already (by Western European standards) weak Portuguese economy. Whilst FRELIMO forces also sometimes engaged in brutality against native villages, none of their atrocities compared to the slaughter at Wiriyamu.

    By 1973 the Portuguese were attempting to sever FRELIMO from their local support networks by establishing resettlement villages. FRELIMO had adopted a completely opposite policy towards Portuguese settlers. Whilst Mondlane had promoted a policy of mercy for European settlers, Machel had a far harsher views towards the white population. Despite the fact that the Portuguese were still in control of the majority of Mozambican territory, the difficult situation for the Portuguese was summed up by comments from a Portuguese journalist: "In Mozambique we say there are three wars: the war against FRELIMO, the war between the army and the secret police, and between the central government [and the settlers]". The spiralling situation in the colonial possessions contributed to the unrest in the Portuguese home territories which would eventually result in the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire on mainland Africa.

    ===
    [183] Historically, this organisation was founded in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. ITTL, where Tangyanika and Zanzibar are separate nations, this organisation was founded instead in Zanzibar.
    [184] IOTL, FRELIMO was able to utilise Lake Malawi for movement and resupply due to Malawi's support of the movement. ITTL, Malawi (Nyasaland) is still a part of the Central African Federation.
     
    Chapter 82: Quem Brinca com Fogo, Quiema-se - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 3)
  • With a lack of economic growth at home; expensive commitments to conflicts in the far-flung colonial empire; and growing discontent at the conscription of young men from the middle and lower classes of the population to fight in tropical backwaters, the Estado Novo regime was buckling under the stresses of multiple concurrent crises. Since 1968, when Salazar had suffered a stroke that left him incapable of governing, Marcelo Caetano had taken the post of Prime Minister at an unenviable time. Western Europe was in a time of transition; democracy had been snuffed out in France, uncertainty loomed about the future of the government of aging Francisco Franco in neighbouring Spain, and plans of an abortive coup by the Italian elite in the piano solo scandal had deepened the ever present divides in that country. Caetano was a loyalist of Salazar, sure, but he hoped that he would be able to steer Portugal towards sustained economic growth. The key to this, in his mind, was the effective exploitation of the underdeveloped resources in the African colonies, most notably Angola. Offshore oil reserves could, in theory, be exploited to achieve energy independence, or something approaching it, and prevent future oil shocks (like the ones that briefly shook Western economies during the fall of the Saudi kingdom and the nationalisation of ARAMCO) from retarding Portuguese economic growth. With this rational, it was never optional that Portugal retain control of Angola and Mozambique, no matter the cost. There were political reasons for maintaining control of the colonies also; under Salazar a corporatist economic policy had been pursued. This left many major industries in the hands of a few well-connected and very wealthy families. Much of this industry was fuelled by the sale or use of raw materials from the colonies. Cash crops such as bananas, cashews, coconuts and specialist timber were produced in the African colonies, as well as industrially-useful metals, diamonds and even cement. The loss of these resources would disproportionately impact the large conglomerates, and anger the well-off and politically-connected elites. They could prove a dangerous enemy indeed, and had in the past been amongst the most ardent supporters of the Estado Novo. The military were another pillar of the Estado Novo which couldn't tolerate failure in Africa. As is typical of militaries, the esteem of their upper echelons was largely dependent on military success. The nationalistic tendencies of the old guard at the top, as well as their anti-communist paranoia, made them a steadfast supporter of the Estado Novo in the past, but any admission of defeat in Africa would quickly turn them against whoever held power. It is for these reasons that despite some softening of his predecessor's policies, such as the introduction of a monthly pension to rural labourers, loosening of restrictions on the press and the authorisation of the first democratic labour union since the 1920s, Caetano committed, by 1974, a full 40% of the national budget to the colonial conflagrations. As the country had become politically polarised, particularly after the Wiriyamu Massacre, thousands of left-wing and anti-war Portuguese fled abroad, primarily to the United States, establishing a notable diaspora centred around Connecticut [185].

    Whilst the brain drain caused by the exodus of anti-government middle class Portuguese wasn't ideal, a much more serious threat to the regime emerged: the Movimento das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Movement; MFA). The MFA was an organisation of junior officers who had been alienated by the Caetano government. There were a couple of major points of contention with government policy; whilst many were disillusioned with the overall policies of the regime, the major catalyst for the establishment of the MFA was a change to military recruitment policy, where local militia officers in the colonies were given the same status as military academy graduates when it came to promotions. This policy had been adopted by the Novo Estado regime on the advice of the leaders of Rhodesia-Nyasaland, as a method to reduce costs for the military. Resented by the academy graduates for obvious careerist reasons, it was also risky in that it could result in an officer corps without the theoretical and technical knowledge required should a wider war break out in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The principal aims of the MFA was a retreat from the losing wars in Africa, the introduction of free elections and the disestablishment of the secret police, the PIDE.

    The MFA would finally see its opportunity come in February 1974; Prime Minister Caetano relieved General António de Spínola from command of Portuguese forces in Guinea. This decision was prompted by de Spínola's criticism of the government's colonial policy and officer recruitment approach. The publication of de Spínola's book Portugal and the Future was poorly received by Caetano, who began to see de Spínola's public commentary as akin to insubordination. This was highly controversial, and the MFA began to prepare for a coup. On the night of 24 April, the coup began, with MFA-aligned military units seizing key points around the country. With most of the non-MFA aligned military overseas, there was little resistance. Politically-centrist officers who weren't members of the MFA quickly threw in their lot with the coup. Despite radio broadcasts from the MFA leaders asking citizens to stay at home, spontaneous demonstrations in support of the coup popped up throughout the capital. Lisbon's flower market was a central focal point of these demonstrations. The sight of soldiers with carnations in their gun barrels inspired the name "Carnation Revolution". Seeing popular support for the insurgents, the Caetano government capitulated. Prime Minister Caetano and President Tomás were exiled to Brazil.

    carnation-revolution.jpg

    Portuguese soldiers during Carnation Revolution
    Events moved quickly after the fall of Caetano; whilst de Spínola believed the overthrow of the government was supposed to be a 'renovation', various groups quickly seized the opportunity to further their own agendas. The coercive apparatuses of the Novo Estado were abolished, but suddenly shops were occupied by workers, hospitals by lower-level employees and nurses, and even private farmlands were in some places occupied by labourers. This raised the spectre of a potential socialist revolution in the minds of more centrist and conservative-leaning people. Even government offices were occupied by disaffected bureaucrats. Leftist political elements sought to manipulate the outcome of the revolution. Mário Soares of the Socialist Party and Álvaro Cunhal of the pro-Soviet Communist Party returned from exile. At this time who actually governed Portugal was unclear. de Spínola headed a provisional government as interim president, choosing a broad-based provisional government which would nominally rule. The prime minister of this provisional government was the moderate independent Adelino da Palma Carlos who was selected as not to favour any of the constituent parties: the centre-left Partido Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Party, PPD), the Socialist Party and the Portuguese Communist Party. Other organisations also wielded considerable power in the immediate post-revolution, however. One of these groups was the National Salvation Junta, comprised of high-ranking, moderate military officers. The Junta worked alongside a coordinating committee that was made up of decidedly more radical junior officers. The most powerful group that emerged was the MFA itself, which established the Continental Operations Command (COPCON), a 5,000 strong elite force headed by Colonel Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. COPCON was the most powerful security force in metropolitan Portugal, and was strongly under the command of the left-wing Col. Otelo (as he was known to the public due to his unusual first name, taken from the Shakespeare character Othello). Alarm bells began ringing in Washington, Paris and Madrid, as it appeared a matter of time before the Communist Party would attempt to seize power via COPCON.

    tomada-de-posse-de-antonio-de-spinola_1482165601.jpg

    General Antonio de Spínola addressing media

    Mid-July saw the appointment of another provisional government by de Spínola, who appointed Colonel Vasco Gonçalves as Prime Minister. Gonçalves would head four provisional governments between July 1974 and September 1975, and whilst starting out as a moderate, would gradually be influenced by leftist elements and would get more and more radical. de Spínola was forced to accept the independence of the African colonies, despite his writings having encouraged a pluricontinentalist Portugal. The first of the African colonies to achieve independence was Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in early September. In late September, de Spínola tried to seize power but was blocked by COPCON and resigned. General Francisco da Costa Gomes would succeed de Spínola as president. Portuguese politics continued its leftward drift, with the MFA dominating the provisional government and the Communist Party consolidating control over trade unions. Having appealed to the 'silent majority', de Spínola attempted an abortive counter-revolution on 11 March 1975. With the failure of this coup, de Spínola fled to Brazil, leading the far-right paramilitary Exército de Libertação de Portugal (Army of Liberation of Portugal, ELP) from exile. Using de Spínola's failed putsch as an excuse, the Junta of National Salvation was abolished and the Council of the Revolution was formed as the most powerful governing body. The new government implemented a broad nationalisation plan, including the banks and large conglomerates. This nationalisation wave was so extensive that it 70% of GDP came to be produced under government-owned businesses.

    Elections were held on 25 April 1975. The most successful party in the elections was the Socialist Party, which won 38% of the vote. The PPD received 26%. By contrast, the Communist Party won only 12% of the vote, much lower than was expected by the communists or their supporters in the MFA. These results showed an overwhelming preference for moderate, democratic parties amongst the Portuguese electorate. Whilst the majority of the military were in favour of democratic governance, the more radical elements of the MFA forced the PPD and Socialist Party to maintain certain policies regardless of the electoral outcomes. The immediate aftermath of the elections saw violence in the countryside, especially in the southern Alentejo region. Landless labours seized the large agricultural estates of the region, transforming them into collective farms. The north saw attempts at the same actions, but were repulsed by the conservative smallholders of the region, which established armed militias who engaged in violent retribution against leftists and labour agitators. ELP cells in the north took advantage of the situation, bombing the offices of trade unions and the Socialist and Communist parties. In mid-July the PPD and the Socialist Party withdrew from the government in protest to the ultimatums of the radical wing of the MFA, taking all popular legitimacy from the fourth provisional government. As their hold over government began to ever slightly slip away as a result of the electoral success of the liberal democratic parties, the Communist Party began to hold democracy in open contempt. They maintained control over the largest trade union confederation in the country, Intersindical, and began to prepare for a seizure of power. Over the border, Spanish forces started preparing for a potential intervention to prevent a bolshevik-style takeover, and the French regime starting sending small tank and commando units across Spain in an attempt to augment such an intervention force, under the pretense of maintaining the Alliance Fraternelle des Nations Occidentales (Fraternal Alliance of Western Nations, FAWN), colloquially known as the 'Paris Pact', of which Portugal had been a founding member. US financial assistance for the democratic parties also began trickling in through clandestine channels. Increasing differences of opinion within the MFA would bring down the fifth provisional government, and Gonçalves with it. A sixth provisional government was formed, led by Admiral José Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo. This government did include the Socialists and PPD as well as representatives from the Communist Party. Mozambique and Angola were granted independence, finally ending the colonial wars (or at least, Portugal's involvement in them). Stability was not achieved quite yet, however. Under the pretense of a left-wing takeover of a radio station, a coup by military units under Col. Otelo was mounted on the 25th November. They sought to outflank and surround leftist military units in the capital, but COPCON had received warning ahead of time and mounted an ambush and counter-attacked that pushed Otelo's forces to a cordon outside of Lisbon [186]. 1st December saw Franco-Spanish forces cross the border to intervene in Portugal. Meeting no resistance until their arrival at the capital, French tank units broke through the improvised defensive lines around Lisbon in a matter of hours. Spanish troops largely maintained a cordon outside of Lisbon, with military units commanded by right-wing Portuguese officers and French commandoes entering the city centre and securing a COPCON surrender in exchange for criminal amnesty. The COPCON military units were dissolved and its officers stripped of their ranks and titles, but there were not reprisal killings. The most notable violence occurred when demonstrators from Intersindical were engaged in demonstrations against the intervention, and, after a molotov cocktail was thrown at a French tank by a particularly bold demonstrator, a volley of gunfire was fired over the heads of the unionists to scatter them. A handful of ricochets off of nearby buildings injured 3 demonstrators. No soldiers were injured in the molotov attack.

    TELEMMGLPICT000266100857_trans_NvBQzQNjv4BqHbjPJshV32uEwMQGn_XUZs7nHI9NZGXgs5vEJup6AP8.jpeg

    Portuguese soldier loyal to putschists overlooking demonstrators in Lisbon, 1975
    A new constitution was promulgated and a new provisional government established under de Spínola. The new consitution committed to the return of nationalised property to its owners, the disestablishment of non-government sponsored trade unions, and outlawing of the Communist Party. Multiparty democracy was nominally allowed, however the President would maintain broad executive powers including the ability to veto any bill before it passes into law. Portugal's commitment to the Paris Pact was also reiterated. At the far-western end of continental Europe, a glimmer of hope for democracy had shone briefly, but was extinguished by the intervention of foreign powers, for whom Portugal was merely a small piece of their far grander designs.
    ===

    [185] This diaspora does exist OTL, and has been augmented by Brazilians moving to the area also, but ITTL, it is larger as a result of none of the left-wing activists fleeing to France due to the military junta in power there.
    [186] Historically, this encirclement attempt was successful and COPCON surrendered without a real fight.
     
    Chapter 83: The More Changes, the More Stays the Same - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 4)
  • Posturing and positioning between the various factions of the Angolan conflict began before the ink had even dried on the agreement for independence. July 1975 saw the expulsion of FNLA-aligned fighters from Luanda by the MPLA. All sides acknowledged that the force that controlled the capital would have the strongest claim to leadership. The Alvor Accords, which had been signed in January and had encouraged the creation of a coalition government, was thrown on the pyre before it ever had a chance to be honoured. By August, the MPLA controlled 11 of 15 provincial capitals, although the FNLA and UNITA remained in control of wide swathes of the countryside. Angered by MPLA support for the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and concerned about the possible establishment of Soviet military bases in Angola in the event of a total MPLA victory, South African forces intervened on 23 October. The bulk of South African forces were in Task Force Zulu composed of Combat Group Alpha which, alongside South African special forces, also included detachments of formerly Portuguese-commanded flechas, the "Caprivi Bushman" battalion of Khoisan troops from South West Africa, armoured cars, a mortar platoon and a 140mm artillery battalion; and Combat Group Bravo under the command of Biafran War veteran Jan Breytenbach which included a battalion of forces loyal to Daniel Chipenda, whose Eastern Revolt had defected to the FNLA, as well as armoured cars and 25mm and 140mm howitzers. Alongside Task Force Zulu the South Africans also deployed three independent combat groups: Foxbat, the bulk of which was made up of several hundred UNITA infantrymen, alongside armoured cars, 3 anti-tank missile vehicles and two .50 cal machine gun-equipped Landrovers; Orange, which had a UNITA battalion, a South African motorised infantry company, a South African medium machine gun platoon, 140mm artillery and an armoured car squadron; and X-Ray, the most lightly-armed of the combat groups, with one UNITA battalion, a SADF infantry company and supporting armoured cars without artillery support.

    4027CFD200000578-0-image-a-70_1494414603253.jpg

    SADF artilleryman posing with howitzers during Operation Savannah

    Crossing into Angola from near the Cubango river, Task Force Zulu drove north through FNLA and UNITA territory, heading north to Menongue and then west to Capelongo, before heading south and capturing Ondjiva with no resistance. Zulu then drove northwest, entering Lubango and then driving westward towards the coast, to Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre. Zulu had now taken virtually the whole south of Angola without having to engage in battle with the MPLA forces, which had withdrawn north and avoided battle against the well-trained and equipped South African-led forces. Task Force Zulu returned to Lubango before marching north towards Benguela. Task Force Zulu first met enemy resistance at the town of Catengue, on the road southeast of Benguela. MPLA defenses were quickly broken and Zulu entered Benguela on 5 November. A day later they entered Lobito to the north of Benguela, linking up with Foxbat. Combat Group Foxbat had been deployed deep into UNITA-held territory at the beginning of the South African intervention, and had been tasked with defending Nova Lisboa. It repulsed an MPLA offensive and then countered, seizing Balombo and moving west where it rendezvoused with Task Force Zulu. Meanwhile, in the northern enclave of Cabinda, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) with the assistance of Biafran mercenaries, mounted an assault on the besieged MPLA garrison. Managing to repulse the initial attack, the MPLA garrison survived, and the FLEC were suddenly swept up by a cross-border incursion by Congo to aid the MPLA [187]. The FNLA, concerned at Congo's cross-border intervention in Cabinda, and feeling cornered between the socialist giant to the north and the MPLA to the south, redoubled their efforts to push south and link up with UNITA and South African forces. On 10 November, FNLA forces struck south from Caxito along the highway towards Luanda. Entrenched MPLA forces met the FNLA forces at the bridge at Quifangondo. The FNLA forces were personally commanded by Holden Roberto, who sought a triumpant entry into the capital. His troops were supported by a handful of medium artillery pieces manned by South African crews. A squadron of SADF English Electric Canberra medium bombers provided air support for the FNLA. Whilst the initial artillery barrage and bombing runs against the defenders were ineffective, the FNLA troops did manage to take the bridge, albeit with fairly heavy casualties which slowed their advance towards Luanda[188]. Despite victory in the battle, almost all of the FNLA vehicles were destroyed, and the defenders were successful in delaying the FNLA long enough for the independence date to be reached with Neto's MPLA still in control of Luanda. At 6 P.M, Portuguese high commissioner Leonel Alexandre Gomes Cardoso announced that Portugal was transferring sovereignty to "the Angolan people" and departed Luanda by sea. At midnight, Neto announced the independence of the "People's Republic of Angola"(República Popular de Angola, RPA) which was immediately recognised by several nations, including the Soviet Union, Congo and many non-aligned nations. In response, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto mounted a joint declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Angola (República Popular Democrática de Angola, RPDA). No nations recognised the RPDA immediately, not even their allies in South Africa and the Central African Federation.

    As the fighting had raged at Quifangondo, Task Force Zulu continued their drive up the coast, capturing Novo Redondo on November 13th. By this time FNLA troops had reached the outskirts of Luanda, but were having difficulty making any headway. Their artillery was of limited use, and the dug-in MPLA forces were better-equipped with superior small arms procured from the Warsaw Pact nations. The MPLA forces were also equipped with BM-21 "Grad" 122mm rocket launchers, the spiritual successor to the famed Katyusha mounted rocket batteries of the 'Great Patriotic War'. These rockets were effective at damaging soft targets like enemy infantry as they attempted to push into Luanda using ineffectual and poorly-coordinated human wave attacks. Their morale waning after a number of unsuccessful pushes, FNLA forces established a cordon to the north of Luanda, deciding to wait to link up with South African and UNITA forces. Roberto would have preferred to take Luanda himself so as to establish himself as the senior of himself and Savimbi, but he couldn't risk his offensive turning into a rout. Roberto's position was made more tenuous as, without announcement, Congolese troops crossed the border at two points: Noqui and Maquela do Zombo on November 19th. Riverine forces of the Congo also captured Soyo at the estuary of the Congo river. Marching south rapidly, Congolese motorised infantry met only mild resistance as they captured M'banza Congo, one of the most significant cities of the north and the traditional capital for the Kongo people in Angola. In an attempt to delay the South African advance until the Congolese intervention could take pressure off Luanda, MPLA forces at several points inland made probing attacks into UNITA territory, which were repulsed by combat groups Foxbat and X-Ray. Foxbat then pushed northward parallel with Task Force Zulu's advance along the coast, seizing Ebo [189], then Gabela, then Quilenda. Combat Group Orange would cover Foxbat's eastern flank, taking Quibala and Conde before linking up with Foxbat again north at Dondo on the Cuanza river. Task Force Zulu took Port Amboim, before swinging inland to Mumbundo to enable support for the independent combat groups if necessary. Foxbat and Orange once again pushed north, this time seeking to take Vila Salazar, opening the roads to the FNLA territory in the north and isolating Luanda from the MPLA's inland territory. Here South African-led forces would experience the most dogged resistance yet; MPLA forces which had been stationed around Malange had pushed west to support the defense of Luanda (or, if possible, to mount a counter-attack into FNLA territory) and to prevent potential isolate by the fast-moving South African combat groups. It appeared that a decisive phase of the conflict was looming; whoever was in control of Vila Salazar would have the upper hand in the battle for the capital; but for the FNLA-UNITA-SADF forces, this victory needed to be quick. By this point Congolese forces had reached the outskirts of Carmona. By the new year, they would certainly be at Luanda, threatening a complete annihilation of FNLA forces. If Vila Salazar was taken, it would be possible for South African forces to stabilise the front at Vista Alegre and prevent a Congolese outflanking of FNLA troops. If the MPLA successfully rebuffed the South Africans, Roberto's only hope would be a retreat via Catete, where his troops would be harassed and vulnerable until linking up with SADF-UNITA forces. This would also require a complete abandonment of the traditional Kongo territory to Congolese occupation, without even the capture of Luanda to show for it. FNLA as a military force would be preserved, but its political influence would be severely reduced, and Holden Roberto would have to kiss his dreams of the presidency goodbye in that scenario, accepting having to play second fiddle to Savimbi. The Congolese intervention had turned the reality of the conflict on its head; from a near certain victory over an MPLA which was under attack on all sides, Roberto now found himself increasingly cornered. As any boxer will tell you, often the best course of action when cornered is a massive, decisive, fully-committed attack.

    In the inland eastern regions of Angola, UNITA had failed in several attacks to seize territory from the MPLA. The relative low intensity of the conflict in the east relative to the hotly-contested western coastal regions enabled the lightly-equipped combat group X-Ray to play a key role in proceedings. Seeing that the UNITA forces were unable to mount effective offensive action in this sector, X-Ray was committed to an attack on Vila Luso, which it captured with little issue. X-Ray and UNITA troops continued their advance to the east and north. UNITA forces with some difficulty managed to capture Henrique de Carvalho [190], whilst X-Ray seized the only useful crossing from Congo into eastern Angola at Teixiera de Sousa. X-Ray would remain in eastern Angola for the rest of its deployment, keeping surveillance on the border with Congo and engaging in small-scale skirmishes with MPLA militants. Back in the west, the fighting at Vila Salazar raged. The initial attack by the joint combat groups of X-Ray and Orange inflicted heavy casualties but were unable to dislodge the MPLA militants from Vila Salazar in the initial assault. Instead they wheeled around to the east of the town, intercepting and engaging with MPLA forces attempting to reinforce Vila Salazar. This succeeded in keeping much of the MPLA reinforcements from reaching the more defensible township. With the arrival of Task Force Zulu, the town was eventually taken after being softened up with artillery and air bombardment. As this fighting was going on, Holden Roberto's FNLA forces had driven east. Leaving some forces outside of Luanda, the bulk of FNLA forces redeployed to Vista Alegre where a tense stand-off occurred upon the arrival of Congolese troops marching south from Quitexe.

    FNLA1973-696x697.jpg

    FNLA troops in training

    As a new year commenced, there was a temporary halt in the fighting as diplomats flew back and forth between capitals attempting to prevent a major regional war. South African involvement in the Angolan civil war had become obvious to the outside world, and the already internationally-unpopular white supremacist government in South Africa was receiving criticism for their intervention. The US State Department and intelligence services were split on policy; the intelligence services seeking to support the apartheid regime as a means to prevent socialist or communist black African-led governments from taking over the whole of Southern Africa, whereas the State Department saw white minority rule in South Africa as highly-problematic for the United States' international reputation. It wasn't long since segregation had been outlawed in the United States; supporting an openly racist white supremacist state wasn't a good look when espousing the values of liberty and equality. The Congolese and South African interests in the conflict were both fundamentally realpolitik in motivation, however. South Africa wanted to cut off support for the SWAPO. Congo didn't want another right-wing nation threatening its southern border; Rhodesia-Nyasaland was already positioned uncomfortably close to the valuable Katanga province. A temporary ceasefire was brokered as negotiations were underway between representatives of the three Angolan factions, the Congolese, South Africa and with the United States who sought to act as mediators. It was agreed that peace in Angola necessitated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, but neither of the major interventionist states would withdraw without the other also doing so as well as guaranteeing that certain preconditions were met: the Congolese government wanted the expatriation of members of ABAKO-R (Alliance des Bakongo - Résistance), a fringe splinter group from ABAKO which sought the secession of Bakongo regions from the DRC as well as free elections, which they believed that MPLA would win. The South Africans claimed that they would be willing to cease involvement in the internal affairs of Angola if assistance to SWAPO ended.

    1280px-Proposed_Flag_of_Angola_%281996%29.svg.png

    Flag of Angola after Moroni Accords, chosen as not to favour any one of the major parties

    By April 1976, a temporary solution was achieved with the Moroni Accords. All parties agreed in principle that free elections would occur in the future after a vague "period of stabilisation". Congolese and South African troops would be withdrawn from the country. The 200 or so ABAKO-R operatives in northern Angola would be sent back to Congo and support for SWAPO would cease immediately. Any SWAPO operatives attempting to cross the border into Angola were to be arrested and immediately turned over to South African authorities. A provisional government would be established with a weak executive branch, with a presidency which would be turned over after a mere two years as long as free elections had not yet been held. According to the agreement, Neto would be the first president, to be followed by Roberto in 1978 and Savimbi in 1980. One of the biggest bones of contention, about the interior minister position, was papered over by a poor short-term solution: Nito Alves, a notable MPLA leader who had been active in organising "popular power" committees in the slums of Luanda, was assigned to the position. In order to convince Savimbi and Roberto to agree, both the FNLA and UNITA were allowed to maintain their armed militia forces and de facto governance of the territories they held prior to the foreign interventions. A number of key issues were left unaddressed, most notably how exactly free elections were supposed to be held in a country with three separate parties which maintained armed militia forces. The primary concern was putting a halt to the immediate threat of escalation and a regional conflict, which it can be said was partially successful.

    The fragile peace in Angola would be again tested, this time by internecine power struggles within MPLA. Having seen Nito Alves slowly accumulate more influence within the party, Agostinho Neto sought to limit his power by suspending him in October 1976, accusing Alves and Chief of Staff José Van-Dunem of "fractionalism". Alves was an ultra-left figure within the MPLA, but had actively suppressed the Maoist Organisation of Angolan Communists and promoted partnerships with the Soviet Union. Where he had been outspoken and broke with the consensus amongst other leading MPLA members was his hostility towards white and mestizo Angolans, even going so far as to state that mestizos should have to apply for citizenship, and that whites should only be given membership if they had been voluntarily part of the independence struggle (like Van-Dunem's wife). Alves and Van-Dunem claimed that a commission of enquiry should be created around the issue of "fractionalism" so that they could plead their case that the suspensions had been unjust. José Eduardo Dos Santos, another leading MPLA figure, headed the commission of enquiry and drew out the proceedings. After 12 hours of debate, it was decided that Alves and Van-Dunem's suspensions would stand. Alves and Van-Dunem immediately began plotting a seizure of power in secret. In the early morning of 27 May 1977, forces of the 8th Brigade commanded by Jacobo Caetano and loyal to Alves seized key points throughout Luanda, including the radio station, presidential palace and a prison, where supporters of Alves were freed. Caetano's forces expected to find Neto in the palace, but concerned about the possibility of a coup, he had moved his operations to the Ministry of Defence building. 8th Brigade troops, after executing a number of political figures they had captured in their initial attack immediately besieged the Ministry of Defence building[191]. Neto was captured after attempting to escape through secret tunnels built underneath the Ministry of Defence building. On threat of harm being done to his family, Neto was forced to make a phony public confession to being a "counter-revolutionary, a bourgeois nationalist and a traitor to the international revolutionary struggle". Neto would be shot in the head immediately after the broadcast finished. The putschists made calls over the radio to the people of Luanda, encouraging them to take to the streets to support the coup and referring to themselves as the "MPLA Action Committee". Dos Santos, seeing the writing on the wall, made an unprompted public statement in support of the Action Committee, and falsely claiming that his past political moves against Alves were made under duress from Neto and his supporters. This transparent opportunism likely saved his life, however, and he would be granted the position of Vice President after the declaration of a new government with Alves as President of the Republic. As news of the coup spread throughout the country, the FNLA and UNITA were on edge. But peace prevailed, at least until April 1978, when Roberto was supposed to, according to the Moroni Accords, take office as President. Alves refused to relinquish power, essentially daring the FNLA to march once again on Luanda. Since the end of the post-independence hostilities, the national army (which was entirely composed of MPLA forces) had gradually strengthened itself with the import of Soviet weaponry. Whilst lacking some of the more advanced weapons held by the USSR's European allies, the Angolan army had been provided with two state of the art Mil Mi-24 'Hind' attack helicopters. A handful of pilots had also been trained in the Soviet Union to allow for the deployment of these extremely useful military assets. The small arms of MPLA-aligned forces also tended to be of a higher quality, and they had greater stockpiles of ammunition and other key supplies. Knowing that his forces would be unsuccessful in an unsupported attack on MPLA forces, Roberto reached out to Savimbi's UNITA. After some deliberation with their South African patrons (who told Savimbi that they would consider a renewed intervention in the event of an MPLA-initiated attack on UNITA, but would not in the event of a UNITA-FNLA offensive action), UNITA refused to join in on a march on Luanda, and as such an enraged Roberto stood down. Frustrated by South Africa's intransigence and clear favouritism for UNITA, Roberto began to send feelers out to pro-Western states in the Gulf of Guinea for future support.

    Nito_Alves.jpg

    Nito Alves, President of Angola after the ousting and murder of Agostinho Neto

    ===
    [187] Historically, the FLEC was supported by Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Congo, which sought to take control of the offshore oil resources of Cabinda. IOTL, the FLEC was supported by Zairean mercenaries. ITTL, a left wing Congo isn't opposed to the MPLA like Mobutu was, but they will likely still seek recompense for their support.
    [188] There are a couple of reasons for the different outcome of the Battle of Quifangondo ITTL. The first is that there was no Cuban intervention, and as such the MPLA defenders weren't assisted by Cuban advisors. Additionally, and more importantly, IOTL Holden Roberto kept his most reliable and strongest units in reserve in Zaire, rather than committing them to battle in Angola. As such, despite the FNLA nominally maintaining the largest armed force of the three Angolan combatant groups (despite being probably the least well-trained and organised), their forces weren't as strongly committed. Why did Roberto keep his strongest units in Zaire? Its uncertain. My thoughts is that he probably felt in the case of a loss in Angola he could live in exile there and that his private army would be an effective bargaining chip with Mobutu, able to be used to suppress Mobutu's political enemies and making it less likely for Mobutu to outright kill him if his relationship with the Zairean dictator soured. But ITTL, without a friendly Zaire to reside in, more of the FNLA's forces (and the better elements of it) being "in-country" lead them to be committed to the push to Luanda.
    [189] IOTL, the advance on Ebo was repulsed due to Cuban troops bolstering the defenders.
    [190] IOTL, the MPLA was able to prevent the UNITA attack due to being reinforced by the Katangese Tigers, the armed wing of the Congolese National Liberation Front, which opposed Mobutu and was comprised of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie. ITTL, this group is not present as a result of aforementioned butterflies from no Mobutu in Congo.
    [191] IOTL the coup was suppressed by Cuban troops. They really came in clutch for Neto a LOT IOTL.
     
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    Chapter 84: The Crab Does Not Bite; it is it's Handshake that Hurts - Portugal's Colonial Wars and their Consequences (Part 5)
  • The poorly-organised Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique left major questions about the future of the country as independence loomed. It was clear that FRELIMO would be the dominant political force in the country, and it had long espoused an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and left-wing political programme. But what would the contours of a FRELIMO-governed Mozambique look like? What would happen to the newly vulnerable white settler population in the country? Would they be allowed to stay and contribute to economic development, even if their prior political dominance was stripped away? Would FRELIMO allow the election of representatives from different parties, or establish a one-party Marxist state? These questions were quickly answered on independence day, the 25th June 1975. FRELIMO notable Armando Guebeza announced the 24/20 order, giving Portuguese settlers 24 hours to leave the country, and with only 20 kilograms of luggage. All of their other possessions would be nationalised. In the next few hours, a contingency plan was activated; Rhodesian troops crossed the border, pushing east as fast as possible. Several of the major towns, such as Lourenço Marques, also saw uprisings by white settlers upon hearing news of the intervention. Supporting the Rhodesian forces was an auxiliary force of mercenaries, led by Mike Hoare. Facing ineffectual resistance from the FRELIMO forces, the interventionist forces halted their advance upon reaching the Zambezi. On 20th September 1975, self-proclaimed 'fascist idealist' Jorge Jardim announced the establishment of the "Free Republic of Zambézia", whose government would largely be comprised of members of FICO, a Portuguese settler organisation that was staunchly opposed to the Portuguese withdrawal and had unsuccessfully lobbied the Portuguese government to arm settlers prior to independence[192]. In the lead-up to independence, Jorge Jardim had established contacts in South Africa and Rhodesia-Nyasaland, and had successfully lobbied the latter to provide military assistance in the event of a FRELIMO persecution of the white settler community. He had also reached out to António Champalimaud, formerly the wealthiest industrialist in Portugal. Champalimaud's various assets had been largely seized after the Carnation Revolution, but he was promised a leading role in promoting economic development should be relocate to Zambézia.

    WP_20151231_051.jpg

    Jorge Jardim, first President of the Free Republic of Zambézia

    During the intervention, the Rhodesian forces focused on the destruction of camps inhabited by Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) militants who had been operating out of remote FRELIMO-governed regions of Mozambique. This campaign was highly successful, driving the dispersed ZANU remnants across the Zambezi. Many would flee even further afield, taking refuge in Tanganyika. The Rhodesian intervention was widely condemned by the international community, but Salisbury perceived the increased security as a worthwhile trade. In the rump remainder of Mozambique, an increasingly insecure FRELIMO leadership began a campaign of terror, instituting effectively a police state, forcing many local inhabitants from their traditional villages into collective farms and re-education camps, and imprisoning political opposition. This had the effect of producing many small rebel groups opposed to FRELIMO. One of these groups was the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) which was effectively a Rhodesian proxy and lead by former FRELIMO dissident André Matsangaissa. RENAMO commenced armed resistance against FRELIMO in 1977. The other major opposition group challenging FRELIMO was the Revolutionary Party of Mozambique (PRM). The PRM was led by Amos Sumane. Sumane had been the founder of the Rumbezi African National Union (UNAR) which had itself broken off a FRELIMO splinter group active in northwest Mozambique during the war of independence. Sumane's group had been active in Zambezia Province (north of the Zambezi, not to be confused with the breakaway state that would occupy south of the Zambezi) where FRELIMO had little popular support. The UNAR was committed to the establishment of an independent state of Rumbezia between the Ruvuma and Zambezi rivers. UNAR itself would be dissolved after a short period of time, but Sumane would return to prominence after independence, establishing the PRM. The PRM was supported by Jardim, as well as by the Central African Federation, which allowed the PRM to mount cross-border raids from Nyasaland into northern Mozambique, which started in 1977. Sumane's forces were mostly composed of Lomué tribesmen who had been angered by FRELIMO's forced villagisation policy. FRELIMO's governance in the north was further challenged by the defection of Lázaro Nkavandame, a notable leader amongst the Maconde ethnic group, to RENAMO. The Maconde, who were concentrated in the north, comprised a disproportionately large share of FRELIMO membership as a consequence of the initial resistance in the war of independence being limited to the north until Portuguese control over other territories waned. FRELIMO was becoming increasingly reliant on shipments of weapons from China via Tanganyika.

    The Free Republic of Zambézia (República Livre da Zambézia, RLZ) over the next couple of years started to establish itself as a somewhat functioning state. Whilst having a number of extremely unsavoury characteristics (keeping black voting rights extremely limited, outlawing any party whose charter contained the words "decolonisation", "socialism" or "Africanism"), the degree of abuse of black subjects was not nearly to the same degree as in their South African ally. Instead, their internal development was more analogous to Rhodesia-Nyasaland, focusing on economic stabilisation, allowing a degree of privilege for African tribal leaders and their kin, and not outlawing interracial marriages (although it is notable that determining whether children from these unions were to be granted voting rights once reaching adulthood was a convoluted progress). Where the RLZ truly was bizarre was in its management of external economic links; cut off from direct trade with most foreign powers (only South Africa, Rhodesia-Nyasaland and France gave the breakaway state full diplomatic recognition) and with Rhodesia-Nyasaland and South Africa being limited in their international trade due to the imposition of trading bans with a number of countries as a result of these countries' continued adherence to white minority rule, the leaders of RLZ had to get creative. Taking advantage of connections made in Brazil and France, the cunning Champalimaud was the architect of a convoluted blockade-busting system: goods would be imported and exported via shell companies in Comoros and Madagascar. These companies would then trade primarily with either Brazil (in the case of direct trade or requisition of products from the United States or Canada) or with France (in case of trade with Europe). Direct trade with Portugal was out of the question as they had opposed the RLZ and were unwilling to support it in case of irritating the United States and Britain, who they sought to maintain close ties with despite having aligned with the Paris Pact regarding collective security arrangements. Rhodesian forces would stay in RLZ until the early 1980s, but would focus their energies on training an RLZ military comprised of both black and white regular troops (although the officer class would be overwhelmingly white, the sole exceptions being the sons of certain tribal chiefs who had proven compliant) as well as flechas. The Cahora Bossa dam would have a permanent Rhodesian garrison, but would provide a great deal of value for the RLZ, who sold the power it generated to both South Africa and Rhodesia.

    ==

    [192] Historically, the Rhodesians did consider an intervention, but would only do so with South African support. The South Africans didn't support this idea, as at the time FRELIMO toned down their criticisms of South Africa, leaving Pretoria expecting a detente. This rhetoric would flare up again later, however. ITTL, the Rhodesians don't feel the need for South African support, as they are stronger ITTL, still holding Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi).
     
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