Sir John Valentine Carden Survives. Part 2.

Don't underestimate the addition of 360 more tanks (and as mentioned by others, the trucks, fuel, support vehicles, Anti-Tank units that go with them). It's easy to see the vast numbers of vehicles in WW2 -( 50,000 T34s? )- and think this is a drop in the ocean. However that's intergrating over a long time. And the numbers grew a lot more later in the war. Based on OTL and what was shipped to North Africa in 1941 alone , nevermind 1942 - the majority of those are top of the range Panzer IV - many of them F1 and probably some F2s - with a much more capable gun. Now would that have made a difference in July '44 - Hell no. Or even if spread out across the rest of the German army in 42 - little. But Allan has put them right where they are needed at the (second) tip of the German Spear.

To put that in context Bock - when faced with the surprise offensive of the Soviets in May 12th towards Kharkov out of the very salient these are being deployed to attack - had around 400 tanks total. That Soviet offensive failed and was probably always going to, although Timoshinko's ineptitude in commiting his main reserve for days after initial progress, doomed 250,000 Soviets.

So what Butterflies might we see? Most are in German's favour. Luftwaffe 2 has been withdrawn from the Med. Army group B gets it own Luftwaffe group. And whilst much smaller than Luft 4 that was diverted from Army A in the Caucasus to counter the Soviet offensive, it will not have had the same losses and crucially has substantial ground attack planes (still Stukas in '42). I'd expcet to see at a minimum the German's countering earlier and possible without the transfer of Luft 4. Which is a huge new butterfly for the South. Soviets lost all their armour OTL - but that was only 1200 tanks - to give you a sense of scale of almost doublig (and in the case of heavier PZr IVs - effectively more than doubling) the German response. You can't much improve much upon OTL for the Germans of completely wiping out 250,000 Soviets...but if it happens faster then they can get over the Donets sooner and really break out before any effective new defensives. This could really effect the starting points for Uranus later in the year or even cancel it all together. Even if timelines remain the same somehow, then Uranus is going to come up not against just Italian infantry and Romanians with Pzr 35s but much more capable Panzers.

History has focused on the inevitabilty of Soviet victory and what a turning point Stalingrad was. But if it's not the meat grinder - by Soviets not being able to get s many constant reinforements in, or Uranus not punching through the paperthin Axis reserves. It might hold.

More interesting is the oft underlooked south of the Caucasus of Army Group A. With more luft support, more fuel ( Rommel used multiple times as much per mile ) then what? Even if Maikop can't be captured earlier - maybe but it will still be wrecked - then actually destryong Baku would possible and WIN THE WAR for the Germans. Yep I said that. It wasn't Stalingrad that sent out the famous "not a step back" order from Stalin - it was , the OTL temporarily, cutting off of oil supplies from the Caucasus. Baku was just a bridge too far for the Luft 4th OTL but they did significinat damage despite the distance, closing in of winter and low fuel reserves. A few days earlier, forward bases a little closer, more fuel, not siphoning off so many aircraft earlier and suddenly - USSR doesn't have the fuel for those later huge operations. Yes they can get it from elsewhere - but not in the same volumes as quickly. 50,000 T-34s -- well they need a lot of Diesel. It matters a lot less that Germany is running out of fuel if the Soviets are too.

Only possible butterflies in Soviet advantage might be Tomoshinko commiting reserves earlier if he encounters heavier resistance in his attack. This probably won't change the outcome but may stall Paulus - an indecisive staff officer with no command experience whatsoever - even further. And lets not forget out hero - the Valiant tank. I'm sure ITTL the Germans are rolling out Pak 37 upgrades even faster but even so the Valiant had one thing the T-34 in '42 despertately lacked. Radios. Without the reserve advance units of Soviet tanks that made great progress in May 12th to May15h ' 42 were cut off in the German counter and command tanks were taken out as a priority as they were the only ones with Radios and easily identifiable. If the Soviets use their now shiny Valiant as front line tanks - sure it won't be the majority - but 100s in a force of 1200 + , then the soviets may escape the encircelement and have some clue about what is going on when the Germans counter in Mid-May. Or even just know what the hell is going, "Hey comrade , Boris just called from a Tank that smashed through German defences and this shit is actually working , lets pile in before the counter can come" Soviet attack will still fail but keeping a now experience 100,000 men east of the Donets is going to make Paulus's work in the summer harder. If Paulus panics (and he will - he really was awful) then instead of a Knight's cross for just being there at the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, he might withdraw. Germans really did lose their shit for the first 5 days or so of the attack after May12th.

But it's plausible that Germany can win the war from here. Or at least get Soviets to the table - Allies don't seem to be doing much and there will be no El Alamein to celebrate in later '42 - and have resources for a much tougher time for the Allies later I know it sounds ridiculous and that's probably not Allan's plan but effectively doubling Army Group B's armoured fighting strength (plus support) ... that is game changing
 
Trucks will make all the difference for the German Tail if they use them well enough and can keep them from getting Partisaned. Though in a lot of ways it will depend on the roads they go over.

Also if the Russians get more desperate on do more crash build T-34s we may see and uptick and technical and crew casualties as well. Those tanks are going to be of really poor quality and worse than existing units which aren't that great already.
 
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Hello,

Considering what is now being learned ITTL, would Carden or the Army consider the idea of a true armored personnel carrier? There are certainly...
But is there enough insight to bring that to its logical conclusion?
If Carden's prewar visit to France had included stops at Laffly (including a review of the colonial-only but functionally interesting, wheeled, fully splinter-protected S15TOE) and Lorraine (where he could have seen the design for the upcoming 39L tracked APC, open-top but very well designed otherwise), Vickers would have been very much more aware of what the future might look like.
 
Don't underestimate the addition of 360 more tanks (and as mentioned by others, the trucks, fuel, support vehicles, Anti-Tank units that go with them). It's easy to see the vast numbers of vehicles in WW2 -( 50,000 T34s? )- and think this is a drop in the ocean. However that's intergrating over a long time. And the numbers grew a lot more later in the war. Based on OTL and what was shipped to North Africa in 1941 alone , nevermind 1942 - the majority of those are top of the range Panzer IV - many of them F1 and probably some F2s - with a much more capable gun. Now would that have made a difference in July '44 - Hell no. Or even if spread out across the rest of the German army in 42 - little. But Allan has put them right where they are needed at the (second) tip of the German Spear.

To put that in context Bock - when faced with the surprise offensive of the Soviets in May 12th towards Kharkov out of the very salient these are being deployed to attack - had around 400 tanks total. That Soviet offensive failed and was probably always going to, although Timoshinko's ineptitude in commiting his main reserve for days after initial progress, doomed 250,000 Soviets.

So what Butterflies might we see? Most are in German's favour. Luftwaffe 2 has been withdrawn from the Med. Army group B gets it own Luftwaffe group. And whilst much smaller than Luft 4 that was diverted from Army A in the Caucasus to counter the Soviet offensive, it will not have had the same losses and crucially has substantial ground attack planes (still Stukas in '42). I'd expcet to see at a minimum the German's countering earlier and possible without the transfer of Luft 4. Which is a huge new butterfly for the South. Soviets lost all their armour OTL - but that was only 1200 tanks - to give you a sense of scale of almost doublig (and in the case of heavier PZr IVs - effectively more than doubling) the German response. You can't much improve much upon OTL for the Germans of completely wiping out 250,000 Soviets...but if it happens faster then they can get over the Donets sooner and really break out before any effective new defensives. This could really effect the starting points for Uranus later in the year or even cancel it all together. Even if timelines remain the same somehow, then Uranus is going to come up not against just Italian infantry and Romanians with Pzr 35s but much more capable Panzers.

History has focused on the inevitabilty of Soviet victory and what a turning point Stalingrad was. But if it's not the meat grinder - by Soviets not being able to get s many constant reinforements in, or Uranus not punching through the paperthin Axis reserves. It might hold.

More interesting is the oft underlooked south of the Caucasus of Army Group A. With more luft support, more fuel ( Rommel used multiple times as much per mile ) then what? Even if Maikop can't be captured earlier - maybe but it will still be wrecked - then actually destryong Baku would possible and WIN THE WAR for the Germans. Yep I said that. It wasn't Stalingrad that sent out the famous "not a step back" order from Stalin - it was , the OTL temporarily, cutting off of oil supplies from the Caucasus. Baku was just a bridge too far for the Luft 4th OTL but they did significinat damage despite the distance, closing in of winter and low fuel reserves. A few days earlier, forward bases a little closer, more fuel, not siphoning off so many aircraft earlier and suddenly - USSR doesn't have the fuel for those later huge operations. Yes they can get it from elsewhere - but not in the same volumes as quickly. 50,000 T-34s -- well they need a lot of Diesel. It matters a lot less that Germany is running out of fuel if the Soviets are too.

Only possible butterflies in Soviet advantage might be Tomoshinko commiting reserves earlier if he encounters heavier resistance in his attack. This probably won't change the outcome but may stall Paulus - an indecisive staff officer with no command experience whatsoever - even further. And lets not forget out hero - the Valiant tank. I'm sure ITTL the Germans are rolling out Pak 37 upgrades even faster but even so the Valiant had one thing the T-34 in '42 despertately lacked. Radios. Without the reserve advance units of Soviet tanks that made great progress in May 12th to May15h ' 42 were cut off in the German counter and command tanks were taken out as a priority as they were the only ones with Radios and easily identifiable. If the Soviets use their now shiny Valiant as front line tanks - sure it won't be the majority - but 100s in a force of 1200 + , then the soviets may escape the encircelement and have some clue about what is going on when the Germans counter in Mid-May. Or even just know what the hell is going, "Hey comrade , Boris just called from a Tank that smashed through German defences and this shit is actually working , lets pile in before the counter can come" Soviet attack will still fail but keeping a now experience 100,000 men east of the Donets is going to make Paulus's work in the summer harder. If Paulus panics (and he will - he really was awful) then instead of a Knight's cross for just being there at the 2nd Battle of Kharkov, he might withdraw. Germans really did lose their shit for the first 5 days or so of the attack after May12th.

But it's plausible that Germany can win the war from here. Or at least get Soviets to the table - Allies don't seem to be doing much and there will be no El Alamein to celebrate in later '42 - and have resources for a much tougher time for the Allies later I know it sounds ridiculous and that's probably not Allan's plan but effectively doubling Army Group B's armoured fighting strength (plus support) ... that is game changing
I take issue with the outcome of your analysis, not so much the analysis itself.

The Germans (assuming they Tomoshinko behaves as per OTL) do have opportunities and may end up being more successful in the Caucasus. A trashed Baku as well as Maikop will have implications for Russian strategic mobility as you point out. But it won't solve the German logistic issues. So you end up with two punch drunk behemoths locked in the East. Eventually the Allies will trash German logistics at home and the Russians will rebuild their oil infrastructure and the Germans will collapse. But later and much more further West than OTL.
 
The Germans (assuming they Tomoshinko behaves as per OTL) do have opportunities and may end up being more successful in the Caucasus. A trashed Baku as well as Maikop will have implications for Russian strategic mobility as you point out. But it won't solve the German logistic issues. So you end up with two punch drunk behemoths locked in the East. Eventually the Allies will trash German logistics at home and the Russians will rebuild their oil infrastructure and the Germans will collapse. But later and much more further West than OTL.
Doesn't this essentially mean that the Western allies roll through Germany, Austria and potential Ceczhlovakia as well maybe part of Poland?

That would shift the post war borders somewhat, also would be intresting to see how this effects the USSR stance in the Allied meetings at Yalta and Tehran.
 
Even if the Germans get to the oil fields in the Caucasus area, they have no way of taking any of the remaining POL back to where it is needed. What ever would survive of the oil fields, refineries, and storage, which all three are going to be destroyed as much as possible, is going to be in small amounts. Even the small amounts were going to be trouble for the Germans to move because the Allies in Persia would be able to reach the areas easily with the heavy bombers and able to attack what is left and the transportation infrastructure to move the oil back to where it could be used, either refined or as finished product, in large amounts.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
Even if the Germans get to the oil fields in the Caucasus area, they have no way of taking any of the remaining POL back to where it is needed. What ever would survive of the oil fields, refineries, and storage, which all three are going to be destroyed as much as possible, is going to be in small amounts. Even the small amounts were going to be trouble for the Germans to move because the Allies in Persia would be able to reach the areas easily with the heavy bombers and able to attack what is left and the transportation infrastructure to move the oil back to where it could be used, either refined or as finished product, in large amounts.
That is right. It is as close to impossible as realistically possible for the Nazis to get the Caucasus oil without first winning the war. But (and it is a great but) if they cut the Soviet Union from their main oil supply, then things change a lot.
Now, if just cutting the volga is enough for that or not is another cuestion.
 
Doesn't this essentially mean that the Western allies roll through Germany, Austria and potential Ceczhlovakia as well maybe part of Poland?

That would shift the post war borders somewhat, also would be intresting to see how this effects the USSR stance in the Allied meetings at Yalta and Tehran.
Well picture a Soviet counter offensive with severe oil shortages. No grand tank led offensives but a brutal slog back from the Volga to the Vistula. I'd be surprised by 1945 if the Soviets had made it to the summer 1944 line (roughly Warsaw - Budapest-Sofia). Meanwhile the Allies collapse the Western Front due to chronic oil shortages on the German side and end up close to Berlin- Prague -Vienna.

Canned sunshine is then available.
 
Even if the Germans get to the oil fields in the Caucasus area, they have no way of taking any of the remaining POL back to where it is needed. What ever would survive of the oil fields, refineries, and storage, which all three are going to be destroyed as much as possible, is going to be in small amounts. Even the small amounts were going to be trouble for the Germans to move because the Allies in Persia would be able to reach the areas easily with the heavy bombers and able to attack what is left and the transportation infrastructure to move the oil back to where it could be used, either refined or as finished product, in large amounts.

Hitler's quest for oil: The impact of economic considerations on military strategy, 1941–42

Joel Hayward

The above gives a good description of the issues that Germany would have had getting the oil to where it was needed.

It appears that during this period there was little discussion between Hitler and his military advisers over the important question of how Caucasus oil was to be transported to the Reich. A quarter of a century earlier, this problem had also vexed Ludendorff and the German High Command, who never arrived at an adequate solution 129. The overworked Fürher may not even have realized the importance of this matter, considering it best simply to cross that bridge when he came to it. He had almost certainly not read the March 1941 report by Generalleutnant Hermann von Hanneken of the War Economy and War Armaments Office, which was appended to a letter sent by Keitel to the OKH. This report warned that, even if the Caucasus oilfields could be captured intact, very little oil (only 10,000 tons per month) could be carried overland to Germany 130. Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe for shipping, there would be no ships available for the transport of Caucasus oil up the Danube because its river tankers were already working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil 131. The only remaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardenelles, and on to Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, 'the opening of the sea routes and the security of the tankers in the Black Sea is the prerequisite for the use of Russian supply sources in sufficient quantity to support the further continuation of the war.' Clearly, to attain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; the Germans would have had to wipe out the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which still had, according to Raeder, 'naval supremacy ... [allowing] great freedom of movement’132) and eliminate British air and sea power from the eastern Mediterranean.

Despite not considering how best to solve this logistics nightmare - which never occurred, because the German Army captured only the already-destroyed Maikop oilfield - Hitler was well aware of the need to make the Black Sea safe for German shipping. However, both he and Raeder appear to have worried more about supplying German armies via the Black Sea than of shipping Caucasus oil back to the Reich or Rumanian refineries 133.

When planning the forthcoming campaign, both Hitler and the German High Command placed considerable emphasis on the need to advance on the Caucasus oilfields so rapidly that the Soviets would not have time to destroy the oil wells and refineries permanently. If the latter were destroyed, the bulk of the oil would have to be refined elsewhere until new refineries could be constructed. Only Rumanian refineries, which still had a considerable surplus refinement capacity 134, could handle large quantities of additional crude, but (for the reasons mentioned above) it would be extremely difficult to ship significant amounts of oil from the Caucasus to Rumania.

An 'Oil Detachment Caucaus' had been formed a year earlier, in the spring of 1941, when the capture of the oilfields was still a principal objective of the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to repair damaged wells and refineries quickly so that exploitation of the oilfields could be commenced as soon as possible. In early 1942, when the capture of the oilfield became the objective of the forthcoming attack, this detachment was expanded considerably and renamed the 'Oil Brigade Caucasus'. The expansion was necessary because recent experiences in Ukraine and the Donets Basin indicated that the Caucaus oilfields would probably not be captured before at least some attempts were made to destroy existing wells and refineries. As a result, this unusual paramilitary force was brought to a strength of 10,794, issued with 1,142 vehicles and six aircraft and ordered to stand by, ready to move into the Caucaus oilfield immediately behind the combat troops 135.



129. Cf. Ludendorff, My War Memoirs, Vol.II, pp.658-60.

130. Quoted in B.A. Leach, German Strategy against Russia, 1939-1941 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973), p. 146. Also see the document cited in note 55.

131. An OKM memorandum of 9 May 1941 makes the same point about there being no available transport ships because all oil tankers were fully occupied with the transport of Rumanian oil up the Danube. Cited in N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims: the Establishment of the New Order (London: Deutsch, 1974), p.498.

132. USAFHRA 180.642A Vol.2: The Commander in Chief, Navy, and Chief, Naval Staff, to Naval Group South: 1/SKl 1 m

275/42 gKdos. Chefs. 23 February 1942. Subject: Operations in the Black Sea
(note: this transl. document is from Vol.II of the unpublished Fuehrer Directives and other Top-Level Directives of the German Armed Forces,compiled by the USAF).

133. Cf. Report to the Fuehrer made by the C.-in-C., Navy, on the Afternoon of February,

13 February 1942,
in 'Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1942', pp.261-5.

134. The surplus refinement capacity of the plants at Ploesti was no secret. For example, in early 1942, British Air Ministry intelligence staff accurately calculated it to be 4,000,000 tons per year. While they noted that Germany did not have a tanker fleet sufficient to transport the oil from the Caucasus to Rumania, they did warn that it could probably also use part of Vichy France's large fleet in the Mediterranean. USAFHRA 512.607: 'German Plans for Russian Oil', AMWIS No.134, Up to 1200-

25 March 1942
(on microfilm 32769).

135. G.E. Blau, The German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-42) Department of the Army, Study No.20-261a (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), pp.109, 130.

136. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, VoI.III, pp.420,
 
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I question the viability of moving the oil by sea. Yes, the Soviet black sea fleet can be handled. But there are two major issues. Where are all the tankers needed comiing from, and how do you stop the rather aggressive RN from sinking them once they are clear of Turkey? Worse, its a bottlneck so a few spies and you know whats on its way. I suupose this wasnt an issue for Germany :p
 
And here we have what appears to be a major advantage for the Germans, brought about by their much earlier withdrawal from North Africa. However the small number of extra tanks and I would assume other motor vehicles, plus the availability of more POL, and aircraft. Is only a temporary relief to what is the fundamental problem the Germans have, the Soviets can afford to take more casualties, and give up even more territory. And then bounce back, in numbers that the Germans can never match, and thus grind them down until they break and start the long retreat to Germany. The real winners of the German withdrawal from the conflict in the Mediterranean is the British, especially as the Germans have removed the Luftwaffe as well as their ground troops. Is not only going to see the British having to expend far less resources for now on the Mediterranean theatre, thus freeing up resources for the Far East. The Italians are going to feel abandoned and start to reassess their position, and there is a good chance that Mussolini is going to be replaced, with someone more amenable to making a deal. Hitler’s fixation with the Soviets along with his advisers poor understanding of global strategy, which has already led them into the madness of attacking the Soviets. Is once again leading them down the primrose path of attacking, when they should be retiring and shortening their lines and preparing for the coming onslaught. Even if they succeed in their plans, it will be the British who benefit in the long run, they can concentrate for the remainder of the year on strengthening their position in the Far East, while tidying up the Mediterranean region, and dealing with the ongoing conflict in the Atlantic. If they are lucky they and the Americans will once the inevitable collapse happens in Italy be able to occupy Italy as far north as Rome by mid 43. Which didn’t happen until just before the Normandy invasion IOTL, and will place them in a position to occupy all of the Italian peninsula by the end of 44. And with the delays to the Soviet march west incurred by greater success in the Caucuses, there is a good chance that the Soviets will not have reached Germany, Austria and Czechoslovak by the time that the Anglo Americans have taken Berlin. Which would see a very different postwar world, and different negotiations between the Big Three in 43.

RR.
And all because one man didn't die in a plane crash. Butterflies eh?
 
The allies are not going to be basing heavy bombers in Persia. Too insecure, both internally and externally, and with too little infrastructure.
What insecurity? The Allies had the southern part of Persia and the Soviets in the northern part of the country with a relatively friendly population for the Allies and a somewhat ok up north population. You are not looking at building something like the airfields in the Marianas for this you just need to have a wing or two there because the Germans would not be able to surge the fighters there for protection from the heavies let alone the mediums. POL would not be a problem with the amount of refined product being produced there and having the experienced people from ARAMACO and The Anglo Persian Oil Company to help them target what they really needed to hit. You also have them not expecting to be based on a long term basis to attack the area.
 
The allies are not going to be basing heavy bombers in Persia. Too insecure, both internally and externally, and with too little infrastructure.
A similar effort was made to base B29s in China which involved getting a vast amount of supplies over the 'Hump'

I would imagine that Persia would be a far easier exercise (not easy but easier) as the airfields etc would be closer to ports etc
 
A similar effort was made to base B29s in China which involved getting a vast amount of supplies over the 'Hump'

I would imagine that Persia would be a far easier exercise (not easy but easier) as the airfields etc would be closer to ports etc
You are also not looking at having long term airbases for the heavies there. Once enough damage is done they will be transferred back to where they will be able to attack other strategic targets in Europe and the Med. It would be more likely to have a longer term commitment from medium bombers that would eventually be transfered as lend lease to the Soviets as the war went on.
 
The allies are not going to be basing heavy bombers in Persia. Too insecure, both internally and externally, and with too little infrastructure.
Why would anyone want to base heavy bombers in Persia, barring some nightmare scenario where the Axis have overrun Turkey, and/or Egypt?
Persia is huge, the coastal bits are a long, long way from anywhere you might want to bomb and the inland bits have terrible infrastructure and communications.
Even if the Axis have somehow seized the Caucasus, got the Baku oilfields back into production and are shipping the oil back across the Black Sea, it would still be more efficient to base your bombers in Crete (or Rhodes) and go after the Rumanian refineries, which also shuts down Rumanian oil production.
Or if you really need to bomb Baku, either Soviets can lend you an airbase closer than southern Persia or they've already lost the war.

I question the viability of moving the oil by sea. Yes, the Soviet black sea fleet can be handled. But there are two major issues. Where are all the tankers needed comiing from, and how do you stop the rather aggressive RN from sinking them once they are clear of Turkey? Worse, its a bottlneck so a few spies and you know whats on its way. I suupose this wasnt an issue for Germany :p
If the oil is being shipped from Batum to Rumania's Black Sea ports, the RN doesn't get a shot unless it wants a de-facto DoW on Turkey.
If they're trying to go to the Adriatic via the Aegean, then things could get very messy, particularly with the Allies holding Crete and Tripoli.
 

Garrison

Donor
Even if the Germans do better I can't see them reaching the oilfields and the further they get the worse the inevitable reverse when they outrun their logistics is going to be. If by some miracle they reached the oilfields then all they are going to acquire is a lot of wrecked infrastructure because the Red Army will trash them before withdrawing.
 
Why would anyone want to base heavy bombers in Persia, barring some nightmare scenario where the Axis have overrun Turkey, and/or Egypt?
Persia is huge, the coastal bits are a long, long way from anywhere you might want to bomb and the inland bits have terrible infrastructure and communications.
Even if the Axis have somehow seized the Caucasus, got the Baku oilfields back into production and are shipping the oil back across the Black Sea, it would still be more efficient to base your bombers in Crete (or Rhodes) and go after the Rumanian refineries, which also shuts down Rumanian oil production.
Or if you really need to bomb Baku, either Soviets can lend you an airbase closer than southern Persia or they've already lost the war.
Easy to why they would be based in Persia.
1. You are not looking at a long term commitment.
2. You are showing the Soviets that you are willing to help them on the Eastern Front.
3. The Germans would not have the AAA, Fighters and Radar coverage for the Caucasus oilfields like they do for the Romanian places.
4. You have to do something to them to make them have yet another place they have to defend, even if you are not keeping the heavies around.
5. They already had plans in place with Operation Pike being updated anyway as the war went on.
 
I question the viability of moving the oil by sea. Yes, the Soviet black sea fleet can be handled. But there are two major issues. Where are all the tankers needed comiing from, and how do you stop the rather aggressive RN from sinking them once they are clear of Turkey? Worse, its a bottlneck so a few spies and you know whats on its way. I suupose this wasnt an issue for Germany :p
Hitler's quest for oil: The impact of economic considerations on military strategy, 1941–42
This report warned that, even if the Caucasus oilfields could be captured intact, very little oil (only 10,000 tons per month) could be carried overland to Germany 130. Moreover, even if the Black Sea could be made safe for shipping, there would be no ships available for the transport of Caucasus oil up the Danube because its river tankers were already working to capacity transporting Rumanian oil 131.
1. Re-orient all naval construction to prioritize building more Danube crude-oil-capable tankers. That would involve delaying other activities in Danube/Black-Sea-access yards, and moving personnel, materials and possibly even equipment from northern and western yards. Germany needed Danube tankers much more than it needed an aircraft carrier or a new generation of destroyers.
2. Build more refining capacity along the Danube, preferably in SE Germany for maximum distance from western and eastern bombers. Build multiple smaller refineries, accepting the resulting additional costs and lesser efficiency, to gain the bombing-damage resilience.
3. Improve rail line capacity and resilience from the Black Sea to Germany. Build more tank cars and locomotives.
4. Commence work on a pipeline project to get crude from the Black Sea to German refineries.
 
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