Book IV – A Beacon of Hope: Building Socialist Britain
Chapter VIII
Defending the Nation
Although the immediate threat of invasion of the SRB had subsided by the beginning of 1927, the BGE and the Dominions still posed a threat and France remained hostile. At home, internal dissent was fermenting and had the potential to escalate into open revolt. The SRB’s military, however, was in poor shape, leaving the SRB exposed. The senior leadership of the armed forces was divided along service lines and were largely political appointments. The army was led by General John Frederick Charles Fuller. Fuller was certainly not a Socialist and was not committed politically to any particular cause. He was, however, an opportunist. As the old system crumbled in the wake of the Revolution in August 1925, Fuller seized the opportunity to further his career. He relished the collapse of the old military establishment which had spurned him because of his unconventional military thinking, abrasive personality and fringe views. He quickly pledged allegiance to the new regime and was selected by Manny Shinwell to command the SRB’s army. With much of the old establishment eradicated, he was eager to seize the opportunity to reshape the army in his own mould. He was constantly frustrated in his efforts, however, by chronic budget problems and a lack of political interest. The relationship between Fuller and the People’s Minister for Military Affairs, Manny Shinwell, started positively as Shinwell showed considerable interest in Fuller’s ideas. However, as Fuller’s reforms were stalled by funding shortfalls and political mistrust of the army, the relationship between the two men became increasingly tense. Fuller began to resent Shinwell, privately accusing him of failing to secure political support for his army reforms. Goodwill was temporarily restored following Fuller’s decision to resist Cook’s coup attempt in July 1926. Although Fuller claimed he was maintaining the modern British army’s tradition of remaining politically neutral from civilian government affairs, his real motivation was simply to protect his own position. It was clear that Cook’s coup would fail, and so Fuller refused to support him. This won Fuller and the army the trust of the new Citrine government. With this newfound trust and sense of goodwill, Fuller hoped that the army’s situation would improve. However, due to a lack of funds and other urgent political priorities, the army was still largely ignored by the government. There was one change that pleased Fuller, although it was purely symbolic. He had always loathed the name People’s Army and was delighted when he was given permission to change the army’s name to the “thoroughly modern and dignified” British Defence Force (BDF). He also dispensed with his title of Chairman of the Central Command, taking the more conventional title of Chief of the General Staff. Historic unit names were also restored in order to try and instil a greater sense of pride within the army, with the exception of all “royal” names.
Since demobilisation following the end of the Great War, the army had returned to its traditional peacetime role of policing the empire. Although the overall number of men in the British army at the time of the Revolution was around 120,000, about half of those men were deployed on active service abroad. Of the approximately 60,000 men on home soil, many were depot troops, green conscripts or units on home rotation after service abroad. Even before the Revolution it had been well noted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that many units were unreliable and of poor quality. As a result, the small fraction of the troops considered reliable, mostly from the elite units like the Guards or Highlanders, were leant on heavily and were some of the last to leave the mainland after keeping the escape corridors open. Around 8,000 men were evacuated to either France or Ireland before resistance collapsed, depriving the SRB of the cream of the crop of British soldering. In the aftermath of the Revolution, the shell of an army that was left behind (quickly labelled the “forgotten army”) was swiftly confined to barracks. It was estimated that around 5,000 men deserted their units in the chaotic weeks following the Revolution which further reduced the army’s dwindling strength. For nearly a year, the People’s Army was little more than a disorganized garrison force plagued by low morale and supply shortages. Following the Revolution, Shinwell disbanded all permanent formations larger than a battalion as the new regime feared a single officer could potentially build up a large personal following in his troops and threaten the precarious state of the new government. Moreover, there were few politically suitable or reliable officers to command larger formations. These changes inevitably led to gross inefficiencies and coordination problems. Only the creation of five military regions, largely for administration purposes, brought any sense of wider cohesion. Under the command of a colonel-commandant (appointments were temporary, the holder reverting to his substantive rank, usually colonel, at the end of his appointment), they were responsible for wider administration such as recruitment and local army aviation regiments. The five military regions and their commanders were: London Area which held responsibility for defending the capital (Archibald Wavell); Southern Command (Edmund Osborne) which oversaw the Channel coast and southern England; Midlands Command (Philip de Fonblanque) which oversaw everything north of London to the old Scottish border; Northern Command (Frederick Hotblack) including everything north of the old Scottish border and Western Command (Henry Cholmondeley Jackson) which included everything from the River Severn in the South to the River Dee up north. There was also a nominal sixth region that covered Northern Ireland which existed purely on paper.
With the abolition of the VWB at the end of 1926 and the creation of the Citizen Militia, Fuller had the opportunity to circumnavigate the official recruitment ban that had been place on the army since the Revolution. Since the Citizen Militia were not subject to a recruitment freeze and could accept new volunteers, and militia members could freely transfer to the BDF if they wished, many men simply joined their local militia and then immediately transferred to the BDF. This helped partially restore the paper strength of the BDF, although no additional funding was forthcoming. In January 1927, Shinwell temporarily froze all transfers from the Citizen Militia, worried that the expansion of the army without adequate resourcing would lead to disgruntlement within the ranks. In March 1927, the BDF finally secured a small increase to its budget after the government secured its financial position through the highly successful sale of sovereign bonds. The direct recruitment ban was also lifted, but the government capped the total strength of the BDF at 50,000. For the first time since the SRB’s inception, the government provided some policy direction to the army, declaring that the focus would be on developing a “strong and disciplined defensive force to protect the nation from outside aggression.” Owing to the large number of pacifists within the government, there would be little in the way of building offensive capabilities within the BDF.
With the formal recruitment ban lifted and the small injection of new funds, Fuller finally felt he had the opportunity to begin implementing some of his reforms. His intention was to fully mechanise the BDF. With no overseas commitments in the foreseeable future, the main purpose of the BDF was to repel an invasion force from either Ireland or France. Static defence and garrison duty would be handled by the Citizen Militia with the fully mechanised and mobile BDF responding to the threat quickly by either stopping the invader on the beaches and driving them into the sea, or if they penetrated inland, surrounding and cutting off the advance in a vast encirclement. For this purpose, he saw the tank as the ideal weapon for this task with mobile infantry and artillery taking a minor supporting role. He believed that a large armoured force consisting mostly of fast, well armoured and armed vehicles was essential to rapid response, with armoured infantry and self-propelled artillery providing support and mopping up operations. In order to achieve this, he officially disbanded the BDF’s remaining cavalry units in April 1926. Shinwell was broadly supportive of the reforms, but warned Fuller that budget expansion for the BDF would remain low for the foreseeable future. The only opposition Fuller faced from within the military was from Lieutenant-Colonel Giffard Le Quesne Martel, the deputy Chief of the General Staff and commander of the Experimental Mechanised Force, who argued Fuller overstated the abilities of the tank and that “his formations have far too many tanks, rendering them entirely unbalanced.” Fuller ignored the criticism and issued a long, optimistic memorandum outlining a comprehensive ten year modernisation program that if implemented would see most infantry battalions transformed into armoured regiments with the remaining infantry battalions motorised or mechanised. Martel’s criticism was largely supported by the trials on Salisbury Plain which showed Fuller’s tank heavy formations struggled without adequate supporting infantry. Fuller rejected the outcome of the failed trials and resorted to skewing battle tests by placing absurd restrictions on the opposing forces and granting bonuses to his own to ensure he was proven correct. Fuller wanted to remove Martel from his position, but Shinwell refused to acquiesce which further strained the relationship between the Minister and the General.
In equipment and material terms, the BDF was largely unchanged from the pre-revolutionary days. The standard side arm was still the .455 top-break six shot revolver, although officers were still allowed the privilege to purchase their own sidearm as long as it was compatible with available ammunition stocks. The standard rifle remained the venerable .303 SMLE, which gave sterling service during the war and a dozen smaller actions. Automatic fire was provided by the Lewis Gun, whilst the standard machine gun remained the respected and robust Vickers .303. The standard 1908 pattern webbing and service dress remained largely unchanged although Fuller commissioned a report on moving away from the traditional service dress towards a more utilitarian uniform better suited for mechanised warfare. Most of the BDF’s heavier weapons like artillery and mortars remained unchanged. Fuller however took great interest in armoured development. The existing designs were a mixture of late war developments and limited post war experimentation. The main types of tanks that equipped BDF armoured regiments consisted of Vickers Medium Mk.I and Mk.II and the Medium Mark C Hornet. The state-owned Consolidated British Armaments Factories presented Fuller with a design for an improved Vickers Medium Mk.II, which he saw as the future backbone of the armoured regiments. Yet Fuller remained deeply frustrated as he was unable to aggressively pursue many of the designs due to lack of funds. Only limited funding was granted for the slow rebuilding of manpower and replacement of the many thousands of small arms and millions of rounds of ammunition which had been looted or stolen from armouries, barracks, warehouses and police stations before and after the Revolution.
With the small size of the professional BDF, the defence of the SRB relied heavily on the bloated and poorly organised Citizen Militia (CM). Although the CM was born from the ashes of the discredited VWB, its role was fundamentally different from its predecessor. Most former VWB men were transferred to the CM with only the cream of the crop moving to the newly established State Security Commission (SCC). The CM’s main purpose was to serve as a reserve manpower pool for the BDF, although it remained distinctly separate. Local command and control was retained by the district Councils of Trade Unions (CTUs), although the Ministry for Military Affairs provided funding and equipment. Due to the localised administration, most of the officer grade appointments were political or personal favours and many CTU members held commissions themselves, describing it as a “perk of the job.” There was often little regard for ability or competency. There was a system of generous allowances for both enlisted and officer ranks that was easily rorted due to poor oversight and corrupt administration. Considerable amounts of stores and material were also sold illegally on the black-market, with the instance of one CM battalion in Essex requisitioning ten additional tonnes of tinned corned beef in one month alone due to alleged “spoilage” issues. The Ministry of Military Affairs would only assume direct control of the various district CMs in time of war, and CM personnel could not be deployed beyond their home CTU in peacetime or transferred to BDF battalions without their written consent. The only use Fuller had for the CM was to circumnavigate the official recruitment ban on the BDF and to provide a static guard for his fortifications and airfields.
Military aviation in the SRB was a competing mixture of pre-revolution remnants, theorists eager to see their ideas transformed into reality and fierce pragmatists trying to make the best of the situation. Before the Revolution, military aviation had been the sole domain of the Royal Air Force (RAF), the world’s first independent air force. Many RAF squadrons had been deployed abroad as part of cost saving measures at imperial defence and policing. Consequently, many home squadrons were either dedicated to home defence, heavy bombing or training cadre units. As the Revolution gripped Britain, many flight crews saw the writing on the wall and began escaping to the nearest friendly territory in their aircraft. Many took family or friends with them, and there were tales of heavily overloaded aircraft struggling to reach friendly territory. The crash of a badly overloaded Vickers Vernon off the coast of Dunkirk on 16 August 1925 was recorded as one of the worst air disasters since man took to flight. The result of this was that the post-revolutionary air force found itself decapitated, as most of its senior leadership had fled and it was bereft of large numbers of aircrew and aircraft. It was at this time, in a rare moment of agreement between the army and navy, that what remained of the RAF was carved up and reincorporated it into their respective services.
The army assumed control of bombing, reconnaissance and local air defence (essentially protecting army formations from attack), whilst the navy assumed all naval, coastal and strategic air defence. Former RAF personnel were transferred at their respective rank into either the army or navy. The structure of the new Army Aviation Corps (AAC) was a decentralised command, with individual regiments under the command of the five military regions. The head of the AAC was Colonel-Commandant Ian Bonham-Carter, who was responsible for administration and procurement, although in reality Fuller and the commanders of the military regions superseded him on all operational issues. No new aircraft had been ordered since the Revolution. Only minimum maintenance was being undertaken on the remaining serviceable aircraft. With the reorganisation of the aircraft industry by the government, a multitude of manufacturers suddenly became one, although there were considerable delays in obtaining spares and parts due to industrial disorganisation that resulted in chronic supply problems. The mainstay of the army aviation regiments for bombing and attack consisted of Fairey Fawn and the Airco DH.9A. Long range heavy bombing aircraft included the Vickers Virginia, a small number of brand new Handley Page Hyderabads and a motley collection of older Vickers Vimys.
In terms of British naval aviation, the navy had been deeply unhappy since the formation of the RAF in 1918, which had assumed control of all military flying, including naval aviation. It quickly became underfunded as the land based forces took precedence. All that changed in the aftermath of the Revolution as the People’s Navy (later the British Navy [BN]) retook control of what it saw as its own. However, it was not only aircraft flying from ships that the navy inherited, but many land based aerial activities. These included coastal aircraft, which translated to anti-shipping strikes and responsibility for strategic interception – essentially responsibility for defending British cities which was further complicated by the lack of coordination with army controlled anti-aircraft batteries and army aviation regiments. Compared to the AAC, the British Naval Air Service (BNAS) featured a central command and control system with regional commands completely separate from the AAC. It was a system which bred inter-service rivalry, competition and inefficiency. The navy also faced problems with its aviation because it lacked the ability to conduct anything beyond basic exercises and training. The three aircraft carriers rarely left the fleet anchorage and many naval air crews had low morale as they (and their machines) sat idle. Flying from land and aircraft carriers, the naval air squadrons’ main task was anti-shipping in the form of the torpedo bomber which came in the form of the Blackburn Dart, a single engine biplane. Much like their contemporaries in the Dominions, the British Navy (as the People’s Navy was renamed in late 1926) saw mainland Britain (as they did Ireland) as an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which to launch its aircraft against enemy shipping. This was typified by the commander of the navy’s torpedo bombers, who stated bluntly, “the main anti-dreadnaught weapon is the torpedo. It is a cheap and effective way to control the sea. Many hundreds of aircraft can be maintained for the same price of a single modern battleship in service today.” However, despite the optimism, the lack of funding from the State Treasury would largely consign this planning to little more than mess hall talk, assumptions, theoretical planning and war-games.
The British Navy since the Revolution had a chequered life. A large proportion of Britain’s naval strength had been deployed across the Empire at the time of the Revolution. The Admiralty’s decision to “quarantine” ships stationed abroad from returning to home in the months leading up to the Revolution to prevent dissent and radicalism spreading did much to preserve the naval strength of the loyalists. Coupled with a number of other ships including the battleship HMS Ramillies fleeing into exile, the true worth of the SRB’s navy lay in its propaganda value. Images relayed around the world in news reels showed the red banner being hoisted above the ships of the Atlantic Fleet at Scapa Flow sending shockwaves around the world. The sight of the world’s most powerful fast battleship, the HMS Invincible flying red banners and jubilantly cheering rebelling sailors on deck was a dramatic image. However, it soon gained infamy when then the ship sailed into the Irish Sea “looking for prey” and at their own initiative fired on the HMS Iron Duke, which, unbeknown to them, was overloaded with fleeing refugees from Liverpool and Blackpool. Despite claiming to be a legitimate target, it was a terrible stain on the new navy’s reputation as hundreds of bodies washed up on the shore. Despite being cleared by a panel of investigation established by the Revcom, two of the junior officers who joined the rebellion hung themselves, unable to live with the guilt. After this incident, most of the fleet was confined to port. Many officers resigned or abandoned their commands and left the country. Many ordinary sailors also deserted, resulting in severe shortages of trained and experienced crews. Adding to this issue was the lack of available fuel oil. Reserves were depleted, and one of the main storage sites at Devonport had been destroyed by retreating loyalist forces. However, much of the fleet was still coal, or partially coal fired, which helped negate the lack of oil.
In a report commissioned by Admiral of the Fleet, Walter Cowan at the end of 1926, the naval command condemned the poor state of readiness of the Atlantic Fleet and the deplorable conditions at the main reserve at Devonport. The remoteness of Scapa Flow was causing morale problems with crews, as well as operational problems. Cut off from major population centres, men were bored and resorted to gambling, drink and fighting with incidences of insubordination and absences reaching plague proportions. Another issue was that while Scapa Flow may have been an excellent location for facing the German Hochseeflotte in the Great War, it lacked major maintenance facilities. As a result, Cowan and Tom Chambers (Minister for Naval Affairs) decided to relocate the majority of the fleet permanently to Rosyth, with only a few cruisers remaining at Scapa Flow. Although closer to possible aerial attack than Scapa Flow, it was hoped defences and countermeasures would be stronger and easier to reinforce. It was also thought that the move would make the fleet less susceptible to a naval attack emanating from Ireland. Despite these issues, Cowan and the Naval Staff enjoyed considerable freedom and enjoyed an amicable working relationship with the Minister for Naval Affairs, Tom Chambers. The BN had also been largely ignored during Cooks tenure as Chairman, but with political and economic stability increasing, the navy was confident that it would soon ‘restore the spirit of Nelson at Trafalgar.’
On the whole, the military of the Socialist Republic of Britain maintained a façade of strength that successfully concealed many of its structural and systematic problems. A by-product of this was the deterrence it created in the minds of the BGE and the Dominion leadership who were unwilling to spend lives and see Britons fighting fellow Britons. Despite this low point for the armed forces of the SRB, there was a sense of normality and stability returning and many within the services expected that soon more money would be available to begin the long rebuilding process and to make them more than a hollow threat to any potential invader.
Chapter VIII
Defending the Nation
Although the immediate threat of invasion of the SRB had subsided by the beginning of 1927, the BGE and the Dominions still posed a threat and France remained hostile. At home, internal dissent was fermenting and had the potential to escalate into open revolt. The SRB’s military, however, was in poor shape, leaving the SRB exposed. The senior leadership of the armed forces was divided along service lines and were largely political appointments. The army was led by General John Frederick Charles Fuller. Fuller was certainly not a Socialist and was not committed politically to any particular cause. He was, however, an opportunist. As the old system crumbled in the wake of the Revolution in August 1925, Fuller seized the opportunity to further his career. He relished the collapse of the old military establishment which had spurned him because of his unconventional military thinking, abrasive personality and fringe views. He quickly pledged allegiance to the new regime and was selected by Manny Shinwell to command the SRB’s army. With much of the old establishment eradicated, he was eager to seize the opportunity to reshape the army in his own mould. He was constantly frustrated in his efforts, however, by chronic budget problems and a lack of political interest. The relationship between Fuller and the People’s Minister for Military Affairs, Manny Shinwell, started positively as Shinwell showed considerable interest in Fuller’s ideas. However, as Fuller’s reforms were stalled by funding shortfalls and political mistrust of the army, the relationship between the two men became increasingly tense. Fuller began to resent Shinwell, privately accusing him of failing to secure political support for his army reforms. Goodwill was temporarily restored following Fuller’s decision to resist Cook’s coup attempt in July 1926. Although Fuller claimed he was maintaining the modern British army’s tradition of remaining politically neutral from civilian government affairs, his real motivation was simply to protect his own position. It was clear that Cook’s coup would fail, and so Fuller refused to support him. This won Fuller and the army the trust of the new Citrine government. With this newfound trust and sense of goodwill, Fuller hoped that the army’s situation would improve. However, due to a lack of funds and other urgent political priorities, the army was still largely ignored by the government. There was one change that pleased Fuller, although it was purely symbolic. He had always loathed the name People’s Army and was delighted when he was given permission to change the army’s name to the “thoroughly modern and dignified” British Defence Force (BDF). He also dispensed with his title of Chairman of the Central Command, taking the more conventional title of Chief of the General Staff. Historic unit names were also restored in order to try and instil a greater sense of pride within the army, with the exception of all “royal” names.
Since demobilisation following the end of the Great War, the army had returned to its traditional peacetime role of policing the empire. Although the overall number of men in the British army at the time of the Revolution was around 120,000, about half of those men were deployed on active service abroad. Of the approximately 60,000 men on home soil, many were depot troops, green conscripts or units on home rotation after service abroad. Even before the Revolution it had been well noted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that many units were unreliable and of poor quality. As a result, the small fraction of the troops considered reliable, mostly from the elite units like the Guards or Highlanders, were leant on heavily and were some of the last to leave the mainland after keeping the escape corridors open. Around 8,000 men were evacuated to either France or Ireland before resistance collapsed, depriving the SRB of the cream of the crop of British soldering. In the aftermath of the Revolution, the shell of an army that was left behind (quickly labelled the “forgotten army”) was swiftly confined to barracks. It was estimated that around 5,000 men deserted their units in the chaotic weeks following the Revolution which further reduced the army’s dwindling strength. For nearly a year, the People’s Army was little more than a disorganized garrison force plagued by low morale and supply shortages. Following the Revolution, Shinwell disbanded all permanent formations larger than a battalion as the new regime feared a single officer could potentially build up a large personal following in his troops and threaten the precarious state of the new government. Moreover, there were few politically suitable or reliable officers to command larger formations. These changes inevitably led to gross inefficiencies and coordination problems. Only the creation of five military regions, largely for administration purposes, brought any sense of wider cohesion. Under the command of a colonel-commandant (appointments were temporary, the holder reverting to his substantive rank, usually colonel, at the end of his appointment), they were responsible for wider administration such as recruitment and local army aviation regiments. The five military regions and their commanders were: London Area which held responsibility for defending the capital (Archibald Wavell); Southern Command (Edmund Osborne) which oversaw the Channel coast and southern England; Midlands Command (Philip de Fonblanque) which oversaw everything north of London to the old Scottish border; Northern Command (Frederick Hotblack) including everything north of the old Scottish border and Western Command (Henry Cholmondeley Jackson) which included everything from the River Severn in the South to the River Dee up north. There was also a nominal sixth region that covered Northern Ireland which existed purely on paper.
With the abolition of the VWB at the end of 1926 and the creation of the Citizen Militia, Fuller had the opportunity to circumnavigate the official recruitment ban that had been place on the army since the Revolution. Since the Citizen Militia were not subject to a recruitment freeze and could accept new volunteers, and militia members could freely transfer to the BDF if they wished, many men simply joined their local militia and then immediately transferred to the BDF. This helped partially restore the paper strength of the BDF, although no additional funding was forthcoming. In January 1927, Shinwell temporarily froze all transfers from the Citizen Militia, worried that the expansion of the army without adequate resourcing would lead to disgruntlement within the ranks. In March 1927, the BDF finally secured a small increase to its budget after the government secured its financial position through the highly successful sale of sovereign bonds. The direct recruitment ban was also lifted, but the government capped the total strength of the BDF at 50,000. For the first time since the SRB’s inception, the government provided some policy direction to the army, declaring that the focus would be on developing a “strong and disciplined defensive force to protect the nation from outside aggression.” Owing to the large number of pacifists within the government, there would be little in the way of building offensive capabilities within the BDF.
With the formal recruitment ban lifted and the small injection of new funds, Fuller finally felt he had the opportunity to begin implementing some of his reforms. His intention was to fully mechanise the BDF. With no overseas commitments in the foreseeable future, the main purpose of the BDF was to repel an invasion force from either Ireland or France. Static defence and garrison duty would be handled by the Citizen Militia with the fully mechanised and mobile BDF responding to the threat quickly by either stopping the invader on the beaches and driving them into the sea, or if they penetrated inland, surrounding and cutting off the advance in a vast encirclement. For this purpose, he saw the tank as the ideal weapon for this task with mobile infantry and artillery taking a minor supporting role. He believed that a large armoured force consisting mostly of fast, well armoured and armed vehicles was essential to rapid response, with armoured infantry and self-propelled artillery providing support and mopping up operations. In order to achieve this, he officially disbanded the BDF’s remaining cavalry units in April 1926. Shinwell was broadly supportive of the reforms, but warned Fuller that budget expansion for the BDF would remain low for the foreseeable future. The only opposition Fuller faced from within the military was from Lieutenant-Colonel Giffard Le Quesne Martel, the deputy Chief of the General Staff and commander of the Experimental Mechanised Force, who argued Fuller overstated the abilities of the tank and that “his formations have far too many tanks, rendering them entirely unbalanced.” Fuller ignored the criticism and issued a long, optimistic memorandum outlining a comprehensive ten year modernisation program that if implemented would see most infantry battalions transformed into armoured regiments with the remaining infantry battalions motorised or mechanised. Martel’s criticism was largely supported by the trials on Salisbury Plain which showed Fuller’s tank heavy formations struggled without adequate supporting infantry. Fuller rejected the outcome of the failed trials and resorted to skewing battle tests by placing absurd restrictions on the opposing forces and granting bonuses to his own to ensure he was proven correct. Fuller wanted to remove Martel from his position, but Shinwell refused to acquiesce which further strained the relationship between the Minister and the General.
In equipment and material terms, the BDF was largely unchanged from the pre-revolutionary days. The standard side arm was still the .455 top-break six shot revolver, although officers were still allowed the privilege to purchase their own sidearm as long as it was compatible with available ammunition stocks. The standard rifle remained the venerable .303 SMLE, which gave sterling service during the war and a dozen smaller actions. Automatic fire was provided by the Lewis Gun, whilst the standard machine gun remained the respected and robust Vickers .303. The standard 1908 pattern webbing and service dress remained largely unchanged although Fuller commissioned a report on moving away from the traditional service dress towards a more utilitarian uniform better suited for mechanised warfare. Most of the BDF’s heavier weapons like artillery and mortars remained unchanged. Fuller however took great interest in armoured development. The existing designs were a mixture of late war developments and limited post war experimentation. The main types of tanks that equipped BDF armoured regiments consisted of Vickers Medium Mk.I and Mk.II and the Medium Mark C Hornet. The state-owned Consolidated British Armaments Factories presented Fuller with a design for an improved Vickers Medium Mk.II, which he saw as the future backbone of the armoured regiments. Yet Fuller remained deeply frustrated as he was unable to aggressively pursue many of the designs due to lack of funds. Only limited funding was granted for the slow rebuilding of manpower and replacement of the many thousands of small arms and millions of rounds of ammunition which had been looted or stolen from armouries, barracks, warehouses and police stations before and after the Revolution.
With the small size of the professional BDF, the defence of the SRB relied heavily on the bloated and poorly organised Citizen Militia (CM). Although the CM was born from the ashes of the discredited VWB, its role was fundamentally different from its predecessor. Most former VWB men were transferred to the CM with only the cream of the crop moving to the newly established State Security Commission (SCC). The CM’s main purpose was to serve as a reserve manpower pool for the BDF, although it remained distinctly separate. Local command and control was retained by the district Councils of Trade Unions (CTUs), although the Ministry for Military Affairs provided funding and equipment. Due to the localised administration, most of the officer grade appointments were political or personal favours and many CTU members held commissions themselves, describing it as a “perk of the job.” There was often little regard for ability or competency. There was a system of generous allowances for both enlisted and officer ranks that was easily rorted due to poor oversight and corrupt administration. Considerable amounts of stores and material were also sold illegally on the black-market, with the instance of one CM battalion in Essex requisitioning ten additional tonnes of tinned corned beef in one month alone due to alleged “spoilage” issues. The Ministry of Military Affairs would only assume direct control of the various district CMs in time of war, and CM personnel could not be deployed beyond their home CTU in peacetime or transferred to BDF battalions without their written consent. The only use Fuller had for the CM was to circumnavigate the official recruitment ban on the BDF and to provide a static guard for his fortifications and airfields.
Military aviation in the SRB was a competing mixture of pre-revolution remnants, theorists eager to see their ideas transformed into reality and fierce pragmatists trying to make the best of the situation. Before the Revolution, military aviation had been the sole domain of the Royal Air Force (RAF), the world’s first independent air force. Many RAF squadrons had been deployed abroad as part of cost saving measures at imperial defence and policing. Consequently, many home squadrons were either dedicated to home defence, heavy bombing or training cadre units. As the Revolution gripped Britain, many flight crews saw the writing on the wall and began escaping to the nearest friendly territory in their aircraft. Many took family or friends with them, and there were tales of heavily overloaded aircraft struggling to reach friendly territory. The crash of a badly overloaded Vickers Vernon off the coast of Dunkirk on 16 August 1925 was recorded as one of the worst air disasters since man took to flight. The result of this was that the post-revolutionary air force found itself decapitated, as most of its senior leadership had fled and it was bereft of large numbers of aircrew and aircraft. It was at this time, in a rare moment of agreement between the army and navy, that what remained of the RAF was carved up and reincorporated it into their respective services.
The army assumed control of bombing, reconnaissance and local air defence (essentially protecting army formations from attack), whilst the navy assumed all naval, coastal and strategic air defence. Former RAF personnel were transferred at their respective rank into either the army or navy. The structure of the new Army Aviation Corps (AAC) was a decentralised command, with individual regiments under the command of the five military regions. The head of the AAC was Colonel-Commandant Ian Bonham-Carter, who was responsible for administration and procurement, although in reality Fuller and the commanders of the military regions superseded him on all operational issues. No new aircraft had been ordered since the Revolution. Only minimum maintenance was being undertaken on the remaining serviceable aircraft. With the reorganisation of the aircraft industry by the government, a multitude of manufacturers suddenly became one, although there were considerable delays in obtaining spares and parts due to industrial disorganisation that resulted in chronic supply problems. The mainstay of the army aviation regiments for bombing and attack consisted of Fairey Fawn and the Airco DH.9A. Long range heavy bombing aircraft included the Vickers Virginia, a small number of brand new Handley Page Hyderabads and a motley collection of older Vickers Vimys.
In terms of British naval aviation, the navy had been deeply unhappy since the formation of the RAF in 1918, which had assumed control of all military flying, including naval aviation. It quickly became underfunded as the land based forces took precedence. All that changed in the aftermath of the Revolution as the People’s Navy (later the British Navy [BN]) retook control of what it saw as its own. However, it was not only aircraft flying from ships that the navy inherited, but many land based aerial activities. These included coastal aircraft, which translated to anti-shipping strikes and responsibility for strategic interception – essentially responsibility for defending British cities which was further complicated by the lack of coordination with army controlled anti-aircraft batteries and army aviation regiments. Compared to the AAC, the British Naval Air Service (BNAS) featured a central command and control system with regional commands completely separate from the AAC. It was a system which bred inter-service rivalry, competition and inefficiency. The navy also faced problems with its aviation because it lacked the ability to conduct anything beyond basic exercises and training. The three aircraft carriers rarely left the fleet anchorage and many naval air crews had low morale as they (and their machines) sat idle. Flying from land and aircraft carriers, the naval air squadrons’ main task was anti-shipping in the form of the torpedo bomber which came in the form of the Blackburn Dart, a single engine biplane. Much like their contemporaries in the Dominions, the British Navy (as the People’s Navy was renamed in late 1926) saw mainland Britain (as they did Ireland) as an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which to launch its aircraft against enemy shipping. This was typified by the commander of the navy’s torpedo bombers, who stated bluntly, “the main anti-dreadnaught weapon is the torpedo. It is a cheap and effective way to control the sea. Many hundreds of aircraft can be maintained for the same price of a single modern battleship in service today.” However, despite the optimism, the lack of funding from the State Treasury would largely consign this planning to little more than mess hall talk, assumptions, theoretical planning and war-games.
The British Navy since the Revolution had a chequered life. A large proportion of Britain’s naval strength had been deployed across the Empire at the time of the Revolution. The Admiralty’s decision to “quarantine” ships stationed abroad from returning to home in the months leading up to the Revolution to prevent dissent and radicalism spreading did much to preserve the naval strength of the loyalists. Coupled with a number of other ships including the battleship HMS Ramillies fleeing into exile, the true worth of the SRB’s navy lay in its propaganda value. Images relayed around the world in news reels showed the red banner being hoisted above the ships of the Atlantic Fleet at Scapa Flow sending shockwaves around the world. The sight of the world’s most powerful fast battleship, the HMS Invincible flying red banners and jubilantly cheering rebelling sailors on deck was a dramatic image. However, it soon gained infamy when then the ship sailed into the Irish Sea “looking for prey” and at their own initiative fired on the HMS Iron Duke, which, unbeknown to them, was overloaded with fleeing refugees from Liverpool and Blackpool. Despite claiming to be a legitimate target, it was a terrible stain on the new navy’s reputation as hundreds of bodies washed up on the shore. Despite being cleared by a panel of investigation established by the Revcom, two of the junior officers who joined the rebellion hung themselves, unable to live with the guilt. After this incident, most of the fleet was confined to port. Many officers resigned or abandoned their commands and left the country. Many ordinary sailors also deserted, resulting in severe shortages of trained and experienced crews. Adding to this issue was the lack of available fuel oil. Reserves were depleted, and one of the main storage sites at Devonport had been destroyed by retreating loyalist forces. However, much of the fleet was still coal, or partially coal fired, which helped negate the lack of oil.
In a report commissioned by Admiral of the Fleet, Walter Cowan at the end of 1926, the naval command condemned the poor state of readiness of the Atlantic Fleet and the deplorable conditions at the main reserve at Devonport. The remoteness of Scapa Flow was causing morale problems with crews, as well as operational problems. Cut off from major population centres, men were bored and resorted to gambling, drink and fighting with incidences of insubordination and absences reaching plague proportions. Another issue was that while Scapa Flow may have been an excellent location for facing the German Hochseeflotte in the Great War, it lacked major maintenance facilities. As a result, Cowan and Tom Chambers (Minister for Naval Affairs) decided to relocate the majority of the fleet permanently to Rosyth, with only a few cruisers remaining at Scapa Flow. Although closer to possible aerial attack than Scapa Flow, it was hoped defences and countermeasures would be stronger and easier to reinforce. It was also thought that the move would make the fleet less susceptible to a naval attack emanating from Ireland. Despite these issues, Cowan and the Naval Staff enjoyed considerable freedom and enjoyed an amicable working relationship with the Minister for Naval Affairs, Tom Chambers. The BN had also been largely ignored during Cooks tenure as Chairman, but with political and economic stability increasing, the navy was confident that it would soon ‘restore the spirit of Nelson at Trafalgar.’
On the whole, the military of the Socialist Republic of Britain maintained a façade of strength that successfully concealed many of its structural and systematic problems. A by-product of this was the deterrence it created in the minds of the BGE and the Dominion leadership who were unwilling to spend lives and see Britons fighting fellow Britons. Despite this low point for the armed forces of the SRB, there was a sense of normality and stability returning and many within the services expected that soon more money would be available to begin the long rebuilding process and to make them more than a hollow threat to any potential invader.
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